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A MULTI-PROCESS COGNITIVE MODEL FOR INVESTIGATING TEXT AND DISCOURSE

(МНОГОПРОЦЕСЕН КОГНИТИВЕН МОДЕЛ ЗА ИЗСЛЕДВАНЕ НА ТЕКСТ И ДИСКУРС)

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ABBREVIATIONS

TW	Textual World
DW	Discourse World
RW	Real World
TL	Text Linguistics
DA	Discourse Analysis

TYPOGRAPHICAL CONVENTIONS

Citations	double quotes	
Linguistic signals	italics	e.g. *dog*, *life*, *politician*
Cognitive processes, structures, models, etc.	small capitals	e.g. SPEAKER, UP-DOWN, LIFE AS A JOURNEY
Slot label	bold type	e.g. **leader**, **issue**, **time**

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I. 1. The object of investigation

The point of departure for the present thesis is what my experience, in both my capacities as a researcher and as a lecturer, would suggest to be a widespread and an ever-spreading academic need for tackling issues related to texts and discourses. More precisely, these issues relate to the analysis of texts and discourses. The issues prove not only numerous; they tend to associate with, generally, divergent, and, frequently, conflicting branches of linguistic, literary, discourse and cognitive studies. Thus, in most general terms, this thesis addresses the complexity of and the resulting difficulties in approaching analytically texts and discourses.

'Approaching analytically' is understood here as falling within two delineable, yet overlapping, domains (term as in Radden and Dirven 2007): the domain of hands-on text and discourse analyses, and the domain of theoretical research on how to conduct hands-on text and discourse analyses. Both domains, clearly, associate with academic activities. This thesis is written in the hope of contributing – however modestly – to the advancement of both scholarly domains.

In doing so, however, the thesis focuses primarily on a third domain – the one of theoretical research on cognitive text and discourse construction. To gain insight into that, the thesis will need to draw on a fourth domain – the one relating to concepts such as TEXT and DISCOURSE. Admittedly, quite a percentage of language users manage to communicate efficiently enough without being aware of the existence of the concepts of TEXT and

DISCOURSE. Nevertheless, the abstract nature of the two notions makes the actual – even if sometimes subconscious – use of texts and discourses a more complicated matter than, let us say, the actual use of BREAD, BUTTER, MILK, etc. Thus, the thesis aims to contribute to four overlapping domains and views the complexity inherent in text and discourse analysis as ensuing from cognitive peculiarities of the concepts of TEXT and DISCOURSE.

The two notions (i.e. TEXT and DISCOURSE) are approached here as resulting from cognitive processes and, consequently, as representing cognitive principles. With regard to the nature of the cognitive processes in question, it seems expedient that I highlight as early as this point that, the way they are interpreted in this thesis, cognitive text- and discourse-related processes can be but are not primarily – let alone exclusively – seen as language-related. Language-related processes represent only some of the multitude and varieties of cognitive processes involved in human communication.

On the issue of which general cognitive principles particularly are upheld here, this thesis opts to rest on the set of general cognitive linguistic principles originally laid out in Lakoff and Johnson (1999) – a preference which will be supported later in Chapter II (II. 4. 1.). However, several of the principles need to be paid special attention to in this introductory chapter as they represent cornerstones for the analysis in the thesis. They also condition the choice of method, data, and the structural organization of the thesis specified later in this chapter.

One of those basic principles holds that 'surface' linguistic expressions can be revealing as to 'underlying' cognitive structures and processes (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) and, consequently, they can serve as an access point to the 'underlying' cognitive structures and processes (see, e.g., Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Langacker 2008; Feldman and Narayanan 2004; Feldman 2006; Barsalou et al. 2018; Borghi and Barsalou 2021; Panther 2022). As Langacker (1987: 155) argues, "linguistic expressions are not meaningful in and of themselves, but only

through the access they afford to different stores of knowledge that allow us to make sense of them." In harmony with this Lakovian precept, I will approach my object of investigation (i.e. cognitive mechanisms conditioning text- and discourse-related mental processing) by starting from linguistic evidence available and then I will move toward conceptual facets of the objects of investigation.

It is not that this directionality is considered here to be the actual one underlying the interrelation between cognitive processes and their linguistic expression(s). It is analytical considerations and practicality which dictate the choice to proceed from linguistic expressions to cognitive processes and not vice versa. In reality, it would be simultaneity which I take to characterize the operation of non-language-related cognitive processes and language-related cognitive processes, which control the use of language signals. The problem is that, despite some technological advances in dealing directly with cognitive processing, linguistic research at present can hardly rely on fully conclusive neurobiological data on all the numerous and diverse linguistic foci of interest. Even if it could, cognitive linguistic research could still contribute by theorizing and hypothesizing about future foci of scholarly interest. One way it could do so is to start from linguistic signals of cognitive processes and then proceed to hypothesizing about 'underlying' cognitive mechanisms operating simultaneously.

I. 1. 1. Background to the object of investigation

As indicated above, the line of argumentation presented here maintains a distinction between language-related and non-language related cognitive processes (the distinction is the center of our discussion in IV.2.2. concerning the difference between Cohesion and Coherence). Language-related cognitive processes in particular are seen here as holding a potential to be coupled with physical linguistic expressions. Throughout this thesis, I will use 'linguistic expressions' and 'language signals' to refer to physical linguistic 'carriers' coupled with language-related cognitive processes.

Such a choice could evoke comparisons with Saussurean linguistics and, consequently, it could raise issues connected with the choice's compatibility with principles of cognitivism. As is well-known, de Saussure postulated both the concept and the sound-image (i.e. the two elements of a linguistic sign) to be of psychological nature:

> The linguistic sign unites not a thing and a name but a concept and a sound-image. The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our senses. The sound-image is sensory, and if I happen to call it 'material,' it is only in that sense, and by way of opposing it to the other term of the association, the concept, which is generally more abstract. (de Saussure 1959: 66)

Cognitivist Lakoff, on his part, quite similarly writes that "[s]trictly speaking, the sign does not refer to the world of reality but to our mental representation of reality" (1987: 168).

Thus, de Saussure's definition of the linguistic sign has led some (e.g. Reda 2016; Zhang and Zhang 2021) to argue that a number of de Saussurean premises are actually quite compatible with modern cognitive premises. Reda maintains that "Saussure planted the seeds of Cognitive Linguistics through his semiotic model of the "linguistic sign" (2016: 90), that Saussure's semiotic model "forms the basis on which the cognitive approaches to lexical and grammatical

meanings are built" (ibid.), and that "Cognitive Semantics may be claimed to have emerged out of developing the Saussurean model of the linguistic sign as a psychological entity" (2016: 92). The rationale behind such lines of reasoning is evident in the following passage:

> Suppose that the opening of the circuit is in A's brain, where mental facts (concepts) are associated with representations of the linguistic sounds (sound-images) that are used for their expression. A given concept unlocks a corresponding sound-image in the brain; this purely ***psychological*** phenomenon is followed in turn by a ***physiological*** process; the brain transmits an impulse corresponding to the image to the organs used in producing sounds. Then the sound waves travel from the mouth of A to the ear of B; a purely physical process. Next, the circuit continues in B, but the order is reversed; from the ear to the brain, ***the physiological*** transmission of the sound-image; in the brain, the ***psychological*** association of the image with the corresponding concept. (de Saussure 1966: 2)

De Beaugrande (1991: 15), discussing this contention of de Saussure's, upholds de Saussure's interpretation of the speaking-circuit as divided into psychological (i.e. word-images and concepts) and physiological (i.e. phonation and audition): speaking, both scholars, quite atypically, agree, involves 'the physiological', whereas language is exclusively 'psychological'. In that, "[e]ven the 'material and mechanical manifestations' are 'psychological" (de Beaugrande 1991: 15).

Admittedly, a single theoretical precept should not be extracted and considered in isolation but against the background of the scholar's whole theoretical framework. Nevertheless, what is of value to the present thesis' theoretical system is the very possibility to differentiate between language-related cognitive processes and non-language-related cognitive processes.

In this respect, Langacker posits the following questions:

> At any given moment, we engage in conceptualizing activity at different levels of awareness and in varied domains of mental experience. It draws on many types of abilities (perceptual, motor, intellectual) and vast stores of knowledge (particular and general; physical, social, and cultural; individual, conventional, and contextual). The problems we now address pertain to the boundary between "linguistic" and "extralinguistic" concerns. What in all this counts as **language**? Which particular skills and bits of knowledge can we specifically characterize as being linguistic? (Langacker 2008: 36; emphasis as in the original).

These questions bring us to yet another unresolved scholarly issue, to yet another point "of chronic and continued contention" (Langacker 2008: 27) – the problem of cognitive modularity. This particular conundrum runs as follows: "Modular theories expect language-specific learning processes and products. Constructivist and neuro-constructivist approaches expect language-learning processes and products to show deep commonalities with nonlinguistic learning" (Deák 2014: 284). Myachykov et al. formulate the essence of this modularity-centered opposition as follows: "While some argue that language is for the most part an autonomous and encapsulated module with a very limited influence from other cognitive systems, others try to derive virtually all linguistic phenomena from general cognition" (Myachykov et al. 2007: 462). A more moderate formulation is proposed by Sinha (2021: 388):

> A fundamental tenet of CL is that the cognitive capacities and processes that speakers and hearers employ in using language are *domain-general*: they underpin not only language, but also other areas of cognition and perception. This is in contrast with Generative (or Formal) Linguistics, to which CL historically was a critical reaction, which takes a *modular* view of both the human language faculty and its subsystems. (emphasis as in original)

Langacker deliberates in very much the same manner, addressing the ensuing issue of the location of the "boundary between 'linguistic' and 'extralinguistic'" (Langacker 2008: 36).

Critically, he poses the question of whether a rigid boundary between the two should be postulated at all. He asks whether the boundary is

> **discovered** by linguists or **imposed** on the basis of theoretical preconception. The answer, I believe, is clearly the latter: the linguistic and the extralinguistic form a gradation rather than being sharply distinct. While there are limits to linguistic meaning, and valid distinctions can be drawn, imposing specific boundaries is both arbitrary and misleading. (Langacker 2008: 37; emphasis as in the original)

Other voices similarly assert that the two modularity-related proposals "are not mutually exclusive" (Myachykov et al. 2007: 462). "Rather, there is a continuum between empirically ignorant and empirically obsessed approaches at the extremes. Some theorists do not read experimental papers; some experimenters could not be bothered to understand formal theories" (Myachykov et al. 2007: 459). Myachykov et al. also go on to suggest any proposed theoretical or analytical model should be "largely integrative in nature" (2007: 471). The viewpoint adopted in the present thesis subscribes to such an integrative proposal.

Overall, non-language-related cognitive structures and processes (e.g. beliefs, attitudes, opinions) have been extensively demonstrated in the relevant literature to employ the same neurobiological patterns as language-related cognitive structures and processes do (see, e.g., Lakoff and Núñez 2000; Feldman 2006, 2020; Lohmar 2012; Barsalou 2006, 2015; Barsalou et al. 2018), which, however, can lead to difficulties in differentiating between them. The two domains can be argued to overlap, blend, and thus make it extremely hard for researchers to delimit one from the other:

> Everything is connected to everything else. Fortunately, not all connectivity is equally dense. The nonuniformity of connectivity makes science possible. Choosing the right boundaries for a unit of analysis is a central problem in every science and the basic approach to this problem has been in place for 2,000 years. (Hutchins 2010: 706)

With respect to the "interplay between linguistic and general cognitive domains" (Myachykov et al. 2007: 462), Jackendoff not only upholds the existence of linguistic cognitive domains and non-linguistic cognitive domains, but also maintains there exists a language-cognition interface, and that the interface is "localized" in the mapping between general cognitive domains and linguistic cognitive domains (Jackendoff 2007: 362). This thesis upholds a perspective suggesting a fuzzy-boundary 'interface' between language cognition and non-language cognition is very likely to be a more readily applicable conceptual metaphor than the discrete-boundaries conceptual metaphor imposed on research. In this claim, the present investigation follows closely Langacker's line of reasoning that "[t]he cognition envisaged by cognitive linguists is non-insular, being grounded in perception and bodily experience" (Langacker 2008: 28).

I. 1. 2. Focus of the object of investigation

Formulating the object of investigation as one associating with text- and discourse-related cognitive processes calls for clarification of the way the terms 'text' and 'discourse' are understood here.

As any literature review will reveal, either term can evoke an array of interpretations of its corresponding concept, so much so that my saying the object of investigation of this thesis associates with TEXT and DISCOURSE may appear significantly uninformative. Due to their capacity to evoke numerous and varied interpretations of their corresponding concepts, 'text' and 'discourse' can be seen as designating too general and too all-encompassing notions. Although those too general and all-encompassing notions may overlap and may do so to varying degrees, a complete overlap between them is also possible (see Tincheva 2015). The result is what may be called a conceptual 'gray area' surrounding the "polymorphous" notions (Angermuller et al. 2012: 6) of TEXT and DISCOURSE.

To support my point, let me try and systematize some of the numerous interpretations of TEXT and DISCOURSE as well as trace the existing correlations between the two. What can be observed throughout the relevant literature is that scholars tend to employ one of three main theoretical strategies. The first strategy is to employ analytically only one of the two terms. For example, de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) and Halliday and Hasan (1976, 1985) use only 'text', while Sinclair and Coulthard (1975, 1977) use only 'discourse'.

The second research strategy is to approach TEXT and DISCOURSE as opposites. In such cases (e.g., Stubbs 1983; Paltridge 2021; Virtanen 2022), TEXT tends to be postulated as written and DISCOURSE tends to be defined as oral (on studies supporting the need to view the oral-written distinction in terms of a continuum rather than a dichotomy [e.g. Ong, 1982/2002; Tannen 1980, 1982; Brown and Yule 1983], see Tincheva 2015.)

Another parameter along which the concepts of TEXT and DISCOURSE and their corresponding terms tend to diverge is form: according to this parameter 'text' tends to be seen as monologic, while 'discourse' – as dialogic (see, e.g., Fairclough 1989, 1992b, 2003). Frequently, those two lines of dissimilarity are taken to run in parallel: 'text' is considered as both written and monologic, while 'discourse' – as both oral and dialogic (see Virtanen 1990, 2022).

The third research strategy evident in the literature is for scholars to approach TEXT and DISCOURSE not as opposites but as two interrelated aspects pertaining to the same phenomenon. There are several observable subtypes within this approach. The first subtype sees TEXT as a verbal record of DISCOURSE, and DISCOURSE as language in use (e.g., Widdowson 1979; Edmonson 1981; Brown and Yule 1983; Kress 1985; Paltridge 2001, 2013; Virtanen 2022). This is not the only version of the – let's call it – 'product vs. process' approach.

Another one is found, for instance, in Fairclough (1989), where he additionally clarifies that TEXT should be interpreted as positioned 'at the center' of DISCOURSE (see the discussion in V.3.). In other words, to Fairclough, a DISCOURSE 'surrounds' and 'envelopes' a TEXT, and DISCOURSE is 'bigger' and 'broader' than its corresponding TEXT. Not dissimilarly, and also quite metaphorically, Stockwell argues (2008: 589) that "...text branches off into discourse with its social and ideological implications".

The second subtype of definitions of TEXT and DISCOURSE as two interrelated aspects of the same phenomenon is exemplified in van Dijk (1977), who maintains that a TEXT is an abstract concept which finds its actual realization in a DISCOURSE. In a fashion not far removed, Stubbs (1983: 10) suggests that TEXT is to DISCOURSE as SENTENCE is to UTTERANCE. Halliday, practically, employs van Dijk's principle, only he does so the other way around: Halliday defines DISCOURSE as the abstract notion and TEXT as the realization of discourse (1978: 40).

A last alternative which needs to be mentioned here concerns definitions of discourses (especially dialogic exchanges) as sequences of texts. De Beaugrande (1980: 19), for example, argues a discourse consists of texts, and investigates how the texts can be related to each other. To explain such a viewpoint, de Beaugrande (1991: 216) generalizes that scholars can either use 'text' as a mass noun or as a count noun to refer to perceptions of individual contributions to a conversational exchange. Typically, in such interpretations, a participant's contribution will be related to a discourse action/ discourse act. Virtanen (2022) even uses 'textual discourse' to refer to separate texts 'within' discourses.

Not only is there an abundance of academic classification strategies employed in the case of TEXT and DISCOURSE but none of the strategies and subtypes of strategies can be generalized to associate rigorously with any specific theoretical approach or discipline. For instance, as stated above, critical discourse analyst Fairclough (1989) and cognitive poetics theorist Stockwell (2008, 2020) both expound basically the same view of DISCOURSE as 'surrounding' and 'enveloping' TEXT. That adds substantially to what the impression of 'a gray area' around the two notions.

In my perspective, however, the considerable interpretative variety around the notions, which allows them to be situated against the background of various approaches, need not be seen as a negative. Instead, it could be viewed as confirmation of the rich conceptual structure and potential of TEXT and DISCOURSE. That rich conceptual structure is precisely what makes the two notions so promising from a cognitive analytical perspective even today. It is my belief that any related impression of 'grayness' and vagueness needs to be, in fact, seen as proof of the yet not fully explored malleability of the concepts of TEXT and DISCOURSE.

Targeted at this research niche, the thesis tries and contributes to explorations of TEXT and DISCOURSE. More specifically, the thesis tries and contributes to explorations of TEXT and DISCOURSE by concentrating on the cognitive mechanisms at work in people's processing

TEXT- and DISCOURSE-related information. As the general theoretical standpoint adopted here is highly procedural, the investigation will not lay emphasis on the 'end product' of cognitive processes (as will be discussed in Chapter IV), and the main focus of the thesis will fall on the isolation of the cognitive mechanisms which control TEXT and DISCOURSE related information.

In that, a cognitive mechanism will be seen in this thesis as functioning through one or more component cognitive operations such as image scanning, attention, selection, analogy, etc. A cognitive mechanism will be seen as a problem solving tool targeted at an organism's surviving and employed in creating meaning(s).

Moreover, cognitive mechanisms and conceptual structure(s) will be perceived here as different from research techniques for studying cognitive mechanisms and conceptual structure(s). The primacy of the former over the latter and the dependence of the latter on the former, however, can hardly be denied. Therefore, attaining the main objective of this thesis is also seen as a prerequisite for further investigations which could establish correspondences between the cognitive mechanisms systematized here and specific research techniques via which the mechanisms could be studied.

I. 2. Research questions

The central hypothesis in this thesis is the existence of a set of cognitive mechanisms which operate simultaneously and coherently to control (a) concepts associating with TEXT and DISCOURSE, and (b) the procedural mental unfolding of actual texts and discourses.

The major point to be highlighted about the hypothesis is that it focuses on a whole set of cognitive mechanisms and not on a single mechanism. As the two chapters in Part I will demonstrate, with the notable exception of research on metaphtonymy, there has been a steady tendency throughout the literature to aim for the isolation of separate cognitive mechanisms and not for their integration.

That, in its turn, has brought about academia's encapsulation into separate research approaches and to rather limiting requirements concerning correlations among object of study, research questions, and theoretical approach. Regrettably, as Hutchins (2010: 707) forcefully argues, "[e]very boundary placement makes some things easy to see, and others impossible to see. The danger of putting boundaries in the wrong place is [...] that doing so will leave important phenomena unexplained, or worse, inexplicable." Furthermore,

> [e]very theory implies a set of ontological commitments and every ontological commitment emphasizes some kinds of connections over others. What looks like low connectivity under one theory may look like a region of high connectivity to another theory. As we tend to look where our theories indicate areas of interest, by looking in particular ways, we actually make the world appear to be the kind of place that our theories can address. This is clear in the history of cognitive science. (Hutchins 2010: 707)

Previous research I conducted unambiguously supports such a view. My Ph.D. research on political speeches traced the lines of conceptual metaphoric transfer from the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schema. Then another monograph of mine investigating the notion of text

structure researched the simultaneous creation of Text Worlds and Discourse Worlds as well as their overlap (Tincheva 2015). Both investigations raised a number of questions for future studies to tackle as neither Conceptual Metaphor Theory, nor Text World Theory on their own proved sufficient in achieving high-level generalizations beyond the objectives of the investigations.

As a consequence, a major objective of the present thesis is to build on that previous research, and to construct a theoretical framework which is cognitive in essence and which co-ordinates premises from several cognitive fields. The thesis will argue in favour of harmonizing principles from studies on conceptual figurativity, gestalt psychology, text-world theory and cognitive text linguistics. The thesis will try and provide a step towards achieving greater cross-fertilization in text- and discourse-oriented cognitive research. Accordingly, the formulation of the main research questions in the thesis are targeted at, first, confirming the existence of a set of cognitive mechanisms related to text, discourse, and their analysis, and, second, at establishing the characteristics of this set of mechanisms.

The thesis addresses the following research questions:

- Is there a set of cognitive mechanisms which controls the mental processing of TEXT, DISCOURSE and related concepts?
- Is there a set of cognitive mechanisms which controls the mental processing of actual texts and discourses? Is this set the same as the set of cognitive mechanisms, which controls TEXT, DISCOURSE and related concepts?
- Does the set operate as an internally-coherent entity with internal co-ordination and dynamics, or do the component cognitive mechanisms in it function independently?
- If the component cognitive mechanisms function as an internally coherent set, what tendencies can be traced in the set regarding the joint operation of the component

mechanisms (i.e. are there observable tendencies in the set's cognitive mechanisms' co-functioning)?

- Can the presence of the set of cognitive mechanisms account for both academic and non-academic uses of texts and discourses as well as of uses of TEXT- and DISCOURSE-related notions (i.e. can they account for those uses by both people familiar with the notions as well as by laymen unfamiliar with the notions?).

I. 3. General approach, Method, Dataset(s)

It can be taken for granted that cognitive studies of language and language use support the primacy of individual cognition over social cognition. However, Langacker emphasizes that "the dynamic nature of conceptual and grammatical structure leads us inexorably to the dynamics of discourse and social interaction" (Langacker 1999: 376). Geeraerts et al. (2010: 3), too, expound the view that quite a number of features in a language can only be "adequately conceived of" if social interaction is taken into account:

> meaning does not exist in isolation: it is created in and transmitted through the interaction of people, and that is why the definition and the basic architecture of language are recognized by Cognitive Linguistics as involving not just cognition, but socially and culturally situated cognition. (ibid.)

Croft (2009: 395) suggests that "to be successful, cognitive linguistics must go 'outside the head' and incorporate a social-interactional perspective on the nature of language". Harder (2010) even calls for a 'social turn' in Cognitive Linguistics. Divjak et al. in their turn support a recontextualization of cognitive studies meant to represent a "return to a prestructuralist holistic view of language, where language emerges and functions at the intersection of the cognitive, social, historical, cultural and biological domains" (2016: 453).

Barsalou's theory of situated conceptualization (e.g. Barsalou 2006, 2015, 2020) also embraces the notion of social cognition and sees social embodiment specifically as related to how people mirror neurally and learn by imitating other individuals' actions, emotions, attention, postures, etc. (2015: 25). "Paying attention to what others do", cognitive linguists Geeraerts et al. write (2010: 5), "creates a mental representation of the collective tendencies in the behavior of the community; adapting one's own behavior to those tendencies, reaffirms and recreates the tendencies".

In a similar vein, conceptual metaphorist Gibbs upholds views of human cognition and learning as "better understood in terms of the entire system (i.e., a person's brain and body interacting with the world" (Gibbs 2022: 61). Above all, it is Cognitive ecologists such as Hutchins (2010) and Yu (2014) who address the complex functioning of the mind–brain–body system, in which "the body does not terminate with the fleshy boundary of the skin, but rather extends out into its environment that is at once physical, social, and cultural, engaging in all sorts of bodily and sociocultural interactions, so that the organism and environment are not independent" (Hutchins 2010: 706).

Thus, the present thesis seeks to contribute, however modestly, to the scholarly understanding of "the rich ecology of minds in action" (Gibbs 2022: 65). The line of investigation adopted here will accord with recent advances in cross-disciplinarity supported across a wide range of viewpoints on the relationship between socio-cultural issues and cognition (see also Wodak 2007; Yus 2018; Holmes 2018). Admittedly, as Langacker (2014) attests, "the full potential for the mutual enrichment of descriptive-theoretical concerns on the one hand, and sociolinguistic investigation on the other hand, has only begun to be realized". The thesis sees that fact as a research niche rather than an impediment.

Thus, the thesis can draw for some of its research techniques and instruments on sociolinguistic investigations. The thesis also accords with early cognitive studies such as Eleanor Rosch's (1973, 1975), which rely on statistical data obtained from real language users. Rosch's experiments have demonstrated conclusively the compatibility of research on imagery and bodily experiences with research on socio-cultural factors. They also uphold the assumption that there exists socio-cultural and, consequently, statistically verifiable agreement among the members of a community about conceptual issues. The present investigation also accepts methodological suggestions stemming from Cognitive Sociolinguistics (discussed in Chapter V), a field advocating the convergence of methods and theoretical frameworks normally

associated with either Cognitive Linguistics only or with Sociolinguistics only (e.g. Kristiansen and Dirven 2008; Pütz, Robinson and Reif 2014; Turner 2018).

In brief, verifying a hypothesis such as the one formulated in this thesis requires interdisciplinary, problem-oriented, adaptive research instruments be employed. As a result, hybridization of quantitative and qualitative methods is the analytical option preferred in the thesis. Each chapter, in its focusing on a specific topic and on a specific facet of our object of investigation, opts for either a qualitative or a quantitative method; each chapter discusses its choice of method separately.

That principle also applies to choice of data analyzed in each chapter. A chapter may draw its conclusions from a (systematic or scoping) literature review, and, thus, use existing research on a general topic as a dataset. Clearly, such a chapter will provide meta-analysis on a theoretical topic, and, depending on the type of review, it can conduct the analysis either qualitatively or quantitatively. Alternatively, a chapter may draw its conclusions from a dataset of texts, which, again, can be achieved either qualitatively or quantitatively. Another alternative is for a chapter to employ data obtained from real language users, which would typically entail quantitative analysis be conducted. All three options are employed throughout the thesis in dependence with the current topic and/or facet of the object of investigation.

I. 4. Organization of the thesis

The thesis includes nine chapters organized into three parts.

Part One starts after the introductory **Chapter I** and is dedicated to the isolation of cognitive mechanisms as candidates for inclusion in the hypothesized multi-process model. Those mechanisms, in most general terms, operate simultaneously in people's processing text- and discourse-related information. Part I includes two chapters.

Chapter II employs inductive procedures with a view of isolating cognitive mechanisms controlling conceptualizations and uses of the concept of POLITICAL SPEECHES. It focuses on perceptions of multi-functionality typically attached to a POLITICAL SPEECH.

Chapter III studies the notion of TEXT STRUCTURE and its numerous scholarly interpretations. The chapter's main aim is to verify or refute the cognitive mechanisms selected (in Chapter II) for inclusion in the hypothesized multi-process model

Part Two situates the multi-process set of cognitive mechanisms within the relevant theoretical literature. Part II includes two chapters.

Chapter IV points the potential position of the model within Text Linguistics.

Chapter V points the potential position of the model within Discourse Analysis.

Additionally, both Chapter IV and Chapter V demonstrate the feasibility of applying the multi-process cognitive model proposed in this thesis to the branches and approaches constituting present-day Text Linguistics and Discourse Analysis.

Part Three elaborates on the multi-process cognitive model proposed by tracing its operation within a variety of domains. Above all, this part centers round the cognitive notion of 'Real

Worlds' proposed in the thesis and argued to perform a key function in text- and discourse-related analyses. Part III includes three chapters.

Chapter VI focuses on the theoretical distinction between gestalt psychology's notion of 'background', Text World Theory's notion of 'Discourse World', and language-use-related theoretical interpretations of 'context'. In distinguishing them, the chapter applies the multi-process model.

Chapter VII focuses on 'Brexit' as a notion displaying an atypical transition from Text and Discourse Worlds into Real Worlds.

Chapter VIII focuses on the genre of Facebook posts, which is seen as one transitioning from Discourse Worlds into Real Worlds.

In all the chapters in Part III, it is the mechanisms from the multi-process model proposed in this thesis which are employed in the explanation of the cognitive and social phenomena in question.

Chapter IX provides a conclusion by summarizing the main contributions of the eight previous chapters. It relates the contributions to the research questions and the objectives of the thesis formulated in the introductory Chapter I.

The thesis ends with a **Bibliography**, and not with a Reference section. The aim behind this decision is to include, in text linguists' de Beaugrande and Dressler's terms (1981; see also Chapter IV), not only a macrostructural 'map' of the research directly cited, but to present the broader and more encompassing 'textual world' of the thesis.

PART ONE

ISOLATING THE MODEL

Part I is dedicated to the isolation of candidates for inclusion in our hypothesized set of cognitive mechanisms, mechanisms which, in most general terms, operate while people process text- and discourse-related information.

To achieve that, the analysis will need to be conducted with a view of isolating cognitive mechanisms from actual conceptual TEXT- and DISCOURSE-related uses. As a consequence, Part I will need to work inductively towards its goal, isolating one cognitive mechanism after another in a step-by-step procedure.

The inductive procedure, however, does not allow for an advance literature review to be first provided and then applied to the hypothesis. To compensate for that structural peculiarity, the literature review will be also provided here in a step-by-step procedure, and it will be included in the same chapter(s) that conduct the mechanism extraction analysis. Each theoretical literature review segment, then, will follow the analytical isolation of a specific cognitive mechanism. Thus, Part I will blend the mechanism isolation procedure with the literature review required.

Two chapters are included in Part I. Chapter II focuses on perceptions of multi-functionality typically attached to a POLITICAL SPEECH. Chapter III studies the notion of TEXT STRUCTURE and its numerous scholarly interpretations. Both those phenomena are approached as holding a strong reveal potential as far as underlying cognitive mechanisms are concerned: historically, the very notions of POLITICAL SPEECH and TEXT STRUCTURE attracted the earliest pre-linguistic interest in language-use analyses, which, in itself, is confirmation of their salience against other TEXT- and DISCOURSE-related concepts.

Two chapters, and not one, are dedicated to the extraction of the cognitive mechanisms in our hypothesized set as it seems more than feasible to have one chapter (i.e. Chapter II) isolate the mechanisms and another (i.e. Chapter III) verify or refute the findings in the first

chapter. Thus, Chapter III in Part I is dedicated to confirming the operation of the cognitive mechanisms identified as part of our hypothesized multi-process model in Chapter II.

The two chapters differ along another parameter as well. Chapter II's point of departure are the results from two sociolinguistic studies I conducted; drawing on those results, the chapter proceeds to analysis of a dataset of political speeches compiled for the purposes of the thesis. In other words, Chapter II relies both on data provided by real language users and on dataset analysis. Chapter III provides dataset analysis only. The analyses in both chapters, however, are essentially qualitative.

CHAPTER II

EXTRACTING THE MODEL

II. 1. The earliest object of text- and discourse-related analysis: Political speeches

II. 1. 1. General background

The point of departure for this chapter is a previous investigation I conducted, which focuses on, arguably, the earliest registered object of text- and discourse-centered analysis (van Dijk 1997: 12), namely political speeches.

As is well-known, in Classical Rhetoric times, aiming to account for the effectiveness of a political speech, Aristotle (1991, trans. Kennedy) listed the components a speech needs to include: a first part stating the subject, a second and third part proving it, an exordium at the beginning and an optional epilogue at the end. Within the boundaries of these main segments, Aristotle determined the 'proper' places for the speaker to reject conflicting arguments, to refute opponents' reasoning, to attack and counterattack the opponents themselves, to clear potential ambiguity, to assert oneself, to refer to similar previous cases and issues, etc. The epilogue, for instance, is suggested by Aristotle as the proper place for clearing any existing or potential tension between the speaker and the addressees, for arousing emotions in the addressees, and for recapitulating the main points of the speech.

Apart from being intrinsically prescriptive, most of Aristotle's analysis can be generalized, first, to focus on the interpersonal function(s) each speech segment should perform. I say 'most of his analysis' as the functions of 'recapitulating the main points of the speech' and 'referring to previous issues', for instance, could not be subsumed under the 'interpersonal

function' category. A second generalization that calls for attention is that, in this kind of analysis, each function is meant to associate with a separate text segment. In the present section of this chapter, I will start by tackling the questions of what differentiates cognitively the segment functions specified by rhetoricians and why it is possible for rhetoricians to have two different types of functions amalgamated into a single analytical framework.

Not unlike Classical Rhetoric studies, modern-day investigations also display an interest in political speeches as "structured verbal chains of coherent speech acts" (Reisigl 2008: 243). In other words, they also tend to see a political speech as a sequence of structural segments, with each segment dedicated to performing a specific 'communicative action'. Additionally, they tend to associate a 'rhetorical strategy' (which they tend to treat synonymously with a 'communicative action', or an 'interpersonal function'; on the cognitive conflation of 'action' and 'function' see Chapter VIII) with specific linguistic expressions, or 'rhetoric structures' (as in, e.g., Charteris-Black 2005). In this chapter, I will not trace correspondences between rhetoric functions and rhetoric structures, as this has long been the most extensively and fruitfully researched facet of political speeches. What I will focus on is not the linguistic signals used to perform certain functions but, instead, on the multi-functional nature of political speeches. Then I'll try and relate the multi-functionality of political speeches to the hypothesized presence of a set of cognitive mechanisms (as discussed in the introductory chapter).

The need for explorations of textual multi-functionality has been advocated by Fairclough and Fairclough (2015: 187), who generalize that

> [t]exts are 'multi-functional': there are various things going on simultaneously in texts. Texts are (or are part of) forms of action, and they also provide representations (of people, objects, events) and are part of the enactment of identities. In other words, texts draw upon and contribute to the constitution of genres, discourses and styles, and they do all of these simultaneously. Textual analysis therefore needs to identify and connect these different functions.

Clearly, by "representations (of people, objects, events)" in the quoted passage, Fairclough and Fairclough also call for a cognitive interpretation of political texts.

This cognitive interpretation needs to be harmonized with the specifics of analyzing political discourse. In the same paper, Fairclough and Fairclough (2015: 188) maintain that it is not analysis of rhetoric structures and metaphors that distinguishes political texts from other kinds of discourse; the analysis of political discourse texts needs to rely on an understanding of what politics is and on the premise that political discourse is "primarily argumentative":

> What distinguishes political discourse from other types of discourse is that it involves deliberation over what ought to be done, in contexts of divergent interests and values, scarcity of resources, uncertainty and risk. Deliberation is an argumentative genre in which practical argumentation (argumentation about what ought to be done, as opposed to theoretical or epistemic argumentation about what is the case) is the main argument scheme. Fairclough and Fairclough (2015: 188)

In a similar vein, Miller (1984) and Cillia and Wodak (2005) argue that politics involves reconciling interpersonal differences through discussion and persuasion, and that, as a consequence, politics is highly dependent on communicative practices such as discussing, persuading and bargaining. Unfortunately, Miller (1984) continues, the high degree of conflation between political actions and communicative actions makes them extremely hard to delimit. What I would like to add here is that delimiting them analytically in its turn can become even more difficult, when one takes into consideration how politics is actually 'enacted' (Hajer 2009). This conflation of domains is an important point of interest here and it will be also considered extensively in the last part of this thesis, in Chapters VII and VIII .

Thus, the present chapter focuses on:

(a) the circumstance that scholars of various backgrounds – and not just rhetoricians –

have underscored the importance of the interpersonal functions performed by a political speech,

(b) the simultaneity in a political speech's performing several functions at once, and

(c) on the overlap or conflation of different types of functions performed by a political speech.

As indicated earlier, this choice of investigative object represents not just a starting point for this chapter but also a point of departure for the whole thesis. The choice is motivated by the fact that, historically, the interpersonal functions performed by a political speech have attracted the earliest scholarly interest (van Dijk 1997) and that this interest has been sustained for centuries. In parallel, ever since the Aristotelian systematization cited above, the simultaneously-performed (interpersonal) functions have been continuously interpreted as 'intertwined with' or 'corresponding to' political speech structural segments. As the text structure of political speeches in particular is the object of analysis in my Ph.D. thesis, I will rely here on the conclusions from that piece of research, and I will try and build on those conclusions with generalizations drawn here.

Against the background of the progression of the whole thesis, this chapter is targeted at isolating the cognitive mechanisms which need to be accounted for in order for both the chapter's objectives and the whole thesis' objectives to be attained. In other words, the chapter's analytical progression is targeted at isolating the cognitive mechanisms which constitute the hypothesized theoretical model and which operate simultaneously to control conceptualizations and uses of political speeches as multi-functional phenomena.

The first step will involve acquiring data from actual language users. On the basis of generalizations of that data, relevant cognitive mechanisms will be 'extracted' and, as a second analytical step, the presence of each cognitive mechanism will be tested against a dataset of

political speeches. The dataset includes 50 speeches by British and American politicians delivered within the span of the last 80 years. The speeches cover a wide range of topics, speaker's political orientations and audience profiles. The dataset is also the source of the sample texts included here.

II. 1. 2. Relevance to the object of analysis

The two questionnaire-based studies I conducted are separated by a decade. In 2009, Study 1 (Tincheva 2013, 2015) had 100 university students complete a questionnaire, which was intended to distinguish political speeches from other political discourse genres such as disputes, interviews and newscasts. In 2019, Study 2 (unpublished) aimed to replicate the original survey but it also included two questions concerning non-political genres.

Study 1

Study 1 finds that, when asked to define a political speech, the respondents prototypically characterize it as (1) a monologic text (2) delivered orally (3) by a politician (4) before 'ordinary citizens'. The respondents would classify a text as a political speech even if it was delivered by a politician before other politicians, but they were reluctant to do so, if the text was delivered by a non-politician before other non-politicians. Perhaps interestingly, the respondents felt the necessity to introduce the parameter of 'topic' of the speech only when they had to decide about atypical cases such as the last one mentioned above. Moreover, even in case they believed the topic to be 'political', that was not enough for as many as 92% to classify a text as a political speech, when it was delivered by a non-politician before other non-politicians.

Defining a 'political' topic, the respondents characterize it as having to do with an unresolved (social) issue or with a situation in which there is something (socially) problematic. The respondents' answers vary as to the domain of activity the situation associates with. For example, both a speech about economic problems and a speech about political ethics can be seen as 'being about' a political topic.

Study 1's results can be generalized to demonstrate that, when classifying a text as a political speech, people almost exclusively base their decisions on contextual parameters such as who the speaker is, who the audience are what both the speaker's and the audience's social

status is. The topic occupies a distant second place in terms of importance, while language-related peculiarities such as overall structure or rhetoric devices are rarely listed as significant by the participants in their deciding on what a political speech is.

With respect to the objectives of this thesis, Study 1's results strongly suggest our set of cognitive mechanisms needs to be able to account for both contextual as well as for textual peculiarities. Likely candidates are mechanisms related to Discourse World building (which could account for how participant information is processed) and Text World creation (which could account for how topic information is processed). Section II. 4. below will be dedicated to that objective.

Study 2

Study 2, which took place 10 years after Study 1 and replicated it, intended to register existing generational differences in attitudes toward the genre of political speeches, if any. Study 2 also includes as respondents 100 third- and fourth-year students at the Department of British and American Studies, Sofia University 'St. Kliment Ohridski'. The respondents are selected for inclusion regardless of their educational status, age, gender, ethnic background, etc.

The three main conclusions from Study 1 remain still valid in Study 2 (although they vary in terms of degrees): first, contextual parameters related to speaker and audience are the most important factors in respondents' definitions of a political speech; second, the topic of the speech occupies second position in terms of importance; third, linguistic peculiarities and rhetoric devices are of little significance in respondents' definitions of a political speech.

Study 2 was not only intended to provide verification or refutation of Study 1's (general) conclusions. Study 2 also included two additional questions. In Study 2, the respondents were asked to provide definitions of two other genres – of a novel, and of a meme. The respondents' definitions obtained can be generalized as follows:

(a) a novel tends to be seen as (1) occurring in the written medium, (2) of considerable size, (3) narrative in essence/ 'being about a story'.

(b) a meme tends to be seen as (1) visual, (2) humorous, (3) internet-dependent, (4) may contain a linguistic element.

These parameters are ranked here in accordance with the frequency with which each is selected by the respondents. Importantly, as in Study 1, the above parameters are revealed to not function as obligatory features, which in itself emphatically suggests prototypology needs to be included as a significant element of our hypothesized cognitive set of mechanisms. Section II.2.below will be dedicated to that objective.

Several conclusions can be drawn from the respondents' answers to the additional questions in Study 2. A novel is first and foremost characterized by its linguistic peculiarities: when the genre of the novel is concerned, the content of the text comes second in importance. Contextual parameters related to text producer and text receiver(s) and especially the social status of the text producer and text receiver(s) are of little significance in respondents' definition of the genre.

A meme on its part tends to be defined primarily through its form of expression, although a meme's users' intentions (such as 'achieving a humorous effect') are also singled out as important by the respondents. Contextual parameters related to text producer and text receiver(s) and especially the social status of the text producer and text receiver(s) are of little significance in respondents' definitions of the genre. Overall, in contrast to political speeches, both novels and memes are perceived as more context-free and more strongly dependent on their content and form.

Both studies' results demonstrate that the most important factor in defining a political speech is context-related and that the key parameter in defining the genre is social status distance between the participants in the communicative exchange. Prototypically, the speaker

delivering the speech needs to be a politician and of considerably higher social status than the addressee(s). In the respondents' answers, the image of the politician as a leader of society is rather salient, which is reflected in the less prototypical status of the frame in which the social status distance is the same but the roles are reversed (i.e. the frame in which a non-politician speaks before politicians). Hence also the fact that in the respondents' answers politicians are 'graded' into 'members of political parties', 'party leaders' and 'heads of state'. The more 'leaderish' the status of the politician (i.e. being a leader to other leaders), the more likely for him (and not her) to be identified as the prototypical deliverer of a political speech. Regardless of how Biblical it may sound, the image of the shepherd and the numerous majority following him seems to prevail still.

The question remains, however, as to where exactly (i.e. in what kind of conceptual space) the politician and the multitude they are leading are conceptualized according to the respondents' answers. The responses in both Study 1 and 2 suggest that, in order for a text to be classified as a political speech, a real-life politician is expected to speak to real-life citizens about how the politician will lead all of them through a common real-life problem. Crucially, that real-life-related conceptual configuration is also expected to be 'reflected' in the content of the text. In other words, a political speech is expected to 'describe' or 'mirror' the real-life situation in which the real-life politician leads everyone through their common real-life problem. It should also be highlighted that no such an anticipation is present in the case of a novel or a meme. A novel, for instance, is not expected by the respondents in Study 2 to 'describe' a real-life situation in which the text producer and the text receiver co-exist and go together through impediments.

In sum, there are three cognitive peculiarities we need to try and account for here: (a) the need for the text of a political speech to be about speaker and listeners 'passing through' a common socio-political issue, (b) the expectation for the speech to be delivered by a politician

who, in real-life, is seen as ‘leading’ society ‘through’ the socio-political issue, and (c) the salience of the contextual parameters in (a) over the textual ones in (b).

In sum, three main candidates for inclusion in our set of cognitive mechanisms can be isolated on the basis of the two studies conducted. The next section (II. 2.) will position the unifying effect of prototypology within the set. The following section (II. 3.) will discuss the cognitive mechanism of conceptual metaphor, which holds a strong explanatory potential as long as participants’ perceptions of MOVEMENT through a political speech are concerned. Then section II. 4. will address the expedience of including World creating mechanisms in our set. The feasibility of World creating mechanisms, as stated above, can be also detected in the respondents’ answers.

II. 2. Prototypology

II. 2. 1. General background

Originating in Eleanor Rosch's research (1973, 1975), Prototype Theory (Langacker 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Taylor 2003/2015; Ungerer and Schmid 2006; Lakoff 2007) emerged in response to the task of finding a fresh perspective onto "the most fundamental of human capacities – the capacity to categorize" (Lakoff 1987: 7). That language is innately related to categorization and conceptualization has long been out of the 'debatable' list of linguistic studies (Fillmore 1975; Lakoff 2007; Geeraerts 2016) and, as Labov summarizes, "[i]f linguistics can be said to be any one thing it is the study of categories: that is, the study of how language translates meaning into sound through the categorization of reality into discrete units and sets of units" (1973: 342).

Viewed from a historical perspective, what gave original impetus to Rosch's Prototype theory of categorization is Wittgenstein's (1953) break-through notions of blurred edges and family resemblances. Rosch, too, emphatically rejects basic principles of classical categorization such as clear boundaries between categories (i.e. boundaries without border-line cases or fuzziness), shared properties (i.e. obligatory conditions for category membership), 'checklist' uniformity among all members of a category, inflexibility of category boundaries, objective conditions for category membership, etc. Mental imagery, bodily experiences and socio-cultural factors, her studies reveal, control human categorization. Hence a crucial role in Prototype theory is played by the assumption that there exists culturally-conditioned and, consequently, statistically verifiable agreement among the members of a culture about the best example of a category.

As is well-known, before Rosch's experiments "sent shock waves throughout the cognitive sciences" (Lakoff 1987: 7), category formation and the relationships between categories used to be invariably considered in connection to either Dichotomy or Classical

typology. Out of the list of prototypology principles enumerated above, there are two which, to me, need to be specially emphasized with respect to the difference between these older theories and prototypology.

The first principle is that, on both of the pre-Rosch approaches, every category member either unambiguously fits within clear-cut limits or it does not. Both those theories, in practice, tell us that, on one's first laying eyes on a PUG, one should be able to classify it as a DOG. Importantly, that classification should happen instantly and it should display no perceptual measurables such as hesitation pauses. Basically, according to pre-prototypology theories, one is expected to recognize immediately that a PUG and a GERMAN SHEPHERD are 'the same thing'.

A second principle that seems to need at least some further illustration associates with the fact that Dichotomy and Classical typology postulate every category as lying unambiguously disparate from other categories. In these approaches, no category could overlap and share features with other categories. TEXTS, then, could be either strictly oral or strictly written, strictly monologic or strictly dialogic. What is more, according to classical categorization principles, TEXT and DISCOURSE should never be confused or mistaken, i.e. they could not overlap, which, as our discussion in Chapter I above demonstrates, proves to be far from true. Without the existence of prototype effects, genres (discussed later in Chapter VIII) such as a SERMON and a LECTURE could never have anything in common. Similarly, text types (discussed in Chapter IV and VIII.) such as 'narrative' and 'argumentative' could never share common characteristics (i.e. a public speech could never 'tell a story' or make a historic recount).

Admittedly, at some point, prototype theory was known to be criticized, especially with regard to its explanatory power within lexical semantics (Smith and Medin 1981; Coleman and Kay 1981; for an overview see Evans and Green 2006). However, as Lakoff (2007) forcefully

argues, Rosch did retract from some of her earliest formulations of Prototype theory, and, despite some conflicting interpretations of the theory's initial premises, the pervasive presence of prototype effects has not been ever denied in the literature (on prototype effects across various studies see, e.g., Hyvärinen 2012; Geeraerts 2016; Dahlman et al. 20016; Supasiraprapa (2017); Watson 2019; Bagasheva 2022).

II. 2. 2. Relevance to the object of analysis

Every category in this investigation (e.g. POLITICAL SPEECHES, TEXT STRUCTURE, TEXT, DISCOURSE, TEXT TYPE, CONTEXT, GENRE, BREXIT, FACEBOOK POST) is expected to display prototype effects. No category is expected to be cognitively delimited from neighboring categories (e.g. TEXT from DISCOURSE) by rigid boundaries. Instead, fuzzy boundaries among categories are expected to be operational. Peripheral, i.e. fuzzy-boundary, non-prototypical uses, will be analyzed here as legitimate category members. Such non-prototypical examples will be approached as sharing a small number of characteristics with other members of the same category and as also possessing characteristics typical of neighboring categories.

Prototype effects are expected to be similarly operational within the set of cognitive mechanisms isolated for the purposes of this thesis. The assumption is that, in accordance with each category and its specificities, some cognitive mechanisms from the set will emerge as more salient than others. It may be even the case that, with respect to some of the categories analysed in every chapter, not all of the component mechanisms in the set will be fully operational.

To prove the decisive role of individual perception in determining both category boundaries and internal category structure, Rosch bases her experiments on statistical data obtained from actual language users. To harmonize our understanding of the thesis's object of investigation with apt research method and instruments, experiment-driven research techniques will be employed throughout this thesis to carry out various tasks and sub-tasks. In that, an experiment involving actual language users may be employed as a central investigative tool. Alternatively, it can be employed as a secondary investigative instrument supporting or refuting conclusions reached via other techniques.

As far as the present chapter specifically – and not the whole thesis – is concerned, the present investigation of the multi-functionality of political speech follows prototypology's principles and aims to supply numerical data on actual uses of the prototypically-functioning concept of POLITICAL SPEECHES. Studies 1 and 2 above report the socio-cultural data obtained from actual language users about conceptualizations of POLITICAL SPEECH. The second, and primary, research instrument in this chapter will be dataset content analysis, the results of which are systematized and discussed in the remaining sections of the chapter.

II. 3. Cognitive mechanisms: Conceptual metaphor

II. 3. 1. General background

The participants' responses in Study 1 and Study 2, and especially the participants' perceptions of MOVEMENT through a political speech, strongly suggest the relevance of research on fictive motion (e.g. Barsalou 2003; Matlock 2004) to the present investigation. That research demonstrates experimentally that fictive motion involves mentally simulated movement. It also confirms that mental simulation of motion is not only triggered by literal thought and language about motion, but also by figurative thought and language about motion:

> Taken together, the research on mental simulation suggests that people (1) construct models that resemble physical space, (2) simulate objects and movement in these spatial models, and (3) simulate in a way that is to some extent analogous to perceiving physical movement. Given this, simulation might also be involved in fictive motion processing, including sentences such as *The road runs along the coast* or *The trail goes through the desert*. (Matlock 2004: 1391)

Hence the expedience in our turning to research on figurative thought in our understanding of how political speeches function.

As is well-known, ever since Lakoff and Johnson started exploring metaphor (1980), it has been viewed as a major cognitive mechanism and not simply as a matter of surface linguistic flourishes. More specifically, metaphor has been redefined as transfer from a conceptual source domain to a conceptual target domain. Metaphor is seen as enabling and perpetuating not only our ways of speaking but also ways of thinking. Crucially, metaphor is seen as enabling and perpetuating cultural, social and political actions, too (e.g., Lakoff 1996, 2002, 2003, 2013, 2014; Musolff 2004, 2006, 2022; Bednarek 2005; Ringmar 2008; Kövecses 2010; Ritchie 2013; Semino et al. 2016; Sharifian 2011, 2017).

A point Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) research has sustained, one which is relevant to the present discussion, details how domains become associated through bodily experience. For instance, when an infant detects a toy lying at some distance and desires it, the infant starts crawling toward the toy in order to obtain it. The infant starts from a STARTING POINT (in which it does not possess the desired object), then moves crawling (along some kind of TRAJECTORY through TIME and SPACE) to the toy. The END POINT of the movement is the PLACE where the baby possesses the toy (i.e., the place where the PROBLEM is solved). As the desired change is brought about by the baby's crawling toward the desired object, crawling becomes associated with change. Subsequent repetitions of the same pattern will endorse the infant's perception of MOVEMENT, to resort to another metaphoric construal, as a "way" of achieving a GOAL. From then on, throughout the person's life, the analogy in the structure (INITIAL POINT → SOURCE; MOVEMENT TOWARD THE TOY → PATH; END POINT → GOAL) will forever determine the person's perception of how goals can be achieved – by "moving towards them."

In a similar vein, POLITICAL GOALS will always be understood as DESTINATIONS. INITIAL STATES in which the goal is not attained are understood as STARTING POINTS and DESIRED STATES are understood as END POINTS in MOTION. What stands in the middle – the trajectory linking the INITIAL POINT to the END one – will be forever interpreted as a POLITICAL PATH along which it is possible to reach the POLITICAL GOAL (Tincheva 2012). Nothing, it should be noted, in the objective nature of any political issue requires that it be thought of as the end point of movement. Purposeful motion, freed from human conceptualization and metaphoric mappings, is not objectively analogical to human political behavior. It is conditioned by the nature of our bodily, sensimotor, perceptions.

Another aspect of metaphors we need to note in connection with the above is a metaphor's analyzability in terms of primary, i.e., simple, or complex metaphors (Grady et al.

1996). A primary metaphor – such as the one of the crawling infant above – has a minimal structure and is grounded, i.e., it directly draws on bodily experience. A complex metaphor, in contrast, is formed out of primary ones by conceptual blending – a mechanism proposed and analyzed by Turner (see, e.g., Fauconnier 1997, 2014; Fauconnier and Turner 1998; Turner and Fauconnier 2002, Grady et al. 1999; Turner 2014; Krieken et al. 2016; Sweetser 2017; Berberović and Džanić 2020).

The blend, importantly, inherits partial structure from both input spaces; what is more, it can also generate emergent structure of its own. As Lakoff and Johnson observe (1999: 60), complex metaphors are not simply built out of primary ones: they amalgamate forms of commonplace knowledge, cultural models, folk theories, generally (for a discussion see, e.g., Kövecses 2012, 2020; Yu et al. 2017). Aspects of the source domain, "which do not explicitly appear in the mapping, may be deduced as an entailment. Thus the metaphors carry entailments of rich inferences" (Pencheva 2011: 114; translation as in Ishpekova 2012: 27).

Overall, complex, or 'molecular' metaphors, are made up of 'atomic', or primary, ones. According to Grady's theory, there are several lines of dissimilarity along which the two types diverge. First, a primary metaphor has minimal structure, while a complex one does not. Second, a primary metaphor draws directly on bodily experience: it is a neural connection arising sub-consciously through recurrence of domain co-activation. In other words, repetitive domain co-activation frequently leads to the formation of cross-domain associations. Thus, in infancy, when a baby's survival often depends on a physically bigger individual, repetitive parent - child physical interactions can give rise to a cross-domain association representing BIG as IMPORTANT. Later in life, the association can be evident in expressions such as *How big can Brexit turn out to be*?' (CNN World News, Live updates, June 25th 2016; see Chapter VII).

An all-important example of a complex metaphor is A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY (Grady et al. 1997, 1999), which pre-defines 'good' behavior and castigates a

person as ‘lost’, ‘without direction’ and not knowing ‘which way to turn’, if that person does not impose a sense of purpose on their life. This complex metaphor, which operates extremely powerfully on a daily basis, stems out of the two primary metaphors PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS and ACTIONS ARE MOTIONS. Drawing on those two metaphors, there arises the A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY complex metaphor, which is made up of four sub-metaphors:

A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY.
A PERSON LIVING A LIFE IS A TRAVELER.
LIFE GOALS ARE DESTINATIONS.
A LIFE PLAN IS AN ITINERARY. (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 61; also Lakoff 2014)

Confirmation of the actual existence of simple and complex conceptual metaphors has come from the Neural Theory of Language (Feldman 2006, Feldman and Narayanan 2004) and Lakoff’s Neural Theory of Metaphor (2009). According to that theory, “every action our body performs is controlled by our brains, and every input from the external world is made sense of by our brains” (Lakoff 2009: 1). “Thought is physical,” Lakoff argues, in that all concepts and metaphors are physically processed by brain structures. That processing happens through the activation of certain neuronal groups in the brain. Another basic tenet of the theory is that when two neuronal groups fire at the same time, what ensues is spreading activation, which connects the network links and we experience a chain of thought. When two activation-spreading processes co-occur and meet, what is formed is the a “circuit.” Subsequent co-activations of the two processes lead to the stabilization of the emergent link. As Lakoff claims (ibid..), it is precisely that mechanism which forms and perpetuates primary metaphors.

Another point evident from the examples included so far is that metaphoric conceptual transfer happens only due to human-specific perceptions of similarities between domains and

not due to some objectively existing similarities (for the Embodied Realism theory see Lakoff and Johnson 1999). Consequently, employing conceptual metaphor as a window onto POLITICAL SPEECHES can allow us a glimpse on the true nature of the concept: CMT does not postulate the need for a notion to be an objective reflection or an accurate representation of anything. On the contrary, through CMT, POLITICAL SPEECH, as any other concept, draws on already existing source domains, and it is expected to do so by mapping non-objective, human-perceived similarities between the concept and previously existing knowledge structures. For that reason, CMT can also help explain possible manipulative conceptual uses.

The claim that metaphorization is not objective is not meant to suggest that metaphoric conceptualization is completely arbitrary. As any literature review will reveal, conceptual metaphors may derive directly from human sensorimotor experience (Lakoff 2009; on grounded cognition see, e.g., Barsalou 2016, 2020). That fact by itself precludes the possibility for a completely random connection between a source and a target domain. An even more significant fact against the arbitrariness of metaphorization suggests that, once conventionalized, an existing set of metaphoric mappings resists new interpretations not drawing on it (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1999, Lakoff 2002; Charteris-Black 2018, 2019).

There seems to be one specific issue which limits CMT's revealing potential as to our object of investigation. True to fact, the "pervasive" and "irreducible" nature (Johnson 1987: xii) of the notion of CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR has opened a vast field of research, which has branched into a number of directions:

- Lakoff's Neural theory of metaphor (Lakoff and Núñez, 2000; Lakoff, 2009);
- the methodology-oriented and data-conscious perspectives deriving from the Pragglejaz group's MIP-based investigations (see, e.g., Deignan, 2005; Cameron and Deignan, 2006; Pragglejaz group, 2007; Semino, 2008; Kövecses, 2010, 2018; Steen et al. 2010);

- Deliberate Metaphor Theory (e.g. Steen 2008, 2015);
- the Cognitive Poetics text-world-based viewpoint (Semino, 2008); Cultural Linguistics (Sharifian, 2011, 2017; Kövecses, 2017);
- the Critical Metaphor Theory perspective (e.g., Charteris-Black, 2005, 2014; Musolff, 2006, 2012, 2021);
- the Career of metaphor theory (e.g., Bowdle and Gentner, 2005; Gentner and Bowdle, 2008);
- (types of) metaphor processing analyses (e.g. Barsalou 2006; Coulson 2008; Werkmann Horvat et al. 2022);
- the pool of research addressing the (possible) need for a conceptual-metaphor-vs-simile distinction (see, e.g., Coulson and Oakley, 2005; Glucksberg, 2008; Dulcinati et al., 2014), etc.

In many aspects, these conceptual-metaphor-centered approaches diverge from each other. In other aspects, however, they do overlap and share both theoretical and analysis-directed viewpoints. It seems safe to argue that, as a typical prototype-like academic concept, CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY exists as a conceptual center surrounded by a broad-ranging periphery, along which many approaches overlap and share properties.

As far as the object of investigation in this chapter is concerned (with the chapter focusing on conceptualizations of POLITICAL SPEECHES), it has to be admitted that, despite the enormity and variety of the research branches cited above, CMT is not finely tuned to the needs of an investigation of conceptualization. CMT has displayed an emphatic preference for tackling categorization processes and not conceptualization ones. Since its very inception in Lakoff et al.'s works (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Gibbs 1994, 2008), CMT has rested on two major claims. The first one concerns the possibility for isolating conceptual metaphor manifestations as actual, in-text occurrences, and that is the

major trend explored throughout the literature. Lakoff's second major premise, however, the one implying recursive conceptual-metaphoric use creates (perceptions of) 'stable' metaphor-deriving concepts, has not attracted equally abundant interest (Bolognesi and Vernillo 2019).

Such a generalization does not represent a claim that Lakoff's interpretation of how abstract concepts enter conceptual systems through metaphoric transfer has not been discussed in CMT-related research at all. Glucksberg, for instance, tackles repeatedly the issue of metaphoric conceptualization operating as categorization (e.g. Glucksberg 2008; Glucksberg and McGlone 1999). The problem is that all arguments of the kind concerning the operation of metaphoric conceptualization tend to focus on (a) proving conceptual metaphorization to be practically the same as categorization, or (b) proving conceptual metaphorization to be either distinct or non-distinct from simile (see, e.g., Barnden 2015; Levant et al. 2020; Olkoniemi et al. 2022; Pambuccian and Raney 2021; Long et al. 2021).

Overall, it seems safe to argue that out of the two simultaneous processes of conceptualization and categorization (conceptualization being directed at the internal structure of a concept, and categorization – at situating the concept within the already internalized conceptual network of the individual), it is only categorization that has found its rightful place in CMT literature so far.

Unfortunately, a cognitive (re-)interpretation of the concept of POLITICAL SPEECH would unambiguously require focusing on the processes of its metaphoric conceptualization in particular. POLITICAL SPEECH is of low cognitive degree of granularity (term as in Langacker 2008), i.e. it is a general concept; it is also an abstract concept, which, as Bolognesi and Vernillo (2019) demonstrate, makes its very emergence unavoidably metaphoric.

A further disadvantage is the related unavailability of a conceptualization-oriented CMT-based methodological protocol. In other words, there exists no well-established

methodology for the verification and analyses of the figurative nature of concepts, metaphoric conceptualization being no exception.

Both these issues, regrettably, apply equally to POLITICAL SPEECHES as well as to most other text- and discourse-related notions investigated in this thesis, e.g. TEXT STRUCTURE (Chapter III), BREXIT (Chapter VII), and TEXT TYPE (Chapter VIII). The present investigation aims to take a step, however humble, toward remedying those two issue.

II. 3. 2. Relevance to the object of analysis

"Human bodily movement, manipulation of objects, and perceptual interactions involve recurring patterns without which our experience would be chaotic and incomprehensible" (Johnson 1987: xix). Some of those most basic patterns are image schemas (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Langacker 1999; Forceville 2006; Oakley 2010; Forceville and Jeulink 2010; Pérez-Hernández 2013, Szwedek 2008, 2018, 2019) such as UP-DOWN, CONTAINER, PATH, PART-WHOLE.

Image-schemas are of gestalt nature (see II. 5. 1. below), i.e. they are holistic structures, in which the whole is more than the sum of its parts (Schmid and Günther 2016; for an overview of neuroimaging proof of gestalt perception see, e.g., Bloechle et al. 2018). Image-schemas may be derived from (relatively simple) everyday bodily experience, but through conceptual metaphor, they can be extended to almost all mental representation. Ungerer and Schmid, for instance, maintain image-schemas provide the source structure and are used for the spatial conceptualization of all abstract categories (2006, 2010).

One image schema of special significance to POLITICAL SPEECHES is the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL one, which, in Lakoff's formulation (1987: 275), displays the following cognitive structure:

> Bodily experience: Every time we move anywhere there is a place we start from, a place we wind up at, a sequence of contiguous locations connecting the starting and ending points, and a direction. [...]
> Structural elements: A source (staring point), a Destination (end point), a Path (a sequence of contiguous locations connecting the starting point and the destination), and a direction (toward the destination).

Clearly, both our discussion of simple and complex metaphors in II. 3. 2., and the respondents' comments in Studies 1 and 2 (in II. 2. 1.) concerning fictive motion suggest the

operation of the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema is especially significant for conceptualizations of POLITICAL SPEECHES. As our discussion in the previous section indicated, the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, which derives metaphorically from the operation of the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema, is one controlling a multitude of aspects of our culture, political aspects included.

In search of confirmation of this assumption, the following samples from our dataset were extracted. The samples include linguistic expressions (italicized), which signal the operation of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor in the genre of political speeches:

Sample 1

We *stand at the crossroads* of our future. Not only our future but those of generations to follow us depend upon choosing *the right path*. (Michael Ancram, Member of House of Lords of the United Kingdom, 2001)

Sample 2

In our struggle against hateful groups that exploit poverty and despair, we must offer an alternative of opportunity and hope. These are some of the *steps* I've described today at the United Nations. (U.S. President George W. Bush, 2002)

Sample 3

And as we *walk*, we must make the pledge that we shall *march ahead*. We cannot *turn back*. (Martin Luther King, Jr.. August 28, 1963)

Previous analysis I conducted on the speeches in the dataset (Tincheva 2015) confirms the hypothesized conceptual transfer from the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schema. The linguistic signals used in the speeches indicate that the mapping from the three-part image schema results in an INITIAL STATE – STEPS – DESIRED STATE cognitive structure, which displays the following internal organization in each of its three segments (ibid.):

INITIAL STATE (containing **slot**: leader, **slot**: followers, **slot**: unresolved social issue/ social task; **slot**: time, **slot**: place)

↓

STEPS (each containing **slot**: leader, **slot**: followers, **slot**: activity/sequence of activities)

↓

DESIRED STATE (containing **slot**: leader, **slot**: followers, **slot**: resolved social issue/fulfilled task, **slot**: time, **slot**: place)

Each segment in the cognitive structure (i.e. INITIAL STATE, STEPS, and DESIRED STATE) proves to function as a gestalt (Tincheva 2015, 2022).

To illustrate the presence and the filling of the slots, the following dataset samples representing INITIAL STATEs are included here. The linguistic structures italicized in them are seen as signalling the filling of the slot positions specified above:

Sample 4

Just 2 hours ago, allied air forces began *an attack on military targets in Iraq and Kuwait*. These attacks continue *as I speak*. Ground forces are not engaged. (U.S. President George Bush, January 16, 1991)

Sample 5

I do not propose to say many words *tonight*. *The time* has come when *action rather than speech is required*. *Eighteen months ago in this House I* prayed that the responsibility might not fall upon me to ask *this country* to accept the awful arbitrament of *war*. *I* fear that *I* may not be able to avoid that responsibility. (UK PM Neville Chamberlain, September 1, 1939)

Sample 6

My fellow citizens:

I stand *here today* humbled by the task before *us*, grateful for the trust *you* have bestowed, mindful of the sacrifices borne by our ancestors. *I* thank President Bush for his service to *our* nation, as well as the generosity and cooperation he has shown throughout this transition. (U.S. President Barack Obama, January 20, 2009)

Sample 7

My fellow Americans, four years ago we launched a great national effort *to rebuild our* country, *to renew* its spirit, and *to restore* the allegiance of this government to its citizens. In short, *we* embarked on a mission *to make America great again* for all Americans. As *I* conclude my term as the 45th President of the United States, *I* stand before *you* truly proud of what *we* have achieved together. *We* did what *we* came *here* to do, and so much more. (U.S. President Donald Trump, January 19, 2020).

As these samples demonstrate, the presence of the INITIAL STATE internal structural organization (containing **slot**: leader, **slot**: followers, **slot**: unresolved social issue/social task; **slot**: time, **slot**: place) is invariable regardless of a politician's political background, social convictions and stylistic idiosyncrasies. The same conclusion is applicable to the other two parts of the INITIAL STATE – STEPS – DESIRED STATE structural parts and elements, i.e. it is equally applicable to STEPS and to DESIRED STATE.

The following samples from the dataset represent STEPS speech segments, and the linguistic structures italicized in them are seen as signalling the filling of the slot positions specified above:

Sample 8

And yet in the midst of all of this, *at 2:55,* Ms Jo Moore, special adviser to the Secretary of State, his appointee, sent an e-mail to her departmental colleagues saying, 'It is *now a very good day* to get out anything *we* want to bury. Councilors expenses?' To think that *someone's immediate reaction was to see what was happening in New York and Washington, not as a human tragedy but as a political PR opportunity, which Ministers*

should make the most of, is almost beyond understanding. (U.K. MP Theresa May, October 23, 2001).

Sample 9

This *conflict* started *August 2nd when the dictator of Iraq invaded a small and helpless neighbor*. Kuwait -- a member of the Arab League and a member of the United Nations -- *was crushed*; its *people, brutalized*. *Five months ago*, Saddam Hussein started this cruel war against Kuwait. *Tonight*, the battle has been joined. (U.S. President George Bush, January 16, 1991).

However, it should be emphasized that in these STEPS segments, in contrast to the segments related to INITIAL STATE, the filling of the slots of **time** and **place** does not explicate the time and place of speech delivery but, instead, the time(s) and place(s) related to past situations. Discussing this crucial point will be postponed for now but will be taken up later in the present section of the chapter.

The following samples from the dataset (already included earlier here) represent DESIRED STATE speech segments. Now the linguistic structures italicized in them are those seen as signalling the filling of the slot positions specified above:

Sample 1

We stand at the crossroads of *our future*. Not only *our future* but those of generations to follow *us* depend upon choosing *the right path*. (Michael Ancram, Member of House of Lords of the United Kingdom, 2001)

Sample 2

In *our* struggle against hateful groups that exploit *poverty* and *despair*, *we must offer an alternative of opportunity and hope*. These are some of the *steps I*'ve described *today at the United Nations*. (U.S. President George W. Bush, 2002)

Sample 3

And as *we walk*, *we must make* the pledge that we shall *march ahead*. *We* cannot *turn back*. (Martin Luther King, Jr.. August 28, 1963)

To generalize, the analysis of the political speeches in the dataset confirms the conclusions drawn from the two questionnaire studies, and, more specifically, the conclusion that, while processing the text of a political speech, the audience set up INITIAL STATE, STEPS and DESIRED STATE cognitive segments and organize the whole text of the speech by mapping these three parts of the cognitive structure onto what they hear or read. Thus, the audience expect a political speech to project a PATH of the ideas of the politician as to how a social problem should or could be solved. The audience expect to be GUIDED or LED along that PATH through TIME and SPACE, and STEP by STEP. The PATH is hypothetical and, arguably, a political speech is successful, if it evokes convincing or desired images for the audience.

Furthermore, the presence (or absence) of all the parts of the INITIAL STATE – STEPS – DESIRED STATES structure is highly likely to be what gives text receivers a 'sense' of the speech being complete (or incomplete). As scholars belong within the category of text receivers, INITIAL STATE – STEPS – DESIRED STATE can also be argued to be the cognitive structure controlling scholars' perceptions of textual segments (such as Introduction, Body, Conclusion, or the Aristotelian rhetoric structural organization discussed in the introductory section of this chapter). The mere activation of INITIAL STATE – STEPS – DESIRED STATE, however, could not account for scholarly perceptions of simultaneity in the operation of interpersonal functions and 'speech act sequences' (also discussed in the introductory section of this chapter).

Another major point to emphasize is that, as already mentioned above, some political speech segments (especially, although not exclusively, segments related to STEPS and DESIRED STATE) do not explicate the TIME and PLACE at which the speech is delivered

but, instead, they explicate time(s) and place(s) related to past situations. In contrast, INITIAL STATE does tend to explicate (although also not exclusively) the TIME and PLACE at which the speech is delivered. As a result, what we are dealing with is a mixture of time and place references and the resulting cognitive construction of a series of spatio-temporally defined EVENTS and SITUATIONS which all relate to the cognitive construction of a political PATH. Crucially, only one or some of those EVENTS and SITUATIONS is the one of the actually happening communicative exchange surrounding the actual political speech.

The third major point suggesting that employing only CMT will not be sufficient for understanding the multifunctionality of political speeches adds further strength to the second major point above. What is evident in Samples 4 and 5 above is that the use of linguistic signals can frequently be ambiguous as to the cognitive space the linguistic signals evoke. For instance, in Sample 4, *Just 2 hours ago* associates with the cognitive space of the communicative context at the time of the speech's delivery. If it associated with a cognitive space different than the one of the immediate communicative context, *before* would have been used instead of *ago*. However, *Just 2 hours ago* can also be argued to associate with the general, real-life socio-political context at the time of delivery of the speech and not simply with the communicative context at the time of delivery.

A different kind of cognitive space ambiguity can be seen in *These attacks continue as I speak,* which simultaneously evokes the concept of TIME in the cognitive space of the immediate communicative context and the concept of TIME in the cognitive space associated with the WAR that is away from the speech's immediate communicative context.

Analysis of the speeches in the dataset reveals such instances of ambiguous and/or simultaneous explication of the concepts of TIME, PLACE, PROBLEM, POLITICIAN, POLITICIAN'S FOLLOWERS and POLITICIAN'S AUDIENCE in more than one cognitive space are pervasive. This conclusion suggest the default and simultaneous presence of the

concepts in question in both cognitive spaces. In other words, the INITIAL STATE – STEPS – DESIRED STATE mapping, which includes the concepts in question, proves to be present not only in the cognitive space of what the text 'is about', but also in the cognitive space 'encompassing' the speech deliverer and their audience.

This can be seen as a case of double mapping of the same SOURCE – PATH – GOAL image schema, with the first mapping taking place in the first cognitive space and controlling people's expectations for a POLITICAL SPEECH 'to be about' a political 'leader' and a leader's 'followers' 'passing through' a common socio-political issue (as evident in Studies 1 and 2). The second mapping, in the second cognitive space, proves to control people's expectations for a political speech to be delivered by a speaker of higher social standing who talks to their audience so that the communicative exchange can be seen as a STEP along the general political PATH (as also evident in Studies 1 and 2). Perhaps surprisingly, the participants' responses in the two studies strongly suggest it is the second mapping, taking place in the second cognitive space, that is more salient in the case of the genre of political speeches.

To differentiate in principle between the two kinds of what I have so far been calling – rather generically – 'cognitive spaces' and to be able to trace specifics of the operation of the double mappings within those cognitive spaces, it seems expedient that I introduce another set of theoretical premises and harmonize those with CMT. The following section will be dedicated to that objective and, accordingly, will argue in favor of harmonizing Text World theory with our findings so far.

II. 4. Cognitive mechanisms: World creation

II. 4. 1. General background

Text Worlds and Discourse Worlds

Chronologically speaking, de Beaugrande and Dressler's (1981) ground-breaking work in the domain of Text Linguistics popularized the notion of the 'textual world' into scholarly discourse- and text-oriented research. To de Beaugrande and Dressler, a Textual World (henceforth TW) is associated with the notion of coherence (discussed later in III.1.). They view a TW as a well-organized configuration of cognitive constructs which function together as a network and 'hold together' a whole text. Importantly, the emphasis in de Beaugrande and Dressler's interpretation lies on the cognitive and non-language-bound nature of a TW.

Additionally, de Beaugrande and Dressler's TW 'contains' more than the cognitive structures signaled by the expressions in the surface text; it also 'contains' what de Beaugrande and Dressler view as a participant's associatively-evoked cognitive expectations and knowledge structures concerning previous experiences perceived by the participant as relevant to a TW. Quite similarly, Talmy (2000) and Herman (2012) employ the term 'story world' to refer to the creation of such text-activated cognitive networks of concepts. In contrast, Text World theorist Emmott (1997) maintains a TW concerns only mental models explicitly signalled linguistically, which, in effect, means denying the operation of the cognitive mechanism of spreading activation (discussed in relation to text processing in, e.g., de Beaugrande and Dressler 1981; Langacker 2008; Sharifian 2011).

Crucially, de Beaugrande and Dressler's TW is not about 'true' or 'false' renditions of reality. Their idea of a World in general bears little resemblance to the philosophical or logics notion of 'possible worlds' and 'actual worlds' (e.g. Kripke 1963; Lewis 1977), nor does it bear any resemblance to Leibniz's 'actual world' as 'the best' of all 'possible worlds' (see also Rutherford 1995, 2018). Reality, in de Beaugrande and Dressler's viewpoint, is a

conventionalized version of it that is generally considered valid by a society or a culture. As a consequence, a TW may or may not cohere with this socially and culturally accepted version of what reality is.

Neither Text World Theory (e.g. Gavins 2007; Whiteley 2011) mentioned above, nor Cognitive poetics (e.g. Semino and Culpeper 2002; Semino 2010; Hidalgo-Downing 2004; Stockwell 2002/2020, 2009) inherited de Beaugrande and Dressler's TW-related premises. Instead, Text World Theory and Cognitive Poetics emerged from Werth's works (1999), which, although published much later, were actually written against the background of relatively the same scholarly environment as was de Beaugrande and Dressler's. For instance, as Werth (1999: 20) acknowledges, he borrows the very term of 'TW' from van Dijk (1977) – an influence also acknowledged by de Beaugrande and Dressler.

Werth's investigations focus predominantly on how different possible realities emerge in the process of text construction (these realities are believed to be associated with the use of negation, modality, etc.). Thus, Werth's proposal focuses on worlds and their subordinate sub-worlds, which he classifies into 'want worlds', 'belief worlds', 'intent worlds', 'desire sub-worlds', 'dream sub-worlds', etc. Moreover, Werth (1999: 20) proposes that a TW should unavoidably "fall within the definition of 'mental space' of Fauconnier (1985)".

However, even in the earliest inquiries into mental spaces, Fauconnier and his collaborators express their unwavering position that "[b]ecause the explicit structure set up in spaces is minimal, and because the default structure is always revisable as discourse unfolds, spaces are very different sorts of things than worlds (such as logicians' possible worlds, or the fictional worlds of narratives)" (Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996: 12). In a similarly adamant way, Coulson states that "mental spaces are local rather than global and are thus not describable in truth-conditional terms. This entails that the elements in a given mental space do not refer directly to entities in the outside world" (Coulson 2001: 21).

The present investigation subscribes to this latter treatment of Worlds as not related to classical logicians' views and interpretations of truth-objectivism (see also the discussion in Chapter VI). It is de Beaugrande and Dressler's interpretation that is preferred here due to its explicitly non-truth-conditional approach to the relation between TWs and reality. Nevertheless, there is an extremely strong point in Werth's theory which is fundamental to the present investigation and which can still be harmonized with de Beaugrande and Dressler's interpretation of TWs: this is Werth's premise of the possibility that a TW can coincide with its corresponding discourse world (henceforth DW).

A TW, from Werth's (1999: 87) point of view, is a "situation distinct from the immediate one of the language event"; more precisely, it is "the 'story' which is the subject of the discourse, together with all the structure necessary to understand it". Moreover, Werth's TW is a mental space 'populated' by PEOPLE and OBJECTS which are constructed as CHARACTERS in the 'world'. PARTICIPANTS in the communicative exchange (i.e. TEXT PRODUCER and TEXT RECEIVER) in their turn can become elements in another World – a DW, which in its turn is defined by Werth [1999: 83] as "the situational context surrounding the speech event itself". In other words, while a TW contains PEOPLE and OBJECTS as CHARACTERS, a DW contains communicative exchange PARTICIPANTS (1999: 83).

Crucially, to Werth, a TW and its corresponding DW may coincide, when PARTICIPANTS in a DW come to be simultaneously constructed as CHARACTERS in its corresponding TW (1999: 86). Such instances, Werth argues, could be interpreted as "discourses about the discourse world itself" (ibid.). In cases like this, a TW is "the conceptualization of that part of the discourse world which is 'in focus' for the purposes of discourse" (ibid.). Basically, overlaps between two Worlds can happen, whenever the two world-networks share a number of concepts and inter-conceptual relations. This can be seen, for instance, in everyday conversations at home, in the street, at the office, etc. Such

conversations concern interpersonal relations within a family, company, etc. Moreover, as Werth demonstrates, the two types of worlds may overlap to a considerable degree, although a complete overlap between them is far from obligatory. As the respondents' definitions provided in Study 2 also demonstrate, it is far from obligatory for the TW and the DW of a novel to share conceptual structure.

Later studies drawing on Werth's theory inherited the absence of definitive resolution of what reality is and how it is to be compared or contrasted with a World:

> A world is a language event involving at least two participants, and is the rich and densely textured real-life representation of the combination of text and context. At the highest level is the discourse world, prototypically involving face-to-face discourse participants, such as two speakers in a conversation, or a letter-writer and receiver, or an author and reader. The language event that is the discourse world is the immediate situation, including the text, surrounding and including the discourse participants.
>
> Factors in the discourse world include the *perceptions* of the immediate situation, and the *beliefs, knowledge, memories, hopes, dreams, intentions* and *imaginations* of the discourse participants. [...] The means of usage is through the notion of the common ground (CG), which is not all knowledge but the totality of information that the discourse participants have agreed to accept as relevant for their discourse.
> [...] Elements of context are incremented into the common ground in the course of discourse processing. The common ground itself shifts during the process, as new ideas are introduced and old concepts are discarded as no longer relevant, or fade away by no longer being mentioned. (Stockwell 2002: 136-137)

What transpires in the passage is that, in this interpretation, a World is initially postulated as 'a language event' and not as a cognitive representation of a language event. The next sentence in the passage, however, has Worlds defined as 'real-life representations', thus triggering ambiguity as to whether a World is seen as a representation existing IN real life, or it is a representation OF real life. The next phrase brings us back to the 'language event' phrase

and clarifies that a World is a representation "of the combination of text and context". This leaves us only with the option of the representations being both part of real life and representing real life. The question of how that is possible remains open.

In parallel, in the excerpt, a DW is postulated in rather objectivist terms as "a language event" involving participants. The DW is "the immediate situation" metaphorized as a SPACE 'surrounding' the text as well as the discourse participants. Such an interpretation of Stockwell's definition is supported in the next paragraph cited, in which what to van Dijk (e.g. 2002, 2018) would be 'cognitive models' and to Fairclough (e.g. 1989, 1992a) would be 'members resources' (see the discussion in Chapter V) to Stockwell here are "perceptions, beliefs, knowledge, memories". Thus, Stockwell, in similarity to van Dijk and Fairclough, simply 'injects' such cognitive structures into a DW. The overall impression of a strong objectivist stand is further heightened by Stockwell's argument that a DW is jointly created by the participants and is negotiated by them into a 'common ground' (i.e. individual participant's DWs are not postulated). Finally, what should be highlighted in the above passage is Stockwell's defining a DW as a combination of rather objectively existing 'text and context'. Overall, the quotation creates an ambiguous impression as to the ontological status and correlation between 'Worlds' and cognition.

In her seminal work on Text World Theory, Gavins (2007) also upholds Werth's premises. She also advances them by demonstrating how a DW can involve not only face-to-face exchanges but also types of discourses such as telephone conversations, where the text producer and the text receiver do not share the same spatio-temporal environment. Gavins (2007: 26) sees such instances as 'split' DWs and she further applies the notion to literary contexts, in which, normally, the author and the reader do not participate in the same spatio-temporal environment. This allows her to specify a further layer in a DW by focusing on the

narrator of a TW, who could either be a part of the TW or not. Thus, Gavins uses the term ‘enactors’ for what Werth calls ‘characters’ in a TW.

Although I fully support the view of language as “essentially world-building in nature” (Gavins and Lahey 2016: 1), there are several points which make me reluctant to fit the present investigation fully within the boundaries of Text World Theory. Above all, I would avoid an interpretation of a DW as “the real-world situation in which language occurs” (Gavins and Lahey 2016: 1). I would rather perceive a DW as a cognitive simulation of that ‘real-world situation’:

> [...] human information processing and exchange, of which textual communication is part, might not be dealing directly with an objective reality. The critical shift of angle is that textual communication – like any other human activity – has to do directly only with mental simulations of an objective reality and not directly with reality itself. Human-specific information processing mechanisms invariably stand as the mediator between the two. (Tincheva 2021: 7)

Such an approach, it is my strong belief, could enable scholars to draw more systematic parallels between TWs and DWs as then the two conceptual entities would share a similar ontological status. Support for such a choice could be found in de Beaugrande and Dressler’s (1981) treatment of what they call ‘user-centered parameters’ in text processing, where all parameters are cognitive in nature and represent a text user’s set of cognitive constructs representing a physical communicative exchange.

Furthermore, I would try and avoid metaphorizing WORLDS as LEVELS, as done in both Stockwell (2002) and Gavins (2007), where hierarchies between DWs and TWs as well as between text- and sub-worlds are postulated. To the best of my knowledge, as of today, there has been no sound neurobiological confirmation of levels’ actual operation; neither has there

been prevailing neurobiologically-supported consent on the issue of how accessibility between Worlds actually takes place.

In brief, sound as Text World Theory's theoretical framework may be indeed, I would rather try and harmonize it with some precepts from other, not necessarily contradictory approaches. Such an approach, for instance, could be de Beaugrande and Dressler's (1981) treatment of TWs, which, in their own words, is "highly procedural" (i.e. to them, a TW is dynamic and 'on-line' created; for a discussion see Chapter IV). De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) refute the existence of 'levels' in textual communication. Crucially, throughout their work, they draw a distinction between reality and any cognitive structure/ network/ world which is used to think about said reality. Finally, for these reasons, such an approach coheres more easily with studies on conceptual metaphor and conceptual metonymy.

Real Worlds

The fact that the present investigation subscribes to de Beaugrande and Dressler's TW interpretation is conditioned by Johnson's crucial realization (as acknowledged in Lakoff 1987) that all human understanding depends on the nature of the human body, on the firing of neurons in our brains, and on our innate perceptual capacities and motor skills. A claim such as this derives from the theory of embodied realism (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999), according to which our bodily experience is what gives rise to and then controls our linguistic and social functioning. In this theory, the body, through its inborn capacities and bio-physical characteristics, is what allows for the existence of specifically human cognitive abilities and, thus, it is also what enables human cognition: "every action our body performs is controlled by our brains, and every input from the external world is made sense of by our brains" (Lakoff 2009: 1). Moreover, "[t]hought is physical" in that all mental structures are physically processed

by brain structures, and the human body is so much 'within' the mind that "there is no aspect of our understanding that is independent of the nature of the human organism" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 209).

Pivotal for such a standpoint is the human capacity for imagery (Johnson, 1987), i.e. for constructing alternative images of the same real-world phenomenon. 'Alternative' here needs to be seen, first, as crucial; second, it needs to be seen as ensuing from the premise that there is no one-to-one correct, objective, true, factual, etc. correspondence between anything 'external' to human thought and anything 'internal' or residing 'in' it.

As a consequence, any human image, model, or – in our case – World is, by definition and by electro-neuro-physiological necessity, a simulation of reality (or some part of it). In other words, human data processing is bound to be only interpretative – a phenomenon which associates with both the pervasiveness of the 'embodied mind' principle (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Turner 2011, 2014; Barsalou 2009, 2015, 2020) and the 'embodied realism' doctrine (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). This particular brand of 'embodied realism' is the kind of approach endorsed in the present investigation; it is the basis for my understanding of TWs, of DWs and of what I propose here to be Real Worlds (henceforth RWs).

Possible questions that could ensue from the above endorsement of Embodied Realism as a theoretical background to the present thesis may concern the presence and nature of RWs. As far as de Beaugrande and Dressler's and Werth's research on the issue is concerned, it does focus on TWs and on the coincidence of TWs with DWs, but it does not employ the notion of RWs. So, why do we need the notion of RW, and why are the notions of TW and DW insufficient?

The first possible answer is the existence of ambiguity as to the scope of a DW (scope variation will be discussed later in Chapters III, VII and VIII). To illustrate what is meant here by 'ambiguity' in this respect, let us take the DW of a parliamentary political speech. Such a

speech may be delivered within the physical limits of a parliament chamber, but it may also be simultaneously broadcast to audiences far away from the actual physical environment of the person delivering it. Thus, to the person delivering it, the political speech's DW may only employ cognitive constructs of MPs as LISTENERS; alternatively, it may include cognitive constructs of MPs, SENIOR CITIZENS FROM LARGE CITIES, COUNTRYSIDE TV VIEWERS, YOUNG MOTHERS, etc. Furthermore, such a speech may be recorded and aired later, which would also introduce changes to its DW. In this case, the changes would not be in terms of location but of time. In brief, in cases in which the same text could evoke either a DW seen as encompassing cognitive constructs related exclusively to the communicative 'here and now', or a DW seen as encompassing a greater number of cognitive constructs that are not related exclusively to the communicative 'here and now'. The existence of these alternatives could be interpreted as the existence of a narrower or broader DW scope for the same text.

This principle is also revealed in variations in individual perceptions of a DW. As argued in the previous paragraph, there cannot be expected to be a single, correct interpretation of (the scope of) a DW that is valid for all members of an audience. Moreover, it is highly questionable if a single, correct DW interpretation could exist even for one and the same text receiver: today, that text receiver may interpret a DW rather differently from the way they interpreted it, for example, two weeks ago, or will interpret it in three weeks' time.

In essence, such issues concern the interplay between a DW and reality. The first question here is how far a DW can extend 'into reality'. The second and, from my perspective, more important question is <u>where</u> a DW 'extends'. In other words, what exactly is the space that a DW can draw on, extend into and 'engulf' chunks from? The answer necessarily has to underline the fact that that space can only be a conceptual space due to the fact that a DW itself is one. As our example with the political speech demonstrates, a DW can incorporate concepts related to a broader and physically distant reality, but it cannot directly incorporate people from

that reality. Hence the present decision to postulate a RW as a conceptual space which interprets reality but is not equal to that reality.

Three main points seem to need at least some clarification here (before the issue is further elaborated on in the chapters in Part III) and they concern my interpretation of the difference between a RW and 'reality'. The first point is that my interpretation relies on the principles of cognition, therefore it does not approach 'reality' as referring to a fully describable and fully analyzable phenomenon which stands independent of human understanding and needs to be fully matched or perfectly represented by human cognitive structures and human academic theories. My interpretation approaches 'reality' simply as a describable and analyzable phenomenon (though not fully so) which does stand outside human minds and of which human cognition can (and needs to) create simulations. In turn, a RW is the human cognitive interpretation/simulation of what 'reality' may be. A perfect fit between the two, I believe, is not needed as humans can and do manage to function on no more than 'sufficient' fits between reality and their RWs.

This discrepancy between a viewpoint on 'reality' as fully amenable to human representation and 'reality' as no more than something sufficiently well simulated by human cognition can trigger a significant blur of theoretical and analytical focus. What can remain outside our lens is the important assumption that human information processing and exchange, of which textual communication is part, might not be dealing directly with an objective reality. The critical shift of angle is that textual communication – like any other human activity – has to do directly only with mental simulations of an objective reality and not directly with reality itself. Human-specific information processing mechanisms invariably stand as the mediator between the two. It is my conviction that a theoretically sound approach could only benefit from taking this into account.

Such a claim, it should be highlighted, does not represent a denial of the existence of an objective reality. The argument here holds that it is the specificities of the human brain and our sensorimotor pre-conditioning (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) that make it impossible for humans to understand and interact with a (possibly) objective reality. As already argued above, without the specificities of the human brain and our sensorimotor pre-conditioning, we, as humans, would not be able to experience reality in the particular ways we do. As a result, our cognitive abilities, which arise from the specificities of the human brain and our sensorimotor systems, unavoidably mediate between the (possibly) objective reality and our human perceptions of it. In a quite significant way, reaching beyond our cognitive abilities and directly into reality seems simply not possible for humans (ibid.).

What seems much more attainable for linguists, as humans, is the study of the human version, i.e. the human interpretation, of the (possibly) objective reality. No matter how opaque, principles of human mental modelling and simulation still appear to be more accessible for us than the reality they serve to interpret. Consequently, analyses of reality are also more likely to be attainable if they are approached as studies of human cognitive structures and not as studies of direct interaction with an objective, human-independent reality.

Perceptions of objectivity, on their part, are most likely brought into effect through high frequencies of occurrence of similar human-nature-conditioned mental interpretations. Due to the common build of human neurological and sensi-motor systems, human-produced mental structures tend to seem significantly similar to each other, and this similarity can be taken to bring about the impression of objectivity, or what Johnson (1987: 18) calls the "one correct God's-eye-view".

In sum, the present thesis upholds the possibility – or, indeed, the necessity – to approach reality from the perspective of the cognitive mechanisms employed by the participants in a communicative situation and not vice versa. In other words, the perspective employed starts

from the human mind; then, it moves towards the possible reality that the human mind needs to interpret/simulate. Even more simply put, what I uphold here is that the generally accepted viewpoint on textual analysis should be reversed and the cognitive structures and mechanisms used by communication participants should not be simply added to the object of analysis (as done in Text World Theory, see section above). It is the context which should be seen as part of the cognitive structures and procedures processed by the participants. After all, reality exists for humans only because they see it as such. An objective reality may or may not exist outside human perception, and no 'World' needs to be seen as a special case of 'real-ness'. In a way – and this can be argued to be quite a crucial way – we can study only our human-specific perceptions of reality and not directly that reality itself.

As a consequence – and this is the second point that seems to need clarification – what is perceived here to be a RW is just one of the numerous possible interpretations of reality. A RW is seen here as an interpretation that need not be an accurate one but needs to be a sufficiently adequate simulation of reality which allows a person to function sufficiently adequately in said reality. Furthermore, that person's current RW need not be a perfect fit to reality, not even to the same person's reality of, let's say, today or two years before today. RWs can vary and this, I believe, is confirmed by everyone's experience of 'learning'.

II. 4. 2. Relevance to the object of analysis

The notion of a TW, in the case of a POLITICAL SPEECH, associates with our respondents' perceptions of 'what a political speech is about' (as reported in Study 1 and 2 earlier in this chapter). However, a TW could not account for our respondents' perceptions of 'a politician speaking to regular citizens'. That can be accounted for through the notion of a DW. Such interplay between types of Worlds will lie at the center of this section of Chapter II.

In exemplifying the construction of a TW, a representative sample from our data set would read as follows:

> Sample 10
> From the moment that the French defenses at Sedan and on the Meuse were broken at the end of the second week of May, only a rapid retreat to Amiens and the south could have saved the British and French Armies who had entered Belgium at the appeal of the Belgian King; but this strategic fact was not immediately realized. The French High Command hoped they would be able to close the gap, and the Armies of the north were under their orders. Moreover, a retirement of this kind would have involved almost certainly the destruction of the fine Belgian Army of over 20 divisions and the abandonment of the whole of Belgium. Therefore, when the force and scope of the German penetration were realized and when a new French Generalissimo, General Weygand, assumed command in place of General Gamelin, an effort was made by the French and British Armies in Belgium to keep on holding the right hand of the Belgians and to give their own right hand to a newly created French Army which was to have advanced across the Somme in great strength to grasp it. (Winston Churchill, PM; March 5, 1946)

No linguistic structure in this longish passage serves to evoke a DW. The excerpt focuses exclusively on creating a TW. *From the moment* and *at the end of the second week of May* evoke the mental construction of past moments and periods and not of the time of the current communicative process, thus providing temporal specifics for the TW only. The spatial

delimitations of the TW are specified through the use of, e.g., *Sedan, the Meuse, Amiens and the south, Belgium, the Somme*. Moreover, all cognitive structures connected with PERSONS and evoked by the text are of people not present at the time and place of delivery of the speech: e.g. THE BRITISH AND FRENCH ARMIES, THE BELGIAN KING, THE FRENCH HIGH COMMAND, FRENCH GENERALISSIMO, GENERAL WEYGAND, GENERAL GAMELIN, THE BELGIANS. Consequently, no element in this passage can be considered as bringing about the construction of a DW.

Sample 11 below also evokes no concepts associated with what could be interpreted as a DW. The whole passage focuses on the creation of a TW through the coordination of concepts such as THE CANARY WHARF BOMB, THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT, THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS, TERRORISTS, THE LAW, CEASEFIRE, etc. All these concepts represent entities absent from the immediate communicative environment:

> Sample 11
> The Canary Wharf bomb clearly and conclusively proves that there is no prospect of the republican movement becoming committed to exclusively peaceful means.
> The duty of government is clear. But the British and Irish Governments have shirked that duty. Instead of making terrorists amenable to the law, they have responded to their agenda asking in return only for a "credible ceasefire". (Trimble, 23 March 1996, UUAP Annual General Meeting)

Despite the fact that both Sample 10 and Sample 11 above do not reveal any degree of World coincidence, public political speeches can indeed display TW and DW overlapping. This possibility is employed, for example, in President Bill Clinton's televised White House Speech of December 11, 1998, in which the cognitive structure of the LEADER in the TW and the cognitive structure of the SPEAKER in the DW coincide, while the CITIZENS in the TW coincide with the LISTENERS in the DW:

Sample 12

As anyone close to me knows, for months I have been grappling with how best to reconcile myself to the American people, to acknowledge my own wrongdoing and still to maintain my focus on the work of the presidency.

Sample 4 discussed in the previous section also exemplifies this principle. In it, *These attacks continue as I speak* simultaneously evokes a DW, in which the politician speaks, and a TW, in which military attacks proceed. In a similar fashion, in Sample 5, the concepts shared by both Worlds are signalled by *I* (in this case, referring to Neville Chamberlain), *this country*, *war*. In the TW, *I* evokes a cognitive structure associating with what happened *Eighteen months ago* as well as with the unavoidable future responsibility. In the DW, *I* evokes a cognitive structure associating with *to say many words tonight*.

The following sample represents the TW – DW overlap, which our dataset reveals to be typical of political speeches. In it, *I ask the American people* evokes the construction of a DW, while *to go on from here, to rise above the rancor* evokes the construction of a TW:

Sample 13

So with profound gratitude for the defense of the Constitution and the best in America that was raised *today* by the *members here* and *those who joined them*, *I* ask *the American people to move* with *me* -- *to go on* from *here to rise above the rancor*, *to overcome the pain* and *division, to be a repairer of the breach* -- all of *us* -- *to make this country as one America* what it can and must be for *our* children in *the new century* about to dawn.

Thank *you* very much. (U.S. President Bill Clinton, December 19, 1998)

In both Words in this sample, it is President Bill Clinton that is in the role of the politician. In the DW, he is the politician who acts as a speaker and who expresses his gratitude,

asks, thanks, etc. In the TW, he is the politician, who *moves* ahead, *rises, makes this country as one America*. In both Worlds, the politician's followers are *the American people*. In the DW, they are being expressed thanks to and asked to move on together with the politician. In the TW, the two parties are to co-operate and *to make this country as one America*.

The following excerpt from the same speech demonstrates the possibility for ambiguous interpretation of which World a language signal evokes. It also demonstrates the possibility for that ambiguity to remain unresolved even after the text has been processed:

> Sample 14
> Good afternoon.
> As anyone close to me knows, for months I have been grappling with how best to reconcile myself to the American people, to acknowledge my own wrongdoing and still to maintain my focus on the work of the presidency. Others are presenting my defense on the facts, the law and the Constitution. Nothing I can say now can add to that. What I want the American people to know, what I want the Congress to know is that I am profoundly sorry for all I have done wrong in words and deeds. (President Bill Clinton, TV address, December 19, 1998)

Here *I want* and *I am profoundly sorry* in *What I want the American people to know, what I want the Congress to know is that I am profoundly sorry* may signal (a) the RW (as would, e.g., *I was sorry for quite some time*), (b) a DW (as would, e.g., *I feel sorry as I am speaking right now*), or (c) a TW (i.e. the protagonist in the story feels sorry). The choice, importantly, remains unresolved as at least two of the alternatives can be argued to be valid simultaneously. In other words, non-determinacy, resulting in lasting ambiguity (terms as in de Beaugrande and Dressler 1981) as to which World is currently being constructed (i.e. a TW, a DW or a RW) does not impede text users' processing a text. World overlapping, consequently, is, arguably, the norm. Moreover, such World ambiguity confirms the fact that choosing which

type of World (i.e. a TW or a DW) is currently being constructed is not a one-correct-answer activity but rather a matter of individual perceptual specificities.

Thus, Sample 14 also illustrates that language signals such as *now* could be interpreted either as triggering a construction of the TW as, for example, would *next* and *after that* in *The question was what we were going to do next*, or *The question was what we were going to do after that?* Alternatively, *now* could be seen as a deictic *now* signalling a DW.

Moreover, in this sample, the choice between the two Worlds is unresolved. Does *now* refer to the RW COMMON POLITICAL PATH the President and the U.S. citizens all 'walk along'? Or does it refer to the time of the ongoing communicative process? The answer should be viewed in light of the fact that the whole speech centers round the topic of the honesty of the U.S. President and the quality of communication between him and the citizens. Therefore, *now* is more likely to be signalling TW or RW construction. On the other hand, the situation in which the speech was delivered was explicitly verbalized by Clinton as a moment aiming to rectify all previous verbal misdemeanors. In other words, the DW itself was meant by the text producer(s) to be profiled as a STEP along the PATH OF LIFE.

The difficulty in deciding the construction of which World is intended applies equally strongly to the use of pronouns in Sample 14. The 1 p. pl. pronoun in *have invited members of Congress to work with us to find* might signal the activation of a joint image of the POLITICAL SPEAKER AND HIS AUDIENCE (however broad a televised audience might be calculated in advance to be). *Us* could, alternatively, signal the activation of a joint image of the POLITICAL SPEAKER AND HIS AIDES. Then again, *us* could signal the activation of a joint image of the SPEAKER AND HIS POLITICAL PARTY. The 1 p. pl. pronoun could also serve to trigger the image of the whole NATION to which both SPEAKER and his (expected) AUDIENCE belong. What is unambiguous, nonetheless, is that the use of the 1 p. sg. pronoun evokes the conflation of a TW, a DW and a RW.

In conclusion to Section II.3. and II.4., it seems safe to argue that the consistently high degree of overlap of Worlds evident across the political speeches in our dataset strongly suggests the overlap is a characteristic feature typical of the genre. However, as the analysis of samples demonstrates, sometimes the linguistic signals can be ambiguous as to which World they evoke. In such cases, it seems justified to speak of a TW-DW overlap or coincidence. On the other hand, on occasions such as those represented in Samples 6 and 7, the linguistic signals used seem to evoke first a TW and then a DW.

The presence in one and the same political speech of both a TW and a DW containing the same INITIAL STATE – STEPS – DESIRED STATE mappings can explain the strong tendency for the Worlds' overlapping in this genre, which is not observed in other genres. That overlap can in its turn explain why, ever since Aristotelian times, scholarly analyses of political speeches have mixed together interpersonal functions and linguistic structural ones (as discussed in the II.1.above): scholarly investigations on the multi-functionality of political speeches tend to have functions pertaining to either of the overlapping Worlds mixed together, or blended.

The principle of World overlap can also explain why, in the case of political speeches, delimiting communicative interpersonal functions (which associate with a DW) from political, non-communicative functions (which associate with a RW) has been found so hard (as discussed in the Introductory section above). More simply put, in political speeches, overlappings between DWs and RWs can be frequently observed. This, regrettably, is too broad a topic to incorporate in the present chapter as that would require yet another cognitive mechanism – the one of conceptual metonymy – be additionally introduced here (see Chapters V, VII and VIII). What the present section does need to highlight, however, is the necessity to combine the strong explanatory potential of the principle of Worlds' co-existence with the

metaphoric transfer from the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schema (which results in the presence of the INITIAL STATE – STEPS – DESIRED STATE structure).

Achieving that is not a straightforward task as there are a multitude of possibilities pertaining to how conceptual metaphor and Worlds' co-existence could function simultaneously in political speeches. As the dataset samples included demonstrate, there can be delineated two mechanisms of World operation: World sequencing (in cases where there is no ambiguity as to which World is currently being evoked) and World overlapping (in cases where there is ambiguity as to which World is currently being evoked).

World sequencing, the speeches in the dataset reveal, can take place in one or more of the INITIAL STATE, STEPS, DESIRED STATE parts. For example, INITIAL STATE may concentrate on the current DW EVENT or SITUATION, then STEPS and DESIRED STATE may evoke the construction of hypothetical future TW EVENTS or SITUATIONS. However, as the dataset Samples included above also demonstrate, there exists World sequencing within the boundaries of a single one of the three parts (i.e. within an INITIAL STATE, within a STEP, or within a DESIRED STATE).

The mechanism of World overlapping in its turn should also prove capable of spanning a whole INITIAL STATE – STEPS – DESIRED STATE structure. And, similarly to World sequencing, World overlapping should also exist within a single one of the three structural parts (i.e. in an INITIAL STATE, a STEPS segment, or in a DESIRED STATE). Thus, it can be expected that (a) either of the two cognitive mechanisms of World sequencing and World overlapping can co-function with conceptual metaphor to create the impression of step-by-step MOVEMENT through the TEXT of a POLITICAL SPEECH, and (b) sequencing the two mechanisms of World sequencing and World overlapping can also co-function with conceptual metaphor to create the impression of step-by-step movement through the text of a political speech.

All considerations taken into account, it seem justified to conclude that simply adding World theory to conceptual metaphor does not appear sufficient in explaining the cognitive mechanisms at play in the genre of political speeches. The next section will argue in favor of further adding the notion of profile shifts to the list of cognitive mechanisms already isolated for inclusion in our hypothesized multi-process model.

II. 5. Cognitive mechanisms: Gestalt psychology's profiling shifts

II. 5. 1. General background

What the existing cognition-related literature affords us with respect to the conclusions in the previous section stems from gestalt psychology. It associates with the cognitive mechanisms of profiling and profile shifts.

Profiling, as proposed by Rubin (1921), derives from gestalt perception principles (Koffka 1935; Wertheimer 1938); it is a very general feature of cognition (Langacker 2008: 58) and concerns mental operations performed in distinguishing between a figure and its background. The very label of 'figure and background' may be little else but a metaphorical expression (Langacker 2008: 58). Nevertheless, the mechanism itself should be emphasized as fundamentally experiential; it is also intertwined with the co-operation of other cognitive abilities such as attention (Schmid and Ungerer 2010) and focusing (Langacker 2008). Thus, my understanding of figure-ground relationships should not be confused with Halliday's (1971: 339) cognition-free claim that foregrounding is "prominence that is motivated": Halliday there speaks of "a poem or a prose text" displaying "regularities in the sounds or words or structures" which are "brought into prominence" because they relate to "the meaning of the text as a whole" (ibid.).

Generally, gestalt perception represents holistic object processing and it draws on innate visual processing mechanisms (see, e.g., Dalrymple et al.: 2013). It results from the innate cognitive incapacity of the human mind to process uninterrupted homogeneous information flow and with the ensuing need for humans to think in terms of separate entities (i.e. 'gestalts') even when there is no objective evidence of an entity's actual being.

As Fig. 1 below (Internet source 1) demonstrates, even unconnected spots, when abiding by gestalt perception principles such as – to mention just a couple – proximity and similarity in color, can be perceived as constituting a holistic image, in this case a DOG gestalt.

Fig. 1 A DOG gestalt

Arguably, every cognitive structure can function as a gestalt (Lakoff and Johnson 1999), regardless of its size or degree of internal structural complexity. Thus, a single concept such as POLITICAL SPEECH or a whole network of concepts such as a World can both be seen as operating in accordance with gestalt principles (for a discussion of 'neural gestalts' see Lakoff 2014).

Another result from the human cognitive incapacity to work with uninterrupted information flow is the need to isolate and bring into focus one gestalt, while suppressing another or other gestalts to the background. The principle is probably best illustrated by the so-called Rubin's vase seen in Fig. 2:



Fig. 2 Rubin's vase

In Fig. 2, one needs to choose whether to focus on (i.e. whether to profile) the white segment in the picture (let us call it gestalt 1) or the black segment in the picture (gestalt 2). Processing both gestalts simultaneously is not a cognitive possibility: in Fig. 2, one can see either the white vase or the black faces. It should be also emphasized that after one profiles, let us say, the vase, and then suppresses it as background and profiles the faces, it is possible to next suppress the faces back as background and profile the vase again.

Such shifts in profiling can occur an unlimited number of times. As the next section will demonstrate, this principle of profile switching, or profile shifting, can operate from one text segment to another as well, and thus create a sense of MOVEMENT through a text.

In the gestalt theory of perception, the cognitive segment that is being profiled is unavoidably interpreted against, i.e. in relation to, the background of at least one other cognitive segment. As the main assumption here is that two types of World (e.g. a TW and a DW) not only can be seen as functioning through the cognitive mechanism of profiling shifts but they need to be seen that way, it seems also necessary to assume that no TW can exist without the background of a DW and vice versa.

To verify these assumptions, I sought linguistic evidence in the political speeches in our dataset. With this respect, there is a theoretical issue concerning the cognitive role language plays that needs to be clarified. While the mechanism of profiling functions dynamically through DW and TW consecutive switches, the process is signalled by linguistic items and structures. Simply put, linguistic expressions are taken here to be indicators of which World is currently being profiled and which World is being suppressed as background. Linguistic signals, thus, are taken to help a text receiver ‘figure out’ either what the text ‘is about’.

A final point which calls for attention concerns the existence of cognitive-grammar and cognitive-semantics research which also employs the notions of figure and background. The relationship between the two is seen there as based on the following rationale: “The Figure

object is a moving or conceptually movable point [...]. The Ground object is a reference-point [...], with respect to which the figure's path or site receives characterization" (Talmy 2000, 315). Similarly, Langacker (1987, 231) defines "the figure in a relational profile" as "a trajectory", and "other salient entities" as "landmark". Overall, such investigations tend to focus on syntactic divisions (see, e.g., Langacker 1987; Croft 2001), on focusing within a lexical matrix or on lexical categorization (see, e.g., Talmy 2000; Langacker 2008). In other words, the research available focuses only on those principles which are necessary and applicable to syntactic analysis and analysis of smaller semantic units.

The present investigation, regrettably, needs to incorporate principles applicable to cognitive networks of considerably greater size and complexity as compared to isolated semantic and syntactic units: it studies POLITICAL SPEECHES, which emerge through the use of numerous sentences in sequence. It also needs to apply the principle to World creation processes, a World, clearly, encompassing numerous conceptual structures.

II. 5. 2. Relevance to the object of analysis

As evident from the analysis of the samples in the previous sections, linguistic signals employed to indicate the profiling of a DW could be, for example, deictic items such as *now* and *here*. Clearly, when *here* is used, a DW is expected to be brought to the fore, and its corresponding TW is expected to be suppressed to the background.

The following samples demonstrate another type of linguistic signals which are used throughout our dataset to indicate, first, the simultaneous presence of a TW and a DW, and, second, the profiling of a DW over a TW. These linguistic signals can be termed 'audience-addressing expressions' and can be subdivided into opening expressions, in-text expressions, and closing expressions. Examples of opening DW-profiling expressions from our dataset are:

> Sample 15
> *Good evening*.
> Just moments ago, I spoke with George W. Bush and congratulated him on becoming the 43rd President of the United States, and I promised him that I wouldn't call him back this time." (Al Gore, Dec. 13, 2000)

> Sample 16
> *Members of the Dail and Seanad,*
> after all the long and torn history of our two peoples, standing here as the first British prime minister ever to address the joint Houses of the Oireachtas, I feel profoundly both the history in this event, and I feel profoundly the enormity of the honour that you are bestowing upon me. From the bottom of my heart, go raibh mile maith agaibh." (Tony Blair, Nov. 26, 1998)

In Sample 15, *Good evening* profiles a DW, immediately after which *Just moments ago* calls up a TW as it refers to a situation distinct from the immediate communicative one. Clearly, there is a degree of ambiguity in profiling, as *Just moments ago* additionally coordinates the

past situation (associating with the TW) with respect to the immediate communicative situation (associating with the DW). Moreover, the later uses of *I* are also ambiguous: technically, they signal that the TW is being profiled, but, due to the nature and specifics of the 1 p.sg. pronominal reference in general, the speaker, to which the pronoun refers, cannot be fully excluded from the current DW. On the basis of these peculiarities, it seems justified to argue that, first, both a TW and a DW are activated through this passage, and, second, the initially profiled DWs is later suppressed significantly in favor of a TW.

In Sample 16, *Members of the Dail and Seanad* profiles the DW, after which *the long and torn history* suppresses the DW as background and profiles a TW. After that, *standing* and *here* suppress the TW and bring back the DW to the fore. As in Sample 15, the use of the pronouns creates a degree of ambiguity through World conflation, as does the use of the progressive tense in *are bestowing*. Nevertheless, as in the samples analyzed in the previous section, here both a TW and a DW can be argued to be present and profiling shifts between Worlds can be safely argued to be enacted.

The same techniques can be seen operating in the following example of an in-text DW-profiling expression from our dataset:

> Sample 17
> Today, we face new threats and instabilities. Weapons of mass destruction are now available to regimes who have little respect for human life.
> *My friends,*
> we in Britain are proud to be part of the great Anglo-American Alliance - the greatest force for liberty the world has ever known. (Margaret Thatcher, 1997)

A dataset example of a DW-profiling closing expression is:

Sample 18

And so, we leave with high hopes, in good spirit, and with deep humility, and with very much gratefulness in our hearts. I can only say to each and every one of you, we come from many faiths, we pray perhaps to different gods -- but really the same God in a sense -- but I want to say for each and every one of you, not only will we always remember you, not only will we always be grateful to you but always you will be in our hearts and you will be in our prayers.

Thank you very much. (U. S. President Nixon, August 8, 1974)

Beyond such addressing expressions, sample 19 below illustrates the possibility for language to signal profile shifts functioning in parallel with World overlaps:

Sample 19

My Lords and Members of the House of Commons.

My Government's central objectives are economic stability, and investment and reform in public services, leading to a more prosperous and inclusive society.

To this end, my Government will continue to secure low inflation and sound public finances. My Government's main priorities for the forthcoming Session will be reform in education, health, crime and welfare. (Queen Elizabeth II; 20 June 2001)

In Sample 19, *My Lords and Members of the House of Commons* triggers the activation of PARTICIPANTS in the DW, thus profiling the DW and suggesting that the TW should be pushed to the background (at least those structures of it which do not overlap with DW structures).

Then, the remaining part of the text focuses on the construction of a TW. However, every time *my* (in *my government*) is used, it first signals that both the DW and the TW are activated. Second, it indicates which of the overlapping Worlds should be brought to the fore. If all the government are present at the time of speech delivery, then what signals the need to switch from profiling the DW to foregrounding the TW is the end of the whole noun phrase *my*

Government. If the government are not present at the time of speech delivery, then only the possessive pronoun would be used to signal the DW. In such a case, what signals the need to switch from profiling the DW to foregrounding the TW is the demarcation line between the pre-modifier and the head noun within the noun phrase *my Government*. Similarly, *central objectives are economic stability, and investment and reform in public services, leading to a more prosperous and inclusive society* suggests the TW be pulled to the fore and the DW be suppressed as the background.

By way of a conclusion to this section, it seems expedient that I highlight the importance of existing research on the cognitive validity of the theoretical construct of deictic shifts. Psycholinguistic and neuropsychological studies have so far convincingly demonstrated that, for example, deictic narrative shifts involve the right temporal gyrus and precuneus, as well as the posterior or middle cingulate on both sides of the cortex (Chilton 2017). In other words, profiling World shifts are very much to be likely not merely a theoretical abstraction but, rather, a fundamental neurophysiological phenomenon.

II. 6. The mechanisms in the multi-process set

As of this point of our investigation, Chapter II managed to isolate the following co-functioning cognitive mechanisms, which are very strong candidates for inclusion in our multi-process set:

- ✓ Conceptual metaphor
- ✓ World construction
- ✓ World overlapping
- ✓ World profiling shifts

The next chapter in Part I will seek verification for the presence of these mechanisms in the set. It will also try and establish if other mechanisms should be considered for inclusion in the model proposed in the thesis.

CHAPTER III

VERIFYING THE MODEL

III. 1. Another early object of text- and discourse-related analysis: Text structure

III. 1. 1. General background

The point of departure in Chapter II is the fact that interest in text- and discourse use originated in Classical Rhetorical times as an interest in (political speech) text segments' organization correlated with text segment functions. To improve the quality of a political speech, Aristotle (1991, trans. Kennedy) recommended a sequence of text segments be delineated and organized as follows: there should be a first part stating the subject, a second and third part proving the main thesis, an exordium at the beginning and an epilogue at the end. Within each of these text segments, Aristotle maintains there are 'proper' places for the text producer to reject opposing arguments, to refute opponents' assertions, to attack and counterattack the opponents personally, etc.

As any literature survey will reveal, present-day studies avoid returning directly to the thousands-of-years old concept of TEXT STRUCTURE, presumably because it tends to be considered a dated and already exhausted area of research. Instead, present-day studies tend to focus on notions such as NARRATIVE STRUCTURE or RHETORICAL STRUCTURE (see e.g. Fludernik 2002; Herman 2009, 2018; Herman et al. 2012; Krieken et al. 2016; Richardson 2019; Cohn 2019). The problem is that, as any literature survey will also reveal, there is a scarcity of scholarly works which overtly address the question of how precisely TEXT

STRUCTURE, NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, RHETORICAL STRUCTURE, etc. compare and differ.

As a consequence, scholars investigating TEXT STRUCTURE, NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, or RHETORICAL STRUCTURE may face difficulties when pinpointing the connection between their object of investigation and the correct term to express that specific object. Another consequence is the confusion they may experience concerning the specific theoretical background against which their object of investigation could be placed.

The situation could be further aggravated by the existing calls for a much-needed integration of the studies on the structure of whole texts. For example, Phelan (1996), Kearns (1999) and Iversen (2014) advocate an analytical merger between rhetorical and narrative elements, while Herman (2009, 2018) and Fludernik (2010) support such a merger between cognitive and narrative structures. It is the very possibility for such a merger to exist that lies in the focus of this paper. My main objective is to provide a viable explanation of how it is possible for TEXT STRUCTURE, NARRATIVE STRUCTURE and RHETORICAL STRUCTURE to exist as different notions and still be susceptible to merger.

Thus, the present investigation focuses on the terminological and conceptual diversity surrounding what I will be calling here WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE, i.e. any kind of structure which 'runs across' a whole text, or 'holds' a whole text 'together'. The underlying assumption is that 'text structure', 'narrative structure', 'rhetorical structure', etc., are not simply different terms designating the same concept but that they serve to profile different aspects of a single concept. Therefore, the cognitive mechanism of profiling, isolated for inclusion in our multi-process model (formulated in Chapter II), is expected to be of special prominence here. Conceptual metaphor, World construction and overlap are also expected to be operational.

To provide a stepping stone for the theoretical generalizations in this chapter, first a dataset is compiled. Next, content analysis is conducted on the dataset. The results obtained from the analysis are then placed within the perspective of verifying or refuting the presence of the cognitive processes hypothesized to be part of our multi-process model.

Thus, the research questions the analysis addresses are:

- What are the major terms used throughout the literature to refer to a structure which ‘runs across’ a whole text, or which ‘holds’ a whole text ‘together’?
- What concept(s) does each of those terms evoke?
- What cognitive mechanisms could account for the existence of the terms and their corresponding concepts?
- Could WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE be viewed as a single conceptual complex governing all terms and their corresponding concepts?

III. 1. 2. Dataset source selection

As my aim in the present investigation is to establish how WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE is conceptualized and how TEXT STRUCTURE, NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, RHETORICAL STRUCTURE, etc. compare and differ, it seems apt that I first isolate and systematize WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE interpretations and the existing terms throughout the relevant literature. To achieve that, mapping out the scope and nature of the body of literature in the topic area seems a mandatory step. In identifying relevant works and sources, I conducted a scoping review, which followed the principles and procedural steps laid out in Khan et al. (2003) and Arksey and O'Malley (2005).

By definition (see, e.g., Levac et al. 2010) a scoping review, in contrast to a systematic review of the relevant literature, is one that includes examples of all kinds of methodologies and study designs. It is a kind of review which represents the existing material descriptively, without the need for critical, single-standpoint theoretical or analytical evaluation of each paper. As Munn et al. (2018: 1) argue, "[r]esearchers may conduct scoping reviews instead of systematic reviews where the purpose of the review is to [...] scope a body of literature, clarify concepts or to investigate research conduct". Consequently, conducting a scoping review seems more apt to the objectives of this paper, which focuses on clarifying how certain concepts are used throughout the relevant literature. The scoping review was also chosen as the appropriate research instrument as it relies on the most extensive searches. Furthermore, it aims to capture and include both computerized and printed resources, which is a need that had to be met here, having in mind the vast time-span from Aristotelian times until the present.

The scoping review I conducted for the purposes of the investigation aims to cover the widest range of linguistic, cognitive linguistic, text linguistic, psycholinguistic, discourse analytical, literary, etc. research. Procedurally, it involves several stages. In the first stage, two scientific databases (*SCOPUS* and *Web of Science*) were searched to identify primary studies

relating to whole-text structure. The two databases were selected due to their exhaustiveness in covering (a) a broad range of communication- and language-related disciplines and (b) works of high quality. No limits on date, general subject, genre or source size were imposed; the only limitation was that the source be in the English language. The search queries were the terms relating to WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE, which were listed in the Introduction above (i.e. 'text structure', 'narrative structure', 'rhetoric structure').

The next step aimed to introduce a branch-like progression of the search. It involved applying the same search strings; this time the queries were run in the *Google Web Search* and *Yahoo! Search* internet engines. Next, all works extracted were assessed as to their eligibility for inclusion in the list of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE relevant sources, i.e. whether they truly dealt with the topic of this investigation. Titles, abstracts and reference sections were all thus screened. To extend further the branch-like progression of the search, the third step was to conduct a re-run of the searches on the two internet engines and to locate the secondary works appearing in the reference sections of the primary list of works. Duplicate records from the different searches were removed manually. These procedures resulted in a list of 317 works on the topic appearing up to October 2021, on which the content analysis was next carried out.

The content analysis located terms used to evoke any kind of structure which 'runs across' a whole text, or 'holds' a whole text 'together'. Next, it traced correspondences in the use of the terms and objects of analysis across the dataset (i.e. it matched terms with the concepts the terms are used to evoke). To narrow the margin of error, I conducted a re-analysis of the dataset about five months later. As the purpose of the present investigation is to outline a conceptual configuration which has the potential to account for any possible interpretation of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE, at both stages (i.e. analysis and re-analysis), my interpretations were viewed only as some of the possible interpretations. The results of the thus conducted content analyses are systematized and reported in the section below.

III. 1. 3. Relevance to the object of analysis

The analysis reveals that throughout the dataset there are 6 terms used to evoke a structure which 'runs across' a whole text, or 'holds' a whole text 'together': 'rhetorical structure', 'narrative structure', 'text structure', 'overall structure', 'superstructure' and 'macrostructure'. This section focuses on the uses of each of those terms throughout the data sources.

As indicated in the introductory section, however, there are several impediments constraining the ways the dataset analysis could be presented here. The topmost issue is the absence of scholarly works which overtly provide definitions of how precisely they view their object of analysis. Similarly, there is an absence of works which overtly specify how TEXT STRUCTURE, NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, RHETORICAL STRUCTURE, etc. compare and differ.

On the one hand, this scarcity is precisely the reason why the present investigation is conducted – the investigation targets this research niche specifically. On the other hand, the absence of such definitions and clarifications makes including citations and definitions from the sources, practically, unfeasible. Including and deliberating on lengthy passages here is beyond the limits of the paper and seems better suited to a more extensive and voluminous genre. To surmount the issue, this section summarizes the main uses of the terms and presents them in the form of what is generally known as 'a literature review'. This seems a viable solution since the information summarized in this section is not the main investigation target; it is merely a stepping stone towards isolating the cognitive mechanisms controlling the use of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE, which is the main goal of this investigation.

'Rhetorical structure'

'Rhetorical structure' tends to, first, concern the sequential arrangement of textual segments, and, second, it tends to correlate those textual segments with certain interpersonal functions the

segments need to perform (e.g. Medhurst 1987; Cumming and Ono 1997; Eggins and Martin 1997; Ansary and Babaii 2009; Bolgün and Asham 2017; Wang et al. 2020). Arguably, it is this type of whole-text structure which originated in Classical Rhetoric times, when Aristotle determined the 'proper' places at which a text producer needs to refute opponents' reasoning, to attack and counterattack the opponents, to refer to similar previous cases and issues, to arouse emotions in the addressees, to recapitulate the main points, etc. However, it should be highlighted that not all functions specified by Aristotle are text-receiver-oriented: 'recapitulating the main points' and 'referring to previous issues', for instance, could not be subsumed under the 'interpersonal function' category. Modern-day rhetorical studies, our dataset reveals, also tend to amalgamate different types of functions into a single multi-functional framework, which is a fact also accountable for through the cognitive framework proposed in the subsequent sections of this paper.

A related use of the term 'rhetorical structure' is the one taught in writing classes (especially in the USA), which deals with text segments such as 'introduction', 'body' and 'conclusion'. This use of the term, too, links each segment to a text user's communicative intent or a text user's perception of an interpersonal goal to be accomplished (e.g., Swales 1990; Swales and Feak 1994; Devitt 2015).

The third – and quite different – use of the term 'rhetorical structure' can be observed in the so-called Rhetorical Structure Theory (Mann et al. 1992; Taboada and Mann 2006; Mitrović et. al. 2017), which views RHETORICAL STRUCTURE as a considerably different phenomenon. The theory aims to establish connections between propositional units and rhetorical discursive relations in a text. The approach bears a strong resemblance to syntactic theories as it represents a RHETORICAL STRUCTURE as a tree in which every relation (e.g. Preparation, Condition, Means, Concession, Contrast) is expressed by a sub-tree. Importantly, the approach works within paragraphs, within subsections and within sections (Taboada and

Mann 2006, 403), and, thus, can be argued to be peripheral to our analysis as it does not relate to WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE.

Yet another use of the term 'rhetorical structure' expresses reference to in-text instances of metaphor, alliteration, litotes, irony, syntactic parallelism, etc. (e.g. van Dijk 1997). Not referring to WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE, this use of the term is also peripheral to the present investigation.

'Narrative structure'

'Narrative structure' is the term which is revealed to be used with the greatest variety throughout our dataset. Moreover, its uses tend to overlap the most with the uses of other terms examined. For example, the 'introduction', 'body' and 'conclusion' sequential organization frequently expressed through 'rhetorical structure' can be used to evoke WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE in narrative studies, too.

Narrative studies (e.g. Emmott 1997; Bal 2009; Felluga 2011; Herman 2018; Richardson 2019; Cohn 2019) can overtly overlap and merge with rhetorical analyses, as evident in, for instance, Feldman et al. (2004) and Herman et al. (2012). On multiple occasions, the rhetorical component in such research is restricted to 'rhetorical acts', i.e. interpersonal communicative intentions (*ibid*.: 2), while the structure-bound component is approached in terms of textual factors such as narrative persona, implied audience, plot, action, time, space, setting, character, etc. Importantly, 'structures' such as the ones of the latter type are actually segment-internal ones and they do not lay emphasis on consecutive textual segments as much as 'rhetorical structure' studies do.

Moreover, it is not only studies in Narratology that display interest in NARRATIVE STRUCTURE. Cognitive textual and discursive endeavors (e.g. van Dijk 1980) can focus on the 'action structure' of narratives (i.e. on text-world ACTIONS). Sociolinguists (most notably

Labov and Waletzky 1967; Labov 2010) can focus on successive textual portions such as Abstract, Orientation, Complication, Resolution, Evaluation, and Coda. (It should be noted, however, that Labov's interpretation of narrative is dependent on clause analyses, especially on what Labov (2010) calls free, narrative clauses, i.e. clauses with their own temporal specifications.)

It is not only that other approaches have adopted the notion of NARRATIVE STRUCTURE. Narratologists also adopt principles from other studies. Eggins and Slade (1997: 38), for instance, elaborate on Labov's six-part narrative structural progression and argue segments such as 'Orientation' and 'Evaluation' may appear either before or as part of 'Complication' and 'Resolution' respectively, that 'Abstract' and 'Coda' segments are optional, and that 'Evaluation' is a segment which does not follow a sequencing pattern but, instead, should be seen as cutting across all other parts of the structure.

Cognitive research and theories, especially research on 'story schemata' (e.g. Rumelhart 1975; Rumelhart and Ortony 1977; Brewer and Lichtenstein 1985) have also left their mark on narratology (see, e.g., Fludernik 2002, 2010; Herman 2009, 2018; Eubanks 2010; Sanford and Emmott 2012) and on visual narratology (see e.g. Cohn 2013, 2019; Plomp and Forceville 2021). The result can be grouped under the label of 'Story Grammars', which seek to link schemata elements to what Rumelhart proposes be analyzed as "the syntactic structure of stories" (1975), i.e. the organization of internal story segments. To achieve that, "syntactic story" categories are listed such as action, application, change-of-state desire, episode, event, pre-action, reaction, state, sub-goal, etc. (ibid.: 222). Principally, the supporters of the approach (e.g. Brewer and Lichtenstein 1985) distinguish between 'abstract structure' and 'non-abstract' structure, the latter standing for the way linguistic expressions form sequences. Attempts to maintain the difference have even led some narratologists (e.g. Emmott and Alexander 2009)

to follow cognitive discourse analyst van Dijk's (1997) and text linguist's Hasan's (Halliday and Hasan 1985) preference for the term of 'overall structure' to refer to the latter.

'Text structure'

'Text structure' is used in the dataset in three main senses. The first one, quite similarly to one of the senses expressed by 'rhetorical structure', associates with in-class writing activities (e.g., Dymock 2005; McKinley 2014; Nicholson and Dymock 2018), and it, too, can deal with text segments such as 'introduction', 'body' and 'conclusion'. A similar use of the term is when it specifies types of 'information progression' such as cause and effect, problem and solution, comparison and contrast, etc. (e.g., Hoye 1979; Hudson et al. 2021). In other words, such interpretations of TEXT STRUCTURE concern the organization of elements that hold 'smaller' chunks of a text 'together' and not a whole text's structure, and are, thus, peripheral to the present investigation.

The third major use of 'text structure' associates with the domain of Text linguistics (e.g., Halliday and Hasan 1976, 1985). This use does not differ in principle from the Aristotelian use of 'rhetorical structure'. It tends to specify the sequential arrangement of textual segments, and to correlate those textual segments with the interpersonal functions the segments need to perform.

'Macrostructure', 'superstructure', 'overall structure'

Three terms – 'macrostructure', 'superstructure' and 'overall structure'– appear in only few of the works in our dataset and do not seem to have gained general prominence. On the contrary, they can be argued to associate exclusively with specific works of specific authors.

A type of cognition-related WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE is analyzed by van Dijk (1980) and de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) under the name of 'macrostructure'. To van

Dijk (1980), 'macrostructure' designates a higher-level conceptual structure which organizes the 'local' MICROSTRUCTURES of discourse. MACROSTRUCTURES, in his view, similarly to RHETORICAL and NARRATIVE STRUCTURES, span whole texts but they do not refer to sequential textual chunks. Van Dijk sees MACROSTRUCTURES as containing more detail than the rather general 'schemata'. Moreover, he introduces yet another notion – the one of 'superstructure' – to refer to a 'global form' controlling macrostructural content. Both SUPERSTRUCTURE and MACROSTRUCTURE, from van Dijk's perspective, are of cognitive non-linguistic nature. It should be emphasized, however, that a different understanding of 'superstructure' is evident in, for instance, Hoskins' decision (1986) to employ the term and to actually use it synonymously with what to van Dijk and Hasan is 'overall structure'.

'Overall structure' is preferred by van Dijk (1997) in his accounting for rhetorical-structure-like segment arrangement and sequencing in whole texts. To him, the presence of such segments can be verified by decomposing a text into smaller units. Similarly, Hasan (Halliday and Hasan 1985) sees 'overall structure' as "the global structure of the message form" (*ibid*.: 53).

Sociolinguists, too, employ the term for relatively the same purpose (e.g. Labov and Waletzky 1967), in contrast to some narratologists (e.g. Emmott and Alexander 2009), who prefer to use 'overall structure' synonymously with 'story schemata'.

A generalization of the uses

There are several lines of generalization that can be drawn about the uses of the terms throughout the dataset and about the conceptual structures those terms are used to evoke:

(a) The notion of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE can be evoked through the use of six terms: 'rhetorical structure', 'text structure', 'narrative structure', 'overall

structure', 'superstructure' and 'macrostructure'. The term 'text structure' tends to be used synonymously with 'rhetorical structure', 'overall structure' and 'superstructure'. 'Rhetorical structure' and 'narrative structure' can also express the merger of aspects of RHETORICAL STRUCTURE (such as those relating to interpersonal functions performed) with aspects of NARRATIVE STRUCTURE (such as narrative persona, plot, characters).

(b) 'Rhetorical structure', 'text structure', 'narrative structure', 'overall structure' tend be used to refer to the linguistic expression of the concept of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE. 'Macrostructure' and 'superstructure' tend to be used to refer to the concept of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE only and to aim to differentiate it from the linguistic expression of that concept.

(c) The notion of the linguistic expression of a structure 'running through' or 'holding' a whole text 'together' is either of two alternatives: (1) it is seen as a network-like progression running through a text (e.g. 'narrative structure'), or (2) it is seen as a sequential arrangement of separate text segments (e.g. 'rhetoric structure' and 'text structure').

(d) The concept of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE also tends to be interpreted as either (1) a network-like progression running through a text (e.g. MACRO-STRUCTURE), or (2) a sequential arrangement of separate text segments (e.g. SUPERSTRUCTURE).

(e) Two of the terms listed in (a) can be found to be employed within the limits of one the same piece of research to express the difference between sequential segment arrangement and network-like progression, e.g. 'text structure' and 'macrostructure' in de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981). In the case of de Beaugrande and Dressler's book specifically, the pair of terms simultaneously

designates the difference between linguistic evidence of the presence of whole-text structure (‘text structure’) and the concept of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE (‘macrostructure’).

(f) Over time, one and the same scholar (e.g. van Dijk) can switch from one term designating WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE to another, as well as from one interpretation of what WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE is to another.

It has to be highlighted here that all the generalizations from (a) to (f) are revealed throughout the dataset to function prototypically, i.e. they do not represent strict rules or requirements. First, there are no clear-cut boundaries between the different uses of the terms and conceptualizations; instead, the boundaries between them are fuzzy due to the uses overlapping and the conceptual structures (e.g. NARRATIVE STRUCTURE and RHETORIC STRUCTURE) sharing features. Second, some uses of the terms and concepts can be statistically proven to be central, or more typical, in comparison to others, which are peripheral (clearly, verifying this assumption could be the objective of another, quantitate, study). Third, the dataset reveals there can be individual specificities and even idiosyncrasies in each author’s individual treatment of the concept of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE.

The last point, connected to the generalization in (f), is, arguably, crucial to the present investigation. The dataset analysis reported here reveals dynamicity in the concept and the ensuing changes in the terms used to evoke that concept. That dynamicity is evident not only within the limits of a theoretical approach (e.g. in narratologists’ calls for rhetoric elements be introduced into narrative studies, see the introduction above). It is also evident within one and the same scholar’s works, and that fact should not be simply categorized as ‘scholarly evolution’.

To explain that evolution, we need to take into account the strong possibility that the dynamicity ensues from a scholar's dealing with a single concept (i.e. WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE) and not with separate, clearly delimited concepts (i.e. RHETORIC STRUCTURE, NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, OVERALL STRUCTURE, etc.). In other words, we need to take into account the strong possibility that, throughout their career, the scholar can be, in fact, exploring different aspects of the same phenomenon.

Overall, the overlaps and merges evident in the dataset confirm that we are likely to be dealing with of a single concept, whose prototype effects (see section below) create the impression of there being different types of that concept. The summarized results and generalization presented in this section, basically, point to the possibility for different terms evoking WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE to actually evoke different elements (or combinations of elements) from the concept of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE.

In other words, the overlaps and merges evident throughout the dataset confirm the possibility for conceptual metonymy (see, e.g., Barcelona 2000, 2011; Dirven and Pörings 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza 2020, 2022) to be operational in the case of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE. As will be hopefully verified later in this chapter (III.2. and III. 3.), this cognitive mechanism needs to be perceived as a candidate for inclusion in our multi-process model.

III. 2. Verifying the presence of conceptual metaphor and prototype effects

This section will start as intended at the end of Chapter II: it will provide analysis of a concept different than POLITICAL SPEECHES (which is the concept analyzed in Chapter II), i.e. it will explore uses of TEXT STRUCTURE this time; then it will target the analysis at verifying or refuting the presence of the first cognitive mechanism from our hypothesized set (i.e. conceptual metaphor and its prototype effects).

Focusing, first, on the possible operation of conceptual metaphor in our current investigative object (i.e. TEXT STRUCTURE), that operation could be confirmed if we note how metaphoric transfer is signalled through certain linguistic expressions (as discussed in Chapter I). As CMT postulates, such expressions may be prepositional phrases, e.g. ***in*** *the text*, ***throughout*** *the text*, ***at*** *the* ***end*** *of the text*. These expressions containing metaphor-signalling prepositions reveal that a TEXT tends to be metaphorically conceptualized as SPACE or a PLACE. TEXT STRUCTURE, then, can be assumed to be perceived as AN ENTITY conceptualized as PLACED 'in' a TEXT.

True to fact, alternative metaphorizations also exist; the TEXT-AS-A-PERSON ontological conceptual metaphor can also be detected through, for instance, *the text* ***says***/ ***discusses***/ ***talks about***, and the TEXT-AS-A-BODY conceptual metaphor – in the 'introduction-body-conclusion' formulation. However, in the case of the related concept of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE, the original, Aristotelian interpretation in terms of a sequential (i.e. spatial) arrangement of textual segments can be seen as evidence of the primacy of the TEXT-AS-SPACE conceptualization over other metaphors.

Moreover, as the Aristotelian postulation of the existence of text segments suggests, in the case of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE, the TEXT as SPACE is not perceived as homogeneous or amorphous: a TEXT is believed to 'contain' separate segments, which are 'arranged' spatially one after the other.

A CMT explanation of text segmentation could see it as resulting from a metaphoric transfer from the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL source domain (discussed in Chapter II). In accordance with the internal organization of the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL structure, human bodily experience can lead to a metaphorization of MOVEMENT THROUGH SPACE in terms of STEPS THROUGH SPACE. As a consequence, when transferred to the domain of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL mappings represent each textual segment as a separate STEP towards a GOAL (ibid.). In other words, the mapping from the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL structure leads to perceptions of each TEXT-STRUCTURE SEGMENT as a STEP along a PATH. Furthermore, employing the three-part SOURCE-PATH-GOAL structure may also result in text users' requirements for an analogous three-part structure (e.g. Introduction – Body – Conclusion) to exist in texts.

Another cognitive component hypothesized (in Chapter II) as relevant to the operation of the multi-process model proposed in this thesis has to do with existing prototype effects in conceptualization. In that respect, Lakoff (2007) argues that some conceptual categories are characterized by clusters of cognitive models and not by clusters of semantic features. Lakoff (ibid.) discusses the prototype effects evident in the operation of the concept of MOTHER, and he delimits the following cognitive models activated whenever one of the many senses of MOTHER is evoked:

> The genetic model: the female who contributed the genetic material is the mother.
> The nurturance model: the female adult who nurtures and raises a child is the mother of that child.
> The marital model: the wife of the father is the mother.
> The genealogical model: the closest female ancestor is the mother. (Lakoff 2007: 136)

Furthermore, Lakoff (2007: 136) argues, the concept of MOTHER "normally involves a complex model in which all of these individual models converge to form a cluster". In other

words, in this case, several cognitive scenarios (Musolff 2006, 2017, 2021, 2022) are integrated to create the 'bigger' and more complex conceptual structure of MOTHER.

Clearly, parallels can be drawn between Lakoff's discussion of MOTHER and the present discussion of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE, in which RHETORIC STRUCTURE, TEXT STRUCTURE, NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, OVERALL STRUCTURE, etc. can be viewed as corresponding to THE GENETIC MOTHER, THE NURTURING MOTHER, THE MARITAL MOTHER, etc. The difference would be that WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE is an abstract, primarily academic concept, which is not bodily and experientially derived and, thus, it cannot rely as heavily on stereotypes the way MOTHER can.

The solution to that issue can also be found in Lakoff (2007), where he demonstrates that even the concept of MOTHER, through its cluster of cognitive models, needs to be approached as simultaneously governed by conceptual metonymy. A major source of prototype effects, Lakoff maintains (2007: 140), conceptual metonymy controls any situation "in which some sub-category or member or sub-model is used [...] to comprehend the category as a whole. In other words, these are cases where a part (a subcategory or member or sub-model) stands for the whole category – in reasoning, recognition, and so on" (on the related issue of cognitive metonymic scenarios see Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Galera-Masegosa 2020).

Thus, on the one hand, each cognitive model such as RHETORIC STRUCTURE, TEXT STRUCTURE, NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, OVERALL STRUCTURE, etc. is structured metaphorically through a mapping from the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL structure. On the other hand, each of those cognitive models can be activated metonymically as a prototypical representative of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE.

The possibility for the simultaneous and coherent co-functioning of conceptual metaphor and conceptual metonymy, or, as Goossens terms it (1990), metaphtonymy has been confirmed to lead to the creation of such amalgamated concepts, or 'conceptual complexes'

(see, e.g., Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez-Hernández 2011). WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE is argued here to be a conceptual complex, so it seems apt that we pay some special attention to the ‘fundamentally concept-forming’ nature (Jimenez-Munoz and Martínez 2017) of conceptual metonymy.

III. 3. Cognitive mechanisms: Conceptual metonymy

Both the previous sections in Chapter III led to the conclusion that conceptual metonymy is very likely to be operative in our object of analysis and, consequently, it represents a likely candidate for inclusion in our hypothesized multi-process cognitive set. Additionally, experimental research has demonstrated that abstract, metaphor-deriving concepts (such as TEXT STRUCTURE) do emerge from metaphoric images but they only do so with the help of conceptual metonymy (for an overview see Bolognesi and Vernillo 2019). Therefore, this section will introduce and pay special attention to the cognitive mechanism of conceptual metonymy.

In contrast to conceptual metaphor, which is a cross-domain mapping, conceptual metonymy has been defined throughout the literature as "an asymmetric mapping" in which source and target domains both belong within "the same overall domain and are linked by a pragmatic function, so that the target is mentally activated" (Barcelona 2011: 19; also Dirven 2002; Radden 2002; Panther and Thornburg 2007; Barcelona 2000a, 2000b, 2007; Brdar 2017; Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2017; Ruiz de Mendoza 2000, 2020, 2022;). What is more, Barcelona maintains that "every metaphorical mapping presupposes a conceptually prior metonymic mapping" and "the seeds for any metaphorical transfer are to be found in a metonymic projection" (2000: 31). Furthermore, as Ruiz de Mendoza (2020: 17) argues, both metaphor and metonymy function together pervasively due to (a) their widespread use, (b) their generally embodied nature as grounded in sensorimotor experience, and (c) their cognitive productivity.

Two other formulations extremely relevant to the present investigation are those of Littlemore (2015), who sees metonymy as evoking a concept by activating even one of the concept's aspects, and the formulation put forward by Barsalou et al. (2008), according to which concepts are represented in the mind as bundles of elements which characterize different facets of the concept. As already argued above, the present investigation sees WHOLE-TEXT

STRUCTURE as a conceptual complex, i.e. as a result of the simultaneous operation of conceptual metaphor and metonymy. That conceptual complex is also interpreted here as holding the potential to be activated metonymically through evoking some of its elements through the terms of 'rhetoric structure', 'narrative structure', 'text structure', 'macrostructure', etc.

Out of the several lines of scholarly disagreement about conceptual metonymy (i.e. debates concerning, for example, obligatory contiguity requirements, bidirectionality, projections or mappings, idealized cognitive model vs. domain differences, conventionalization vs. creativity), there is one that seems especially relevant to the present investigation. It concerns the issue of whether metonymy, like metaphor, is a mapping, or if, as Croft, for example, argues (1993, 2002), metonymy concerns only the salience and highlighting of conceptual elements (see also Koch 2004).

The interpretation adopted here relies heavily on principles of prototypology, which does not require rigid boundaries be postulated between the operation of mappings and highlighting. Such an interpretation, arguably, is also readily harmonizable with research viewing conceptual metonymy and conceptual metaphor as positioned on a scale instead of viewing them as two delineated categories (see, e.g., Chen and Lai 2012). In other words, as conceptual metaphor and conceptual metonymy operate jointly and simultaneously, it does not seem feasible that our scholarly analysis-friendly notions reflecting the two cognitive processes be strictly separated.

Thus, the definition of conceptual metonymy employed here interprets the cognitive mechanism as inevitably taking effect through figure-ground profiling techniques, and, possibly, by also triggering mappings. Following Radden and Kövesces (1999), conceptual metonymy is definitely not seen here as taking effect through referential substitution but,

instead, through interrelating conceptual elements, which in its turn leads to enacting complex amalgamated meanings.

Conceptual metonymy is defined in the literature as taking place by one's highlighting a domain within its domain matrix (Croft 2002); in other words, conceptual metonymy is defined as an intra-domain activation-related operation (Barcelona 2011). Seeing conceptual metonymy as indelible from intra-domain profiling requires our mentioning several related – and frequently used interchangeably – academic notions: prominence, salience, perspective, viewpoint, stance, focus, etc.

To exemplify my point about the interchangeability of the notions, let me cite von Heusinger and Schumacher (2019), who believe the use of those notions is primarily based on intuition, and that

> the term "prominence" is often informally used in the sense that a prominent entity "stands out" in a certain "context". It is at times used interchangeably with the terms "salience", "accessibility", "attention" and "activation" in the literature on discourse-pragmatics, "highlighting" in phonology, or with "the higher rank of an element on a hierarchy of semantic or syntactic entities" (von Heusinger and Schumacher 2019: 118)

In a similar vein, Vandelanotte (2019: 172) believes those terms can be overused synonymously:

> [m]any linguists and stylisticians work on the assumption that the notions of perspective, viewpoint and point of view can be used interchangeably, while allowing for certain subfields to have certain preferences, with, for instance, cognitive linguists mostly talking about 'viewpoint', and typologists often opting for 'perspective'.

Starting with 'activation' out of the notions listed, the term will be reserved in this thesis for 'bringing' conceptual structure(s) 'into' working memory (see Chapter IV) and thus making

conceptual structure(s) available for online processing. As a result, 'profile' and 'activate' cannot be used synonymously here as done in, for example, Barcelona (2000a, 2011). Similarly, the term 'highlighting' used, for example, by Croft (2002) will be dis-preferred for its not emphasizing the simultaneity in the co-functioning of a figure and its corresponding background. 'Highlighting' here will be viewed as, let us metaphorically call it, the first stage of profiling, a stage at which a conceptual zone is being 'selected', and made 'salient' or 'prominent'. That would additionally help us characterize profiling as the gradable (i.e. not simply 'on' or 'off') phenomenon that it is.

Furthermore, 'activation' which, to Barcelona (2011), is intertwined with 'attention shifts', is believed to impose a perspective on a metonymic target domain. The cognitive phenomenon of perspective, in its turn, is also essentially experiential: in Zeman's words (2019: 226), "[i]n real life, our eyes are commonly restricted to one perspective only. If one stands in front of a building, one is able to see only its fore - but not its backside". Moreover, Vandelanotte (2019: 170) maintains, "any aspect of a language user's chosen construal of a given situation reveals some aspect of the perspective being adopted".

However, as Vandelanotte (2019: 172) herself admits, in cognitive linguistic studies, pronouns, tense and aspect are "the primary suspects" analyzed to establish perspective peculiarities, which makes such studies not readily adaptable to the purposes of the present thesis. To make matters worse, working from his Cognitive Grammar perspective, and, thus, unfortunately, limiting his conclusions to syntactic structures, Langacker (2008: 73) consequentially merges the notion of 'perspective' with that of 'viewpoint':

> If conceptualization (metaphorically) is the viewing of a scene, perspective is the **viewing arrangement**, the most obvious aspect of which is the vantage point assumed. Under the rubric of perspective I also consider **dynamicity**, pertaining to how a conceptualization unfolds through processing time. (emphasis as in original)

In other studies, 'viewpoint' is "not necessarily someone's point of view, but it relies crucially on a selection of an aspect of space topology which provides a filter through which events are narrated. Viewpoint may thus be spatial or temporal [...] it can also be epistemic [...] or ideological" (Dancygier 2012:61). In accordance, Dancygier (2017, 2021) adds to the discussion of 'viewpoint' the role of joint attention, gesture, and eye gaze.

However, the focus of her studies falls on, for example, differentiating between viewpoint expression in spontaneous conversation and in fictional narratives, which, Dancygier argues, differ principally. Following such a line of reasoning, Vandelanotte (2019) and Wieczorek (2010) investigate viewpoint switches among characters' cognitive perspectives and a narrator's deictic perspective. Importantly, such studies conduct their analyses irrespective of the notion of Worlds. In my perspective, such switches do need to take into account possible overlaps between CHARACTERS in a TW and PARTICIPANTS in a DW, and, consequently, they need to be harmonized with World profiling shifts/switches (see Chapters VII and VIII).

'Scope' is yet another term from our list of metonymy- and profiling-related notions. To Dzozd (2010: 7) scope "is not an individual tool – it is one of the aspects of a more general human ability of construal". Langacker (2008: 62) similarly maintains that scope "has an evident cognitive basis: there is only so much that we can mentally encompass at any one moment" as "our visual apparatus limits what we can see at any one time. Experientially, we have a restricted "viewing frame". As a result, selection and foregrounding can be "grouped under a common rubric" called 'focusing' (ibid.). As already argued above, it is the term 'profiling' which will be used in this thesis to signal the joint and simultaneous operation of those cognitive mechanisms, which will need to lead to the exclusion of the very term 'focus' from our current discussion.

What, however, is of utmost importance and could not be excluded from our discussion (especially to the analyses offered in Part III), is what I would like to call 'scope variation'. Within research on conceptual metonymy, the notion is not unknown. Ruiz de Mendoza (2011) posits that metonymic mappings are actually a manifestation of the cognitive operations of domain expansion and reduction. In domain expansion, the source domain is a subdomain of the target (Ruiz de Mendoza's example [ibid.] is that of a VIOLIN used to stand for a VIOLIN PLAYER). In domain reduction, the target is a subdomain of the source (Ruiz de Mendoza's example [ibid.] is *He drank two bottles*, where the BOTTLE stands for its CONTENTS). Clearly, the principle will need to be adapted to the research specifics of this thesis, which will be an objective in Part III.

Crucially, Ruiz de Mendoza harmonizes his explorations of the processes of domain expansion and domain reduction with the notions of perspective and gestalt perception:

> In supplying a point of access, the target is conceptualized from the perspective of the source [...] This property of metonymy is grounded in the principle of gestalt perception. The perception of an overall shape results from dividing the perceptual field into a more prominent part, the figure, and a less salient part, called the ground. The figure stands out against the ground. [...] Metonymy thus exploits perceptual saliency, which makes it a central cognitive process. (Ruiz de Mendoza 2011: 19)

Thus, scope variation in particular is seen in this thesis as key to understanding how Worlds can be profiled metonymically through either World expansion or World reduction. However, none of the approaches discussed in this section, Ruiz de Mendoza's theoretical frame included, has so far been applied to Worlds and their overlaps. The thesis will need to address that theoretical and analytical niche.

III. 4. Verifying the presence of World overlappings, World profiling shifts and conceptual metonymy

Evidence verifying the presence of (a) TW-DW overlaps and (b) TW-DW profiling shifts in perceptions of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE is sought in our dataset. The analysis is based on the premise (discussed in Chapter I) that, as profiling shifts are enacted dynamically on DWs and TWs, the process will be signalled by linguistic expressions to help 'figure out' textual segment boundaries. Those linguistic expressions are expected to signal simultaneously which World is currently being profiled.

One of the ways to use linguistic signals for these purposes is to focus on scholar's choices of text-structure-segment labels for each segment progression they propose, e.g. 'Introduction' – 'Body' – 'Conclusion'. This section is dedicated to the analysis of text structural progression labels as one of the access points to the underlying cognitive processes.

The dataset proposals as to how a TEXT STRUCTURE is organized through text-segment sequencing display an array of interpretations. Those interpretations range from Hasan's (Halliday and Hasan 1985) 'Precipitative event – Consequential event – Revelation' to Swales's (1990) academic-genre-centered CARS model ('Establishing territory – Establishing a niche – Occupying the niche'). Other examples extracted from the data sources and selected for inclusion in this section are: van Dijk's (1977) 'Setting – Complication – Resolution – Evaluation – Moral'; Winter's (1994) 'Situation – Evaluation – Reason for evaluation'; Hoey's (1994) 'Problem – Solution'.

A closer look at the segment labels researchers tend to employ reveals the labels can signal INANIMATE ENTITIES (e.g. 'Problem'; 'Solution') and those ENTITIES can be of different scope (e.g. 'Situation' vs. 'Evaluation of the situation' or 'Reason for evaluation'). Some of those ENTITIES can be of more static character (e.g. PROBLEM), others can imply ACTIVITIES (e.g. EVALUATION). Some of the labels are revealed to represent agent-free or

non-agent-specific ENTITIES (e.g. PROBLEM), others can imply a TEXT USER as an AGENT (e.g. EVALUATION). The question is in which World does each of those ENTITIES, ACTIVITIES, USERS, etc. belong within. Understanding that, as demonstrated below, can help us establish with which World each text segment associates. In its turn, tracing segment-and-World correspondences can help us verify (a) whether there is TW-DW overlap, and (b) whether there are shifts in profiling one type of World (e.g. TW) over another (e.g. DW).

Our dataset analysis reveals that, typically, far from all labels used within a single sequential progression (e.g. 'Introduction' and 'Body' in 'Introduction – Body – Conclusion') associate with the same type of World, which can be viewed as the first confirmation of the presence of both TW and DW in the same text-segment progression.

As far as World shifts/switches are concerned, in van Dijk's (1977) 'Setting - Complication - Resolution - Evaluation – Moral', 'Setting', 'Complication' and 'Resolution' evoke a TW, as they concern elements and stages of the story told. However, 'Evaluation' and 'Moral' in the same text-segment progression are more DW-oriented: they are related to text users' evaluating a story and drawing a moral from it. Thus, in this case, switching from 'Story Resolution' to 'Evaluation' would indicate the presence of a profiling shift from a TW (containing 'Story Resolution') to a DW (containing 'Evaluation').

Similarly, in Winter's (1994) 'Situation - Evaluation - Reason for evaluation', 'Situation' associates with a TW as it profiles elements of the story told. The subsequent 'Evaluation' profiles a DW: it evokes TEXT USERS as EVALUATORS. Thus, we could say that, within Winter's proposed sequence, there is a shift from profiling a TW (which contains SITUATION) to profiling a DW (which contains EVALUATION). Next, 'Reason for evaluation', within the same segment progression, could be seen as profiling either of the two Worlds: a REASON could be an element extracted either from the story told (TW) or from seen as related to the communicative exchange (DW). This cognitive ambiguity as to which World

is currently being profiled can be seen as confirmation of the presence of a TW-DW overlap. At that, the TW-DW overlap happens after the preceding switch from TW to DW (i.e. from the TW-related SITUATION to the DW-related EVALUATION). In other words, this example reveals that within the same TEXT STRUCTURE segment progression, we can have a mixture of World shifts and World overlaps.

TW-DW overlapping can be also observed in Sinclair and Coulthard's (1975) text segment progression of 'Initiation – Response – Feedback', which largely, although not exclusively, can be seen as related to a DW. I say 'largely' because, to associate unambiguously with a DW, the labels should read, for instance, 'Initiating', 'Responding', 'Providing Feedback'. That is, they should signal what a TEXT USER DOES in a DW. However, nominal in nature, 'Initiation', 'Response' and 'Feedback' simultaneously explicate what a text producer does in a DW and serve to portion WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE down into segments. In other words, the labels actually preferred, and not the labels of 'Initiating', 'Responding', 'Providing Feedback', serve to conflate DW functions with TW activities.

An extremely rare example of absence of TW-DW conflation in our dataset can be observed in Hoey's (1979) 'Problem – Solution' text structural organization. Here both 'Problem' and 'Solution' may be argued to evoke TW construction: each of the two labels describes what a text segment 'is about'. Furthermore, the fact that there are only two parts in the structural progression (i.e. only 'Problem' and 'Solution') upholds the possibility for Hoey's intentional creation of a more 'static' interpretation of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE, an interpretation which does not follow fully the underlying metaphoric transfer from the three-part SOURCE-PATH-GOAL cognitive structure (discussed in III. 2. above). As there is no World overlapping, nor World sequencing (i.e. no shifts from TW to DW or vice versa), Hoye's suggestion can be argued to represent a prototypically peripheral case in scholars' metaphorizing a sense of MOVEMENT through WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE.

‘Introduction – Body – Conclusion’ in its turn represents a structural text segment progression involving two segment labels which confirm an overlap between a TW and a DW. ‘Introduction’ and ‘Conclusion’ simultaneously express what the text producer does (which relates to the DW) and serve to portion down the TW into separate segments. ‘Body’, however, although revealing the presence of the ontological metaphor of TEXT as A LIVING ORGANISM (discussed in III. 2. above), relates to neither the TW, nor the DW only. On the one hand, the use of ‘Body’ can be seen as confirmation that conceptual metaphorization functions powerfully in all perceptions of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE. On the other hand, if it were only metaphorization that controlled the use of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE, this set of segment labels should read something similar to, for instance, ‘Head – Body – Lower limbs’.

In brief, the text segment progressions proposed in almost all of our data sources (with the single exception of Hoye’s ‘Problem – Solution’) display degrees of simultaneous TW-DW overlapping and/or World profiling shifts. Demands for cognitive processing economy can be argued to produce rather ‘naturally’ such overlappings and shifts. The main point here is that the combined operation of TW-DW overlaps and TW-DW profiling shifts is what functions in parallel and simultaneously with conceptual metaphor to create the perception of MOVEMENT ‘through’ the conceptual complex of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE.

As far as the operation of conceptual metonymy in WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE is concerned, as argued in III. 1. 3., the assumption that WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE is a conceptual complex, which is fully triggered by none of the existing terms in the literature but which can account for any of the concepts behind the terms, is supported by the dataset analysis. The dataset analysis in III. 1. 3. also traces correspondences in what content/conceptual area/combination of cognitive elements each term (e.g. ‘text structure’, ‘narrative structure’, ‘rhetorical structure’, ‘superstructure’) can evoke.

What is revealed in III. 1. 3. is that, for example, a CHARACTER would typically activate NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, while A TEXT PRODUCER'S COMMUNICATIVE PURPOSE would typically activate RHETORICAL STRUCTURE. A TEXT PRODUCER'S COMMUNICATIVE PURPOSE, however, could alternatively activate A NARRATIVE PERSONA, and, through it, it could alternatively activate NARRATIVE STRUCTURE.

Viewed from the opposite perspective, NARRATIVE STRUCTURE itself could explicitly combine, let's say, a CHARACTER and a NARRATIVE PERSONA, while RHETORICAL STRUCTURE could combine a CHARACTER and TEXT PRODUCER'S COMMUNICATIVE PURPOSE.

To make prototypicality effects in our particular example even worse, in parallel, a CHARACTER will prototypically associate with a TW, while TEXT PRODUCER'S COMMUNICATIVE PURPOSE will prototypically associate with a DW. Due to the possibility of TW-DW overlap, TEXT CHARACTER, TEXT PRODUCER'S COMMUNICATIVE PURPOSE, NARRATIVE PERSONA, etc. can all become integrated in the area of overlap into a coherent cognitive emergent structure. That structure would be neither simply NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, nor only RHETORICAL STRUCTURE; it will integrate a combination of some particular WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE elements and it may not necessarily be conventionalized (yet). As our dataset analysis demonstrates, that happens frequently across scholars' investigations.

Additionally, one and the same scholar can use one and the same term to evoke different combinations of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE elements. In other words, the same scholar can profile and investigate different metonymically-activated aspects/conceptual areas of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE. The same scholar can also postulate different terms for the same combination of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE elements.

Second, conceptual metonymy also operates in the cognitive processing of the text-structural segments discussed earlier in this section. For instance, a linguistic signal such as 'Conclusion' would profile the third segment out of the 'Introduction – Body – Conclusion' progression but, to do so, it would evoke (metonymically) the whole three-segment progression. Clearly, in parallel, the profiling mechanism will 'push' the other two segments (i.e. Introduction and Body) to the background. The profiled segment, above all, will be metonymized through a specific function (e.g. CONCLUDING, SUMMARIZING, EVALUATING) representing the whole of it.

In that, if the metonymy profiles an ACTION/FUNCTION connected to AN ANIMATE DOER, a nominal linguistic signal will be used for the textual segment. If it is just the ACTION/FUNCTION that is being profiled, a verbal linguistic signal will be chosen for the segment. In either case, a segment label will signal metonymically only part of the full internal conceptual organization of a text structural segment.

The inconsistencies in scholars' labelling text structural segments within the same textual progression (e.g. combining 'Setting' and 'Evaluation' in 'Setting – Complication – Resolution – Evaluation – Moral' discussed above) stem, arguably, from inconsistencies in scholars' metonymizing different types of Worlds within the same text structural progression.

Crucially, as FUNCTIONS/ACTIVITIES from a World can be transferred (through World overlap) metonymically to a text segment's structure, this gives us grounds to hypothesize that conceptual metonymy needs to be additionally investigated as simultaneously operating on Worlds. This contention, however, will need to find further support through analyses of more and different concepts than WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE. One of the objectives of the chapters in Part III will relate to that possibility.

III. 5. Implications

In sum, this chapter illustrates how TEXT STRUCTURE, RHETORICAL STRUCTURE, NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, MACROSTRUCTURE, OVERALL STRUCTURE, SUPERSTRUCTURE, etc. function as central or peripheral category examples of the same multi-faceted conceptual complex due to the amalgamated operation of the cognitive mechanisms of conceptual metaphor, conceptual metonymy, World overlaps and World profiling shifts.

This chapter also confirms the need to incorporate the cognitive mechanism of conceptual metonymy into our multi-process model, and verifies that the mechanism functions simultaneously with the other cognitive mechanisms in our hypothesized set.

If amalgamated into the set, conceptual metonymy could also help explain, for instance, why, in the case of political speeches (analyzed in Chapter II) delimiting communicative functions from political functions has been found by scholars so hard to accomplish – different functions associate with different metonymy-sustaining overlappings between DWs and RWs. In them, trying to evoke a World through a FUNCTION may result in the metonymic activation of more than one World. A main objective of Chapter VIII, which discusses TEXT TYPE, is to demonstrate that possibility.

In sum, the operation of conceptual metonymy does not only amalgamate with the operation of conceptual metaphor, as discussed in the literature on metaphtonymy. It does not only involve gestalt perception and profiling, as discussed in cognitive linguistics. Conceptual metonymy, it is an objective of this thesis to demonstrate, also amalgamates with World overlapping and World profiling shifts.

PART TWO

SITUATING THE MODEL

Part I has isolated the following cognitive mechanisms for inclusion in the multi-process model proposed here: conceptual metaphor, conceptual metonymy, World overlapping and World profiling. Each mechanism has been argued to function through the amalgamation of component cognitive operations. All the mechanisms have been argued to co-function procedurally and prototypically.

However, due to the specificities of the human mind, the analysis presented here could not account aptly for the simultaneity in the presence and operation of the cognitive mechanisms constituting our model. The analysis, by necessity, can only take them one after the other. Hopefully, in the process of analysis, what will emerge will be the relative prototypical importance of each mechanism to the particular object of analysis.

What is proposed in the thesis, it should be highlighted, is a model without an approach. Where the model could be applied and for what purposes are the main issues addressed in Part II. As the multi-process cognitive model is meant to be employed in analyses of text(s) and discourse(s), Text Linguistics and Discourse Analysis seem to be the evident domains where the model could be aptly situated. Therefore, Chapter IV will discuss the scholarly domain of Text Linguistics, then Chapter V will turn to the scholarly domain of Discourse Analysis. Clearly, each chapter will display features typical of a literature review (to which no separate chapter is dedicated in this thesis) but the discussion is not intended to stop there. The progression within the chapters will be the following:

First, each chapter will clarify and systematize the fundamentals of the approaches typically associated with the scholarly domain it investigates.

Second, each chapter will compare and contrast the fundamental principles sustaining those approaches.

Third, each chapter will pinpoint concepts and research areas the model proposed in this thesis could be employed to (the later chapters in this thesis will turn to some of those concepts).

Fourth, each chapter will apply the multi-process model to the scholarly domain it investigates.

As far as the last point above – applying the multi-process model to the theoretical approaches within the domains of Text Linguistics and Discourse analysis – is concerned, it is my conviction that each theory can be argued to represent a conceptual metaphorization of its object of analysis (i.e. TEXT and/or DISCOURSE). In that, each approach selects a facet or a cluster of elements relating to TEXT and DISCOURSE that it chooses to profile in its studies. Overall, each approach is seen here as conditioned by the same set of cognitive mechanisms that allow scholars (as humans) to reason about TEXT and DISCOURSE. It is, however, the 'meta' principles and cognitive processes that I target investigatively in the chapters in Part II. Therefore, what the chapters will also attempt is to provide cognitive accounts of how and why the approaches exist in the form they do.

CHAPTER IV

SITUATING THE MODEL: TEXT LINGUISTICS

IV. 1. 'What exactly is Text Linguistics?'

What text linguistics (henceforth TL) is has been a question whose answer has changed over the last several decades. The question may have drawn a clearer response in the 1970s and early 1980s, when TL put forth its roots, but as of today there can be traced several alternative, and almost irreconcilable, views on the issue.

Tracing back the roots of TL, one finds oneself obliged to return chronologically to the heyday of what is known as 'linguistics proper'. Historically speaking, almost every scientific effort since the late 19th century seems to have been going in either of the following directions:

(a) (further) decomposing an object of investigation into its smallest, impossible to further decompose – but still analyzable – units, or

(b) (further) expanding perceptions of scholarly objects of investigation beyond the broadest boundaries in existence.

Both trends blossomed in parallel with major tendencies in chemistry, physics, astronomy, and other natural sciences: those sciences sought to get to, for example, the smallest bit of the atom, or to broaden our world out into space.

Accordingly, at the time, linguistics was also preoccupied with reaching the 'basic units' linguistic structures are composed of: 'linguistics proper' studied lexemes, morphemes, phonemes, etc. It did not, however, expand into domains 'beyond' and postulated the sentence as the largest 'unit' of linguistic analyses (see, e.g., Bloomfield 1933). Anything beyond the

sentence was not accepted to be a legitimate object of study of 'linguistics proper' and was assigned to other scholarly approaches and domains, most notably Stylistics.

Beyond a shred of a doubt, understanding language as a system of levels such as phonology, morphology, and syntax provides a powerful tool for tackling the enormity of linguistic variation but the restrictions it imposes both on its subject and its methodology inevitably result in findings of somewhat narrower scope and validity. Clearly, at present, the issue of whether linguistics should expand as far as possible 'beyond' the sentence can be safely argued to enjoy general consensus: modern linguists unite around the belief that a true understanding of language needs to broaden and encompass studies of whole texts, discourses, and relevant factors 'beyond'.

Broadening the realm of linguistics beyond the sentence, however, proved impossible to sustain by applying the same rules and principles as the ones employed in linguistics proper. True to fact, the principle of basic unit composition, associated with analysis at all other levels of the system of language, did leave its mark on the initial attempts to extend linguistic investigations to the study of texts. Text grammarians Harris (1952), who was the first to come up with the 'Chomskian' notion of transformation, and Katz and Fodor (1963) argued that a text is to be treated as one long sentence put together by using different punctuation. They saw a text as a unit above the sentence, which, to them, meant a sequence of well-formed sentences and not an entity susceptible to different-order principles. Accordingly, they believed text analysis should aim at breaking a text down into its smaller units and at isolating even smaller components in them.

That methodology steered text analysis away from the truly important factors which control the nature of texts; it steered studies of text away from the principles which hold a text together. Indeed, today, it is a commonsense to say that textual communication is a very complex phenomenon. What, in those times, was not as willingly acknowledged is that a text

is also a very well-integrated phenomenon. The much-needed shift of emphasis from compositionality to integration prompted later studies (e.g. Halliday and Hasan 1976, 1985; van Dijk and Kintsch 1978, 1983) to focus on (a) the co-functioning of textual components, and on (b) merging aspects of textual communication into a complex model. Those later studies demonstrate extensively that, if there is a 'textual level' at all, it does make use of fundamentally different principles from the principles operating at 'lower' language levels, and that the internal structure of a long sentence differs qualitatively – and not just quantitatively – from a structured sequence of sentences.

Generativist considerations also determined the later evolution (e.g. Kintsch 1974; van Dijk 1972, 1977) of the so-called text grammars in their aiming to provide an explicit description of the grammatical structures of texts. Following in the footsteps of sentence grammars, which described sematic relations between clauses in complex sentences, text grammars also aimed to describe the linear, or sequential, semantics of a whole textual 'unit'. However, as the most notable proponent of the approach, van Dijk, claims much later (2004), the idea turned out to be 'totally misguided' and, as van Dijk has declared on several occasions, text grammar is "a concept that I now use with some hesitation, if not shame" (1995: 384).

The major problem in text grammar, in van Dijk's view (ibid.), derives from the realization that coherence in text is not defined by meaning relations between sentences only but primarily by referential relations outside the text, which text grammarians disregarded. Moreover, those referential relations were seen (e.g., van Dijk 1977) as holding between entities in a 'possible world', which means text grammarians also followed in the footsteps of formal semantics and philosophy – another factor which, according to van Dijk (2004), helped render the idea 'misguided'.

To further clarify the background against which TL emerged in those times, we need to highlight another factor resulting from linguistics proper's postulation of the sentence as the

highest linguistic unit – the insistence that linguistics should not be dealing with extra-linguistic factors. Clearly, in those times, pragmaticists (e.g. Grice 1975; Grundy 1995) had already begun to demonstrate extensively that "language and situation are inseparable" (Stubbs 1983:1). Drawing heavily on the philosophical work of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), pragmatic research had already steadily advanced the recognition that intertwining knowledge of language structures with knowledge of language use is a necessity rather than an academic whim. As text grammar was, practically, divorced from such considerations, text grammars failed or, rather, had to evolve into "the psychology of text processing" (van Dijk 2004: 7):

> ...unlike grammars, language users may use information from both text and context at the same time, or operate at several text levels (phonology, syntax, semantics, pragmatics) at the same time in order to interpret the text. In sum, actual text processing is very different from formal, structural text analysis. (ibid.)

In sum, what TL inherits from the earlier approaches to text, as evident from van Dijk's quote above, is (a) an understanding of the importance of context, and (b) an understanding of the importance of the psychological/cognitive processing of text. As will be discussed throughout this chapter, this thesis aligns itself with these basic postulates of the original TL endeavors. It views TL as an approach based on those two premises. It applies the model proposed in this thesis to the TL originating from those two principles.

The emergence of TL in the works of Halliday and Hasan (1976, 1985), de Beaugrande (1980), and de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) ensued, in the words of the scholars themselves, precisely from the realization that principles of constituency are not operational when texts are concerned. Trying to shake off all structuralist and generativist considerations inherited from linguistics proper and text grammar, TL founders tried and transformed linguistics by formulating an entirely new set of theoretical premises unrelated to any of the basic precepts of what used to be considered 'true linguistics'. In accomplishing that, TL's

founders created what can be summarized to be an evolutionary progression from semiotics-based analysis of textual features (Halliday and Hasan) to the inclusion of cognitive processes into the analysis of text production and reception (de Beaugrande and Dressler).

Later developments in TL theory, methodology and research techniques, however, spiraled so far away from those two original postulations that, today, defining TL as a unified discipline is far from a straightforward endeavor. Admittedly, there is an extent to which the claim of strong divergence between TL branches also applies to the original TL endeavors, i.e. it is also applicable to Halliday and Hasan's (1976) and de Beaugrande and Dressler's (1981) research. As will be asserted below, they, too, are not readily amalgamatable into a single approach as there are significant distinctions between the two TL branches. Nevertheless, today's lack of clarity around the question of what TL is can be seen as having a lot to do with a modern-day lack of adherence to the original two basic principles, namely: (a) a common acknowledgement of the importance of context, and (b) a common acknowledgement of the importance of the cognitive processing of text.

To illustrate my point concerning present-day views on what TL is believed to be, let me cite a prominent definition:

> In recent years, the study of texts has become a defining feature of a branch of linguistics referred to (especially in Europe) as **textlinguistics**, and 'text' here has central theoretical status. Texts are seen as language units which have a definable communicative function, characterized by such principles as cohesion, coherence and informativeness, which can be used to provide a formal definition of what constitutes their *textuality* or *texture*. On the basis of these principles, texts are classified into text types, or genres, such as road signs, news reports, poems, conversations, etc. [...] Some linguists make a distinction between the notions of 'text,' viewed as a physical product, and 'discourse,' viewed as a dynamic process of expression and interpretation, whose function and mode of operation can be investigated

using psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic, as well as linguistic, techniques. (Crystal 2008, emphasis as in original)

There are a number of claims in this passage which, to my mind, call for special – either positive or negative – comment, and I will address each of them below:

a) "'Textlinguistics' is practiced primarily in Europe."

The assertion is reminiscent of Longacre's (1983: 337) interpretation that what in America is called 'discourse' is called 'text' in Europe. Apart from addressing a terminological confusion (discussed in the Introduction here), both claims can be seen as essentially focusing on the interface and the interdependence between an instance of language production (i.e. text or discourse) and its context. This can be seen as confirmation of the centrality of the first of the two premises outlined above to any TL investigation.

b) "'Text' has a central theoretical status."

The Introduction in this thesis subscribes to such a view, and the present investigation accordingly has that as a point of departure. What is more, as this chapter will demonstrate, defining a 'text' has been the point of departure for TL founding studies, too.

c) A text has "a definable communicative function".

Whether a text really performs a single function and how that function can be determined are questions which, at this point of the present investigation, will be considered open. Chapter VIII in Part III will be dedicated to those questions specifically.

d) The (single) communicative function a text performs is "characterized by such principles as cohesion, coherence and informativeness".

The first thing to note here is that ‘informativeness’ is not a term used in the works by Halliday and Hasan, nor in those by de Beaugrande and Dressler. To the best of my knowledge, the term has also not been used in the works of any renowned TL researcher ever since (although the term appears as ‘word informativeness’ in some computer processing studies). Regrettably, freely citing ‘terms’ such as ‘informativeness’ seems quite characteristic of some linguists’ perspective on TL, and may suggest an attitude to the discipline as fundamentally arbitrary and vague about its basic premises. The term which is actually and consistently used in TL is ‘informativity’, as will be discussed below.

The second thing to object to in the above passage is that cohesion, coherence and informativity are claimed to be text-related ‘principles’. To Halliday and Hasan (1976), the three are properties of a text, they belong ‘within a text’, characterize it and distinguish it from a non-text. To de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981), the three are textual parameters, or standards, functioning simultaneously to create a text’s textuality. Neither approach treats cohesion, coherence and informativity loosely as ‘principles’.

Even less do text linguists treat the three as characterizing a single textual function, as is claimed in the quotation above. Moreover, even the three Hallidayan meta-functions (Ideational, Textual, Interpersonal) cannot be simplistically linked in any way to cohesion, coherence and intertextuality.

e) Cohesion, coherence and informativity can be used to “provide a formal definition of what constitutes [...] *textuality* or *texture*”.

Crystal’s definition implies the three properties (according to Halliday and Hasan)/ the three parameters (according to de Beaugrande and Dressler) are sufficient in accounting for a text’s ‘textuality or texture’. As will be elaborated on later in this chapter, in neither of the two TL approaches’ viewpoint, is Crystal’s claim true. To Halliday and Hasan, it is cohesion,

Thematic-Rhematic progression and text-types which build up texture. To de Beaugrande and Dressler, it is a totality of seven parameters which co-function to bring about textuality.

f) ... *"textuality* or *texture".*

The two terms can be interpreted as used synonymously by Crystal. In reality, the two have little in common, and each belongs only within one of the two TL theoretical systems (i.e. in Halliday and Hasan's, or in de Beaugrande and Dressler's).

As Halliday (1976: 20) originally formulated it, "[t]he concept of texture is entirely appropriate to express the property of 'being a text'. A text has texture and this is what distinguishes it from something that is not a text." More recent Hallidayan TL research (e.g., Forey and Thompson 2009) typically sees 'texture' as the 'quality' that makes a text 'hang together'. Within de Beaugrande and Dressler's research, 'texture' is never used; they concentrate on the conceptually different notion of 'textuality'.

'Textuality' in its turn is not used in Hallidayan TL. The only use of 'textuality' is in *Cohesion in English*, where it appears towards the end of the book, as late as page 296, in the following passage:

> Textuality is not a matter of all or nothing, of dense dusters of cohesive ties or else none at all. Characteristically we find variation in texture, so that textuality is a matter of more or less. In some instances there will in fact be dense clusters of cohesive ties, giving a very close texture which serves to signal that the meanings of the parts are strongly interdependent and that the whole forms a single unity.

Due to the dubious formulation in Crystal's definition, and due to this excerpt's being a single, isolated occurrence in Halliday and Hasan's book (1976), it is very difficult to put forth a hypothesis as to precisely what Halliday might have meant in that passage. His later influential works connected to TL (Halliday and Webster 2014; Halliday and Matthiessen 2014) do not

include even a single mention of ‘textuality’; quite understandably, the volumes employ the term ‘texture’ exclusively. In brief, it seems completely justified to state that, within Hallidayan TL, it is only the notion of ‘texture’ which is used, and ‘textuality’ is, in reality, not part of the Hallidayan theoretical system.

Regardless of those facts, Crystal (2008) is very far from being alone in his mixing together the terms of ‘texture’ and ‘textuality’. For instance, a highly acclaimed scholar working within the framework of Cognitive Poetics tables the following interpretation: “Texture is the experienced quality of textuality. Textuality refers to the stylistic patterns in evidence in a text” (Stockwell 2016: 458).

Clearly, this is an individual interpretation rather than an account of what Halliday and Hasan, and de Beaugrande and Dressler actually propose. As is well known, de Beaugrande and Dressler’s notion of textuality has to do with the seven standards of cohesion, coherence, intentionality, acceptability, informativity, situationality and intertextuality, and not just with ‘stylistic patterns’. Moreover, the ‘stylistic patterns’ in a text, as explicitly stated by de Beaugrande and Dressler, and discussed later in this chapter, associate almost exclusively with one of the parameters – cohesion, and they associate somewhat marginally with a second one – informativity. This makes it hardly possible for ‘stylistic patterns’ to be equated with ‘textuality’, as Stockwell suggests.

Additionally, if it is only one of the two notions – texture or textuality – which is postulated by its originator(s) as something that is ‘experienced’ (to quote Stockwell, ibid.), then that notion decidedly is ‘textuality’. In other words, it is ‘textuality’ that is defined in TL as essentially entailing “factors of cognition” [1981: 17]) and not, as Stockwell suggests, ‘texture’. In contrast, ‘texture’, which is part only of Halliday’s theory, is postulated as residing ‘within’ a text and not as pertaining to a text user’s (cognitive) experience.

Indeed, Stockwell's interpretation (2016: 458) is, to my mind, quite valuable for its seeking traces of conceptual metaphorization and embodiment in the very term of 'texture':

> A text is a linguistic object in which elements are perceived as being linked or patterned, and which is most typically perceived as being coherent [...] It is clear through this sequence of terms that there is a common thread that ties together the objective properties of a piece of language and the experiential effects on a reader. Texture, in everyday understanding, is the quality of feeling that is associated with different objects in the world. It is primarily a physical sense, with its main usage associated with fingertip touch and then the haptic system in general; secondarily, the notion of texture is transferred to the visual field, and then to the sense of taste; and lastly it is used in an abstract, conceptual sense. In bodily semantic terms, texture starts at the fingertips and is then associated with the eyes and the mouth. It is only loosely associated with sound and smell in everyday usage, though musicians and perfumiers deploy the term in their own specialist domains.

Nonetheless, the re-definition seems specifically tailored to the uses of a single approach (i.e. Cognitive Poetics), as professed by the author himself:

> In cognitive poetics, which explores the interaction between readers and literary works, the definition of texture and its actual set of usages in the world is the starting point for an exploration of the ways in which stylistic patterns and readerly experience inter-animate each other. (Stockwell 2016: 459)

Thus, the interpretation put forward by Stockwell does not seem intended to hold for text-related investigations in general. Perhaps that is why it does not maintain the basic distinction between the notions of texture and textuality, as postulated by the original TL authors, and perhaps it aims to table an interpretation specifically tailored to the needs of Cognitive Poetics.

In sum, regardless of their numerous interpretations and re-interpretations, ‘texture’ and ‘textuality’ belong within two different theoretical systems. As will be argued below, ‘textuality’ is part of de Beaugrande and Dressler’s theoretical system and has to do with cognitive processes, while ‘texture’ is Halliday and Hasan’s semiotics-based term for a property ‘possessed’ by a text.

g) In Crystal’s definition of TL above, cohesion, coherence and “informativeness” are the basis on which “texts are classified into text types, or genres”.

This – from my perspective – debatable claim will be paid special attention to in the next part of the thesis, more specifically in VIII. 6., which centers around the notion of ‘text types’.

h) In Crystal’s definition, the dynamic aspect of text or discourse “can be investigated using psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic, as well as linguistic, techniques”.

The present investigation subscribes fully to this premise. Socio-linguistic research instruments seen as especially prominent to the objectives of this thesis.

To generalize my findings on the central issue of this section, namely the question of what TL actually is, it seems justified to conclude that modern-day interpretations of ‘TL’ diverge considerably. Both prominent scholars’ research, as evident in the quotations included above, as well as in less acclaimed studies tend to exemplify significant divergences and lack of unity on the issue. For instance, Gonçalves (2018) excludes completely Hallidayan research from her perception of what TL is and only includes de Beaugrande and Dressler’s contributions into her definition of ‘TL’. Even more characteristically of the modern-day lack of agreement on what TL is, building on previous studies headed towards such a conclusion (e.g. Mellet and

Longrée 2009), Postolea (2014) maintains TL is simply corpus linguistics and, thus, practically discards any interest in context and its relevance to text analysis (i.e. such studies equate 'context' with 'co-text').

To try and provide a conceptually sound answer to what the academic notion of TL is, this chapter will proceed by returning to the original studies constituting TL. It will try and establish what the theoretical center of the original studies is; then it will trace the lines of divergence between the original studies, in the hope of thus helping explain present-day scholarly TL divergences. Finally, it will try and provide a fresh re-definition of what TL is; it will do so by applying to the concept of TL the multi-process cognitive model I propose in this thesis.

IV. 2. The two original branches of TL

IV. 2. 1. The semiotics-based branch: Halliday

Halliday's theoretical system, as any other theoretical system, rests on a number of basic premises, which themselves are determined by certain concepts and their interpretation. Perhaps understandably, acknowledging the fact that in *Cohesion in English* Halliday seeks to establish a new scholarly approach to language use, those concepts and premises are overtly defined by him in the first pages of the seminal book (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 1–9). Here, I isolate key definitions from those pages, systematize them thematically, and provide content analysis. The intent is for this systematization to serve as a stepping stone in my establishing the overall conceptual profile of Halliday's approach. That could, hopefully, allow me to then test the multi-process model I propose in this thesis for compatibility with Halliday's TL approach.

'Text'

The first set of definitions concerns the size and medium (i.e. written vs. oral) of the chunk of language used. As characterized in *Cohesion in English*, a text is:

- "...any passage - spoken or written, of whatever length, that does form a unified whole"
- "...a momentary cry for help or a whole play"

While the two parameters of size ("of whatever length") and mode ("spoken or written") used to be a debated topic at the time (as discussed in the Introduction here), "a unified whole" in Halliday's definitions concerns an issue, or, rather, issues of a different order – those issues associate with the general domains of text meaning and text function. However, Halliday's definitions do not clarify the specific nature or characteristics of that association. Halliday's formulation, moreover, can be argued to be rather underspecified in that how one understands

whether a chunk of language is one whole or not, and how one understands whether a chunk of language is indeed unified or not, are questions not overtly answered by Halliday and Hasan. Halliday and Hasan simply state that a person "can normally decide without difficulty whether it forms a unified whole or is just a collection of unrdated sentences" (1976: 1)

This peculiarity is evident in the following definitions by Halliday and Hasan, too:

- "A text is best regarded as a semantic unit; a unit not of form but of meaning."
- "A text is not made of the words written down or uttered aloud but is made of meanings."
- "A text does not consist of, it is encoded in sentences."
- "A text is a unit of language in use. It is not a grammatical unit, like a clause or a sentence."
- "It differs from a sentence in principle, in essence, in kind."

Several points need to be highlighted with respect to these definitions: the first one is Halliday's insistence that a text is qualitatively different, that is, different in essence, from units and structures susceptible to 'lower' language levels' principles and operations. As argued above, founding TL against the legacy of text grammars required very explicit formulation of how TL differs from generativist and structuralist approaches. Thus, Halliday's definitions seem targeted at accomplishing that objective specifically.

Yet, while defending what a text is not, Halliday's definitions seem a little less efficient in establishing what a text is. Or, to be precise, they seem a little less efficient in establishing precisely what a text is. Stating that a text is a "unit of language in use", however true, does not include a specification of what that 'unit' is and how (i.e. on what principles) it is to be delineated as an entity in its own right.

The same applies to defining a text as being "a unit not of form but of meaning": one may wonder how precisely to delineate analytically a chunk, or a portion, of 'meaning' so that

the language used can be identifiable as a single text. Similarly, one might wonder how precisely to employ analytically the (principally valid) claim that a text "does not consist of, it is encoded in sentences." What is more, the questions remain as to how that encoding (or assigning meanings) happens 'in' the text user's mind, and why a text is encoded in sentences, if sentence sequences are not what actually makes up a text.

The previous should not be considered a criticism of the initial Hallidayan endeavors aiming to forge the foundations of a much needed new field in linguistics, i.e. TL. Indeed, some of the questions I raise have been addressed in other scholarly works subsequently. What my main point here is concerns the questions of where Halliday postulates the boundaries of his particular brand of TL, and on what he bases the limitations and goals of his TL.

It is my conviction that, generally, no scholarly approach could ever encompass and account for the totality of its object of study due to the limitations of human perceptions and human cognition, academic cognition being no exception to that principle. To use a conceptual metaphor, no approach could ever slice off but a piece of the whole cake that is its object of study. That piece could be broad or narrow; it could also be chosen to cut down through a variety of layers of study. What the present investigation tries to establish is what Halliday chooses to slice out of the totality of the vast object he endeavors to investigate. The questions I raise in this chapter represent an attempt to clarify the purposes and limits of the original TL branch associated with Halliday's semiotics-based function-centered textual investigations.

Within that framework, the definitions included above demonstrate, Halliday insists on maintaining a distinction between form and meaning, and, in doing that, he lays emphasis on the latter. As evident in the definitions right below, Halliday elaborates on a form-function distinction, and, although, as will be argued later in this chapter, the analytical procedures he puts forward may be seen as contradicting some of his basic theoretical claims, the theoretical

system he expounds in the introductory pages of *Cohesion in English* (1976) seems indisputably sound:

- Text is "language that is functional, i.e. in contrast to isolated words or sentences, it performs a certain function in a certain context."
- "Communication activities as social activities exist as texts."

The first conclusion that needs to be drawn with regard to these definitions is that, in them, text functions (also discussed in Chapter VIII) are declared to be crucial to Halliday's version of TL. The second thing is that 'text function' is interpreted by Halliday as social/pragmatic function, and not as one holding between language structures.

'Text function(s)'

The issue of what a text function precisely is relates to both our discussion of the multi-functionality of political speeches in Chapter II and to the notion of text types discussed in Chapter VIII.

A cornerstone of Halliday and Hasan's TL (1976) is the semiotics-based premise that a text is language that is functional. As Halliday repeatedly states, in contrast to isolated words or sentences, a text performs a certain function in a certain context. To Halliday, this function-based, meaning-driven principle is what makes a text a semantic unit and not just a 'bigger' sentence.

Another keystone idea in Halliday and Hasan's theory is the possibility for one and the same text to achieve simultaneously more than one purpose, which coheres well with our discussions in Chapter II and Chapter VIII. As is well known, according to Halliday, there are three main functions a text typically performs. The ideational function (subdivided into

experiential and logical), the interpersonal function and the textual function are so coordinated as to produce a unified effect:

> To be able to read a text, or listen to it, effectively and with understanding, we have to be able to interpret it terms of all these metafunctions. In other words, anyone who is learning by listening to a teacher, or reading a textbook, has to:
>
> 1a. understand the processes being referred to, the participants in these processes, and the circumstances – time, cause, etc. – associated with them [EXPERIENTIAL];
>
> 1b. understand the relationship between one process and another, or one participant and another, that share the same position in the text [LOGICAL];
>
> recognize the speech function, the type of offer, command, statement, or question, the attitudes and judgements embodied in it, and the rhetorical features that constitute it as symbolic act [INTERPERSONAL]; and
>
> grasp the news value and topicality of the message; and the coherence between one part of the text and every other part [TEXTUAL]. (Halliday and Hasan 1985: 45)

Translated into the terminology of the multi-process cognitive model put forward in this thesis, the EXPERIENTIAL, the LOGICAL, and the TEXTUAL functions, the way they are formulated by Halliday (ibid.), associate with TWs. Out of the several cognitive TW aspects (the way they are postulated in de Beaugrande and Dressler's framework discussed below), the TEXTUAL function can be seen as associating with coherence specifically.

The INTERPERSONAL function in its turn can be argued to suggest a DW-TW conflation as it has "speech function" and "rhetorical features" amalgamated (not unlike political-speech functions discussed in Chapter II, and text-structure rhetorical segments discussed in Chapter III). Overall, such a reading confirms the generalizations made in the

previous section about Hallidayan TL staying closer to the text rather than to its context, at that it stays closer to the text as a product rather than to text as a process.

The slighter role allotted to DWs within the Hallidayan framework may be argued to run against Halliday and Hasan's insistence that 'text functions' are closely intertwined with the notion of 'context', or against their pointing out that "the text creates the context as much as the context creates the text" and that "[m]eaning' arises from the friction between the two" (1985: 47). What is more, Halliday and Hasan's perspective of 'context' represents a set of parameters existing objectively – contextual elements, to Halliday and Hasan, can be studied independently of human cognition. Precisely how contextual information is understood by a text user, how contextual information creates text through "friction" between the two (Halliday and Hasan 1985: 47), and how meanings are actually assigned to text elements are issues beyond the scope of interest of Hallidayan TL.

What Hallidayan TL keeps in its focus is existing correlations (i.e. not processes but products) between contextual elements and their textual functions. Those, Halliday and Hasan (1985: 26) argue, can reveal the nature of a text in the following manner:

SITUATION: Feature of the context	(realized by)	TEXT: Functional component of semantic system
Field of discourse (what is going on)		Ideational meanings (transitivity, naming, etc.)
Tenor of discourse (who are taking part)		Interpersonal meanings (mood, modality, person, etc.)
Mode of discourse (role assigned to language)		Textual meanings (theme, information, cohesive relations)

Fig. 1. Halliday's meta-functional model

The field, according to this scheme, "is expressed through the experiential function in the semantics", the tenor "is expressed through the interpersonal function in the semantics", and the mode "is expressed through the textual function in the semantics" (ibid: 25). Again, Halliday's approach does not discuss the issue of how the three components of the system of text become actually "expressed".

As a consequence, although Halliday repeatedly emphasizes that a text is both a product and a process, Halliday's TL can be generalized to deal with the end results of textual processes and to disregard the processes themselves. Viewed from the perspective of our multi-process model, Hallidayan TL unvaryingly metonymizes TEXT as a PRODUCT against the constant background of TEXT as a PROCESS.

'Texture'

A key notion in Hallidayan TL is 'texture'. As Halliday and Hasan unambiguously state, their seminal *Cohesion in English* is about "the resources that English has for creating texture" (1976: 2). Furthermore,

> [t]he concept of texture is entirely appropriate to express the property of 'being a text'. A text has texture and this is what distinguishes it from something that is not a text. It derives this texture from the fact that it functions as a unity with respect to its environment. (ibid.)

Several points need to be foregrounded in this definition. First, 'texture' is Halliday's answer to what distinguishes a text form a non-text. Second, 'texture' is a quality, or a property, of a text. Third, a text 'possesses' the quality, or property, of texture, or, to put it differently, the conceptual metaphor underlying this specific scholarly interpretation sees 'texture' as residing 'in' a text. Clearly, such an interpretation relies considerably on texture's objective presence

'in' a text. In contrast, as will be discussed later in this chapter, in de Beaugrande and Dressler's branch of TL, whether a portion of language constitutes a text or a non-text represents a rather subjective perception they choose to call 'textuality'.

Above all, from Halliday's perspective, 'texture' is not equal to cohesion: the latter is a major linguistic resource for producing texture but it is not the only resource. As postulated in *Cohesion in English*, cohesion operates together with coherence and text structure in order to create texture.

Cohesion

In Halliday and Hasan's seminal book *Cohesion in English* (1976), cohesion is postulated as a semantic concept referring to the meaning relations within a text. Halliday and Hasan also define cohesion as "the set of linguistic resources that every language has […] for linking one part of a text to another" (1985: 48), and argue that cohesion is "expressed partly through the grammar and partly through the vocabulary" (1976: 7).

The previous raises the question of whether Halliday and Hasan accept that cohesion can hold within a sentence, which is an important issue with a bearing on the discussion of de Beaugrande and Dressler's interpretation of cohesion, presented later on here.

On the one hand, Halliday and Hasan define cohesion as a non-structural relationship:

> A text, as we have said, is not a structural unit; and cohesion, in the sense in which we are using the term, is not a structural relation. Whatever relation there is among the parts of a text - the sentences, or paragraphs or turns in a dialogue - it is not the same as structure in the usual sense. (1976: 6)

On the other hand, Halliday and Hasan admit to the fact that any structural relation (including the ones which link parts of a sentence or components of a clause) represent "a unifying relation" (1976: 6). Thus, they conclude,

> [...] any unit which is structured hangs together so as to form text. All grammatical units - sentences, clauses, groups, words - are internally cohesive simply because they are structured. The same applies to the phonological units, the tone group, foot and syllable. (1976: 7)

Nevertheless, cohesion within a grammatical unit, a phonological unit, a tone group, etc. is not included in Halliday and Hasan's theoretical framework, which represents a major difference from de Beaugrandian TL discussed below.

Generally, cohesion is considered by Halliday and Hasan to be achieved on the basis of the cohesive devices used in a text. Cohesive devices in their turn are defined as clues used by text users in their arriving at the meanings which underlie surface structures. Importantly, Halliday and Hasan's cohesive devices represent lexico-grammatical patterns which actualize the semantic relationships in a text. Hence *Cohesion in English* is so organized as to provide an exhaustive classification of cohesive devices from the point of view of type of lexical and grammatical units.

As it is one of the purposes of the present discussion to distinguish between Hallidayan TL and de Beaugrandian TL, it seems apt that we reiterate here at least some information concerning the types of cohesive devices (1976: 31). Out of the three major categories Halliday and Hasan postulate (i.e. Grammatical, Lexical, Conjunctive), Grammatical devices constitute the first type; the type includes three sub-types: Reference, Ellipsis and Substitution.

As reference, strictly speaking, is not a grammatical phenomenon, Halliday and Hasan approach it along the lines of the types of grammatical units used to express it (e.g., pronouns,

determiners, comparatives). In other words, they do not classify semiotic processes of assigning meanings but, instead, they classify linguistic signs suggesting the existence of those processes. In a similar vein, through the notions of exophora, anaphora and cataphora, Halliday's view on reference tells us the interpretation of a textual element may lie 'outside' the text (i.e. in the objectively existing context of a communicative exchange) or 'inside' the text.

The TEXT as a PLACE metaphor is also observable in their treatment of the other two grammatical cohesive devices. Substitution and ellipsis are considered by Halliday and Hasan to function by replacing one linguistic item with another, or by employing the so-called zero-replacement. To use Halliday and Hasan's terminology, substitution and ellipsis TIE together linguistic ENTITIES and thus produce cohesion. The metaphor of a COHESIVE TIE which resides IN a TEXT is similarly conceptualized as applying to the second and third type of cohesive devices Halliday and Hasan postulate – Lexical cohesive devices and Conjunction. In brief, through metaphtonymy, Hallidayan TL 'positions' cohesion and cohesive devices WITHIN the TEXT as a PRODUCT, which also confirms that, in Hallidayan TL, text-related PROCESSES are steadily suppressed as background.

Although Halliday and Hasan's groundbreaking book (1976) is about cohesion, they unambiguously defend the position that the formal presence of cohesive devices in a text is far from sufficient in categorizing a portion of language as a text. The absence of cohesive devices in its turn is not sufficient for a portion of language to not be called a text. As is also well known, to account for those two phenomena, Halliday and Hasan introduce the notion of 'coherence' in linguistic analysis.

Coherence

According to Halliday and Hasan's (1976, 1985) definition, a coherent text is a semantically connected, integrated whole, which expresses temporal, locational, causational, etc. relations

among concepts. A text receiver perceives a text as coherent when there are direct and indirect semantic links between lexical items and sentences. But lack of logical and associative connections in semantic space cannot be compensated for by semantically-unconditioned overt cohesive devices:

> A text is a passage of discourse which is coherent in these two regards: it is coherent with respect to the context of situation, and therefore consistent in register; and it is coherent with respect to itself and therefore cohesive. Neither of these two conditions is sufficient without the other, nor does the one by necessity entail the other. (1976: 23)

Coherence, clearly, is not merely an issue of wording, hence the somewhat lesser potential of the Hallidayan approach (in comparison to de Beaugrande and Dressler's) to render an exhaustive account of coherence – its theoretical framework does not encompass cognitive structures and processes. Hence also the fact that in Halliday's works cohesion is given prominence, while coherence is assigned a secondary role as an object of investigation.

The evolved 'cohesion' and 'coherence'

In the literature, both the notions of 'cohesion' and of 'coherence' have evolved since the publication of *Cohesion in English* in 1976. They have evolved in both Halliday's works and his followers'. One of the most noteworthy examples of that evolution, from my perspective, is Widdowson's discussion of cohesion as 'a pragmatic matter', where he claims that "we need to discover the pragmatic conditions which control the choice of one cohesive device over another" (1992: 109). The idea, regrettably, has garnered little support (a rare exception would be, e.g., Lei and Jie 2021) and, as of today, to the best of my knowledge, there is no established TL branch dealing with that specific subject.

A facet of cohesion which has attracted considerable scholarly attention and has been proliferated throughout the greatest number of relevant works is the use of anaphora and

cataphora. Related studies' foci of interest vary from 'classic' anaphora (e.g. Breban et al. 2011; Liddy 1990; Steinberger et al. 2007), 'backward' anaphora (e.g. Mittwoch 1983; Kazanina et al. 2007), anaphora in automatic text summarization (e.g. Antunes et al. 2018), co-reference resolution and/ or zero-anaphora (e.g. Kaczmarek and Marcinczuk 2017; Sukthanker et al. 2020; Lee et al. 2017), cataphora (e.g. Blom et al. 2015; Trnavac and Taboada 2016), cohesion in teaching practices (e.g. Yasuda 2019; Evan et al. 2020), coherence (e.g. Giora 1997; Jackson 2020), intertextuality (e.g. D'Angelo 2009), etc.

All these studies can be summarized as exemplifying the Hallidayan preference for analyzing text as a product vs. text as a process. Clearly, some of the research (e.g. Kaczmarek and Marcinczuk 2017; Sukthanker et al. 2020) emphasizes the background importance of text as a process to a greater degree as compared to other research (e.g. Tanskanen 2006; Tseng 2018; Yasuda 2019). However, a truly process-driven analysis (e.g. Matchin et al.'s [2014] neurobiological investigation on 'backward anaphora' and Ferstl and von Cramon's 2001 fMRI study on cohesion and coherence) is rather an exception, and, clearly, so far such data analyses have served as psycholinguistic confirmation of already existing theoretical premises rather than as theoretical advances in their own right.

Halliday's latest version of TL (Halliday and Matthiessen 2014), too, is based on the conviction that text is rather the product of the processes of speaking and writing:

> When people speak or write, they produce text; and text is what listeners and readers engage with and interpret. The term 'text' refers to any instance of language, in any medium, that makes sense to someone who knows the language; we can characterize text as language functioning in context [...]. Language is, in the first instance, a resource for making meaning; so text is a process of making meaning in context. (Halliday and Matthiessen 2014: 22)

Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that, in Hallidayan TL as a whole, the question of how exactly a text "makes sense to someone who knows the language" remains outside the lens. Hence also the contradiction in seeing text as "a process of making meaning in context" (ibid.) and, later on the same page, arguing a text is "either viewed as **artefact**, or else viewed as **specimen**" (Halliday and Matthiessen 2014: 22; emphasis as in original). Crucially, in the same book, Halliday and Matthiessen (2014: 612) go on to assert that

> [**t**]**ext** is something that happens, in the form of talking or writing, listening or reading [...]. When we analyse it, we analyse the **product** of this **process**; and the term 'text' is usually taken as referring to the product – especially the product in its written form, since this is most clearly perceptible as an object. (emphasis as in original)

Consequently, it can be concluded that Halliday's notion of 'cohesion' does not vary from its original 1976 version and rests on the existence of 'lexicogrammatical resources of cohesion':

> ...there is a set of lexicogrammatical systems that have evolved specifically as a resource for making it possible to transcend the boundaries of the clause – i.e. the domain of the highest-ranking grammatical unit. These lexicogrammatical systems originate in the textual metafunction and are collectively known as the system of COHESION (Halliday and Matthiessen 2014: 622).

Overall, the most prominent post-Hallidayan TL evolution by far is represented by – what I would like to call – the second, cognitive, branch of TL. As professed by de Beaugrande (1980), Halliday and Hasan's *Cohesion in English* is what triggered the emergence of that second branch.

IV. 2. 2. The cognitive branch: de Beaugrande and Dressler

The cornerstone of de Beaugrande and Dressler's (1981) approach can be found in their repetitive insistence that their particular brand of TL be called the 'procedural' model. The reason they give for that preference is the viewpoint on 'text' they choose to adopt – de Beaugrande and Dressler view the text from the perspective of the individual text user's mind and its cognitive capacities.

In contrast to Halliday and Hasan, who pay more attention to text as a product (although, as demonstrated in the previous section, they also acknowledge the importance of approaching text as a process), de Beaugrande and Dressler focus exclusively on text as a process. In combination with the viewpoint they adopt, the processes de Beaugrande and Dressler describe in their *Introduction to Text Linguistics* (ibid.) are, rather understandably, cognitive. As de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 91) maintain, there exist different cognitive structures, which can be related to cognitive text processing as follows:

> ...how a topic might be developed (frames), how an event sequence will progress (schemas), how text users or characters in TWs will pursue their goals (plans), and how situations are set up so that certain texts can be presented at the opportune moment (scripts). Different pattern types might share the same basic knowledge in a variable perspective (e.g. a frame for 'structure of a house' versus a plan for 'building a house'.

Furthermore, by definition, de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 3) treat a text as 'a communicative occurrence which meets seven standards of textuality' (i.e. cohesion, coherence, intentionality, acceptability, informativity, situationality, and intertextuality). Failure to satisfy any of the seven standards results in a non-communicative occurrence, i.e. in a non-text. The set of standards is generally considered to be far from homogenous, as cohesion and coherence are what de Beaugrande and Dressler themselves call 'text-centered', and the rest of the standards – 'user-centered'.

This section will discuss each of the seven standards with a view of establishing similarities and differences between Hallidayan TL and de Beaugrande and Dressler's TL. Another objective is for the section to pave the way for the subsequent discussion (included in the next chapter) on the notion of 'context' and its relevance to the five 'user-centered' parameters in de Beaugrande and Dressler's theoretical system.

Cohesion

Within de Beaugrande and Dressler's TL, cohesion

> concerns the way the components of the SURFACE TEXT, i.e. the actual words we hear or see, are *mutually connected within sequence.* The surface components **depend** upon each other according to grammatical forms and conventions, such that cohesion rests upon GRAMMATICAL DEPENDENCIES. […] the grammatical dependencies in the surface text are major signals for sorting out meanings and uses. All of the functions which can be used to signal relations among surface elements are included under our notion of COHESION. (1981: 3; emphasis as in original)

In similarity to Halliday and Hasan's interpretation of 'cohesion', de Beaugrande and Dressler's version also sees cohesion as associated with linguistic structures that are not necessarily adjacent to each other. In contrast to Halliday and Hasan, however, de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 50) emphasize the importance of cohesion within syntactic units such as a phrase, a clause, or a sentence. Although Halliday acknowledges the presence of cohesion within a sentence, the cohesive potential of syntax is principally disregarded in his theoretical framework. Arguably, trying to break away from structuralist and generativist premises, Halliday assigns syntax to the domain of 'linguistics proper' and excludes it from TL analysis.

Within the short-range boundaries of any syntactic unit, de Beaugrande and Dressler argue, cohesion is easier to detect: in short-range structures, cohesion emerges from the

grammatical dependencies between elements, e.g. between determiners and head nouns in Noun Phrases, which makes such instances of cohesion 'more obvious' (ibid.). This is not to suggest that long-range structures are not the focus of attention in de Beaugrande and Dressler's model. However, de Beaugrande and Dressler lay special emphasis on the fact that they perceive as cohesive any linguistic structure positioned within any range that serves to provide 'continuity':

> The notion of "continuity" as employed here is based on the supposition that the various occurrences in the text and its situation of utilization are related to each other, or in cognitive terms: each occurrence is instrumental in ACCESSING at least some other occurrences. (de Beaugrande and Dressler 1981: 48)

The rationale behind their broadening the scope of cohesive devices – in comparison to Hallidayan classification of cohesive devices – derives from de Beaugrande and Dressler's overall philosophy of how language occurs. As part of human cognition, they maintain, language use is susceptible to the limitations of the cognitive capacities of the human mind. As a result, de Beaugrande and Dressler base their whole view of the seven parameters of textuality on the keystone notion of 'working memory' (or 'active storage'), and argue that the seven standards are dependent on the impossibility for short-term memory to retain information beyond a certain size and degree of complexity. The ensuing need is for language processing mechanisms to make information manageable, which, almost exclusively means chunking information down into manageable portions.

Applying the notion of 'working memory' to linguistic analyses has been supported in other studies. For example, Ritchie (2004: 269), following Kintsch (1998), deliberates that working memory

> includes both short-term memory and elements in long-term memory that can be readily activated, either because of a lingering high level of activation (e.g., from recent access) or because of cues present in short-term memory. Thus, each participant's working memory will include all ideas recently activated as a result of the preceding communicative interaction [...], along with salient perceptions of the physical environment [...]. Slightly less accessible will be other ideas, memories, etc. that are closely linked to these elements. [...] The exact neural mechanisms are not known, but it is very likely that interpretation involves co-activation of neural assemblages, which create or strengthen links between the co-activated assemblages.

Applied to cohesion, that means all language devices, most notably syntax, which serve to chunk down language flow into manageable portions, function cohesively: the devices facilitate and optimize a specific text's 'continuous' flow. As de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 52) themselves explain it:

> There appears to be a very short-lived imprint of visually or acoustically perceived materials upon which some provisional organization must be rapidly imposed [...] These provisionally organized materials can then be retained for some longer periods of time, but still only within modest limits. It follows that text processing could not afford to run through the participants' vast stores of world knowledge immediately; there must be some ancillary organizational system with far more limited options and patterns. [...] surface structures are more predominantly maintained in a "short-term" storage, and conceptual content in a "long-term" storage [...] The functions of syntax reflect these cognitive factors.

Syntax being only the first cohesive device in de Beaugrande and Dressler's model, there follow an array of other cohesive devices, each serving to signal which text-related cognitive model(s) should be kept activated 'in' working memory. Those cohesive devices include: recurrence (i.e. the repetition of elements or patterns), parallelism (the repetition of a structure by filling it with new elements), paraphrase (the repetition of content conveyed

through different expressions), the use of pro-forms (replacing elements with shorter forms), ellipsis (the omission of surface expressions). To generalize, de Beaugrande and Dressler's cohesion relies heavily on the re-usage and modification of linguistic units and structures occurring (usually) earlier in the same text.

Those units and structures, crucially, can be modified or re-used because they need to re-signal previously evoked linguistic cognitive structures into working memory (note that, in contrast to cohesion, coherence, discussed below, is about (re-)signaling the activation of non-linguistic cognitive structures). In other words, cohesive devices may signal which already activated cognitive models or structures are to be kept activated in working memory, and which are to be de-activated.

In that regard, let me point to what de Beaugrande and Dressler term 'pro-forms', which, to my mind, are especially reveling as to de Beaugrande and Dressler's cognitive procedural working-memory-conditioned version of TL. In Hallidayan TL, pronouns belong within the group of 'Grammatical cohesive devices', and, more specifically, they are part of the 'Refence' sub-category of grammatical cohesive devices. Pronouns are positioned by Halliday in that category as, generally, they represent a grammatical word class. Beyond the word class, when pronouns are used cohesively, the 'tie' they participate in holds between two equally cohesive linguistic elements – between a full noun phrase and a reduced one realized by the pronoun. In other words, to Halliday, a pronoun is not a textual substitute for a noun phrase (although, from a syntactical perspective, it can be seen as a substitute); from a textual perspective, a pronoun is a cohesive unit participating in a cohesive tie/chain in parallel with (an)other nominal unit(s). Accordingly, Halliday maintains a clear distinction between pronominal cohesive ties/chains, and substitution: 'Substitution', to him, represents a separate sub-category of grammatical cohesion, alternative to '(Pronominal) Reference'.

In de Beaugrande and Dressler's TL, pronouns are not substitutes either. But they also do not function in parallel with other units in common 'chains', the way they are postulated to do in Hallyday's TL. Pronouns, to de Beaugrande and Dressler, are used to signal ongoing cognitive processes, i.e. they are used to indicate sequential conceptual progression. The basic principle, as mentioned above, is that, while communicating, text users evoke cognitive structures in their working memory, but due to the limited capacity of working memory, any subsequently appearing cognitive structures need to either 'push' previous cognitive structures 'out of' working memory or be themselves 'replaced' by even newer structures. Previously activated cognitive structures, in their turn, may be selected to stay 'in' working memory, and not to be replaced. In that, the 'location' and activation status of a cognitive structure can be signalled by, let us say, a noun phrase or by a pronoun. Clearly, using a shorter language signal will place a lesser load on the cognitive processing of a text. That is why pro-forms, de Beaugrande and Dressler argue, exist: in comparison to noun phrases, they are simpler and easier to process cognitively.

That is also why de Beaugrande and Dressler do not classify pronouns as one of the 'grammatical cohesive devices' but, instead, they group pronouns with other types of linguistic units which can be employed to re-signal previously evoked linguistic cognitive structures into working memory, and they call them pro-forms. De Beaugrande and Dressler take this principle so far as to discuss what they call 'pro-verbs' as belonging within the same type of cohesive devices as 'pro-nouns'. Indeed, de Beaugrande and Dressler readily classify under 'pro-forms' any shorter linguistic unit which can be used to re-confirm a conceptual structure's current status as to working memory.

The role of language units in signalling a conceptual structure's current status as to working memory is a principle of all-encompassing validity, according to de Beaugrande and Dressler's theory. That principle also helps explain another significant difference between their

TL and Halliday and Hasan's TL: in de Beaugrande and Dressler's TL, 'Reference' is not a 'grammatical cohesive device'. In fact, first, 'Reference' is not listed by them as a cohesive device at all, and, second, to de Beaugrande and Dressler, there is no such a category as 'grammatical cohesive devices' whatsoever: they do not base their model on linguistic forms/ structures but, instead, on cognitive processes. Thus, what is of importance to Halliday and Hasan is the aspect of 'co-reference' which calls for its interpretation as an in-text anaphoric/ cataphoric tie between two linguistic units referring to the same exophoric entity. What is of importance to de Beaugrande and Dressler is whether two linguistic units (re-)signal cognitive operations involving the same cognitive structures or not.

The above can be confirmed unambiguously, if we look at de Beaugrande and Dressler's (1981: 60) definition of anaphora: to them, it concerns the "use of a pro-form *after* the co-referring expression" (emphasis as in original), and it is "the most common directionality for co-reference, since the identity of the conceptual content being kept current is made plain in advance". Once again, as the citation ambiguously states, reference, in de Beaugrande and Dressler's TL is strictly about conceptual content and, more specifically, about conceptual content kept current in working memory. Cataphora, in its turn, is similarly defined: it concerns "the use of the pro-form *before* the co-referring expression" (emphasis as in original), when "[p]rocessing would require the creation of a temporarily empty slot position on a **hold stack** [...] until the required content is supplied" (1981: 63; emphasis as in original).

Moreover, in de Beaugrande and Dressler's model, repetitive signalling of operations involving the same cognitive structures can be achieved by a variety of linguistic means exemplifying various word classes and syntactic structures. One and the same concept, as argued above, can be signalled by a noun phrase and then by a pronoun. Alternatively, one and the same concept can be signalled by a noun phrase and then by another, different noun phrase. Thus, de Beaugrande and Dressler's TL avoids the contradiction of Halliday and Hasan's TL

which first postulates (co-)reference as exclusively ‘grammatical cohesion’ and then occasionally mentions it in the discussion of ‘lexical cohesive devices’. De Beaugrande and Dressler’s TL opts for the cognitive cohesive device of PARAPHRASE to account for many of the cases Halliday and Hasan would view as ‘lexical cohesion’.

Following this pattern, de Beaugrande and Dressler further extend the list of cohesive devices they propose and, apart from the devices already listed above (i.e. Syntax, Parallelism, Paraphrase, Pro-forms, etc.), they include Ellipsis, Tense, Aspect, (what they call) Junction, and Intonation. Clearly, Tense, Aspect and Intonation, in similarity to Syntax, are not present in Halliday and Hasan’s (1976, 1985) theoretical model. Nevertheless, de Beaugrande and Dressler’s model reflects the importance of those cohesive devices for the continuous and uninterrupted flow of cognitive structures throughout text processing.

To further illustrate the differences between the two TL approaches, let me also comment on the notion of ‘Junction’ as part of the cohesive devices listed. While Halliday and Hasan (1976) term it ‘Conjunction’ and build the category around the respective word class, de Beaugrande and Dressler use ‘Junction’ to explain how cognitive structures are coordinated and organized into larger cognitive structures. De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 71-74) outline four major types of junctive interrelations: conjunction (coordinating same-status cognitive structures which are both true in a TW), disjunction (between cognitive structures of alternative status, of which only one can be true in a TW); contrajunction (between same-status cognitive structures which are seen as incompatible or unexpected in a TW); subordination (between two cognitive structures, the status of one of which depends on that of the other, e.g. cause and effect). Clearly, such an interpretation is fully compatible with the multi-process model proposed in this thesis.

Coherence

The interpretation of coherence in de Beaugrandian TL (e.g. de Beaugrande 1980, 2005; de Beaugrande and Dressler 1981; Givón 1992; O'Brien and Cook 2016; Giuffrè 2017) serves to explain how, in textual communication, linguistic cognition interplays with non-linguistic cognition.

De Beaugrande and Dressler's (1981: 84) coherence is "clearly not a mere feature of texts, but the outcome of cognitive processes among text users". Coherence, to them, is also founded on the (relatively) uninterrupted flow of consecutive cognitive models/ structures/ networks running through working memory (the way the process is discussed in the section on 'Cohesion' above). The (relatively) uninterrupted flow is termed by de Beaugrande and Dressler 'continuity' and is postulated to derive from the 'mutual access and relevance within a configuration of CONCEPTS AND RELATIONS' (ibid.).

A text, then, is coherent when text receivers can discover such continuity through it and is incoherent when this is not possible. Simply put, if there is no clash or mismatch between the cognitive models evoked by a text in the process of a text user's building a TW in working memory, this results in conceptual continuity, i.e. coherence. In accordance with that principle, a non-coherent text may trigger the construction of an inconsistent TW, in which the configuration of cognitive models and the relations between the models clash, i.e. they are perceived as incompatible.

However, as de Beaugrande and Dressler deliberate in *Introduction to Text Linguistics*, there are two – and not only one – conceptual sources that could potentially trigger conceptual incompatibility: (a) a clash between or among cognitive structures within a TW, and/or (b) a clash between or among TW cognitive structures and cognitive structures in a text user's background conceptual storage. The second alternative derives from the necessity for a text to

make sense by more than itself "but rather by the interaction of TEXT-PRESENTED KNOWLEDGE with people's STORED KNOWLEDGE OF WORLD" (1981: 6).

Within such a framework, either discrepancy, i.e. either (a) or (b), will render a text incoherent, i.e. difficult to comprehend or incomprehensible. Clearly, most frequently, in a nonsensical (i.e. in an incoherent) text there is a discrepancy between the configuration of TW cognitive models and the text receivers' background knowledge (i.e. the network of cognitive models which a text receiver may extract from his/her long-term memory and operate with during text reception).

De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 147) also pay attention to the interconnection between a TW and reality, as it is perceptions of reality which condition and control the use of every text produced or received by humans:

> The socially dominant model of the human situation and its environment constitutes what is commonly called the REAL WORLD. Propositions held to be true in that world [...] would be FACTS. [...] The facts which a person or group consider to be generally applicable to some 'real' or recoverable situation or event constitute BELIEFS. The 'real world' is accordingly the privileged source of beliefs underlying textual communication. Of course, we can produce and receive many texts which are not factual in this way; but we still tend to use the 'real' world as our point of orientation.

As I have argued elsewhere (Tincheva 2015, 2021), adequacy of the representation of reality, i.e. a fine fit between a TW and a RW is not an obligatory requirement as evident, for instance, in fairy tales and Hollywood movie scripts. The communicative purpose of a TW, generally, is to construct a coherent and convincing, albeit not necessarily 'realistic' interpretation of the RW. Consequently, coherence does not emerge from realistic but from well-incorporated configurations of RWs and TWs which do not display discrepancies or clashes among cognitive structures.

Intentionality and acceptability

As evident in our discussion in so far, the notion of 'context' has been crucial to studies of text and discourse. The third and fourth standards of textuality postulated by de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) – Intentionality and Acceptability – are highly relevant in that respect.

In similarity to Cohesion and Coherence, Intentionality and Acceptability rely on cognitive processes and structures (hence their absence in Halliday's approach). They are postulated by de Beaugrande and Dressler to be 'user-centered' parameters, Cohesion and Coherence being text-centered.

De Beaugrande and Dressler defend the necessity to incorporate Intentionality and Acceptability into their theoretical model by arguing that communication can and often does take place through not fully cohesive and coherent texts (1981: 113). Intentionality and Acceptability may be "less obvious", de Beaugrande and Dressler argue, nevertheless, such "attitudes" (ibid.: 113) are often crucial for classifying a text as such.

By definition, Intentionality concerns the text producer's ATTITUDE (which is seen by de Beaugrande and Dressler as a cognitive structure) to construct a cohesive and coherent text which could fulfill the text producer's communicative goal(s). Acceptability reverses the viewpoint and approaches the text from the receiver's perspective: it associates with the receiver's ATTITUDE to deal with a cohesive and coherent text, and to perceive it as relevant to themselves. The two processes involve text producer's and text receiver's GOALS (also seen by de Beaugrande and Dressler as cognitive structures) and the way(s) they affect the current instance of textual communication.

Intentionality may fail whenever a sequence of linguistic signals is intended by the producer as a cohesive and coherent text but certain situational factors place limits on time and text processing resources (e.g. auditory difficulties). As de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981:

114) point out, such “discontinuities and shifts are usually tolerated when they do not disturb communication, especially if their causes are readily apparent”. In such cases, depending on the particular text receiver’s ATTITUDES, GOALS and PLANS to process the text, Acceptability may step powerfully into the equation to make communication still possible.

Informativity

As a standard of textuality, Informativity is used to account for the extent to which text-presented information is new or unexpected to the text receiver. In other words, this standard deals with information storage and text receiver’s EXPECTATIONS. Those expectations, in de Beaugrande and Dressler’s TL, represent cognitive models and structures which can be retrieved from background storage and activated in working memory.

All such cognitive resources as expectations arise from the tendency for humans to apply similar patterns of dealing with real-world-related information and from the way they do that in a consistent fashion. As de Beaugrande and Dressler (ibid.: 147) argue,

> Humans do not perceive the world as a bombardment of individual stimuli; they integrate their sensations into a MODEL of the world … Whatever knowledge is acquired is used continually used as a bridge to annex further knowledge…, for instance, the use of GLOBAL PATTERNS such as FRAMES, SCHEMAS, PLANS, and SCRIPTS for matching, integrating, and controlling large amounts of current materials.

The second source of expectations, from de Beaugrande and Dressler’s perspective, is language-related and concerns the conventional patterns in which language can be organized to signal cognitive structure(s) and cognitive processes. For example, a linguistic arrangement such as ‘organized to language second expectation mental the source way be the of is signal can structure’ would not be acceptable, in contrast to the previous sentence in this paragraph.

Clearly, the (phrasal, clausal, paragraph, etc.) arrangement of linguistic elements in each language varies within certain boundaries and only variations within those boundaries will be considered acceptable. Within those boundaries, however, there exist different degrees of acceptability, and the lesser the degree of typicality of the linguistic organization, the greater the informativity of the text.

By way of an example, let us consider a simple case of inversion. '*I won't marry you*', which relies on a rather typical, and hence, neutral, syntactic organization, will not be as informative as '*Marry you I won't*', which, due to its less typical syntactic organization, will carry additional information about, let us say, the emotional status of the text producer, or the genre the specific text exemplifies. In de Beaugrande and Dressler's terms, '*Marry you I won't*' rates higher in terms of informativity.

Principally, only deviations from text users' expectations convey an additional load of information about a text, and only atypical uses carry additional meanings by breaking away from the expectations. Those atypical uses may concern either the organization of non-linguistic cognitive structures, or the organization of linguistic cognitive structures. However, as de Beaugrande and Dressler generalize, informativity as a textual parameter associates much more easily with coherence rather than with cohesion: it is more frequently that a text producer will create an atypical TW rather than signal a typical TW through atypical language units. Thus, as a means of achieving greater informativity, language signal organization comes second compared to conceptual configuration.

The third source of expectations concerning informativity arises from the techniques available in each language for thematic-rhematic arrangement. The fourth source of expectations de Beaugrande and Dressler discuss is text type (discussed later here and in VIII. 6. in connection with Intertextuality). The fifth source of informativity-related expectations stems from the immediate context in which a text is produced and received: situations can be

and are classified into types of communicative occurrences and each type is associated with a set of text-types and styles which are normally expected to appear in it. For example, a political speech would be highly unexpected at a bachelor's party and an every-day style conversation would be unanticipated between a country's President and a regular student. That does not mean in such cases the text will certainly be non-communicative on account of the break away from the prescriptions of convention. The text still may very well function successfully and it may even be accepted as more informative.

The parameter of Informativity, the way it is conceptualized by de Beaugrande and Dressler, is important to our discussion due to its conflating two types of cognitive structures and processes. As discussed earlier in this section, Cohesion is unambiguously interpreted by de Beaugrande and Dressler as dealing with the cognitive processing of language knowledge. Coherence, as also demonstrated above, is unquestionably interpreted by de Beaugrande and Dressler as dealing with the cognitive processing of non-linguistic information. Intentionality and Acceptability, in their turn, are interpreted by de Beaugrande and Dressler as dealing with non-linguistic information processing, which coheres well with their being postulated as non-text-centered parameters. However, Informativity presents us with an issue: similarly to Intentionality and Acceptability, it is postulated as a non-text-centered parameter, but, in contrast to non-text-centered parameters, it deals with knowledge of language processing also.

On several occasions in *Introduction to Text Linguistics*, de Beaugrande and Dressler indicate the seven parameters they postulate function together and, thus, need to be seen as mutually dependent. 'Informativity' dealing with language processing information, however, suggests more than simply mutual dependence. If our multi-process cognitive model is applied to de Beaugrande and Dressler's theoretical framework, INFORMATIVITY, arguably, represents an area of conceptual overlap between LANGUAGE-RELATED COGNITION and NON-LANGUAGE-RELATED COGNITION. That, in its turn, triggers an overlap between

TEXT-CENTERED PARAMETERS and USER-CENTERED PARAMETERS. The result is rather consequential as it can also be suggested to represent and overlap between a TW and a DW.

However, as our discussion below will, hopefully, demonstrate, equating TEXT-CENTERED PARAMETERS with 'TW', and USER-CENTERED PARAMETERS – with 'DW' would be imprecise and misleading. The matter would be further aggravated, if the notion of CONTEXT also enters the equation, and this chapter and the next one will address that matter.

Situationality

Situationality is another user-centered standard of textuality, which is meant to account for the factors which render a text relevant to a current communicative situation (de Beaugrande and Dressler 1981: 163). In similarity to Intentionality and Acceptability, Situationality also depends on the GOALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, etc.

Situationality reveals how background storage information about previous experience can be used in various manners. In that, de Beaugrande and Dressler maintain (1981: 163), if the dominant function of a text is to provide a relatively objective account of a situation, the cognitive mechanism of SITUATION MONITORING takes place. If the dominant function is to achieve a personal goal, SITUATION MANAGEMENT is performed. The borderline between the two is essentially fuzzy, de Beaugrande and Dressler argue, as revealed by cases in which situation management is carried out under the disguise of situation monitoring (i.e. cases in which private goals are presented as objective accounts of a situation).

De Beaugrande and Dressler term the introduction of a personal angle on a situation MEDIATION and maintain it is present in texts almost exclusively, although they do allow for objectivity in textual communication. 'Mediation', thus, involves the activation and operation

with a greater number of cognitive structures, which makes the cognitive load in situation management greater than that in situation monitoring.

In their discussion of situationality, de Beaugrande and Dressler list twelve strategies for rendering a text relevant to an ongoing communicative situation. For example, they argue (1981: 173) it is typically safe to begin a discourse by using situation monitoring and thus employing remarks which are low in informativity and less likely to cause a conflict of opinions on the topic. This strategy is frequently resorted to in the very common opening remarks about the weather people use. Most of the strategies de Beaugrande and Dressler propose concern the achievement of different degrees of mediation, primarily through negotiation. The rationale behind this seems to derive from the fact that, first, unmediated situation monitoring triggers problematic and conflicting outlooks among participants (1981: 174), and, second, mediated situation management is almost all-pervasive as a way of processing contextual information.

In sum, SITUATIONALITY on its own, and not only as one of the USER-CENTERED PARAMETERS, is also a candidate for being equated with the notion of a DW.

Intertextuality

The last of the seven standards of textuality, Intertextuality, concerns the ways in which the production and reception of a text depend upon participants' knowledge of previously occurring texts.

Chronologically speaking, it is not only the TL notions of 'cohesion' and 'coherence' that originated in Halliday and Hasan's (1976) theoretical model but 'intertextuality', too. From Halliday and Hasan's viewpoint, however, intertextuality is discussed as cross-reference between a text and a previously existing text/previously existing texts. In other words, to Halliday and Hasan, intertextuality is more or less an end result, an existing similarity or sameness between two or more texts.

In contrast, to de Beaugrande and Dressler, Intertextuality represents cognitive processes of finding RESEMBLANCES between an ongoing text and previously processed text(s). As in their discussion of Situationality, here they also resort to the notion of cognitive MEDIATION.

According to de Beaugrande and Dressler, the first intertextuality-related factor which may influence a text's comprehension depends on the expanse of time elapsed between the production or reception of a text and the production or reception of previously encountered texts perceived as relevant. The rule applying here is simple: the larger the expanse of time, the greater the cognitive mediation.

Apart from time, the second factor which concerns intertextuality relates to the issue of whether the resemblance holds between an ongoing text and a single previous text, or between an ongoing text and a whole class of previously encountered texts. The role of mediation here is slightly more complex, or, rather, more subtly differentiated. To de Beaugrande and Dressler, whenever a whole type of texts is evoked in processing of an ongoing text, text users employ extensive MEDIATION. In contrast, quoting directly from a specific well-known text (e.g. the Bible) entails much lesser mediation (de Beaugrande and Dressler, 1981: 182).

De Beaugrande and Dressler's approach to extensive-mediation intertextuality associates with a long-standing issue in both literary and linguistic research, namely the issue of what text types are. "The question of text types", de Beaugrande and Dressler write, "offers a severe challenge to linguistic typology, i.e. systemization and classification of language samples" (1981: 182). Generally, text types are defined as being about text classes, which display certain traits and are typically associated with the achievement of certain communicative purposes. Hence de Beaugrande and Dressler state that a typology of text types "must be correlated with typologies of discourse actions and situations" (1981: 183). The major

problem with such an approach is the impossibility to encompass the considerable variety of actions, functions, personal goals, etc. which may pertain to a text type.

By way of a solution to the problem of text type classification, de Beaugrande and Dressler, first, try to apply a well-established distinction – the one according to which texts can be descriptive, narrative or argumentative. Then they propose an alternative classification in accordance with TW characteristics depending on whether a TW represents an alternative to the accepted version of the real world or not (e.g. literary texts). This criterion, however, does not appear sufficient when poetic texts need to be classified as a literary subtype. The sole characteristic feature on which de Beaugrande and Dressler base their decision in this respect is the specificity of the cohesion of poetic texts. Literary texts, they conclude, as a text type, are not principally different from other types and subtypes as they display various constellations of description, narration, and argumentation.

Generally, the "sets of texts and their characteristics remain fuzzy", de Beaugrande and Dressler write, as "the conditions of communicating are simply too diverse to allow such a rigorous categorization" (1981: 186). This issue will be the object of investigation of Chapter VIII in Part III of this thesis.

What has to be highlighted here, however, is that Intertextuality is yet another standard of textuality which, in similarity to Informativity, deals with processing language-related information but is simultaneously classified as a text-user parameter. In other words, if our multi-process cognitive model is applied to de Beaugrande and Dressler's theoretical framework, INTERTEXTUALITY represents an area of conceptual overlap between LANGUAGE-RELATED COGNITION and NON-LANGUAGE-RELATED COGNITION. That, in its turn, triggers an overlap between TEXT-CENTERED PARAMETERS and USER-CENTERED PARAMETERS.

The result is rather consequential as it can also be suggested to represent and overlap between a TW and a DW. INTERTEXTUALITY, then, belongs to the area of conceptual TW-DW overlap. How it should be positioned with respect to CONTEXT, however, is yet another issue (see Chapter VI).

IV. 3. Applying the multi-process model to the TL branches

This section will first return to an issue raised at the beginning of the chapter (in IV.1.) regarding Crystal's (2008) definition of TL: are de Beaugrande and Dressler's 'textuality' and Halliday and Hasan's 'texture' the same thing?

On the basis of the extensive discussions in the previous two sections, it seems fully justified for me to conclude here that interpreting TEXTURE (to which *Cohesion in English* is dedicated) and TEXTUALITY (to which *Introduction to Text Linguistics* is dedicated) as synonyms would run counter to the conceptualizations employed by the respective authors. TEXTURE and TEXTUALITY are two distinct concepts and, importantly, they function against the backgrounds of two conceptually different theoretical systems.

While TEXTUALITY, according to de Beaugrande and Dressler, depends on cognitive processes associating with the seven standards they propose, Halliday and Hasan (1976: 2) put forward 'texture' as a property a text 'possesses' and which associates with cohesion only. While Halliday and Hassan see texture as a a property belonging 'within' a text, TEXTUALITY 'resides in' a text user's mind. Rather logically, neither 'texture', not 'textuality' is used in both theoretical TL systems: 'texture' is only used by Halliday and Hasan, and not by de Beaugrande and Dressler; 'textuality' is only used by de Beaugrande and Dressler, and not by Halliday and Hasan.

A last peculiarity to note with respect to the two TL branches is that, as a result of all the arguments laid out in this chapter so far, de Beaugrande and Dressler's TL is considerably more difficult to employ analytically, i.e. considerably more difficult to employ in hands-on analytical practices. It is overwhelmingly dynamic, takes little interest in text as a product, and concerns text user-centered cognitive principles, which are considerably more difficult to observe and measure as compared to tracing the cohesive chains in text as an end product (as proposed and practiced in Hallidayan TL).

The multi-process cognitive model proposed here, clearly, associates more readily with the cognitive version of TL supported by de Beaugrande (1980, 1991, 2004, 2022) and by de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981/2016) than with the Hallidayan TL branch (Halliday and Hasan 1976, 1985; Halliday and Webster 2014; Halliday and Matthiessen 2014). The model is directly employable in Beaugrandian TL research, while its application in Hallidayan TL would require additional modifications. In relying heavily on the notion of 'working' memory, Beaugrandian TL, its ensuing understanding of language signals, and its distinguishing between language-related cognitive processes and non-language-related cognitive processes are what lies at the center of the multi-process set of cognitive mechanisms upheld in this thesis. A potentially significant disparity between Beaugrandian TL and our model lies in de Beaugrande's understanding of what 'reality' is – 'RW' is a long way from being postulated in de Beaugrande and Dressler's theoretical system. This is a major theoretical and analytical niche, to which the whole of Part III in this thesis will be dedicated.

Moreover, if one adopts a vantage point 'outside' the two TL theoretical approaches, and takes a step back for the purposes of meta-analysis of those approaches, the multi-process model proposed in this thesis could serve for the purposes of that meta-analysis. As repeatedly demonstrated in the previous two sections of this chapter, any difference between the two TL branches can be traced back to their divergence on the issue of what constitutes a text. In other words, it can be traced back to their conceptualizations of their object of analysis. From there ensue divergences on what elements/ characteristics/ structures of text should be analyzed by TL, what methodologies and research techniques are appropriate to use, etc. Thus, to try and re-construct the cognitive frames or scenarios (term as in Musolff 2006) which Halliday and Hasan, on the one hand, employ, and which de Beaugrande and Dressler, on the other hand, employ seems to hold a strong revealing potential.

Drawing on the discussion in the previous sections in this chapter, and translating the original TL premises into the premises adopted in this thesis, we could generalize that, according to both Halliday and Hasan, and to de Beaugrande and Dressler, in any cognitive frame of TL-analysis, there need to be postulated at least two key cognitive slots: a **text** and **a text user**/ **text users**. Clearly, to adopt a sound analytical position as to how the two original TL branches could be faithfully deciphered, a researcher needs to 'take a step back', 'broaden' the frame, and introduce the role of the **text analyst/ scholar**, too.

From that perspective, several questions arise: where is the position of the TEXT with respect to the TEXT USER within the frame? What is the ANALYST's position within the frame with respect to the TEXT and with respect to the TEXT USER? Apart from the specifics of a TL frame, in REAL LIFE, where does the TEXT exist, according to each TL scholar? In other words, does it 'reside' in, let us say, society, and, if yes, then where exactly in society? Clearly, the questions chart two main areas of interest: one centers round the issue of how TEXT is conceptualized within each approach, and the other centers round the issue of how TL is conceptualized within each approach.

In Hallidayan TL, the text can be argued to be conceptualized metaphorically as an OBJECT (see Halliday and Matthiessen's [2014] definition of it as an ARTEFACT above), or, principally, as a static ENTITY. To Halliday, there are activities one can perform on the OBJECT such as ASSIGNING MEANINGS, where MEANINGS are themselves metaphorized as THINGS or ENTITIES. In contrast, de Beaugrande and Dressler's metaphor of a TEXT sees it as a PROCESS, or, to be precise, as a multitude of simultaneous PROCESSES.

In Hallidayan TL, a text is an OBJECT between which and the TEXT USER there is – for lack of a better metaphorization – (EMPTY) SPACE. Arguably, in parallel to the multitude of theoretical views on LANGUAGE as to where language 'resides' (an issue de Beaugrande [1991: 17] called 'The quest for the locus of language'), TEXT, too, can be taken to occupy a

variety of positions within the TL cognitive frame. To Halliday and his followers in particular, as argued above, TEXT seems to be, principally, dissociated from the TEXT USER. The connection between the two is instantiated through a process of ASSIGNING MEANINGS, which, presumably, lies 'somewhere between' the TEXT and the TEXT USER, and 'connects' them. Where MEANINGS reside in the Hallidayan TL frame and in Hallidayan REALITY, and, how meanings are TAKEN from where they reside and then become ASSIGNED to text UNITS is also underspecified. What is repeatedly noted in Halliday's works is that a TEXT USER is 'somehow' and 'intuitively' capable of conducting the 'assigning meanings' process.

To de Beaugrande and Dressler, a TEXT is not an OBJECT but a cluster of parallel COGNITIVE PROCESSES, which 'run' 'through' (i.e. they are LOCATED WITHIN) a TEXT USER'S MIND. Thus, first, within the de Beaugrandian TL frame, there is no (EMPTY) SPACE between the TEXT and the TEXT USER. Accordingly, MEANINGS do not 'reside' somewhere 'out there' but, instead, they emerge in the process of text processing. Therefore, they are not 'collected' from somewhere 'outside' the text and then 'connected' (i.e. assigned) to the textual units.

Another point of importance is that the general text user's vantage point is not the main focus of Hallidayan TL but, instead, the TL scholar's vantage point is. The scholar/ analyst is the one with the ability to work with terms such as 'determiners', 'meronymy', 'lexical collocation', etc., and is thus capable of tracing cohesive devices. How a text user who is not a TL scholar works with a text 'intuitively' does not lie within the scope of interest in Hallidayan TL. In other words, the addressee of *Cohesion and English* is the linguist as the text's user (clearly, the book aims to establish a new branch of Linguistics) but how any text user works with any text is not an object of discussion.

In stark contrast, the addressee of *Introduction to Text Linguistics* is also the TL analyst but the book focuses on the way any text user works with any text. As a result, in the latter book, the vantage point of the ANALYST lies considerably closer to that of the TEXT USER. There the TL scholar's vantage point is similar to that of any text user in that it, too, exists through and is enabled by cognitive text-related processes.

Admittedly, the TL analyst is additionally expected to be able to operate professionally with such terms as 'syntax', 'prosody', 'intertextuality', etc. After all, *Introduction to Text Linguistics* is also targeted at a professional audience (in similarity to *Cohesion in English*). However, in Beaugrandian TL, the professional – non-professional audience difference exists solely in terms of scope of background knowledge accrued for ongoing text-processing purposes. Simply put, the background knowledge of a non-specialist text user and a linguistically schooled text user may differ but the vantage points from which they experience a text are not as different as in Hallidayan TL. Within the de Beaugrandian theoretical system, there is only one general perspective and that is the one from within a human – including a scholar's – mind.

As a consequence, in de Beaugrandian TL, the scholar's mind analyses a (general) text user's mind, and both the object of the analysis (i.e. the TEXT in the MIND) as well as the activity of conducting the research (i.e. TL) belong within the general domain of, let us call it, the cognizing HUMAN MIND. In contrast, in Hallidayan TL, the TL analyst as if 'watches from aside' as other TEXT USERS work with a TEXT. In that, the TEXT and the TEXT USER are two separate PHYSICAL OBJECTS. To de Beaugrande, due to his belief the TEXT happens in/ through the TEXT USER'S MIND, the TEXT and the TEXT USER are metonymically connected into one gestalt. Thus, de Beaugrande's TL as if studies one ENTITY only.

On side note, for those reasons, de Beaugrandian TL can be argued to be at the same time more self-reflective on the part of the scholar, and of greater general validity as compared to the Hallidayan one – the de Beaugrandian version includes the scholar (and his mind) in its generalizations concerning all texts users.

Conceptual metonymy, which is another cognitive mechanism from our model, can also be detected in text linguists' understanding of their field of research. In Hallidayan TL, a metonymy-controlled transfer suggests TEXT be understood through focusing on TEXTURE. In Beaugrandian TL, a metonymy-controlled transfer suggests TEXT be understood through TEXTUALITY. Moving 'down' those two metonymy chains to higher degrees of conceptual granularity, TEXTURE is further associated metonymically with COHESIVE DEVICES, and TEXTUALITY is further metonymically associated with COGNITIVE PROCESSES.

In Hallidayan TL, yet another metonymic transfer can be argued to hold between MEANING ASSIGNING and TEXT AS A PHYSICAL PRODUCT, with an emphasis on the PHYSICAL PRODUCT. In Beaugrandian TL, the corresponding metonymic transfer can be traced between COGNITIVE PROCESSES and TEXT AS A COGNITIVE PRODUCT, with an emphasis on the COGNITIVE PROCESSES. Clearly, in the previous, 'emphasis' suggests co-ordination between conceptual metonymy and yet another cognitive mechanism from our multi-process model – profiling.

Additionally, profiling is also present in scholars' conceptualizations of TL as a mechanism operating on Worlds. Admittedly, despite Halliday's insistence that context and textual functions are crucial to text understanding, Hallidayan TL includes little analysis of anything but linguistic structures, i.e. it stays 'very close' to linguistic expressions and does not include DW-related information into its analyses. In Hallidayan Functional Grammar/ Functional Linguistics, interpersonal functions are postulated as a point of departure for any study, and, indeed, correlations between them and linguistic structures are traced. In Hallidayan

TL, however, context-dependent functions remain permanently in the background and are not brought into focus. Simply put, correlations between contextual elements/characteristics and cohesive devices are not an object of interest within Hallidayan TL. An illustration of this point can be found in Halliday and Matthiessen's discussion (2014: 613-618) of a textual function as a text-forming component of the semantic system (they term the specific component 'the sharing component' and relate it to what they call a 'sharing' type of context). The analysis there does not reach beyond clauses and sentences, and the analysis of cohesive devices from the same perspective is left for much later (2014: 623). Critically, even visually, it is laid out in a completely separate table.

What is more, in neither Hallidayan TL, nor in Hallidayan FL, is there any other context-related information but interpersonal functions perceived as relevant, i.e. no other contextual element is studied. The (meta-)functions themselves are viewed in a rather objectivist manner: Hallidayan studies do not consider possible differences in text function classification: in the discussion of the 'sharing' type of context mentioned above, for example, there are no individual interpretations permitted and all participants in the communicative exchange are considered to agree on the textual function being indeed the one of 'sharing'. In sum, it seems justified to argue that contextual elements are peripheral in Halliday's conceptualization of TL. As a consequence, studying DWs is significantly absent from the list of Hallidayan TL objects of investigation.

In contrast, de Beaugrande and Dressler's theoretical system lays heavy emphasis on the importance of context as constructed in a text user's mind. Their very postulation of text-centered standards of textuality (i.e. cohesion and coherence) vs. user-centered standards (i.e. intentionality, acceptability, informativity, situationality and intertextuality), and the fact that the user-centered standards are their original contribution to TL (Halliday discusses only cohesion, coherence, and, to some extent, intertextuality) highlights the importance de

Beaugrande and Dressler attach to the 'user-centered' aspects of textual communication. Their insistence throughout the book that all seven standards are correlated, interdependent and function jointly in itself suggests de Beaugrande and Dressler conceptualize TL as focused on the conflation between text-centered and user-centered textual factors.

In their discussion(s) of text-centered parameters, de Beaugrande and Dressler can be argued to profile TW-related textual factors, and, in their discussion(s) of user-centered parameters, de Beaugrande and Dressler can be argued to profile DWs. Thus, in discussing first text-centered parameters and then user-centered parameters, *Introduction to Text Linguistics* can be argued to enact the cognitive mechanism of TW-DW profile switches. Furthermore, as evident from our discussion in the previous section, two of the user-centered parameters – Informativity and Intertextuality – can be argued to exemplify TW-DW overlaps.

Whether and how one should distinguish among 'DW', 'context', and 'RW' is an issue which will be addressed in the next two chapters of this thesis. A resolution to the issue will be attempted on the basis of the presence of conceptual metonymy and World scope variation as mechanisms controlling that distinction. For the purposes of the present section, it seems sufficient to conclude that all the cognitive mechanisms from the model proposed here can be detected in scholars' interpretations of what TL is.

IV. 4. What TL is

By way of a conclusion to Chapter IV., on the basis of the cognitive mechanisms proposed in the multi-process model, the following definition could be formulated.

TL is a scholarly domain characterized by:

a) (metaphoric) scholarly perceptions of TEXT as a PHYSICAL PRODUCT, as a COGNITIVE PRODUCT, or as a system of text-related COGNITIVE PROCESSES;
b) metonymy-driven analysis of linguistic expressions to which meanings can be assigned, or of cognitive processes from which language-expressed meanings can emerge;
c) conflation and profiling switches between text-centered textual aspects (cohesion, coherence) and user-centered textual aspects (intentionality, acceptability, informativity and situationality).
d) no rigorous methodology
e) (a) – (d) functioning prototypically.

The prototypological operation of these characteristics is what also allows for claims of corpus text analysis and text-mining activities to be considered to be ‘TL proper’ (see Section IV. 1. above). However, following the generalizations drawn here, such investigations can be at best regarded peripheral to TL: they are of extremely narrow-focus in terms of object of analysis (i.e. they study the linguistic expressions only) and can be seen as research on co-text rather than on text and its relation to context. Such investigations, thus, lie closer to quantitative linguistics and digital humanities (e.g. Pawlowski et al. 2021; de Angelis 2020).

CHAPTER V

SITUATING THE MODEL: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

V. 1. What is 'Discourse Analysis'?

As indicated in the introductory segment of Part II of this thesis, the multi-process model proposed here is most likely to be found employable in two domains of scholarly activity – Text Linguistics (TL) and Discourse Analysis (DA). Chapter IV analyses the possibilities for employing the model in TL; as expected, the multi-process model is shown there to harmonize readily with the cognitive version/branch of TL. In analogy to Chapter IV, Chapter V will now analyse the possibilities for (a) employing the model within DA, and (b) applying the model to DA. Thus, the chapter will first need to demonstrate if and to what extent cognitive studies are a part of the DA theoretical and analytical paradigm.

In analogy to Chapter IV, Chapter V will first try and clarify how the broad and varied field of DA tends to be understood by the respective scholars. Next, in symmetry with Chapter IV, meta-analysis will be conducted on the summarized data on 'what DA is', and the model will be applied to the academic concept of DA with a view of formulating an alternative definition of the field.

As discussed in the thesis's Introduction, the concepts of 'text' and 'discourse' are notoriously difficult to distinguish, which can lead to a difficulty in distinguishing between TL and Discourse Analysis (DA), too. Not that distinguishing between the two is a must – David Crystal (2008), for instance, maintains that TL and DA overlap almost completely and that a great number of linguists find little difference between the two. Virtanen (2022) even uses 'text and discourse linguistics' as a term covering both TL and DA, and argues some of the important

fields of study of ‘text and discourse linguistics’ are cohesion and coherence. Similarly, another prominent scholar in the field, Paltridge (2021) merges DA with both Pragmatics and the Ethnography of communication in order to study what he terms ‘discourse structure’. However, he pursues that endeavor by applying all Hallidayan TL premises related to cohesive devices, only adding to the list ‘homophoric reference’ (i.e. reference, in which an object’s identity is retrieved by recourse to general knowledge and not to the discourse setting/ environment).

Quite similarly to TL, the academic notion of DA presents some not insignificant challenges in itself. ‘Discourse Analysis’, although, evidently, quite different from ‘analyses of discourse’, has not been easy to define, especially in the last decade. The phrase ‘Discourse Analysis’ is considered to have been first used by text grammarian Zelig Harris in 1952, but after that analyses of discourse took strong root in sociological and anthropological research rather than in research of linguistic background (for a discussion see Angermuller et al. 2014). A highly prominent example of such studies are Foucault’s investigations, which approach discourse as having to do with

> ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. (Foucault 1969: 2)

Nevertheless, this chapter will be specifically dedicated to the linguistic strand of DA, which has subsequently flourished to become synonymous with ‘DA’.

The linguistic strand originated in the works of Sinclair and Coulthard (1975; Coulthard 1977), in parallel with but quite independently from TL. Since then, DA has gradually expanded to a degree where any approach to whole discourses or texts is likely to be subsumed under its heading. As will be demonstrated here, Conversation Analysis, Pragmatics, Sociolinguistics, Text Linguistics, even Semiotics can be considered by scholars to be ‘DA’. For the last decade,

however, there can be also observed a reverse dynamic, as Applied Linguistics and Pragmatics have been experiencing such re-definition of their domains that they in their turn threaten to engulf DA (see, e.g. Schmitt and Rodgers 2020; Yus 2013).

In the next section of this chapter, I will provide a brief systematization of the fundamentals of the approaches considered by (a majority of) scholars to fall within DA. As far as the attainability of this task is concerned, undoubtedly, it is commonsense to note that academia lacks an agreement on that question: academia abounds in perspectives and alternative interpretations of what DA is to such an extent that an exhaustive review of opinions would amount to at least one separate volume. What seems attainable here is for each systematization sub-section to include basic information about (a) basic premises and main investigative topics of each field, and (b) methods and research techniques typically employed by each approach.

V. 2. A prototypology of DA

This section of Chapter V will systematize data obtained through a meta-synthesis literature review (Atkins et al. 2008; Grant and Booth 2009), which was chosen as the most appropriate vehicle due to its (a) being of qualitative nature, and (b) being targeted at providing a new interpretation of an existing research field (Atkins et al. 2008). This type of literature review serves to build new theories, especially explanatory theories, and is best employed in re-interpreting high-quality studies. In other words, a meta-synthesis literature review does not aim for the broadest range – unlike the scoping review conducted for the purposes of Chapter III – but for 'distilling' information from primary sources of top value. While scoping reviews are most appropriate for clarifying existing scholarly stances on an issue or on a concept, meta-synthesis reviews are best employed in outlining research fields and approaches (ibid.).

Thus, this section systematizes data from top publishers such as Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press, Routledge, John Benjamins, Wiley, de Gruyter. It is also influenced by a preference for more up-to-date publications. It encompasses research conducted by prominent scholars such as Johnstone (2002), Fairclough (2003), Schiffrin (2003), Wodak and Chilton (2005); Boxer (2010), Gee and Hanford (2012), Hanford and Gee (2013), Cap (2019), Hyland et al. (2021), Paltridge (2021), de Cleen et al. (2021), Schröder (2021), etc.

The information from all primary sources thus extracted is then cross-checked. The final results include only information that appears systematically in most sources. Thus, works such as Noveck's (2018) volume on Cognitive Experimental Pragmatics published by Cambridge University Press, however illuminating and up-to-date, remain outside the data summarized below.

V. 2. 1. Pragmatics

As is well known, drawing heavily on Austin's (1962) and Searle's (1969) philosophical work on Speech Acts, pragmatic research (e.g. Grice 1975, 1978, 1989; Grundy 1995; Carston 2022; Horn 2006; Caffi 2016; Jaszczolt 2018, 2019) has advanced the recognition that intertwining knowledge of language structures with knowledge of language use is a necessity rather than an academic whim. 'Language and situation are inseparable' (Stubbs 1983:1) in pragmaticists' perspective and all levels of language, in their view, need to be accounted for in terms of contextual function(s).

As is also well known, the evolution of pragmatics tends to be measured along two main axes into: (a) Gricean, post-Gricean, and neo-Gricean (see, e.g., Jaszczolt 2018, 2019; Belligh and Willems 2021), and (b) cognition-related (i.e. Relevance Theory, as in Wilson and Sperber 1985; Sperber and Wilson 1986; Wharton 2009; Wharton et al. 2022) or non-cognition related (see, e.g., Huang 2017; Cave and Wilson 2018; Wilson 2019; Kecskes 2022). In terms of range of key topics, pragmatics has been classified into wide-scope and narrow-scope pragmatics (Allan and Jaszczolt 2012), or micro-pragmatics and macro-pragmatics (Cap 2011). Clearly, utterance interpretation, acts of speech, inference (entailment, presupposition, implicature), deixis, etc. are of key interest in micro-pragmatics, while macro-pragmatics deals with possibilities for harmonizing pragmatics with studies on cognition, culture and society. As Horn and Kecskes (2013: 355) generalize,

> most pragmatic research can be related to two fairly broad traditions and one recent development: linguistic-philosophical pragmatics (or so-called Anglo-American pragmatics), sociocultural-interactional pragmatics (or so-called European-Continental pragmatics) and intercultural pragmatics. Linguistic-philosophical pragmatics seeks to investigate speaker meaning within an utterance-based framework focusing mainly on linguistic constraints on language use. Socio-cultural interactional pragmatics maintains

that pragmatics should include research into social and cultural constraints on language use as well.

The latter suggests there are intentional overlaps between pragmatic research and other disciplines. Allan and Jaszczolt (2012) are some of the multitude of scholars who at present support investigations on pragmatic 'interfaces' (ibid.) with semantics, morphology, and studies on prosody, language change, information structure. Reference, anaphora and textual coherence, typically associated with TL, are also claimed to be valid investigative objects in pragmatics.

True to fact, as discussed in the previous chapter, in breaking away from structuralist and generativist premises, TL adopts quite a number of pragmaticists' premises. The analysis offered in Halliday and Hasan's *Cohesion in English* (1976) repetitively relies on notions such as 'turn', 'turn-taking', 'adjacency pairs', 'locutionary and illocutionary force', etc. De Beaugrande and Dressler's *Introduction to Text Linguistics* argues on many occasions for putting a cognitive spin on Gricean maxims. Clearly, in contrast to pragmatic research, those notions are used in TL operatively: they are not the focus of scholarly attention there, much less the primary object of investigation. In other words, Pragmatics and TL do overlap in some of their areas of interest but they do not share a common focus on what they study. In TL, pragmatic notions are used only as a tool, or a vehicle, in studying other properties and processes which characterize a text.

Allowing pragmatics to overlap with other disciplines has been also supported by Wodak (2007) in her merging Pragmatics and Critical Discourse Analysis (she discusses 'the pragmatics of discourse'). Kecskes (2010) merges pragmatics with premises typical of the socio-cognitive branch of Critical Discourse Analysis specifically. Sociolinguistics also – quite separately – has been amalgamated with pragmatic principles (Allan and Jaszczolt 2012; Holmes's 2018), and Allan and Jaszczolt (2012) demonstrate the potential of what they term

'sociopragmatics' as a cross-cultural and intercultural domain. Beltrama et al. (2022), too, emphasize the importance of simultaneous multi-discipline foci on the link between pragmatic phenomena and social meaning:

> [R]esearch paved the way for an integration of semantic and pragmatic analysis in the study of sociolinguistic variation, suggesting that a full understanding of the dynamics whereby pragmatic variables become invested with social meaning crucially requires considering the subtle differences in semantic meaning between different variants, and how this content interacts with general pragmatic principles governing language use. (Beltrama et al. 2022: 2)

As far the potential of pragmatics in cross-cultural and intercultural investigations is concerned, we need to pay special attention to the branch called Intercultural pragmatics, typically associated with the name of Istvan Kecskes (2008, 2010, 2022). In his own words,

> Intercultural pragmatics is concerned with the way the language system is put to use in social encounters between human beings who have different first languages, communicate in a common language, and, usually, represent different cultures [...] research in intercultural pragmatics has four main foci: (1) interaction between native and nonnative speakers of a language,1 (2) lingua franca communication in which none of the interlocutors has the same L1, (3) multilingual discourse, and (4) language use and development of individuals who speak more than one language. (Kecskes 2018: 41)

However, the general theoretical system behind Intercultural pragmatics is that of van Dijk's Socio-Cognitive Discourse Approach (discussed later in this chapter) rather than the general non-cognitive pragmatic one (Kecskes 2018: 43). In other words, a strong cognitive trend can be observed across all abovementioned branches of Pragmatic research.

Although frequently equated with Relevance Theory (see Yus 2018), Cognitive pragmatics is yet another branch which undeniably attracts considerable contemporary interest

beyond ‘RT’ (see, e.g., Fischer 2017; Mazzone 2018; Cave and Wilson 2018; Wilson 2019). Arguably, Schmid’s work (2012) sparkled a re-definition of the field in terms of cognitive-pragmatic aspects to what he calls ‘the construal of meaning-in-context’. It is Panther’s work (e.g. 2003, 2022), however, which has truly moved beyond earlier cognitive pragmatic studies. Panther (2022) (re-)defines Cognitive pragmatics’ key topics so as to include contextualized uses of figurative language and thought (i.e. conceptual metaphor, conceptual metonymy, irony, hyperbole, etc.), cognitive inferencing in indirect speech acts, the cognitive and functional motivation of morphosyntactic structure, etc.

Such an overlap between cognitive studies and pragmatic ones has long been evident in the literature. Bruner, most notably, upholds the analytical importance of what he terms ‘pragmatic frames’ (1983, 1996). Clearly, Bruner’s suggestion builds on Minsky’s frame theory (1975), but there are aspects in Bruner’s suggestion which additionally prove fundamental to both his followers’ research (e.g. Hirsh-Pasek et al. 2015; Rohlfing et al. 2016; Stephens and Matthews 2014) and to the present investigation.

A ‘pragmatic frame’, also known as an ‘interactional format’ (Bruner 1983: 120), is currently defined in the literature as

> a negotiated interaction protocol targeted to achieve a joint goal that involves (1) a surface layer, namely, an observable coordinated sequence of pragmatic behaviors in the form of words and actions, (2) a deep structure underlying these behaviors that targets the achievement of one or several joint goals, and (3) a nested cognitive layer that specifies which cognitive operations the frame triggers as it unfolds. (Rohlfing et al. 2016: 2)

Clearly, such an interpretation of cognitive constructs associates with both language-acquisition cognitive processes (typically associated with the domain of psycholinguistics) and language-use cognitive skills. Even if for no other reason but pure logical necessity, such an

interpretation centers around the communicative-interaction-oriented capacities of the human mind. In other words, such communication-driven dynamic interpretations of cognitive constructs believe pragmatic frames to "comprise a link between communicative and cognitive skills" (Rohlfing et al. 2016: 10).

Overall, present-day Pragmatics is an ever broadening scholarly field, which is characterized methodologically by qualitative rather than quantitative research techniques and principles. The types of data used and the methods of data collection in pragmatic research varies from introspectional and observational, through the rare experimental one, to the atypical corpus-driven kind (Jucker et al. 2018).

By way of a conclusion to this sub-section, it seems crucial for me to cite Yus's (2018) elaboration on what he calls 'levels of pragmatic analysis', which he considers to entail "a broadening of research and a cross-breeding of disciplines, since now several conclusions obtained from sociology, anthropology, computer science, etc. may also have to be taken into consideration insofar as they shed light on why messages exchanged on the Internet achieve relevance" (2018: 76). As a consequence, Yus puts forward a re-interpretation of 'Pragmatics' as a cover label for DA, TL, Conversation Analysis, (interactional) Sociolinguistics, etc., as they all share an interest in 'the contextualization of communication' (ibid.). This, Yus claims, would allow pragmatic analyses to be either text-centered (if, for example, they focus on utterance comprehension) or directed at broader social interactions (if, for example, they concentrate on shared social meanings and cognitive structures).

In quite a similar vein, Xie (2020: 139) supports a broad view of pragmatics as "a functional perspective on every aspect of linguistic, visual and/or multimodal behavior", thus subsuming all current above-and-beyond-the-sentence-level research under 'Pragmatics'.

V. 2. 2. Applied linguistics

Not unlike pragmaticists who propose subsuming all current ‘above and beyond the sentence level’ research under ‘Pragmatics’, there are a growing number of voices proposing ‘Applied Linguistics’ as such a cover term subsuming not only studies investigating text(s) and discourse(s) but subsuming all language-related research which is not of purely theoretical (i.e. of non-applied) value.

As discussed by Berns and Matsuda (2006), Applied Linguistics tends to be seen as a scholarly endeavor of early but ‘narrow’ beginnigns. Its first steps are considered to have been in the late 1940s, and its first foundational scientific works to have appeared in the late 1950s. In those times, ‘Applied Linguistics’ referred to attempts at systematizing foreign-language teaching practices into a consistent scientific approach. Thus, the 1960s saw Applied Linguistics dedicated to contributing to theoretical linguistic topics such as language assessment and language policy. From the 1970s through the 1990s, the field continued to expand to include issues such as second language acquisition and multilingualism; its research paradigm shifted from theoretical to empirical studies exclusively targeted at solving practical problems. In other words, the field was strictly concerned with applying theoretical linguistic findings to actual language-related practices. The new century enhanced the importance of studying language for special purposes, of contributing to language policy and planning, and of actively solving language and literacy issues.

At present, the domain tends to be be argued to subsume the following ‘major branches of applied linguistics’ (Davies and Elder 2004; Li 2021): discourse analysis, conversation analysis, contrastive linguistics, stylistics, translation studies, studies on second language acquisition, on language teaching, on language literacy, on language assessment, on language planning and policy, on bilingualism and multilingualism, on translanguaging.

Conceptual Metaphor Theory, too, can be occasionally classified as an 'applied linguistics branch' (as in, e.g., Boers 2003) since, in Boer's view (ibid.), CMT's foundations are theoretically contestable but its analytical conclusions are extremely well suited to pedagogic purposes. In its turn, the traditional applied linguistics research on language pedagogy and educational psychology has been re-defined and delineated as a separate Applied Linguistics branch called 'Educational Linguistics' (e.g. Li 2011).

From my perspective, to 'subsume' other language-related scholarly domains, Applied Linguistics needs to offer its own breakthrough and unique paradigm on the most general issues of, let us say, what language is and how it should be studied. Clearly, such a 'requirement' has been met in the past by Linguistics proper, Generativism, Cognitive Linguistics (Conceptual Metaphor Theory included), etc. Despite its rapid growth as an interdisciplinary field, and despite its currently undergoing processes of 'reconceptualizing' language, 'reconceptualizing' the native speaker, 'reconceptualizing' language learning and practice (Li 2013, 2021), Applied Linguistics' major contributions still derive from the application of other disciplines' breakthrough theoretical paradigms. From my perspective, its strengths lie precisely in the applied character of the field, which allows it to overlap with, practically, all other approaches, and, thus, to present a second facet to all their endeavors.

In brief, as the evolutionary progression of Applied Linguistics included here hopefully demonstrates, Applied Linguistics may be 'informed', may have an 'interface' with, or may present a considerable overlap with some DA branches (e.g. with sociolinguistics and with conversation analysis); nevertheless, at this stage of its evolution, it would be somewhat farfetched for it to (a) 'cover' and 'embrace' all language-related analyses, and (b) be seen as more than a separate branch which, to an extent, overlaps with DA. As Angermuller et al. (2014: 3) argue, DA on its own boasts significant both theoretical and applied achievements, with the

empirically-oriented discourse analytical research finding sound theoretical foundations within DA itself.

As far attaining the objective of the present chapter of this thesis is concerned, in comparison to the other approaches under ‘DA’, Applied Linguistics seems to demonstrate the least overlap with cognitive studies of text(s) and discourse(s).

V. 2. 3. Conversation Analysis

Drawing heavily on earlier ethnomethodological work by Goffman (1959) and Garfinkel (1964, 1967), the study of conversational interaction initiated by Sacks (1963) and his collaborators (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974, 1978) boasts an unambiguous sociological background. The approach investigates social action and, especially, social order the way it is maintained through everyday-talk practices. The organizational structure of conversation is seen within the CA/ talk-in-interaction approach as key to understanding how members of a society manage to produce and recognize mutually intelligible social actions. CA's focus of interest falls on social actors' abilities to organize systematically their verbal interactions and to solve ongoingly communicative tasks such as how conversational turn taking should be distributed.

Ethnomethodology's 'ethno' emphasis on the importance of personal interpretative processes is counterbalanced by CA's premise of the importance of social conventions, which, clearly, may be individually followed or ignored (see, e.g., Goodwin 1981, 2000; Atkinson and Heritage 1984; Heritage 1998). In parallel, CA's scope of interest widened from analyzing everyday informal talk exclusively to analyzing talk in various institutional settings. Against this theoretical background, CA studies turn taking, adjacency pairs, repairs, conversation openings and closings, pauses and silences, eye gaze, gestures, etc. Clearly, such a view of the underlying structural organization of language in use overlaps considerably with Pragmatics' notion of adjacency pairs and turns (see, e.g., Levinson and Torreira 2015).

Methodologically, the approach advocates a descriptive standpoint and combines it with a qualitative type of analysis. A rigid requirement of CA is for inductive reasoning to be applied and collections of samples (i.e. audio/visual recordings of interaction) to be transcribed in great detail. The rationale behind these preferences is that social organization can only be understood if scholars analyze actual social interaction(s).

V. 2. 4. Sociolinguistics

As another approach which, in similarity to CA, emerged out of sociology, and which is historically interconnected with anthropology, Sociolinguistics studies the effect of social parameters on language use, and, generally, society's effect on language. While the sociology of language profiles the effect of language on society, Sociolinguistics uses that only as background.

Based on the earlier Ethnography of communication/Ethnography of speaking (Hymes 1967; Gumperz 1982; Gumperz and Hymes 1991), Sociolinguistics rests on the premise that fundamental characteristics of social behavior are reflected in language (e.g. Goffman 1969, 1974; Chafe 1970, 1980; Bolinger 1990/2002, Tannen 1992; Labov 1996/2006, 2001). As a consequence, Sociolinguistics investigates language variation, languages in contact, the effect of social variables (e.g., gender, age, ethnicity, level of education, religion), the effect of socioeconomic class differences on speech communities, high prestige and low prestige varieties, cross-cultural (mis)communication, politeness, etc.

Methodologically, in its correlating social variables with linguistic features, Sociolinguistics tends to rely on statistical and, generally, quantitative data. Sociolinguistics is typically practiced through research techniques such as interviews with speakers of a language, and matched-guise tests. In terms of data analyzed, in similarity to CA, sociolinguistics opts for actually-used, non-idealized language samples.

An important peculiarity to note is that, as early as 1969 and 1974, Goffman proposed a cognitive, frame-based perspective be adopted on social structures and social variables. Since 1975, Labov's experiments have also emphasized the importance of cognition to scholars' understanding of language variation. However, it has been only in the last decade that the "inevitability of Cognitive Sociolinguistics" (Geeraerts 2003: 31) has been recognized. As Labov (2014: 23) argues, "the human language learning capacity is *outward bound*, that is,

aimed at the acquisition of the general pattern used in the speech community. The end result is a high degree of uniformity in both the categorical and variable aspects of language production" (emphasis as in original), and that uniformity calls for a 'convergence' between Cognitive Linguistics and Sociolinguistics.

Kristiansen and Dirven (2008) support the view and argue that Cognitive Linguistics can no longer afford to ignore social variation and that, in its turn, Sociolinguistics can only benefit if cognitivists' understanding of the meaning is coupled with an understanding of variationist phenomena. Hudson (in Pütz et al. 2014) also emphasizes that

> [c]ognitive linguistics is gradually coming to terms with social aspects of cognition - how familiar cognitive processes such as categorization apply to the people and situations in which we interact, how variation and attitudes might be modelled cognitively, and how intimately the social context is embedded in our cognition for language and meaning.

Thus, Cognitive Sociolinguistics (e.g. Kristiansen and Dirven 2008; Geeraerts et al. 2010; Pütz et al. 2014; Callies and Onysko 2017; Benczes and Ságvári 2018) focuses on the social 'recontextualization' of cognition, cultural conceptualizations and their diversity, variation in cognitive processing models, perceptual dialectology, metaphor variation, etc. Its central principles derive from the maxim that "language is all about meaning" and combine "four specific assumptions about the nature of linguistic meaning – that meaning is flexible and dynamic, that it is encyclopedic and nonautonomous, that it is based on usage and experience, and that it is perspectival in nature" (Geeraerts et al. 2010: 3). "While 'meaning as categorization' is a kind of catchphrase in Cognitive Linguistics, some of the questions that ensue for cognitive sociolinguists here are:

> · How do language users perceive lectal differences, and how do they evaluate them attitudinally?
> · What models do they use to categorize linguistic diversity?
> · How does linguistic stereotyping work: how do language users categorize other groups of speakers?
> · What is the role of subjective and objective linguistic distances: is there a correlation between objective linguistic distances, perceived distances, and language attitudes?
> · Are there any cultural models of language diversity: what models of lectal variation, standardization, and language change do people work with?
> · To what extent do attitudinal and perceptual factors have an influence on language change?
> · How do language users acquire lectal competence, how is it stored mentally, and how does it work in language production?
> [...] What Cognitive Linguistics can bring to this domain of investigation, are the various models of categorization (like prototypicality and cultural models) that it has developed in dealing with linguistic categories at large. (Geeraerts et al. 2010: 10)

Generally, Sociolinguistics overlaps not only with Cognitive Linguistics but also with the Socio-cognitive paradigm in Critical Discourse Analysis (as in Kristiansen and Dirven 2008), with studies of cultural models and cultural linguistics (as in Sharifian 2011, 2018), with Pragmatics (as in Levinson and Torreira 2015; Clachar 2004), with Applied Linguistics (as in Mesthrie's 'Applied sociolinguistics' of 2011).

Methodologically, Sociolinguistics is carried out descriptively and almost exclusively quantitatively. The data analyzed can be either experimentally elicited or naturally occurring. Prototypically, sociolinguistic research involves quantitative empirical data analysis.

V. 2. 5. Sinclair and Coulthard's Discourse Analysis

At the very roots of the original DA endeavor lie Sinclair and Coulthard's works (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975; Coulthard 1977, 1994; Coulthard and Montgomery 1981). Sinclair and Coulthard have had their main attention targeted at the structure of discourse, and more specifically, at the structure of dialogue. In analyzing the structural elements underlying dialogic exchanges, the original DA studies had to be distinguished from approaches such as Conversation Analysis (CA), which also analyse the structural organization and progression of dialogue. A major difference between the two lies in that, while CA adopts and employs Pragmaticists' two-part structure (i.e. adjacency pairs in turn-taking), DA comes up with its own set of premises concerning a three-part structure in 'moves', which is an original suggestion of their own and is based prototypically on classroom communication patterns. That DA three-part model includes initiation-response-feedback/follow-up and, perhaps too simply put, provides an alternative to Pragmaticists' notion of two-part adjacency pairs (Tsui 1994).

The data analyzed by the approach stems from classroom recordings; it is not manipulated and is intentionally non-idealized. Thus, according to Sinclair's words (in Coulthard 1994: 12), their version of DA represents a whole new phase of linguistic development and amounts to a redress of the "particular balance between speculation and fact in the way in which we talk about our subject" (ibid.). Before that, Sinclair continues, linguists had been relying too heavily on speculation. To avoid circularity in hypothesis verification, DA analyses are performed on samples of actually used language. In other words, in similarity to CA, in DA, linguistic assumptions derive from corpuses/corpora of actually used, non-idealized language data.

As is well known, the subsequent evolution of DA has moved far beyond initiation-response-feedback/follow-up analyses. At present, 'DA' can be claimed to designate two delineable strands of language-related studies. The 'narrower' approach (i.e. Sinclair and

Coulthard's approach) sees discourse as pertaining primarily to the underlying structure(s) of conversational exchanges, i.e. turns, pairs, moves, acts, exchanges, etc. (e.g Sinclair and Coulthard 1975; Coulthard and Brazil 1981; Brown and Yule 1983; Hoey 1979; Mulholand 1991; Tsui 1994; Sinclair 2004; Walsh 2006). The 'broader' approach elaborates on any kind of linguistic features (underlying structural peculiarities of dialogue included) as a means of proliferating social differences/distances and stereotypical (cognition-dependent) ways of thinking about them (e.g. Fairclough 1989, 1992, 2008; Mumby 1993; Obeng 1996; van Dijk 1985, 1997, 2000, 2008; Lakoff 1996, 2013, 2014). While the first type of approach targets the linguistic structural patterns of communicative dialogic exchanges and the interconnection between interpersonal actions and linguistic features, the second type shifts the focus on the social specificities which the linguistic structures are used to express and perpetuate.

In accord with these two views on what discourse analysis constitutes and how it should be carried out, there have emerged, arguably, two types of interpretations of the very concept of 'discourse'. In the first case 'discourse' correlates with notions such as conversational unity and connectivity (most frequently, unity of 'acts') or on ways of combining separate stretches into unified communicative wholes (as done in Sinclair and Coulthard's works).

In the second case, the notion of 'discourse' has come to gravitate more closely to types of communicative spheres and practices: we distinguish 'the discourse of politics', 'legal discourse', 'the discourse of power', 'religious discourse', etc. This second kind deals extensively with social beliefs, ways of thinking, and communicative means of perpetuating social practices and differences. It rests on the assumption that discursive practice "contributes to reproducing society (social identities, social relationships, systems of knowledge and belief) as it is, yet also contributes to transforming society" (Fairclough 1992: 65).

Additionally, as discussed in the Introduction of this thesis, within the second type, there may be argued to exist two subtypes. As Labocha maintains, *discourse* can be used either in the singular or in the plural form, each option expressing different content:

> The term *discourse* when used only in the singular number is understood as a cultural norm which regulates linguistic (communicative) behaviour, whereas the term *discourse* when used also in the plural number, i.e. in the form *discourses*, may be understood […] as an expression synonymous with the term utterance. (Labocha 2011: 62)

Such a view resembles closely that of Gee (1990), who distinguishes between what he calls 'little d discourse' (i.e. specific instances of language in use) and 'big D Discourse' (i.e. language use in integration with other meaning-making practices such as gestures, glances, dress code, customs, habits, etc.).

Angermuller et al. (2012: 4) also provide a valuable systematization of existing differences in scholarly interpretations of 'discourse'.

> – If one distinguishes between *discourse* and *sentence*, discourse is considered to be a linguistic unit constituted by a series of sentences. [...]
> – If one contrasts *discourse* with *language*, discourse typically refers to the uses that can be made of language in a specific context. [...]
> – One can also oppose *discourse* and *text*, which implies two different understandings of *discourse*: (a) *One discourse corresponds to each text*. [...] (b) *Or a group of texts from various genres is associated with one discourse*. Discourse can thus cover a multitude of phenomena: a discipline (psychiatry, astronomy… of whatever epoch); a position in a discursive field ('Communist discourse', 'surrealist discourse'); a type of discourse ('journalistic discourse', 'administrative discourse'); verbal production specific to a category of speakers ('the discourse of nurses', 'the discourse of mothers in a family'); etc.

The two basic interpretations of the notion of ‘discourse’, from my perspective, cannot and should not be seen as standing in opposition. On the contrary, it is more accurate (as well as more practical) to see them as representing the two sides of the same coin. Which one to flip on would be rather a matter of theoretical viewpoint and analytical need, and not that much of exclusion and rejection of the alternative theoretical strand. Which one to profile can frequently be a matter of theoretical compatibility with a specific object of investigation.

V. 2. 6. Discourse Studies

The 1970s and 1980s Sinclair and Coulthard's 'DA' evolved into (a) quantitative research on non-idealized dialogue/discourse data (see, e.g., Sinclair and Coulthard's proliferous Collins Cobuild project), and (b) a new field of language-related research, which, as argued in the previous section, approached discourse from the perspective of social structure(s) perpetuation. As of late, the latter has been reformulated under the label of 'Discourse Studies', although for many, it is still the only actual 'DA'.

'Discourse Studies' is 'an extremely heterogeneous field' (Angermuller et al. 2014: 1) and sometimes – perhaps in an attempt to distinguish it from non-linguistic research into 'discourse'– is argued (ibid.: 6) to consist of "discourse theory + discourse analysis". This section will proceed chronologically and trace the thread of evolution of different branches of the approach in terms of (a) object of investigation, (b) objective of the investigation, (c) type of data analyzed, and (d) method of analysis used. Hypothetically, this will allow us to chart out the conceptual evolution of DA scholar's understanding of their field.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)/ Critical Discourse Studies (CDS)

The Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) branch of DA, still occasionally equated with 'Critical Linguistics', associates with the name of its originator Roger Fowler and the names of the major proponents of its three sub-branches – Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak. The three branches are so diverse it is rather difficult to treat CDA as a single 'school or a paradigm': it represents "at most a shared perspective on doing linguistics, semiotic or discourse analysis" (van Dijk 1993: 131).

While all three branches combine critique of existing discoursal phenomena with explanations of how those phenomena exist and come to be perpetuated, van Dijk's branch is sustained by its firm cognitive foundations, Fairclough's – by a systemic functional linguistic

perspective combined with the premise that 'doing CDA' is, in fact, conducting social action, and Wodak's – by the historical dimensions of power asymmetries, manipulation, exploitation, inequality, ideology, etc.

Later re-named by van Dijk, Fairclough and Wodak into Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), the critical perspective on discourse does not perceive itself as limited to studying structural properties of text or discourse; nor is it limited to relating those structures to social structures:

> CDS not only engages in social and political analyses of the context of text and talk, but more specifically takes an explicit stand on the abuse of power a large media organization may have by manipulating the attitudes of readers on immigration. It explains that and how the symbolic elites of politics and the mass media are able to control public discourse and attitudes and thus may contribute to the reproduction of racism and xenophobia in the country. (van Dijk 2018: 28)

What is CDS's most distinctive feature is the 'third dimension' they add to DA, namely a critical standpoint. Practically, this is the only approach to language which allows itself to and prides itself on 'assuming a stand' on their object of investigation.

The following (rather lengthy) quotation (Graham 2018: 201-202, in Fairclough and Fairclough 2018) seems an excellent example of what 'taking a stand' means in CDS. It demonstrates aptly how and why researchers in the field perceive their scholarly activity as, in fact, social activity:

> [W]e need, as analysts, to make our position clear about what we are analysing, and why, how, and to what end we are analysing it. To pretend that CDA is anything other than a primarily moral pursuit would seem to me to be dishonest [...] CDA has been an interdisciplinary force for over 25 years, yet the problems we have spent our time critiquing and attempting to transform seem to have grown exponentially during that

> same period: inequality, racism, violence, discrimination, religious extremism, right wing discourse more generally – all of these have come to dominate the public sphere. Political systems in allegedly developed democracies have steadily deteriorated into little more than cynical vacuums tuned to the most flagrantly corrupt practices while a reality television star cum crypto-fascist is the presumptive Republican nominee for the world's most dangerous and destructive nation [...] CDA is primarily ethical. It aims to transform action and values such that the social scene becomes increasingly equal, more democratic, less victimising.

Fairclough and Fairclough (2018) discuss the above quotation as claiming to exemplify an intrinsically moral stand, while, in effect, it perpetuates a single ideological viewpoint. Clearly, they argue, the passage openly assumes a left-wing perspective, which is exclusively the case with CDS researchers. As Fairclough and Fairclough's argument goes, to achieve greater validity, CDS does not need to give up on taking a stand; it needs to allow for other political-and-ethical perspectives to be equally embraced by the approach.

The present investigation is not concerned with this specific CDS issue, nor with the debate around it. The reason for my including (a) the lengthy citation, and (b) Fairclough and Fairclough's comments is that they hold a strong revealing potential as to how CDS researchers conceptualize their endeavor (as indicated in the introduction to this chapter, this will be the central topic of our next section V.3.).

Socio-cognitive approach (SCA)/ Socio-cognitive Discourse Studies (SCDS)

Another branch of Discourse Studies has also experienced a change of name – from 'Socio-cognitive approach' (SCA) to 'Socio-cognitive Discourse Studies (SCDS)'. The branch rests on the premise that 'cognition is a necessary interface between discourse and society'(van Dijk 2012). SCDS suggests that "many structures of discourse itself can only (completely) be described in terms of various cognitive notions, especially those of information, beliefs or

knowledge of participants" (van Dijk 2017: 24). In its turn, interpreting 'beliefs or knowledge' as cognitive structures allows scholars to approach cognitive processes and structures as an interface between individual discursive instances and general social practices:

> We have argued that, within our sociocognitive approach, the role of context in the production and understanding of discourse is fundamental. Since knowledge is part of the context, each level of discourse structure depends on the knowledge of the participants, as explained above. [...] we analyse how the structures of discourse are controlled by the knowledge of the language users. (van Dijk 2012: 592)

In other words, SCDS rest on the assumption – and it is only an assumption, not an investigative object of analysis – that there is a cognitive interface between social structures and discourse structures:

> It is also worth remembering that a CDA study has an *inherently 'holistic'* approach toward the subject matter of analysis where the analysts are interested to account for how ideologies are interwoven into discourse and try to explicate the link between discourse and the society. (ibid.; emphasis mine)

Methodologically, van Dijk (2018: 28) prefers the label of 'Socio-cognitive Discourse Studies' over 'Socio-cognitive Discourse Analysis' based on the fact that SCDS is not a unified method but, rather, a diverse research area, which allows SCDS to harmonize freely with both quantitative and qualitative analyses (ibid.).

A last point to note here is the difference between SCDS and another cognition-centered, although slightly more peripheral, branch of CDA. As proposed and formulated by Charteris-Black (2004), CMA (Critical Metaphor Analysis) aims to harmonize Conceptual Metaphor Theory, CDA, and the Relevance Theory approach in Pragmatics. As Musolff (2012: 301) maintains, "cognitive linguists' recognition of metaphor as a fundamental means of concept-

and argument-building can add to CDA's account of meaning constitution in the social context" and, in return, "discursive-pragmatic factors as well as sociolinguistic variation have to be taken into account in order to make cognitive analyses more empirically and socially relevant". As a consequence, CDA can be also seen as a field contributing to the "integration of cognitive and communicative aspects in metaphor theory" (Musolff 2012: 305). Charteris-Black's (2004) CMA, it should be noted, is also characterized by the rather a-typical for CDA employment of data-driven and corpus-analytical research techniques.

Generally, employing both quantitative and qualitative methods applies to all modern-day DA, with it still displaying a strong preference for qualitative analyses. The areas of interest and central topics of modern-day Discourse Studies include media studies, the discourse of advertising, the discourse of social media, the discourse of digital media, etc. Earlier studies' investigative objects still remain within DA's focus of attention: genre, narrative, multimodality, gender, race, identity, etc.

The types of data analyzed by DA also vary as:

> Discourse analysts can work with extensive corpora in order to reveal the meaning structures and communication patterns of large discursive communities. Or they may have recourse to small excerpts which they analyse in great detail in order to illustrate some theoretical claims. 'Texts' do not always designate written data; they can comprise written, oral or non-verbal data. (Angermuller et al. 2014: 3)

To conclude, DA "could be considered as not only a trans-disciplinary or even post-disciplinary project but rather one which runs counter to the division of knowledge into specialized disciplines and sub-disciplines" (Angermuller et al. 2014: 1).

V. 3. Applying the multi-process model to DA branches

The multi-process cognitive model proposed here, clearly, associates more readily with the cognitive (sub-)branches of DA, i.e. with Relevance Theory in Pragmatics, Cognitive Sociolinguistics, (Inter-)Cultural Linguistics, Socio-cognitive Discourse Studies, Critical Metaphor Analysis, etc.. However, the model is not equally readily employable by all of them as there are some significant differences in how each branch uses cognitive precepts for their (analytical) purposes.

While some approaches adopt a 'from within the discourse participant's mind' perspective onto their object of analysis (e.g. Cognitive Pragmatics, Cognitive Sociolinguistics), others adopt a 'from within the discourse scholar's mind' perspective onto their object of analysis exclusively (e.g. SCDS). In the first case, the viewpoint of the discourse participant and that of the discourse scholar lie much closer and can frequently shift between one or the other. In the second case, the two viewpoints diverge radically and do not converge on any occasion or for any purpose. Clearly, the first type of studies tend to be associated with 'classical' cognitivist principles, while the second type – with 'broadly' cognitive endeavors, which insist on the existence of 'social cognition' but do not specify its locus or cognitive nature. While the present thesis subscribes to the first type of studies, it also tries and contributes to a convergence of the two types, as advocated by, for instance, Geeraerts et al. (2010; see V. 2. 3. above).

Adopting a vantage point 'outside' existing theoretical systems and approaches, and taking a step back for the purposes of meta-analysis, we could apply the multi-process model proposed here to the prototypology of DA as systematized in the previous section. One way to achieve that is to parallel our meta-analysis in Chapter IV (dedicated to TL), and to try and re-construct the cognitive frames or scenarios employed by DA scholars across the DA branches and sub-branches. The figurativity underlying (a) scholars' conceptualizations of their object

of analysis, i.e. of DISCOURSE, and (b) scholars' conceptualizations of their scholarly field (i.e., CDA, Pragmatics, CA, SCDS, etc.) are believed here to condition scholars' choices of method, research techniques and analytical procedures.

In this respect, as the previous section reveals, metaphorizations of DISCOURSE can vary across DA ranging from perceptions of DISCOURSE as an OBJECT (similar to perceptions of TEXT as an OBJECT) to seeing DISCOURSE as a DANCE or, more generally, as a PERFORMANCE (see the discussion of this suggestion of Gee's [2005] in VIII. 5.). No matter how peripheral Gee's metaphoric conceptualization may be claimed to be, metaphorizations of DISCOURSE, clearly, vary widely along a dynamicity scale. Another non-prototypical metaphor also confirms such a generalization: Stockwell's (2008: 589) proposal that "text branches off into discourse with its social and ideological implications" can be interpreted as starting from a static OBJECT metaphorization (i.e. TEXT as a TREE) and then highlighting a more dynamic aspect of it (i.e. DISCOURSE as the result of the ACTION of BRANCHING).

In other words, each DISCOURSE metaphorization can be (metaphorically) positioned along a scale, at one extreme of which there is an OBJECT point, and at the other extreme – an ACTIVITY point. In this, out of the list of DA approaches above, Fairclough's notion of text/discourse can be argued to exemplify the most static end of the scale as there we can see TEXT/DISCOURSE metaphorized as MATERIAL SOUNDS/RECORD, and TEXT/DISCOURSE metaphorized as A PRODUCT. As we move away from the 'static' end of the scale towards the 'dynamic' end, perceptions of DISCOURSE as a (STRUCTURED) EXCHANGE, evident in, for instance, CA and in Sinclair and Coulthard's DA, come next. Another 'step' away from the 'static' end could be marked by approaches focusing on DISCOURSE as (interpersonal) ACTIONS (e.g. Pragmatics), and yet another – by approaches studying DISCOURSE as (socio-cultural) ACTIVITIES or as cognitive ACTIVITIES (e.g.

SCDS, CMA, Intercultural linguistics). Near the ACTIVITY end of the DA scale we could position Cognitive pragmatics/Relevance Theory, and nearest that end – psycholinguistic DISCOURSE comprehension studies.

It is on rare occasions, however, that we encounter DA research exemplifying the truly dynamic end of the scale. Compared to TL, no DA approach is of such emphatically procedural character as de Beaugrande and Dressler's. What is more, while TL employs the TEXT as a PROCESS metaphor (which entails a lesser degree of intentionality on the part of the text user), DA can be generalized to employ TEXT as an ACTIVITY (which entails a higher degree of intentionality on the part of the text user). Arguably, a PROCESS (in TL) is of more human-independent, involuntary character, and an ACTIVITY (in DA) suggests the presence of a DOER. Undoubtedly, while TL (in its de Beaugrandian version) stands very close to the 'classic' principles of Cognitive Linguistics and profiles psycholinguistic processes, DA lies much closer to social sciences and profiles the role of the discourse participant as a social actor.

Next, positioning a DA approach along the static-dynamic scale could not depend on a single parameter. As discussed in the Introduction, DISCOURSE tends to be defined as oral but that does not preclude it from also being accepted as written (as in, for example, van Dijk's CDA). Clearly, the difference between an oral and a written version is considered to be significant: one needn't go much further than CA's heavy emphasis on elaborate notation system(s) used to turn conversation recordings (which are actual, physical entities but can be also perceived as being of relatively dynamic character) into written transcripts (which represent more static records of previous dynamically unfolding conversations). Another parameter associated with the static vs. dynamic character of various perceptions of DISCOURSE is the monologic vs. dialogic distinction. Clearly, monologic discourses are metaphorized as more 'static' and dialogic 'exchanges' – as more dynamic due to the simultaneous operation of turn-taking procedures.

Overall, perceptions of what DISCOURSE is tend to corelate rigorously with the type of data a DA approach tends to analyse. At that, in comparison to TL, the correlation is more rigorous. Despite Hallidayan TL's more static view of TEXT and the extremely procedural character of de Beaugrandian perceptions of TEXT, both TL branches study both dialogic and monologic texts as well as both written and oral texts. In contrast, few DA branches can be found to study both dialogic and monologic texts as well as both written and oral texts. CA and Sinclair and Coulthard's DA, for instance, are unlikely to study a written monologue, and they investigate orally-unfolding dialogic instances almost exclusively.

Our discussion of metaphorizations of DISCOURSE and metaphorizations of DA could not but at least mention some metaphoric visualizations put forward by DA analysts themselves. Starting with the simpler and second most frequently used one – van Dijk's triangle of discourse, cognition, and society (Fig. 1) – one cannot but note the likely influence of semiotics on this metaphorization.



Figure 1. Van Dijk's discourse-cognition-society triangle (van Dijk 1998)

As in semiotic studies, the three apexes in the triangle represent unambiguously distinct entities that stand at certain distances from each other. As discussed in the previous section, in his later studies (e.g. 2012, 2018), van Dijk proposes one of the three elements, namely cognition, be

perceived as an interface between the other two. In other words, van Dijk himself cancels the triangle alternative and goes on to uphold another – principally different – metaphorization.

That does not preclude other scholars from elaborating on the triangle suggestion. For example, in Fig. 2, we can see that Hart (2008) not only utilizes the underlying triple structure of the triangle but also applies directionality between the apexes. What is of special consequence to the present discussion is that he even profiles (by using a different colour for) the 'metaphor' angle against the background of the other two.



Figure 2. Hart's placement of metaphor in the discourse-cognition-society triangle (2008)

Our literature survey reveals that the most frequently employed metaphorization is Fairclough's concentric squares (1989, 1992a, 1992b, 1995/2014). In that visualization, a DISCOURSE 'surrounds', 'envelops' and/or 'includes' a TEXT (Fig. 3 below). In other words, DISCOURSE in it is not an alternative to TEXT; it is a 'bigger' and 'broader' ENTITY or a PLACE, at the center of which TEXT is situated:



Fig. 3. Fairclough's (1989) concentric squares

This metaphorization calls for several comments. The central one concerns its stark contrast from TL's understanding of context as a single SPACE/ AREA/ DOMAIN, etc. Here Fairclough outlines two concentric SPACES/ AREAS/ DOMAINS, both surrounding TEXT (this conceptualization will be paid special attention to later in this section and in Part III of this thesis):

> Discourse, then, involves social conditions, which can be specified as social conditions of production, and social conditions of interpretation. These social conditions, moreover, relate to three different 'levels' of social organization: the level of the social situation, or the immediate social environment in which the discourse occurs; the level of the social institution which constitutes a wider matrix for the discourse; and the level of the society as a whole. What I am suggesting, in summary, is that these social conditions shape the MR people bring to production and interpretation, which shape the way in which texts are produced and interpreted. (Fairclough 1989: 25)

The second point which calls for comment is related to the understanding of 'MR' in the above citation and, more generally, to Fairclough's stipulation that the narrower contextual SPACE, which 'directly' surrounds TEXT, and which is termed by him 'Interaction', subsumes text users' productive and interpretative processes. Although part of Fairclough's theoretical

system, those ‘processes’ bear a strong resemblance to the Beaugrandian text users’ cognitive PROCESSES in that the locus of communicative PROCESSES is taken to be the text user’s mind:

> It is an important property of productive and interpretative processes that they involve an interplay between properties of texts and a considerable range of […] ‘members’ resources’ (MR) which people have in their heads – including their knowledge of language, representations of the natural and social worlds they inhabit, values, beliefs, assumptions, and so on. (Fairclough 1989: 24)

Moreover,

> [t]hese processes take place in people's heads, and it is therefore not possible to observe them as one might observe processes in the physical world. The only access that the analyst has to them is in fact through her capacity to herself engage in the discourse processes she is investigating. In other words, the analyst must draw upon her own MR (interpretative procedures) in order to explain how participants draw upon theirs. The analysis of discourse processes is necessarily an 'insider's' or a 'member's' task - which is why I have called the resources drawn upon by both participant and analyst members 'members' resources' (MR). (1989: 167)

In de Beaugrandian TL, however, those PROCESSES lie at the center of attention and represent the main focus of research interest. Within Fairclough’s paradigm, communication-related text users’ cognitive PROCESSES are simply ‘added’ to his notion of ‘context’, i.e. they are ‘injected’ into an objectively existing immediate communicative environment. In that, Fairclough’s metaphorization of TEXT and DISCOURSE resembles significantly Halliday’s, as also evident from the following explanation:

> A text is a product rather than a process – a product of the process of text production. But I shall use the term *discourse* to refer to the whole process of social interaction of which a text is just a part. This process includes in addition to the text the *process of production*, of which the text is a product, and the *process of interpretation*, for which the text is a resource. Text analysis is correspondingly only a part of discourse analysis, which also includes analysis of productive and interpretative processes. The formal properties of a text can be regarded from the perspective of discourse analysis on the one hand as *traces* of the productive process, and on the other hand as *cues* in the process of interpretation (Fairclough 1989: 24).

It should be duly noted that the second and third concentric squares have undergone some conceptual changes across Fairclough's works. The 1989 'Interaction' is later (1992) changed into 'Discursive practice' with a significantly lesser emphasis on the cognitive nature of processes and an increasing degree of objectivization. In parallel, the third – and largest – square of 'Context', which in 1989 subsumes 'Social conditions of text production/ interpretation', in 1992 becomes 'Social practice':



Fig. 4. Fairclough's (1992a) concentric squares

Still later, in 1995, Fairclough changes 'Discursive practice' to 'Discourse practice', and 'Social practice to sociocultural practice'. Overall, throughout his works, there seems to be an observable tendency for eliminating the presence of individual cognitive processes even simply

as part of ‘context’, and for a simultaneous steady profiling of societal activities. In parallel, the societal activities are further elaborated on and finer distinctions such as ‘social’, ‘institutional’, ‘cultural’ are further accrued.

In addition to Fairclough’s metaphorization of DISCOURSE, he offers us his conceptualization of ‘DA’:

> Corresponding to these three dimensions of discourse, I shall distinguish three dimensions, or stages, of critical discourse analysis:
>
> • Description is the stage which is concerned with formal properties of the text.
>
> • Interpretation is concerned with the relationship between text and interaction - with seeing the text as the product of a process of production, and as a resource in the process of interpretation; [...]
>
> • Explanation is concerned with the relationship between interaction and social context - with the social determination of the processes of production and interpretation, and their social effects. (Fairclough 1989: 26)

Later (1992b), Fairclough visually represents this understanding of his as follows:



Fig. 5. Fairclough’s (1992b) ‘Discourse’ and ‘DA’

Viewed from such a perspective, TL may be argued to be the study of text(s) and discourse(s) concerned with the 'Description' and 'Interpretation' stages/dimensions of DA, while DA is concerned with all three of the dimensions, i.e. it also includes an 'Explanation' stage. In other words, DA 'encompasses' and 'embraces' TL.

Other metaphorizations of DA can also be observed in the literature. As evident from Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 below, they tend to represent variations of Fairclough's concentric spaces and/ or van Dijk's triangle. Fig 6. specifically can be interpreted as a blend between Fairclough's concentric three-stage spaces and van Dijk's 'cognition' as an interface between the two:



Fig. 6. Daghigh et al.'s (2018) illustration of van Dijk's (1998) model

Fig 7. represents DA as a 'meeting point' of three separate notions, which stand at distances from one another and, consequently, do not entail overlaps:



Fig. 7. Angermuller et al.'s (2014: 7) triangle of DA: language, practice, context

Apart from conceptual metaphor, the other cognitive mechanisms from our multi-process model can also be found operating in scholars' interpretations of DISCOURSE and 'DA'. When Paltridge (2021), for instance, argues there are two types of DA – textually-oriented DA and socially-oriented DA, he can be seen as employing Fairclough's concentric spaces metaphorization. The same holds true for Yus's (2018) claim DA is either 'narrower', or text-centered (i.e. focusing on utterance comprehension), or 'broader' in focusing on social interactions (i.e. on social meanings as cognitive structures). Both perceptions, as already demonstrated above, derive from conceptual metaphor. However, the implied possibility for 'switching' between one or the other type, in parallel with transferring the rest of the DA properties from the 'narrower' to the 'broader' or from the 'broader' to the 'narrower' domain, profiling, scope variation involves, and conceptual metonymy.

Another DA-related aspect of the operation of conceptual metonymy can be detected in some scholars' profiling conversation structure, or dialogue structure, over linguistic/ conceptual content to stand for the whole structure-context conceptual complex. As evident in CA, for instance, or in Sinclair and Coulthard's DA, turns, moves, acts and their organization into adjacency pairs, exchanges and transactions may be typically profiled in analyses, while social structures, roles, practices, etc. may function as background. As a variation to a 'typically profiled' object of analysis, pragmatic studies can be argued to switch their attention dynamically between profiling turn-sequencing peculiarities and profiling interpersonal contextual functions. In contrast, CDA and SCDA tend to profile social structures, roles, practices, etc., while linguistic units (and not conversation structures) tend to function metonymically as background.

The cognitive models/ structures/ processes employed by text users can also be selected for profiling in some studies. De Beaugrandian TL has been demonstrated in the previous

chpater to exemplify such a preference. A degree of foregrounding of cognitive models can be also found in, for instance, van Dijk's (e.g. 2002, 2012, 2014) and Sharifian's (e.g. 2011, 2017) studies. If there is an observable tendency in this regard, it is that, if translated into Fairclough's three-space metaphor of DISCOURSE, cognition-profiling research tends to study the innermost discourse space and its 'adjacent' 'Interaction' space. If the second and third spaces are profiled for analysis (i.e. the 'Interaction' space and the 'Social practice' space), cognitive structures/ models/ processes tend to lie in the background and not to serve as primary analytical object of research.

When the first space is profiled for analysis (i.e. the text-centered, or language-related, features of the TEXT are in focus), the second and third spaces can be conflated into one SPACE/CONTEXT (i.e. the 'Interaction' space and the 'Social practice' space). In other words, for many studies distinguishing between the two 'broader' spaces is – to use a Cognitive pragmatic term – irrelevant. For some studies, however, conflating them intentionally can have considerable socio-pragmatic consequences. To use Fairclough's words (1992: 65), discursive practice "contributes to reproducing society (social identities, social relationships, systems of knowledge and belief) as it is, yet also contributes to transforming society". Clearly, such a claim evokes ideas related to the notion of perlocution in pragmatics, and, as will be discussed in Part III below, it is also suggestive of the notion of performativity. However, from the perspective of the multi-process model proposed here, "conducting social action" (ibid.), regardless of whether it is supportable or not, reveals the scholar's conflating the 'Interaction' space and the 'Social practice' space. In other words, communicating within the ACADEMIC DISCOURSE domain is figuratively related to acting within the REAL WORLD domain.

V. 4. What DA is

By way of a conclusion to Chapter V., on the basis of the cognitive mechanisms proposed in the multi-process model, the following definition of DA could be formulated.

DA is a scholarly domain characterized by:

a) scholarly metaphorizations of TEXT as a PHYSICAL PRODUCT and DISCOURSE as a SPACE around the PRODUCT. Alternatively, DISCOURSE can be metaphorized as an interactional STRUCTURE consisting of smaller STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS (i.e. turns or moves) profiled against background knowledge about INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES. Yet another alternative is for DISCOURSE to be seen as a conceptual area of conflation between COMMUNICATIVE PRACTICES/ATTITUDES/BIASES as SOCIAL PRACTICES/ATTITUDES/BIASES, where either can be profiled;

b) in all of the alternatives in (a), there can be observed a metonymic transfer of conceptual elements between the domains in each pair. Thus, scholarly interpretations of what DA is as an activity tend to frequently stipulate 'correspondences' between the two metonymically linked domains in the pair need to be traced (e.g. correspondences between social structure ELEMENTS/ UNITS/ ENTITIES and textual ELEMENTS/ UNITS/ ENTITIES need to be traced);

c) a variety of research techniques and methods, with a stronger preference for qualitative analysis;

d) (a) – (c) functioning prototypically.

PART THREE

ELABORATING THE MODEL

Part III follows the conceptual metaphorization demonstrated in Part II to dominate studies on text(s) and discourse(s): the conceptualization of TEXT, DISCOURSE and SOCIETY/ CULTURE as representing a progression in terms of concentric geometric spaces of increasing scope.

The two main objectives in Part III are (a) to contribute to studies of cognitive phenomena in context, especially to "enaction" studies, which emphasize the interdependence between thought and action (as in Hutchins 2010) and (b) to stress the importance of the notion of 'RW' as a major contribution of the multi-process model prosed in this thesis. The two are seen as interconnected.

To achieve those objectives, however, this chapter will need to return to and then further clarify the interconnectedness among several notions which appeared in Part I or Part II: 'DW', 'context', 'user-centered parameters', 'communicative environment', 'discourse setting', 'context of situation', 'immediate environment', etc. The chapters in Part III, as a consequence, will need to progress spirally by accruing new data and new viewpoints on those concepts.

In parallel, the chapters here will build on the findings in Part I, which discussed the earliest concepts of interest to (pre-)linguistic studies (i.e. POLITICAL SPEECH and TEXT STRUCTURE). In contrast, Chapter VII and Chapter VIII in Part III will turn to some of the latest concepts of language-related interest: online communication, virtual action, identity acting, performativity.

In similarity to the chapters in Part I, the chapters in Part III will investigate both 'offline' uses of cognitive mechanisms and processes as well as 'online' (i.e. situated) cognitive mechanisms and processes (terms as in Vereza 2021).

In terms of research techniques, in Part III, Chapter VI will provide qualitative data analysis, while Chapters VII and VIII will provide quantitative data analysis. The quantitative

data reported are obtained through analysis of datasets specifically compiled for the purposes of this study.

In thus applying the multi-process cognitive model to a variety of text- and discourse-related concepts, Part III is expected to also verify that, in analysis of different phenomena, different cognitive mechanisms from the set display different salience. In other words, Part III is expected to confirm (a) the prototypical operation of the cognitive mechanisms within the model, and, (b) the presence of context-dependent profiling within the model.

CHAPTER VI

REAL WORLDS: OPERATION AND APPLICATIONS

VI. 1. 'TW – DW – RW overlaps' revisited

Chapter II, Section IV focused on two major issues out of the general Worlds and World-creation topics: (a) the existence of TW-DW overlaps, and (b) the difference between 'RW' and 'reality'. This chapter will delve deeper into these topics by focusing on (a) TW-RW and TW-DW-RW overlaps, and (b) DW-RW overlaps and profiling.

In other words, this chapter will demonstrate with what domains/structures/networks a RW can overlap and with what domains/structures/networks it cannot. Above all, the chapter will demonstrate why the notion of 'RW' is indispensable for our multi-process model. Last but not least, the centrality of 'RW' will be employed to revisit several concepts which were mentioned or discussed in the previous chapters but whose interpretation has not been shown to cohere with the multi-process model.

As argued in Chapter II and Chapter IV, this thesis draws heavily on the de Beaugrandian interpretation of TWs, which sees them as essentially and unambiguously cognitive and procedural in nature. According to de Beaugrande and Dressler, coherence in a TEXT emerges through two basic mechanisms (see IV. 2. 2.). The first mechanism for creating coherence requires the text's TW be free of excessive clashes, discrepancies or discontinuities among the concepts 'within' the TW. For instance, a TW of a text mentioning a ROSE should not signal later within the same TW the same flower as a DAFFODIL. Similarly, if a TW discusses a character as the PROTAGONIST'S MOTHER, it should not refer to her later as the PROTAGONIST'S SISTER. If that happens, the result is 'confusion' in the text receiver's

mind: the TW's internal organization has brought about difficulties in the text user's processing the text. In other words, coherence suffers from such difficulties and impediments triggered by internal TW organization.

The second mechanism for creating textual coherence requires a TW be free of substantial clashes between its concepts and a text user's knowledge of the world. For instance, a TW should not evoke images of the Earth as being flat. Similarly, the TW of a recipe about how to make a cake should not suddenly start evoking images of Caesar salad ingredients being added to it. Simply put, according to this second source of coherence, for a TW to be coherent, it should not go against any already existing cognitive structures in a person's long-term memory, cognitive structures which concern facts about 'how the world is'. Thus, de Beaugrande and Dressler do not postulate any notion comparable to the 'RW' proposed in our model; they see a TW as directly interacting with a text user's background storage.

Yet, they discuss facts text users know about reality and do suggest there is a distinction between background knowledge that is coherent with said reality (i.e. they talk of 'facts') and background knowledge which is not coherent with said reality (i.e. 'non-factual' background knowledge). In other words, de Beaugrande and Dressler seem to assume some of the background knowledge a text user has at their disposal will not be organized as 'part of reality'. To account for the difference, 'RW' is postulated within our model – it is that conceptual area which is currently organized into an interpretation of objective reality. Furthermore, it is a notion which itself seems to cohere better with de Beaugrande and Dressler's cornerstone concept of WORKING MEMORY (discussed at length in Chapter IV). Simply put, the vast totality of background knowledge structures is hardly directly processable in WORKING MEMORY; a metonymically organized smaller domain such as 'RW' seems a better fit for a procedural explanation of cognitive processes.

'RWs' can also help explain how a fairy tale's TW or a Hollywood script's TW may clash with a text user's RW but the text's TW can yet be seen as coherent. In such cases, RW structures concerning the concepts of FAIRY TALES and HOLLYWOOD SCRIPTS as genres can be simultaneously activated to MEDIATE and help minimize processing effort. That, in its turn, could help bring perceptions of TW discrepancies below threshold levels (on coherence-related cognitive thresholds see de Beaugrande and Dressler 1981; O'Brien and Cook 2016). That can explain why viewers (as text receivers) may sneer at the 'impossibles' in a movie's TW and, at the same time, perceive the movie's TW as coherent. Hence also the fact that lack of or insufficiency of RW knowledge can make a child believe a fairy tale's TW is actually part of a RW. The child, for instance, may not discriminate between the "Batman" TW (in which FLYING is attainable for HUMANS) and the RW (in which FLYING is not).

There are a range of degrees as to how far removed a TW can be from its corresponding RW, or, to rephrase that, how big the TW-RW overlap can be. Arguably, the purpose of a text producer is the construction of a convincing (i.e. a coherent) TW, which does not necessarily overlap fully with a text receiver's RW. As long as the two Worlds cohere to a sufficient degree, the text can exemplify any point on a scale from 'completely unrealistic' to 'fully objective'. A sci-fi book, for instance, could configure a representation of what life is expected to be or what it should be in 200 years' time, which would trigger a small overlap between a TW and a RW. A novel, on the other hand, can select a portion of present-day city life and so construct it as to purport realism.

To exemplify my point about 'realistic' texts I will resort to a movie-script dataset I compiled for the purposes of a previous study I conducted (Tincheva 2018). In the dataset, texts exemplifying a considerable degree of TW-RW overlap are: "Good Will Hunting", "Only You", "Saving Mr. Banks", "Tin Cup", "Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy", "The Departed", "Traffic", "When Harry Met Sally", "You've Got Mail", etc. Among these examples, the degree

of overlap between TW and RW also varies: “Only You” and “Good Will Hunting” construct a TW which is a part of its corresponding RW.

There is a scalar difference even between the two scripts, and that difference is conditioned by time sequencing constraints: while “Only You” unfolds over a period of several days, “Good Will Hunting” stretches over several months. The greater the ‘compression’ a RW’s TIME is into a TW’s TIME, the less ‘realistic’ the TW. That principle, however, functions prototypically: the TW of “When Harry Met Sally” spans more than a decade, but the movie is generally perceived as extremely realistic due to TW-RW overlap of multiple other World elements. In other words, “When Harry Met Sally” constructs a TW the majority of whose elements and interrelations among elements are generally perceived to coincide with RW elements and interrelations among elements, which overrides the time compression in the TW.

The script of “Amadeus” presents us with an example of another degree of overlap between a TW and a RW. Movie scripts based upon real-life events, frequently called ‘bio-pics’ (e.g. “Bohemian Rhapsody”, “Elvis”, “Walk the Line”), or scripts aiming to construct their TW in such a way as to resemble the TW of a documentary (e.g. “Syriana”, “We Were Soldiers”) aim to convince audiences that their TWs are actually ‘parts of’ the RW. “Inception” and “The Prestige”, in contrast, purposefully take their TWs to the limits of minimal overlappings with RWs.

“Kate and Leopold” in our sub-dataset is worthy of special mention due to its revealing not only yet another degree of TW-DW overlap but also another manner of overlap between TW and RW. The script evokes the construction of two segments in its TW and not only one. The first one profiles the TW against a segment of RW concerning present-day way of life. The second TW segment is profiled against a segment of RW concerning early 19th c. way of life. The two segments are connected into a common TW cognitive structure through the operation

of a non-RW concept, namely TIME TRAVEL. As a non-RW concept, TIME TRAVEL is entirely simulational and not of representational character (non-existent 'realities' as RW notions will lie at the center of our discussion in the next Chapter VII). However, this characteristics of TIME TRAVEL allows for the two TW segments to cohere within a common TW.

An alternative interpretation merits at least a mention here and it concerns the possibility for interpreting the present-day TW segment in "Kate and Leopold" and the early 19th c. TW segment there as two separate TWs. A third alternative could come from Text World Theory and Cognitive Poetics, which would opt for a treatment of those two TW segments as two separate sub-worlds due to their being 'delimited' (to use Werth's [1999] term) through different deictic markers. Undoubtedly, these two alternatives would be just as valid interpretations as the main one proposed here. Nevertheless, I would argue that the present-day TW segment and the early 19th c. TW segment are best treated as two segments within a common TW due to their sharing story characters and relations between those characters, i.e. due to their significant degree of overlapping. Thus, I would rather interpret such cases in terms of variations in TW scope rather than see two separate TWs or sub-worlds. After all, movie goers are rather unlikely to see "Kate and Leopold" as two separate movies with two separate TWs.

Confirmation of such a position can be found in the scripts of "The Dark Knight", "The Matrix", "X-Men" and "Wanted", where the initial parts of the TW are constructed as portions of present-day RW but, later on through the script, segments of the TW move further and further away from the RW to become more and more 'fictive'. Nevertheless, such scripts are considered to construct a single TW and the degree of 'fictiveness' is usually determined by the segment of least TW-RW overlap. In brief, a TW invariably displays some degree of overlap with a RW, as the TW draws on a RW for its concepts and its 'story' (this claim will be further

supported in the next chapter). Consequently, a TW's concepts and 'story' could be understood only in similarity with or in opposition to a RW. Second, a TW is unavoidably profiled against a RW to establish the degree of the TEXT's 'fictiveness'.

Most of these principles of TW-RW overlap and profiling apply similarly to DW-RW overlap and profiling. First, a DW, in similarity to a TW, needs to cohere with a RW in order for a text user to 'make sense' of the ongoing communicative occurrence and to decide whether it the communicative occurrence is 'real' or, for instance, a dream. To achieve that, a DW, in similarity to a TW, draws on a RW for its concepts, and, consequently, its concepts are (a) shared with the RW, and (b) are understandable against the background of the RW. Second, as demonstrated in II. 4. 1. 2., in similarity to TWs, DWs may overlap with and 'extend' into RWs to various degrees. In that, the scope of a DW against the background of a RW may vary considerably.

A crucial difference between a TW and a DW in their drawing on a RW for projected structure(s) is that, while a TW can display a wide variety of degrees of overlap with a RW, a DW needs to overlap with a RW (almost) fully. In other words, a DW may be narrow or broad (i.e. it may include a multitude of conceptual structures and structures' interrelations, or fewer conceptual structures and structures' interrelations) but the totality of the DW will inevitably contain concepts which are part of the RW, and will be of narrower scope than that RW. Simply put, a DW will always be 'included' in a RW. This is a principle of consequence as far as the potential of a DW and a RW to stand in metonymic relations is concerned.

As far as the (number of) conceptual structures within a DW is concerned, a discussion of the scope of a DW can be found in Werth's works, where he proposes 'incrementation' (1999: 310) as an explanation of how information can be ongoingly (re)configured to create a DW. To Werth, a DW 'contains' all participants and entities from the immediate communicative environment plus all the background knowledge available to the participants.

As he admits, that knowledge represents "no less than *all* the knowledge available to the whole human race" (Werth 1999:117; emphasis as in original).

Alternatively, we could employ de Beaugrande and Dressler's (ibid.) cognitive notion of SPREADING ACTIVATION to illustrate how associated background knowledge structures can be accrued into a DW. In this case, clearly, a text user will not 'bring' the totality of human knowledge to the table; each individual text user will bring only their own background knowledge. Importantly, even that individual person's background knowledge will not be all activated at once. There will be different segments of it which will be organized into a (current) RW, and there will be segments related to previous RWs a person has, which are unlikely to be used. (By a 'current RW' I mean the RW at a specific moment in a person's life. Clearly, a person's RW in his/her infancy will be different than the same person's RW in his 30s.) Along the same lines, to conceptualize a portion of experience as a (COMMUNICATIVE) SITUATION, even fewer RW structures will be activated and organized into an even smaller portion of a RW, a portion which will be perceived as relevant to the currently ongoing communicative exchange. It is that last, smaller portion of conceptual space that is termed here 'a DW'.

Thus, a DW, unlike a TW, will typically be constructed as 'realistic': first, it draws unavoidably on a RW, and, second, its full scope fits within a RW. An additional reason for the 'realistic' DW character would be the fact that, even when a participant's communicative intent is to lie or hide information, it is necessary for that participant to construct in his/her own mind a 'realistic' DW which will allow him/her to choose their best strategy for lying or for hiding information (for a discussion see de Beaugrande and Dressler's [1981] chapter on user-centered parameters).

Another issue the present section needs to highlight is that the principle of overlapping and profiling holds among all three types of Worlds simultaneously, i.e. among TWs, DWs and

RWs. In support of that claim, let us now consider the following sample from the "How to Train Your Dragon" movie screenplay. The text opens with a voice-over (i.e. an off-camera commentary) directly addressed at the text receiver/movie viewer:

HICCUP (V.O.)

> This is Berk. It's twelve days North of hopeless, and a few degrees South of freezing to death. It's located solidly on the meridian of misery. My village. In a word, sturdy. And it's been here for seven generations, but every single building is new. We have fishing, hunting, and a charming view of the sunsets. The only problems are the pests. You see, most places have mice or mosquitos. We have ... dragons.

In this passage, the village of Berk is constructed as the place of 'here and now' as prompted by the deictic demonstrative *this*. The question is whether this 'here and now' belongs within the DW, as the voice-over technique suggests, or it belongs to the RW as a four-year-old might believe. Alternatively, it may belong to the TW. Furthermore, if BERK is interpreted as part of the DW, then whose 'here and now' does that DW represent? Is it the speaker's, and who, indeed, is the real speaker in this text? Is it the script writer or is it the main character (i.e. Hiccup)? Furthermore, which text user's opinion should be valid on these questions: is it the film makers', the actors', the film critics', or the opinion of the children who watch the movie and who are, presumably, the intended audience of the text-presented story?

The answers to these questions would probably depend on the answer to another one: the question of who the intended text receiver is. Is it the film producer, who first reads the script and on whose decision the potential making of the script into a film depends, or is the intended text receiver, namely the future film audience? Furthermore, do the speaker and the text receiver share the same 'here and now', when, by default, the text producer (i.e. script

writer) and text receiver (i.e. movie producer or his/ her assistant) rarely share the same space (i.e. they are rarely present together at a film producer's office or home, where the movie script is first to be read and, then, turned into a screenplay)?

Clearly, the RW of a normally socialized adult would suggest that, in the movie genre, the text producer is the script writer 'speaking' 'through the voice' of the main character. However, for this to happen, a person needs to have accumulated enough conceptual experience to also understand that the TW (the world of HICCUP) is not really a part of the RW, although it is presented as such (i.e. the two Worlds do not really overlap). An adult would know that the text receiver's DW will necessarily be different from the main character's DW, which, although constructed in the form of a DW, is still nothing but a part of the fictive TW. An adult would also have previous knowledge of the fact that, in this way, the TW of the main character is manipulatively constructed as (if) a part of the RW and also as a DW that is meant to be seen as 'shared' with any future text receiver. And last but not least, the sample above also illustrates that it is not only the TW and the DW which can be profiled against the RW. As the use of *You see, most places have mice or mosquitos* reveals, sometimes even the RW can be pulled to the fore, and the TW and the DW can be suppressed.

What is of greatest significance here, however, is the mere fact that the above questions and ambiguities exist. What prompts these questions and gives rise to the ambiguities is the existence of an overlap among all three types of Worlds – the DW, the TW and the RW – simultaneously. Furthermore, it is not necessarily only one TW and one DW that overlap with the RW, and this will be the main point made in the next section of this chapter.

VI. 2. Two cases in point: Kylo Ren and Black Widow's 'marriage story', and Mark Wahlberg's 'shooting' of Matt Damon

An event of undoubtedly global proportions and lasting implications, the 2020 pandemic spring lockdowns heightened (if not permanently, then at least temporarily) the role of media service providers and aggravated what some have described as the 'streaming wars' (see Internet source 2). Within this context, a movie industry product which had already garnered significant 2019 cinema award attention, Noah Baumbach's "Marriage Story", featured prominently in Netflix's spring pandemic period streaming success. Some of the headlines promoting that product, however, attracted my attention for rather different reasons unrelated to the ongoing contextual 'streaming wars' environment. *Black Widow Breaks Up With Kylo Ren* (Internet source 3) and *Black Widow and Kylo Ren Struggle With Their Relationship in STAR WARS, Marvel, and MARRIAGE STORY Mashup* (Internet source 4, capitalization as in original) are just two headlines that exemplify how the "Marriage Story" movie tended to be pitched to audiences.

Simultaneously with the spring 2020 pandemic social distance restrictions, in the first half of June 2020 another socio-political event of international significance occurred. *The Black Lives Matter* movement swept across the United States and, to varying degrees, across many European countries. At the time, I happened upon a Twitter message reading, *The scene in The Departed where Mark Wahlberg shoots Matt Damon is the blueprint for how to handle corrupt cops* Internet source 2).

Both the "Marriage Story" and "The Departed" references and interpretations cited above may be considered by some to be confusing or incoherent. To me, these references and interpretations are worthy of analysis because they seem representative of specific – and widespread – present-day text-use and discourse-use tendencies. To support my point, let me clarify that Kylo Ren is a character in the "Star Wars" franchise, and Black Widow is a character in "The Avengers" franchise. Kylo Ren is played by the actor Adam Driver, while Black Widow

is played by the actress Scarlett Johansson. In the "Marriage Story" movie, the two actors play Charlie Barber and Nicole Barber respectively. Neither character has anything to do with "Star Wars" and "The Avengers".

In contrast, "The Departed" reference mentions Mark Wahlberg and Matt Damon, who are actors in this movie. However, it is, first, the same movie they participate in and not in different franchises as is the case with Adam Driver in "Star Wars" and Scarlet Johansson in "The Avengers". Second, there is no verbal reference to their characters from the movie whatsoever.

What made me combine the cases is the fact that they both mention actors and movie characters but they seem to do so through different cognitive techniques. In other words, either textual instance creates a 'new reality', but it triggers the creation of a RW through different RW, DW and TW overlaps. An explanation of those differences in creating and using Worlds will be attempted here on the basis of the multi-process model proposed in this thesis.

Such an explanation is also intended as an alternative to what, to many, would be the 'obvious' scholarly understanding of our two cases in point – that they should be tackled through the notion of intertextuality. Indisputably, that possibility is central as long as "Star Wars", "The Avengers", "Marriage Story" and "The Departed" can be seen as hypotexts, which exist – to use Kristeva's (1977) original metaphoric phrase – 'in conversation' with the 2020 hypertexts (i.e. the articles and Twitter messages cited).

As is well known, although fundamentally a Saussurean notion, Kristeva's (e.g. 1977, 1984) intertextuality (also, e.g., Barthes 1977; Todorov 1981) generally associates with literary investigations. Adopting a 'classical' semiotic perspective on intertextuality could allow us, for instance, to classify our two cases in point in terms of their being obligatory, optional, or accidental (Gennette 1980; Hebel 1989). It could also allow us to approach our two cases in

point in terms of intertextual figures such as allusion, quotation, calque, plagiarism, translation, pastiche and parody (see Allan 2000).

Alternatively, we could follow in the footsteps of the influence intertextuality has had on linguistic studies. As argued earlier here (IV. 2. 2.), Halliday's semiotic background conditioned the presence of the notion and the term in his "Cohesion in English" as early as 1976, and de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) extended as well as cognitivized the linguistic understanding of intertextuality to the status of a separate parameter of textuality. Later on, Fairclough's research (e.g. 1992a) also served to enhance the role of intertextuality in Discourse Analysis as did Tannen's (2006) in Sociolinguistics. A cognitive re-interpretation is offered by Kövecses (2015, 2018, 2019) in the form of 'intertextual coherence', which, according to his definition, occurs at the "conceptual metaphor-culture interface" (the notion is associated with Kövecses's [2020, 2022] "contextualist approach to conceptual metaphor").

Applying the conclusions and generalizations formulated in this chapter to the two cases in point, one finds that in the "Black Widow Breaks Up With Kylo Ren" title, *Black Widow* simultaneously signals a TW (through the person the article's 'story' is about) and a RW (through the cultural entity of a Marvel comics character, or as many would have it, a Marvel 'Universe' hero). In other words, *Black Widow* signals an overlap between a TW and a RW. *Kylo Ren* also signals such an overlap between a TW and a RW; the difference is that this particular character associates with structures in the Star Wars RW domain and not with the Marvel RW domain (to many, it should be noted, neither domain will be part of their background knowledge at all). Importantly, the Marvel-based TW and the Star Wars-based TW have nothing in common, i.e. they do not overlap and thus represent two separate TWs evoked by the same article title.

Breaks Up in the article title, however, represents quite a different mechanism. It evokes the TW of the movie that is the main topic of the title, and that movie's TW has nothing in

common with, i.e. it does not overlap with, the Marvel-based TW, nor with the Star Wars-based TW. This is a completely new TW, and, as the title suggests, in that TW, Black Widow and Kylo Ren were married and now are getting divorced. However, true to fact, this has nothing to do with what the 'new' TW is about. The third TW is about the Charlie Barber and Nicole Barber characters, who are the ones actually divorcing.

What makes this overlap of three TWs possible is the RW fact that the RW person (i.e. Scarlett Johansson) who plays the Black Widow character in the first TW is the same person who plays the Nicole Barber character in the third TW. Similarly, the RW person (i.e. Adam Driver) who plays the Kylo Ren character in the second TW is the same RW person who plays the Charlie Barber character in the third TW. In sum, the cognitive mechanism at work in the case of this article title allows for a RW to overlap with a total of three TWs, while there are also separate pairings and overlaps among these TWs.

Importantly, two of the TWs (i.e. the one I, for brevity, call 'the Marvel-based TW' and 'the Star Wars-based TW') associate with previously occurring TEXTS/ MOVIES. This phenomenon allows us to argue that in this case we have double intertextuality: two separate segments in the main TW (the main TW being that of the Barbers' divorce story) overlap with two re-activated TWs (the "Star Wars" TW and the "Black Widow" TW). Simultaneously with this instance of intertextuality, however, in this case, we have TW-RW overlaps.

In the case of the Twitter message reading *The scene in The Departed where Mark Wahlberg shoots Matt Damon is the blueprint for how to handle corrupt cops*, Mark Wahlberg and Matt Damon are both RW actors, and, as such, their mentioning evokes a RW. However, in the RW, Mark Wahlberg has not shot Matt Damon. Thus, *shoots* evokes a TW in which that happens. As the RW and this TW share structures (the concepts of MARK WAHLBERG and MATT DAMON), there is an overlap between the two. *The Departed* and *The scene in The Departed* also re-activate a previous TW, while *handle corrupt cops* evokes the RW. In brief,

in contrast to the Black Widow and Kylo Ren example, this case presents us with only two TWs and one RW segment. The intertextuality in this case concerns only re-activation of the TW of *The Departed*.

In sum, analyses of this type demonstrate that TWs, DWs and RWs co-function in more complex ways than simply overlapping. However, discussing the co-occurring phenomena as linear constructions of 'sub-worlds' (as done in Text World Theory and Cognitive Poetics, see Chapter II) is hardly supportable by the presence of any cognitive mechanism(s). Conceptual metonymy, on the other hand, as the next section will argue, could help explain those.

VI. 3. DW – RW metonymic profiling

The previous sections argued a DW typically (a) is profiled against a RW, and (b) varies in scope depending on the number of the RW conceptual structures the DW accrues. The combination of those two factors strongly suggests the DW-RW interconnection can be explained through the operation of the cognitive mechanism of conceptual metonymy (see Chapter III).

To verify the assumption about the operation of conceptual metonymy in DW-RW overlaps and profiling, we could follow the cognitive mechanism's peculiarities listed in Barcelona's (2011) systematization. Barcelona argues forcibly in support of scholars' approaching conceptual metonymy in terms of, what he calls, prototype-based and not 'unitary' definitions of it. The theoretical framework he advances rests on the existence of degrees in metonymicity and can be summarized to include the following premises (Barcelona [2011: 9]):

– Metonymy is a relationship between domains and not between entities;

– Metonymy is not necessarily connected to an act of reference;

– Metonymy is a type of domain highlighting (also called 'domain activation');

– Metonymy, in contrast to metaphor, is not a mapping; (see also Panther [2022] on metaphor as a figure of analogical reasoning vs. metonymy as a figure of associative reasoning);

– Metonymy can be bidirectional (i.e. reversible), as evident through metonymic alternatives such as CAUSE FOR EFFECT and EFFECT FOR CAUSE, or WHOLE THING FOR A PART OF THE THING and PART OF A THING FOR THE WHOLE THING;

– Despite the bidirectionality of metonymy, one of the metonymic options tends to be a preferred (i.e. 'default') option;

– There are degrees in metonymicity, and, as a result, some metonymies are more prototypical than others, e.g. the ‘stand-for’ relationship;
– Metonymy can be motivated by the cognitive principles of HUMAN OVER NON-HUMAN, CONCRETE OVER ABSTRACT, GOOD GESTALT OVER POOR GESTALT, and SALIENT OVER NONSALIENT.

We could employ this set of premises systematized in Barcelona (2011) as a set of parameters for establishing the presence of metonymycity. Those parameters, as unambiguously declared by Barcelona (ibid.), function prototypically, which harmonizes fully with the multi-process model proposed here.

Out of those premises, there is one which seems of special importance to the present discussion, namely the one purporting metonymy is a type of domain highlighting. Barcelona is not alone in supporting such a claim. In quite a similar fashion, Lakoff (1987, 1992) maintains metonymy operates within an idealized cognitive model. He also sees it as a cognitive mechanism, in which a subcategory stands for the category including it; the same mechanism is termed by Lakoff ‘intra-domain activation’ (1987: 12). Langacker (1993: 30) defines metonymy as a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity is mentally accessed via another entity. Croft (1993), specifically, postulates that metonymic domain highlighting happens when a secondary domain (i.e. a (sub)domain) within a (complex) domain matrix is activated. Barcelona (2022a, 2002b, 2011) adds that the two domains are typically located within the same, bigger domain matrix. Above all, as Panther and Thornburg suggest (2004: 95), “the crucial criterion for metonymy is not ‘addition’ or ‘substitution’ but the degree of conceptual *prominence* of the target meaning”.

In our case, a DW could be seen as such a (sub)domain, and a RW – as the bigger and more complex structure; both domains can be argued to depend on the matrix domain of

'background knowledge'. Clearly, as Lakoff (1992: 36) cautions, the 'boundaries' of cognitive domains are often fuzzy and it may be extremely difficult to discern whether or not a domain and a subdomain, or, alternatively, two subdomains, are located in the same superordinate domain. At the 'level' of whole texts, discourses, and Worlds, that may not even be necessary. Simply put, even if we leave the notion of 'background knowledge' out of the picture, RWs and DWs can be argued to exemplify a typical subdomain-matrix domain conceptual relationship, which, in addition to all other overlap- and internal-structure-related characteristics specified in the previous sections, would represent confirmation of our central assumption here – that a DW and a RW co-function metonymically.

Moreover, as all the scholars cited agree, conceptual metonymy is not about substituting one entity/domain for another. Conceptual metonymy, researchers agree, is about interconnecting domains into a more complex whole. In our case, that would mean a DW and a RW can be metonymically integrated into a single conceptual space. The phenomenon can be observed in a DW and a RW jointly operating as a background against which a TW is profiled (as demonstrated in Chapter II and the previous two sections of this chapter). The phenomenon can be explained through the principle holding that, in metonymy, one domain actually provides an access point to another domain, which can happen only if the two domains are in a relationship of 'conceptual contiguity' (Kövecses and Radden 1998; Barcelona 2000b; Littlemore 2015; Ruiz de Mendoza's 2020) – a principle RWs and their corresponding DWs follow (i.e. a DW is seen as A PART OF a RW).

Additionally, Ruiz de Mendoza (2020) maintains that conceptual metonymy is fundamentally connected to and inherently dependent on the principles of gestalt perception and perceptual salience. Yet another key premise of his (2020, 2022) states that there are two major cognitive operations which sustain metonymy: domain expansion and domain reduction (see also Chapter III). Clearly, the notions of conceptual expansion and reduction cohere fully

with this thesis's treatment of World scope variation. Overall, the so-described system of theoretical premises throughout the relevant literature explains why (a) a DW and a RW can be difficult to delimit in their extensive contiguity, (b) profiling/highlighting/activating a DW means suppression of a RW as background, and (c) structures from the RW domain may be transferred to its corresponding DW domain to construct it as a 'real' SITUATION .

Two last points call for special comment. The first one is that metonymic (re)conceptualization are seen in the literature as having the potential to be either temporary and transient or, alternatively, to become permanent and typical. The latter are termed by Lakoff (1987) 'metonymic models' and represent, in Barcelona's (2011) term 'default' metonymizations. To Lakoff (ibid.), whether a metonymization will be transient or it will become conventionalized can depend on the cognitive principle of GOOD GESTALT OVER POOR GESTALT (see also Radden and Kövecses 2007; Ioannou 2019). In the case of a DW and a RW, the argument can hold of their representing a GOOD GESTALT (i.e. one which does not include too many differences across the internal structures in the two domains), and, consequently, of their co-functioning as a conventionalized 'metonymic model' (in which a DW is typically metonymically profiled against a RW).

Last but not least, this metonymic model coheres well, i.e. functions as a GOOD GESTALT, with some conceptual metaphorizations of special social salience. The LIFE AS A JOURNEY complex structure, as discussed earlier here (II. 3. 1.), is especially prominent in governing both social and individual perceptions of LIFE and of INDIVIDUAL LIVES. In accordance with that metaphor, any segment of experience can be conceptualized as a SITUATION, and a SITUATION would, normally, be metaphorized as A PLACE. LIFE, thus, becomes metaphorized as a PATH consisting of a series of PLACES, some of those 'places' representing (COMMUNICATIVE) SITUATIONS.

In other words, against the background of such a cognitive framework, a DW can be seen as a SITUATION, i.e. as A PLACE along the PATH OF LIFE. Moreover, a DW can be seen as 'embedded in' and representing a 'part of' the RW PATH OF LIFE. Simultaneously, due to the operation of conceptual metonymy, a DW can be seen as a 'smaller' PLACE embedded in the 'bigger' PLACE that LIFE can be perceived to be.

These generalizations are supported by, for example, analyses of the genre of political speeches (discussed in Chapter II). As I have also argued (Tincheva 2015, 2022), political speeches can be distinguished from other genres precisely on the basis of their atypically high degree of TW-DW-RW overlap and conflation: a political speech displays a coincidence of RW roles (POLITICIAN, CITIZENS/MEMBERS OF SOCIETY), DW participants (SPEAKER, HEARER) and TW characters (POLITICAL LEADER, FOLLOWERS).

To conclude, the simultaneous operation of several conceptual metaphor mappings plus conceptual metonymy would be difficult to explain without the presence of the notion of 'RW' as a separate domain of operation of the cognitive mechanisms in question. Without it, the World profiling mechanism, also operating simultaneously, would be even more difficult to trace.

VI. 4. 'Context' revisited

The discussions in both chapters in Part II repeatedly retuned to the notion of 'context' as central to the theoretical frameworks of TL and DA. The notion, however, was not defined there, nor was it harmonized with the operation of the multi-process model proposed in this thesis. Additionally, the related notion of 'DW' was discussed in the chapters in Part I. Its relation to the notion of 'context' was also not specified.

Above all, Part I and Part II did not specify the relation between 'DW', 'context' and 'RW'. 'RW' will lie at the center of the investigations presented in Part III. Its presence as a component in our multi-process model is regarded here as essential. Therefore, this chapter will need to return to

It not by chance that our discussion has evaded so far defining the notion of 'context'. A concept of 'maddening elasticity' (Givon 2005: 18), 'context' is "generally undefined" (Clark and Carlson 1981: 313) and "the notion is commonly used in a more or less informal way" (van Dijk 2007: xix). Goodwin and Duranti go even further and claim that "eventually we might have to accept that such a definition may not be possible" (1992: 2). Indeed, the notion can be found "frustrating" because "almost every encounter one has with context opens up to the slippery slope of relativity" (Givon 2005: 14).

Despite the general view on CONTEXT, this section will resort to it as a point of departure and try applying the multi-process model to the way the notion is used. On that basis, the next step envisaged will be a re-formulation of the broad domain around the notions of 'context, 'DW', 'RW', 'Intertextuality', 'Situationality', 'communicative environment', 'discourse setting', 'context of situation', 'immediate environment', etc.

Non-cognitive interpretations of 'context'

Chronologically speaking, in 1932, anthropologist Malinowski memorably proposes that "a statement, spoken in real life, is never detached from the situation in which it has been uttered", and that "the utterance has no meaning except in the context of situation" (1932: 307). As an anthropologist, Malinowski focuses primarily on the interdependence of language use and its social functions, which results in his preference for the actual term of 'context of culture'. The term is later echoed in Firth's 'context of situation' (1950, 1957).

Firth introduces the concept into linguistic studies (1950), and, to characterize 'context', lists the following parameters:

- participants in the communicative situation
- the action of those participants (verbal vs. non-verbal)
- other relevant features (surrounding objects, relevant events)
- the effects of the verbal action

A closer look reveals some of the parameters in Firth's classification (i.e. participants, surrounding objects) concern physical/ material contextual elements. Others, in contrast, concern abstract, intangible notions (i.e. participants' non-verbal actions, other relevant events), which, however, also belong within the contextual environment. Participants' verbal actions and the parameter of 'effects of the verbal action' on their part can be argued to either belong within the physical environment or among the abstract notions (in cases when the effect concerns emotions, beliefs, social attitudes, etc.). Overall, the classification encompasses predominantly non-language related variables.

Later on, in 1964, Hymes puts forward a different set of contextual parameters:

- participants (addressor and addressee)

- topic
- setting
- channel (e. g. speech, writing)
- code (e.g. language, dialect)
- message form (e.g. sermon, debate)
- event (in which the message form is embedded)

This classification, too, can be argued to display an internal absence of consistency. The parameters of addressor, addressee, setting, channel concern physical/ material contextual elements. Topic, code, message form, type of social event concern abstract, intangible notions. Overall, in contrast to Firth's classification, this one encompasses predominantly language related variables.

Another version of his is Hymes' SPEAKING model (the acronym stands for setting, participants, ends, act sequence, key [related to the message form], instrumentalities, norms of interaction, genre) (1972: 65). Still later, Hymes (1976) modifies his suggestion by adding 'intent' and 'effect of the communication'. Arguably, Hymes moves towards a more and more society-related version of his parameter set.

Lewis (1972, in Brown and Yule 1983: 40) in his turn suggests situating contextual parameters along separate co-ordinates:

- possible-world co-ordinate (the states of affairs which might/ could/ are supposed to be or are)
- time co-ordinate (revealed through tenses and adverbials)
- place co-ordinate (adverbials)
- speaker co-ordinate (deictic first person reference)
- audience co-ordinate (deictic second person reference)
- indicated object co-ordinate (demonstratives, e.g. this, those, etc.)
- previous discourse co-ordinate (phrases like *the latter*, *the aforementioned*, etc.)

- assignment co-ordinate (all ‘things’ mentioned)

This classification is especially notable for consistently correlating language-related units/ structures (e.g. demonstratives, adverbials, tenses) with contextual elements. However, while some contextual elements can be unambiguously ascribed to the physical environment of a communicative event (e.g. speaker, audience, place), others (e.g. possible worlds, all ‘things’ mentioned) evoke associations with TWs as mental phenomena, or, at least, they unambiguously represent abstract phenomena. Those abstract phenomena, crucially, are text-related and not society-related.

In contrast, sociolinguist Labov’s (1972) Variation analysis classification of contextual parameters is almost exclusively society-related:

- the social situation (i.e. the setting)
- the social identities (e.g. gender, age, and ethnicity)
- the key (i.e. formal vs. informal style)

Proceeding chronologically, we need to highlight the influential classification developed by a follower of the Firthian tradition. Halliday (e.g. 1985, 2014; see also Chapter IV here) proposes context is characterized by the parameters of:

- field of discourse (concerned with what is happening, i.e. conventional events)
- tenor of discourse (concerned with who is participating, what the relations between the participants are, what their social status is)
- mode of discourse (concerned with the role language is playing, with the symbolic organization of the text, with the channel, with the medium)

The first parameter in this classification concerns abstract, intangible notions which are society-related. The second one can be either seen as dealing with physical/ material contextual parameters (such as participants) or with abstract notions (such as participants' social status). The third parameter is, generally, language-related, but while the channel can be associated with the material/ physical environment, 'the role language is playing' and 'the symbolic organization of the text' are abstract in nature.

The next, and last, example is a recent classification, which, in the words of its author, is directed at incorporating socio-cultural aspects into 'context'. Paltridge's classification (2021: 78) includes:

- the setting of the text
- the focus and perspective of the text
- the intended audience for the text, their role and purpose in reading the text
- the relationship between writers and readers of the text
- expectations, conventions, and requirements for the text
- the background knowledge, values and understanding it is assumed the writer shares with their readers, including what is important to the reader and what is not
- the relationship the text has with other texts

The entries in this extremely disparate list can be generalized to be predominantly non-language related (i.e. they are not interrelated with any specific language units/ structures); they seem to be exclusively targeted at describing the communicative situation. In this, the first parameter – 'setting of the text' – arguably, associates with the material/ physical environment, while the next parameters concern abstract notions associating with conventional social and communicative phenomena. It should be noted that all those parameters are discussed by Paltridge (ibid.) as if they were of completely objective nature, while, in reality, they evoke the

slippery slope of relativity mentioned at the end of the previous section (e.g. “the background knowledge, values and understanding it is assumed the writer shares with their readers, including what is important to the reader and what is not” [ibid.]; emphasis mine).

The last parameter in the list, however, seems of special importance to the present investigation as it addresses ‘the relationship the text has with other texts’, i.e. ‘intertextuality’. Placed within the context of the rest of the parameters, ‘the relationship the text has with other texts’ can be seen as unrelated to the material/physical environment and, in similarity to ‘expectations, conventions, and requirements’ and ‘background knowledge, values and understanding’, as related to text users’ perceptions albeit in unspecified ways.

Generalizing on our discussion of the classifications so far, there are two lines of distinction that each parameter within any classification seems to be characterized with respect to. The first line opposes physical/material entities and abstract notions. The second line opposes language-centered/text-centered entities and society-centered notions. The parameters prove to function prototypically and, consequently, this opens the possibility for our generalization to summarize them metaphorically as ‘scales’ rather than as oppositions.

However, another conceptual metaphor underlying scholar’s perceptions of context seems significantly more evident and tends to be pervasively expressed by the scholars themselves. It concerns context variations as to SCOPE. In other words, it concerns not only what context should ‘include’ but also the related question of ‘how far’ context should ‘extend’.

For instance, to Halliday and Hasan (1985), there is ‘narrow’ context (in their words, the immediate environment) and ‘broad’ context (in their words, cultural context). In that respect, Halliday (2006) even goes to postulate four ‘dimensions’ of textual operation. Bunt (1997) similarly suggests there are several dimensions of context: linguistic, cognitive, semantic, physical-perceptual and social. Ochs’s (1979) also discusses contextual ‘dimensions’: setting, behavioral environment, language as context, and extra-situational context.

Ochs's proposal (ibid.) is noteworthy for yet another reason: the notion of 'language as context', which is also evident in research by van Dijk (1977, 1978) and Kintsch (1984). Brown and Yule (1983), Gumperz (1982, 1992) and Mey (1993) even employ a different term – 'co-text' to emphasize the difference. To other researchers (e.g. Kamp 1990, 2003), non-linguistic context is 'utterance context', while linguistic context, or co-text, is termed 'discourse context'.

Briefly put, in the case of CONTEXT, scope variation can happen in either direction – CONTEXT may expand into socio-cultural domains, or CONTEXT may contract to include neighboring linguistics structures only. In principle, research on context verifies the conclusions drawn in Chapter V. 3., which uphold the prevalence of Fairclough's (1989, 1992a, 1992b, 2018) conceptual metaphorization of textual communication in terms of concentric geometrical figures/spaces.

Cognitive interpretations of 'context'

Cognitive research on CONTEXT similarly confirms the key presence of Fairclough's (ibid.) spatial metaphorization but adds a significant observation to its analyses. Duranti and Goodwin (1992), for instance, distinguish between physical/situational context and social/extra-situational context, but they also discuss the co-operation between a context and a focal event the context surrounds. They compare that co-operation to the one between an environment and an organism within that environment. Importantly, Duranti and Goodwin compare that co-functioning to the visual processing mechanism of figure-ground (discussed earlier in Chapter II). In the same vein, Yeh and Barsalou (2006: 352) define context as "a region of perceived space that surrounds a focal entity over some temporal duration, perceived from the subjective perspective of an agent". It should be noted, however, that no matter the scope of a CONTEXT (i.e. simply physical or also social), Duranti and Goodwin's metaphor sees the dynamic figure-

ground shifts as happening within a single contextual frame encompassing relevant physical or contextual elements.

In DA (see Chapter V), a similar CONTEXT as a FRAME metaphor would typically associate with van Dijk's research (e.g. 1977a, 1977b, 1997, 2009, 2012), where what he first terms 'context spaces' (1979) and, later, 'context models' (1997) resemble Johnson-Laird's (1983) 'mental models' (van Dijk 1997: 193). Van Dijk's 'context models' are socially shared representations used to achieve subjective interpretations of an ongoing communicative event (1997: 194). His version of a context-processing cognitive procedure means a participant selects a suitable pre-existing frame-like cognitive structure and matches it to an actual ongoing situation. The result would be the participant's either keeping the context-frame active, or discarding it and then 'filling' its 'place' with a 'more appropriate' one. A version of this proposal can be also observed in Ungerer and Schmid's (1996: 47) suggestion that a currently active context calls up other frame-like contexts from long-term memory and thus combines with them to build 'bundles of contexts' (ibid.).

Clearly, such a cognitive reading connects an objective physical situation with a mental representation of it. As van Dijk explicitly states, "context is both a theoretical and a cognitive *abstraction*, viz. from the actual physical-biological-etc. *situation*" (1977b: 217; emphasis as in original). This citation, however, is noteworthy for yet another reason: the model proposed in this thesis sees no principled difference, let alone an opposition, between 'theoretical' and 'cognitive' mental structures. Both are perceived here as resulting from the operation of cognitive mechanisms. A difference would be that some of them (corresponding to van Dijk's 'theoretical abstraction') are cognitive mechanisms used to process information about other cognitive mechanisms (corresponding to van Dijk's 'cognitive abstraction').

This example evokes two related conceptual metaphorizations cognitive research can also be observed to employ: Sperber and Wilson's (1986) CONTEXT as a MUTUAL

COGNITIVE ENVIRONMENT, and CONTEXT AS OTHER MINDS (originally in McDermott 1976). Both metaphorizations associate with Clark's (1996) COMMON GROUND in communication, which refers to all the knowledge, beliefs and suppositions participants in a communicative act believe they share. This idea that, when communicating, people become 'environments for each other' is interpreted by Mey in light of the fact that "in order to understand another person's wording, I have to participate in his or her contexts, to word the world with him or her" (1993: 304). Givon also elaborates on the cognitive construal of other minds (1998, 2005): he argues it emerges out of the dependence of our species' survival on our enacting cooperation and communication. Both cooperation and communication, Givon maintains, are utterly dependent on the successful construal of the mind of the other (2005: 7). Clearly, this metaphorization bears a strong resemblance to this thesis' consideration for factors conditioning the so-called social cognition and not individual cognitive process only.

In confirmation that CONTEXT AS OTHER MINDS is a psycholinguistically supported metaphor, Kaplan and Iacoboni's data (2006) demonstrate that mirror neuron activity is very much linked to social competence. As their empirical results prove, in order to predict the intentions of others, humans use the same neuron areas to process both contextual information and information about physically grasping objects. Generally, research from neuro-physiology (see, e.g. Callaghan et al. 2005) has provided robust support for the premise that people of specific, and, frequently, high levels of intelligence are consistently better mind readers than others. Specific cultures also seem to be able to school better average accomplishers of mind reading (see, e.g. Cohen and Gunz 2002), although the objects of those 'reading' procedures may vary in their capacity to be read. Simply put, some people's minds prove easier to interpret than others; additionally, the minds one has 'read' repeatedly (e.g. family members' minds) are more easily managed (Epley 2007). To conclude, neurological

investigations provide unvarying confirmation to the claim that some of us are just better mind-readers and, thus, better context-makers than others.

By way of a summary to this section on CONTEXT, let me – seemingly somewhat out of context – cite Halliday (1985: 46) in his deliberation that

> [t]he context of situation, however, is only the immediate environment. There is also a broader background against which the text has to be interpreted: its context of culture. Any actual context of situation, the particular configuration of field, tenor, and mode that has brought a text into being, is not just a random jumble of features but a totality - a package, so to speak, of things that typically go together in the culture. People do these things on these occasions and attach these meanings and values to them; this is what culture is.

The passage is prototypical in that (a) it uses synonymously 'context of situation' and 'immediate environment' to refer to a segment of a physical, objectively existing reality, and not to cognitive spaces, (b) it metaphorizes CONTEXT OF SITUATION as a 'narrower' segment WITHIN the 'broader' CONTEXT OF CULTURE, (c) CONTEXT OF CULTURE is metaphtonymized to function as background against which CONTEXT OF SITUATION can be profiled, and (d) it interprets 'context' as a "package" of "things" that "go together" (ibid.).

In general, scholarly conceptualizations of CONTEXT are not dependent on conceptual metaphtonymy only. As evident from the classifications summarized in this section, the World-creation and profiling-shift mechanisms in our multi-process model also play a part in CONTEXT conceptualizations. The classifications reveal the creation of:

(a) RWs, which transpires in the systematic attempts at inclusion of physical/material contextual elements such as participants and surrounding objects (i.e. in the absence of a 'RW' - 'reality' distinction),

(b) DWs, as evident in the systematic postulation of the importance of abstract contextual elements such as participants' (non-)verbal actions, effects of the verbal action(s), social events, mutual cognitive environments,

(c) TWs, displayed, for instance, through the frequent inclusion of language-related units/ structures (e.g. demonstratives, adverbials, tenses) in the analyses.

However, despite the operation of all three types of Worlds evident in the general scholarly understanding of CONTEXT, to many scholars (e.g. Werth 1999; Gavins 2002, 2007), 'context' is, in all effect, equal to 'DW' only.

Thus, the following section will draw on these generalizations and will turn to a question which seems to have been implied at many points through our discussion: how is one to distinguish among 'DW', 'context', 'communicative situation', 'user-centered parameters', etc.

VI. 5. RW as TW and DW background vs. Context

In continuation to the previous section's conclusion, it seems apt that I start here by reiterating that human cognitive processes/structures do not exist independently of the human mind, and, consequently, human cognitive processes/structures are not stand-alone entities that could be added or not added to scholarly analyses of physical contexts/situational environments. Moreover, human cognitive processes/structures are not stand-alone entities of the same status as all other elements of physical contexts/situational environments. Therefore, simply 'injecting' them into 'contexts' or into 'Worlds' as yet another type of elements that need to be paid attention to seems misguided.

As a consequence, Worlds could not be mixtures or intersections between human cognition and a possibly objectively existing reality which is 'out there' and exists independently of human cognition. Worlds are 'located', to use a common metaphor, within the human mind's eye only and are best seen as simulations (of situational environments) that happen in humans' minds. Thus, Worlds should not be analytically 'added to' or 'injected into' real-life contexts/situations, although, as the chapters in Part II and the previous section here extensively demonstrate, that seems to be the scholarly norm.

With that caveat in mind, against the general theoretical background against which they tend to be used, 'reality', 'setting', 'communicative environment' and 'communicative situation' are taken here to refer to (the possibly objective) physical reality. If a generalization about these terms could be made, albeit a very tentative one, it seems justifiable to repeat our conclusion about the presence of figurative conceptualization in terms of concentric geometrical figures. On the basis of the discussion in VI. 4., we might argue that there is a slim tendency for scholars to view 'setting' as being of narrowest scope and most clearly to evoke physical entities only, 'communicative environment' and 'communicative situation' – as being broader than 'setting' and less likely to evoke physical entities only, and 'reality' – as being

broadest in scope and so 'all embracing' as to subsume 'setting', 'communicative environment' and 'communicative situation', too.

If a generalization of the scholarly notion of 'context' could be made, it would need to take into consideration the following peculiarities:

(a) In the literature, 'context' tends to concern the relationship between two different and separate entities – a unit and its surroundings. From the perspective of the multi-process model, CONTEXT is a conceptual area seen as RELEVANT to a UNIT;

(b) In the literature, 'context' serves to understand better a unit under analysis (e.g. 'context' is used to understand better a text). From the perspective of the multi-process model, CONTEXT exists as a notion due to the cognitive necessity for any ENTITY/UNIT to be profiled against a BACKGROUND. In this, CONTEXT could function similarly to a BACKGROUND, and it would not necessarily donate structure or involve projections to its corresponding FIGURE (e.g. DISCOURSE structures prototypically would not occur as TEXT structures);

(c) In the literature, more frequently 'context' would be seen as part of an objectively existing reality, and, as a consequence, it would be treated as a static entity which includes an unvarying set of consistently important elements. From the perspective of the multi-process model, CONTEXT is a dynamically constructed and ongoingly adapted network of concepts, the elements of which co-function prototypically.

(d) In the literature, the 'size' of a context is fixed and pre-determined. From the perspective of the multi-process model, CONTEXT can involve significant scope variations.

Overall, CONTEXT results from the need for the cognitive mechanism of figure-ground profiling to be enacted for information processing optimality. CONTEXT tends to be

theoretically metaphorized as SURROUNDINGS which do not include and never merge with the UNIT they SURROUND. Similarly to a BACKGROUND, which stands apart from its FIGURE, a CONTEXT stands different from its corresponding UNIT. Rather tellingly, in the case of text- and discourse studies, CONTEXT is not used synonymously with DISCOURSE, which could merge with TEXT. In the literature, 'context' and 'text' are two interrelated but separate entities. It is correspondences between contextual elements and unit elements that are sought and traced by scholars, and not resemblances.

Inherent in such a definition is the answer of whether a CONTEXT and a WORLD can be used synonymously. As already demonstrated in this thesis, Worlds can provide for each other the basis for the operation of figure-background profiling. However, simultaneously, they overlap, coincide, and provide internal-structure projections for each other. In other words, in contrast to a context or a background, a World can function metonymically with its profiled unit. What is more, the role of such a profiled unit can be performed by another World.

Thus, a CONTEXT can 'cut across' two or more Worlds, and accrue from there conceptual elements which are dynamically perceived as relevant to the understanding of a UNIT. A WORLD, then, could function as a CONTEXT if it stands in contrast to a UNIT. This can happen, as demonstrated by examples in our Chapter II, where some of the political speeches are shown to keep a TW and a DW separate, i.e. without overlaps between them.

CHAPTER VII

REAL WORLDS AND SOCIO-POLITICAL THOUGHT: BREXIT

VII. 1. A case in point: Brexit

Brexit, i.e. the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU), has kept many an analyst absorbed for quite some time. The impact of Brexit has been debated from a multitude of angles – financial, political, ethnic, religious, etc. A language-related fact worthy of note is that the term 'Brexit' is believed to have been employed for the first time by Peter Wilding on May 15, 2012 in his *Euractiv* blog post 'Stumbling towards the Brexit' (Wikipedia). Furthermore, 'Brexit' was modeled after 'Grexit', which had been coined half a year earlier (i.e. February 2012) by the Citigroup's economist Rahbari (ibid.). Clearly, 'Grexit', too, had aimed to combine the name of an EU country (i.e. Greece) and the possibility of that country's leaving a structure, or all of the structures, of the Union. The present chapter, however, does not focus on linguistic aspects of 'Brexit'; it offers a cognitive-linguistic perspective on BREXIT, i.e. it investigates the ways in which BREXIT is conceptualized by applying the multi-process model to it.

Beyond doubt, Brexit represents a socio-cultural event of global significance. Leaving an international union of this scale and leaving the EU specifically are first-time occurrences in history. It is precisely the unprecedent-ness of this socio-cultural phenomenon which makes it our point of investigative interest. The choice is conditioned by Part III's central focus on the notion of 'RW', and, in accordance, Chapter VII aims to place conceptualizations of BREXIT into a RW-relevant perspective.

Thus, this chapter investigates BREXIT's originating in an alternative-future-related RW simulation. Simply put, being a first-time historical occurrence, BREXIT could not be argued to have emerged – as most concepts do – from recursive processing of an already existing RW ENTITY. Chronologically, in people's minds, the possibility for Brexit used to be only 'hypothesized', which means BREXIT used to be positioned within a 'projected' or 'hypothetical' future-related RW (Alternatively, it can be argued to represent a separate RW segment; on the possibility for profiling to operate on isolatable World segments see VI. 1.). Then discussions of the possibility of BREXIT came to be repetitively experienced by the public. Such discussions profiled the concept of BREXIT in TWs, and, while doing that, constructed evaluative attitudes towards BREXIT in DWs. Next, a referendum was held on whether the concept should 'become reality'. Only after that did BREXIT become part of present-day RWs (Clearly, for simulation to occur, "experiences of actual category members must become established in long-term memory" [Barsalou 2016: 14]).

From the perspective of the model proposed here, BREXIT is argued to be of special interest due to its representing a fuzzy boundary case as far as the principle of TWs and DWs drawing on RWs is concerned. Even as a fuzzy boundary case, or perhaps precisely because of that, BREXIT presents us with is a possibility to re-confirm our claim in Chapter VI that a TW and a DW invariably draw on a RW, which is a major objective of this chapter.

Another objective is for this chapter to further develop the conclusions drawn in Chapter VI about the possibility for multiple Worlds of the same type (i.e. TW, DW and RW) to overlap: Chapter VII will try and demonstrate how a hypothesized (segment of a) RW and a present-day (segment of a) RW can overlap to 'bring' a concept 'into reality'. The third objective is to advance our understanding of the ways in which a DW and a RW can overlap, and thus pave the way for our next discussion in Chapter VIII.

The RW specificity of BREXIT's evolution as a concept is complicated by BREXIT's representing an abstract notion, which may raise impediments before our specifying the concept's World status (on the issue of abstract notion comprehension see, e.g., Borghi 2020; Lievers et al. 2021; Werkmann Horvat et al. 2022; Villani et al. 2022; Paoletti et al. 2022). Clearly, a technical invention, which, arguably, also originates first in a future-related RW and only then becomes 'part of' a present-day RW, would be more readily conceptualized as 'real' due to the invention's physical form. Nonetheless, the present argument holds that both a concrete and an abstract notion can exemplify the World overlap principle (on the scalar nature of abstraction and concreteness see, e.g., Barsalou et al. 2018; Bolognesi et al. 2020).

Another impediment before this investigation derives from the fact that, BREXIT, unlike the concepts explored in Part I (i.e. POLITICAL SPEECH and TEXT STRUCTURE), is not language-knowledge-related. In other words, BREXIT, being a socio-cultural concept does not employ an additional, simultaneous, language-related 'layer' of metaphorization, metonymization and World profiling mechanisms. That, in its turn, strongly suggests BREXIT-related language use could not be as yielding as an access point to BREXIT, at least not as it was in the case of POLITICAL SPEECH and TEXT STRUCTURE.

With a full view of these impediments, this chapter will attempt to:

(a) support an argument from Chapter VI – the argument that a TW and a DW invariably draw on a RW, even if the RW is not a representation of present-day 'reality' but a simulation of an alternative-future-related 'reality';

(b) confirm the possibility of the simultaneous operation and overlaps of more than one RW at a time through an individual's cognitive evolution;

(c) explore and provide information specifically on BREXIT as a newly-emergent concept of global socio-cultural impact.

With a view of those objectives, this chapter focuses on the first 4 days after the referendum (i.e. June, 23rd 2016, on which a national referendum on the UK's leaving the EU was held, and the following 3 days). Those were the days on which Brexit transited from a purely hypothetical notion towards an actual possibility.

Verification of the importance of those days as a "transformative" period (Krzyżanowski 2019) could be observed in the steep spike in Google searches from the UK on the issue of what 'Brexit' actually 'means' (Internet source 5). The spike amounted to a Google-reported 250% increase within the first hour after the referendum results were announced, and to a more than 400% increase in the next 3 days. Thus, on those days, BREXIT exemplified a concept 'transitioning' from a future-related RW into a present-day RW, and, as the present hypothesis runs, it did so via DWs.

As to the duration of the evolution and the 'transitioning' of the concept, one needs to note that even prior to the 2016 referendum, the place of the UK in the EU had never been indubitable. In the 46 years of its membership, the UK had not been overwhelmingly conceptualized as belonging 'in'. As any survey will confirm, no less frequent are conceptualizations of the UK as being 'in a relationship' with the EU, which, clearly, implies a 'stand-alone', 'outside' position. Moreover, the UK-EU 'relationship' displayed a tendency for being categorized as 'special, 'ambiguous', 'complicated', 'awkward', etc. (see e.g. Wodak 2016; de Burca 2018; Black 2019; Koller et al. 2019; Matrisciano 2022). Such evaluations and conceptual metaphorizations have been evident on the part of both the UK and other European countries (Hanhimäki 2016; Adler-Nissen et al. 2017).

Moreover, this bilateral ambiguity has its roots stretching back to WWII (Black 2019). For instance, Winston Churchill, in his Zurich speech on an 'United States of Europe', excluded the UK from the project he ardently proposed. Expressing a continental perspective, in 1963 and 1967, French President de Gaulle vetoed twice the UK's attempts to join the European

Economic Community. Overall, since the very beginning, there have been strong voices in both the UK and continental Europe who opposed the UK's entering the Community.

That event did take place in 1973, despite the internal splits over the decision, splits that ran deep both within parties and UK society. Moreover, as many have declared, the UK's "[j]oining the EEC was a pragmatic economic choice and not an indication of any commitment to greater political unity with 'continental' Europe" (de Burca 2018). To test the joining decision, a referendum was held a mere 2 years later (i.e. 1975), asking the British whether they believed the UK really belonged with the continent. At that first referendum, 67% voted Remain. However, subsequently, the UK resisted further integration: it did not adopt the euro, nor the Schengen provisions. Instead, the UK persevered in its 'semi-detachment' from the EU (Black 2019) and with its Euroscepticism (Alexandre-Collier 2015; Adler-Nissen 2016; Zappettini 2018).

The important point here is that, in many ways, long before the 2016 referendum, UK citizens had been familiar with the 'hypothetical' notion of leaving the EU. As Zappettini and Krzyżanowski (2019) maintain, before 2016, the notion had already been in the process of 'bringing into life' its own 'real-world referent'. Importantly, before the referendum, the "evidently elusive concept" of BREXIT (Krzynowski 2019: 2) used to be characterized by what Krzynowski calls "an outright empty signifier", while reasoning about an exit from the EU "to a large extent boiled down to a presentation of, and competition between, various imaginaries" (ibid.; emphasis mine). In sum, it was after a considerable time span that, following the 2016 referendum, BREXIT'S evolution entered a radically different phase.

Another socio-cultural fact of special prominence as far as DW-related attitudes and stereotypes are concerned is that the 2016 referendum decision did not enjoy substantial domestic agreement. The referendum results announced only a 51.9 % pro-Leave vs. 48.1 % pro-Remain difference between the two stances represented at the poll. In reality, that difference

stands for less than 2 % of the votes cast. In confirmation of how small the gap between Leave and Remain was, in the first post-referendum days, numerous media (e.g. *the BBC, CNN, The Guardian, The Telegraph, The Independent*) carried interviews and Twitter messages by 'Leave' voters who had not believed their vote 'would actually count' and were subsequently worried by the unexpected success of the contributions they made. Voices in the media would also propose the way the public voted at the referendum did not actually reflect a lasting political and social preference; instead, there was the possibility that the referendum results were only an anti-system declaration not intended to lead to a 'real Brexit'.

Whether or not those media accounts were truly representative of the social situation, more than three years later, the desire to reverse the Brexit decision still thrived. Any review of the British media from November 2017 to November 2019 registered an increase of opinions trying to propel a reversal. What is more, 2017, 2018 and 2019 opinion polls claimed that 'up until May 2017, Remain had never been ahead of Leave. However, subsequently, Remain have never been behind. That would seem to suggest there might well have been a small swing in favour of Remain' (Internet source 6). What is in focus here is that, regardless of which of the two alternatives prevailed, polls consistently registered a less than 2 % difference between the two Brexit stances (ibid.). Based on the evidence, it seems safe to generalize that the pro- and against-Brexit UK political attitudes were on a relative par for almost four years. This peculiarity also needs to be reflected in the dataset used for the present analysis (discussed in the next section).

Another factor conditioning the parameters of the dataset concerns the specific DW-RW overlap through which the BREXIT transited from the future-related RW simulation into the present-day one. As the overview of the transition of the concept presented above demonstrates, discussions of BREXIT, especially public mediated discourse, contributed significantly to the notion's becoming part of the present-day RW. Hence the heightened salience of TWs and DWs

as to the construction of BREXIT. Hence also the role of public political discourse, and public and social media in achieving the DW-RW overlap which facilitated the ensuing RW-RW overlap and transition.

Apart from the radical spike in Internet searches as to 'what Brexit means', the first post-referendum days also witnessed a soundbite addressing the issue. In her first speech as UK Prime Minister (July 13th 2016), Theresa May declared her belief in a future 'hard Brexit' through her rhetorically forceful "Brexit means Brexit". PM May's expression starting with *Brexit means…* evokes an expectation of a reformulation to follow. The semantics of the verb *mean* imply one thing is being represented as another. In other words, the *Brexit means…* beginning strongly suggests the possibility for conceptual metaphor to control what appears after.

In reality, May flouts that expectation and thus creates a memorable – even if not universally embraced – quote. Admittedly, requiring conceptual metaphoric transfer be enacted in the rest of that sentence means interpreting the utterance a touch too literally. It would be hard to deny it is precisely May's avoidance of metaphoric conceptual transfer that creates the sense of irreversibility the message conveys so directly.

Unlike Theresa May, only a few days earlier, Jean-Claude Juncker, the then President of the EU Commission, had stated that he did not expect an 'amicable divorce' between the UK and the EU as the relationship had "never been a tight love affair anyway" (Internet source 7). Adopting a continental EU viewpoint, President Juncker had not shied away from conceptualizing BREXIT metaphorically as a DIVORCE. Many similar instances suggest BREXIT's TW-DW-RW operation needs to be studied contrastively as far as UK vs. non-UK EU differences are concerned.

The conclusion is supported by research such as Clarke et al. (2017), which analyzes data collected just before and immediately after the poll, and traces motivations behind the vote.

In doing that, Clarke et al. do not discuss exclusively the UK viewpoint but also support their findings by data obtained from other European countries. Their analysis establishes significant differences in the EU attitudes of citizens on either side of the Channel.

Media-induced differences in BREXIT attitudes are also the object of interest in Adler-Nissen (2016), who compares UK and Danish newspapers' 2015 coverage of what she calls each country's 'euro-outsiderness'. Adler-Nissen employs an evaluative approach to the UK articles in her dataset and sees each as characterizing the UK's outsiderness as predominantly positive, negative or neutral. On that basis, she establishes that 46% of the articles present the UK's outsiderness as positive, 29% – as neutral, and only 25% – as negative (2016: 240). Moreover, Adler-Nissen concludes, 'contrary to voters in other euro-outsider states, British voters are presented with euro-outsiderness as merely a pragmatic solution' (ibid.: 246). The present investigation follows Adler-Nissen et al. (2017) in their claim that "[w]hile it is important to analyse how rival imaginings give rise to particular forms of political contestation in the United Kingdom, it is also the case that Brexit is constructed and imagined from the outside" (2017: 573-4).

In another comparative, media-centered and Brexit-related investigation of differences between the UK and continental EU states (i.e. Austria, Germany, Poland and Sweden), Krzyżanowski maintains that "in the UK itself the 'Brexiteers' and other supporters of Brexit – including, unfortunately, a significant part of the UK media – were strategically downplaying the critical nature of UK's eventual decision to leave the EU" (2019: 3). In contrast, in continental Europe,

> both liberal and conservative European press recognised a far-reaching, negative and indeed critical impact of the Brexit vote and considered its importance as crisis within an array of dimensions that were UK-specific, international and European. […] They all formed a specific semantic field of the 'Brexit' concept as attached to various formats

> and dimensions of ‘crisis’ in the studied discourses nested within both wider and nationally-specific tendencies in reporting crisis and its implications for politics, society and the economy. (Krzyżanowski 2019: 23)

Overall, the historical background behind BREXIT suggests any dataset used for the purpose of our investigation needs to reflect:

(a) the presence of all-European metaphorizations of Brexit,

(b) differences between conceptualizations in the UK and continental EU,

(c) the evaluative nature and attitudinal bias of the public discourse on BREXIT in the UK.

Alternatively, three sub-datasets could be delineated to separately serve each purpose.

VII. 2. Theoretical background specifics

Several theoretical issues need to be disambiguated before the dataset and analysis are presented in this chapter. One of them is the difference between 'a metaphoric set' and 'a complex metaphor'. From the viewpoint of CMT, in metaphoric transfer, more than one domain can function as a source when adding conceptual structure to a target. Furthermore, one and the same source domain can donate conceptual structure to multiple target domains. The result is a whole set of "alternative ways of thinking" (Fauconnier 1997: 20) about a target domain. That phenomenon is also discussed by Lakoff and Johnson as "metaphorical pluralism" (1999: 70). Critically, the metaphors within such a pluralistic set need not be directly interconnected and need not derive from a single domain.

Illustrations of that principle would be the absence of systematic coherence between, for instance, THE EU IS A CYBERNETIC DEVICE and THE EU IS A FAMILY metaphors appearing in our dataset and reported below. Another illustration can be found in the available possibilities for metaphorizing a STATE. One option would be to employ conceptual transfer from the source domain of the HUMAN BODY (e.g., Musolff 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022; Tincheva 2014). That mapping is observable in linguistic units such as *head of state*. Another option would be to employ the STATE IS A PERSON metaphor (see e.g. Chilton 1996, Charteris-Black 2005, Kimmel 2005) as in, for instance, *Germany is angry with the UK* and *Scotland's neighbours* in our dataset. Still other alternatives would be to use CONTAINER as a source domain (Hart 2005) or even a CYBERNETIC DEVICE (Ringmar 2008).

Similarly, as research has demonstrated (e.g. Musolff 2017; Walter and Helmig 2008; Ishpekova 2012), the EU tends to be conceptualized metaphorically as a BODY (as in [*Brexit*] *is just an amputation, not a death blow to the union*), a PERSON (as in [*Brexit*] *will kill off the EU)*, a common HOUSE (as in …*the house we share with 27 other countries*), and a FAMILY (as in *the divorce is being negotiated*). One, however, would find it rather difficult if, for some

reason, required to imagine either a STATE or the whole EUROPEAN UNION as, let's say, RAIN or a HILL. Such conceptual transfer would not cohere with any of the metaphors in the existing set, nor would it cohere with their entailments the way, for instance, the STATE IS A BODY and the STATE IS A PERSON successfully do.

In contrast, an internally coherent cluster of metaphors would constitute 'a complex metaphor' (Grady 1996) and not a 'set of metaphors'. The LIFE IS A JOURNEY complex metaphor (see the discussion in II. 3. 1.), for example, brands a person as 'lost', 'without direction' and 'not knowing which way to turn', if that person does not instill a sense of PURPOSE in their life. This complex metaphor runs as follows: out of the two primary metaphors PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS and ACTIONS ARE MOTIONS, there arises the complex metaphor A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY, which includes the sub-metaphors of A PERSON LIVING A LIFE IS A TRAVELLER; LIFE GOALS ARE DESTINATIONS; A LIFE PLAN IS AN ITINERARY (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 61). The present dataset also displays a high frequency of uses of this metaphor applied to the domain of POLITICS (e.g. *…the British people have made a very clear decision to take a different path*).

Importantly, the present study does not aim to argue a case for an existing complex BREXIT metaphor. The main objective here is to isolate a pluralistic set of BREXIT mappings, in which each metaphor could be either simple or complex. Admittedly, no matter whether simple or complex, a metaphorization really tends to co-activate associatively additional cognitive structures in both the source and target domains. Such co-recurring conventionalized stereotypical combinations of conceptual elements are frequently discussed in the literature as 'metaphoric scenarios'.

Acknowledging influences by Fillmore's (1975) 'scenes', Putnam's (1975) 'stereotypes', and Lakoff's 'scenarios' (Lakoff, it should be noted, defines them [1987: 285–286] as a subtype of what he calls Idealized Cognitive Models structured by a SOURCE–

PATH–GOAL schema), Musolff (2006: 24) defines a metaphoric scenario as "a specific subdomain category" which has the potential to be selected as a source in metaphoric transfer. Musolff exemplifies his idea of such a domain as a conceptual space allowing for domain-internal conceptual overlaps and variation such as ECONOMY–BUSINESS, GAMES–SPORTS, LIFE–HEALTH–STRENGTH, LOVE–MARRIAGE–FAMILY, NATURE–WEATHER, PERFORMANCE–SHOW, WAR–FORTRESS–BATTLE (2006: 26).

Due to such intra-domain overlaps, activating a scenario can co-activate "a whole hierarchy of more general mappings (e.g., at a superordinate level, A NATION STATE IS A PERSON and the knowledge that leaders of states can metonymically represent their countries (hence the exchangeability of politicians' proper names and names of states in the examples)" (Musolff 2006: 24). Clearly, such an interpretation suggests the crucial role played by metaphtonymy in scenarios' operation; unfortunately, Musolff stops short of such a generalization. The present investigation openly acknowledges the joint functioning of conceptual metaphor and conceptual metonymy in scenario mappings and aims to demonstrate they can also take place from one World to another.

A characteristic feature of metaphorizations is that mapping a scenario can involve contrastive evaluations of the conceptualizations involved. Lakoff (2004) demonstrates the principle in his discussion of the A NATION IS A FAMILY metaphor's operation in U.S. politics, where the same metaphor evokes two contrasting scenarios – a STRICT FATHER scenario and a NURTURING FATHER scenario. Clearly, although both drawing on the FAMILY domain, each scenario evokes different sets of beliefs and general social attitudes.

Other characteristics which need a special comment here concern the discursive functions of scenarios used to characterize political attitudes specifically. As a rule, text users "are not only provided with a general schematic frame to understand the order of events and a few causal links between them, but rather with a whole little scene, complete with the presumed

"interests" and "biases" on the part of the participants and an evaluative interpretation" (Musolff 2006: 27). Accordingly, the dataset organization and the subsequent analysis presented here will need to include information on the evaluative use of scenarios in DWs.

The dataset organization and the subsequent analysis presented here will also need to include information on overall frequencies of source domain use in metaphoric BREXIT conceptualizations. As Musolff (2006: 28) maintains, scenarios "appear to dominate public discourse not just in terms of overall frequency but also in that they help to shape the course of public debates and conceptualizations of political target topics by framing the attitudinal and evaluative preferences in the respective discourse communities". Truly, the discourse functions and strategic uses of conceptual metaphorizations have been increasingly attracting scholarly attention (see, e.g. Vereza 2021; Pilgram and van Poppel 2021; Rossi and Macagno 2021), and the present study will try and contribute to this body of scholarly works.

Thus placing metaphoric scenarios within the context of TWs and DWs, one needs to distinguish, as Vereza (2021) does, between conceptual-system metaphors (termed by her 'off-line' metaphors) and locally situated episodic conceptualizations (termed by her 'on-line' metaphors). Kövecses (2010, 2020a, 2020b), too, distinguishes between conventionalized, general-knowledge metaphors and individual, online metaphorizations. The present investigation seeks to isolate 'online' BREXIT metaphoric conceptualizations with a view of predicting their subsequent becoming conventionalized, 'offline' BREXIT metaphoric conceptualizations.

The previous point concerns the evolution of metaphoric conceptualizations and relates to the Career of metaphor hypothesis. As put forward by Bowdle and Gentner (2005), the Career of metaphor theory addresses the psycholinguistic difference between novel and conventional metaphors. It manages a balancing act between the argument surrounding the neurobiological existence of that difference (see e.g., Coulson and Oakley 2005; Rapp et al. 2007) and the

argument surrounding the difference between conceptual metaphors and similes (see e.g., Gentner and Bowdle 2008; Glucksberg 2003, 2008; Dulcinati et al. 2014). Put extremely briefly, analyses connected to the Career of metaphor approach demonstrate that when a metaphoric transfer is novel, it is processed cognitively as a comparison, and when a metaphoric transfer becomes conventionalized, it is processed as an act of categorization.

The understanding upheld here follows the Career of metaphor interpretation that both those stages of the same process rely on metaphoric mappings, and that fact need not necessarily represent a theoretical conflict. After all, human- and humanities-related phenomena have been demonstrated to be susceptible to principles of prototypology (discussed in Chapter II), which allow for peripheral uses to diverge significantly from central cases. So far, I have been unable to locate in the literature any conclusive neurobiological and/ or experimental evidence as to why metaphorization need not be approached from the viewpoint of prototypology. On the contrary, support for this view is lent by neurobiological results as in, for instance, Benedek *et al*. (2014). Diachronic approaches (Bowdle and Gentner 2005; Wodak 2014), which correlate socio-cultural factors to the sometimes chance turns a metaphor's evolution may take, also support an interpretation such as this. Studies on 'discourse careers' (e.g. Musolff 2017) and 're-framing' of metaphors (Musolff 2019), cohering with what Krzyżanowski (2019), from a CDS perspective, calls 'recontextualization', have also established conceptual evolution can experience course changes "through continuous reinvention in non-conventional uses" (Musolff 2017: 649).

Last but not least, this section needs to pay attention to already existing research on metaphoric BREXIT conceptualization. Generally, researchers agree that "[t]he overall socio-political milieu before and particularly after the referendum has given rise to a proliferation of media texts which have dealt with various impacts of the outcome in a highly figurative manner" (Đurović and Silaški 2018: 26). Researchers also unite around the BREXIT source

domains encountered before the 2016 referendum: DIVORCE, FIGHTING/WAR, JOURNEY, NATURAL DISASTER, GAME (BOXING, CARDS) (Musolff 2017; Morozova 2017; Charteris-Black 2019).

However, each study explores only one particular (aspect of) Brexit metaphorization. Đurović and Silaški (2018), for instance, analyze evidence of BREXIT IS DIVORCE in 2016 media texts. Morozova (2017) focuses on different modalities of metaphorization in the first 1 ½ year after the referendum. Musolff (2017) explores the career of the HEART OF EUROPE metaphor in the 25-year period before the Brexit poll. All these studies can be summarized to display a preference for qualitative analysis, while the present investigation offers quantitative analysis of metaphoric BREXIT conceptualizations.

Another difference between the investigations cited above and the one presented here is the period of social dynamics selected for analysis. Đurović and Silaški (2018), for instance, focus on BREXIT IS DIVORCE metaphors appearing in the media throughout 2016. Morozova (2017) chooses the first year and a half after the referendum for her analysis of Brexit metaphorizations of different modalities. Musolff (2017) prefers the much broader perspective of the 25-year period leading up to the Brexit referendum.

As argued in VII.1. above, the present investigation focuses exclusively on the first post-referendum days, and bases that choice on socio-cognitive reasons.

VII. 3. Data source selection

Several factors conditioned the selection of text sources for the dataset. The first factor is the existence of numerous statistics-based extensive reports and analyses on how UK media covered the Brexit referendum both prior to the vote and succeeding it (see, e.g., Loughborough University's Centre for Research in Communication and Culture's report and the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism's report [Internet source 8 and 9 respectively]). Such statistical reports provide wide-ranging information along parameters such as printed vs. online editions, desktop vs. mobile readership, general Brexit stances and media ownership, etc. However, there is no statistical information available as to the top online media preferred by European and UK audiences specifically on the topic of Brexit and specifically around the time of the referendum. Furthermore, even if there were a corpus measuring audience exposure precisely on the topic of Brexit, it would have to reflect the prototypical functioning of several factors and the resulting audiences overlaps in consumption (see Mukerjee et al. 2018).

Therefore, to obtain data which is well-focused on audience preferences on the topic of BREXIT, the present investigation has to cross-check information from two different types of sources. The first type of information source requires generalized data from the available statistical sources be correlated. That statistical data concerns the readership of major online media (i.e. both desktop and mobile outlets) around the time of the referendum.

The choice of online media specifically is prompted by the spike in 'Brexit' Google searches reported in VI. 1.above, which strongly supports reports claiming that, on the issue of Brexit, most UK citizens and non-UK citizens resorted to online-supplied information. In this, it should be borne in mind that online media use demonstrates not only the fastest growing general spread but also the fastest slump in trust (e.g. Newman et al. 2017; Kalogeropoulos et al. 2017, 2019). Therefore, our dataset needs to locate a meeting point between online media of greatest reach and most trusted online media in the UK and in continental EU. Crucially, a third

variable would also require inclusion: the one concerning media trust on political issues specifically.

Thus, the selection of media for our dataset rests on the 2016 Reuters Institute Digital News Report, which also incorporates findings by YouGov, Ofcom, etc. (Newman et al. 2017). It is a report that covers three major parameters: general circulation, overall trust, and trust on political issues. Five separate sources of different social background were selected and correlated for the purpose (Internet sources 10-14) in order to avoid possible biases in the reports themselves.

The second type of information source I employ for the purposes of this chapter is a survey I conducted within the first two weeks after the Brexit referendum. That survey probes 60 respondents (Tincheva 2019a) on the online media outlets they used most frequently around the time of the referendum specifically on the topic of Brexit. The survey was meant to trace the main characteristics of a broader European perspective on the Brexit process, which embraces both UK viewpoints and continental ones.

That survey focuses on English-language online media and their influence. It includes 40 EU respondents. In terms of nationality, 20 of the respondents are British and 20 (non-native speakers) represent various EU cultural backgrounds (4 are German, 4 – Austrian, 3 – French, 3 – Slovenian, 3 – Bulgarian, 2 – Swedish, 1 – Greek). In terms of educational status, 20 of the respondents hold higher education degrees (3 of them are holders of Ph.D. degrees, and 18 – of Master's degrees) and 20 have no higher education degree. 4 of the Master's degrees are in engineering, 5 – in economics, 11 – in the humanities. In terms of gender, 20 respondents are female and 20 are male. In terms of age, the youngest respondent is 21 and the oldest one is 63. As far as the decision to include 20 British and 20 non-British EU respondents is concerned, that decision was prompted by the fact that Brexit is not a purely domestic issue relating to one EU country only. On the contrary, Brexit could be argued to be especially salient precisely due

to its all-EU significance. Nevertheless, not the whole EU population had a legal political say on the matter of Brexit, as only British citizens had the right to vote on it. Hence our survey includes equal numbers of EU citizens who had the right to vote on Brexit and EU citizens who did not have the right to vote on Brexit.

Clearly, UK media outlets were expected to be especially prominent in the respondents' answers in the survey. First, it is UK media that are most likely to provide insiders' views in their reporting and analysis of Brexit. Second, the global role of English as a lingua franca could not be underestimated. As Sharifian maintains, English is increasingly adopted by a growing multitude of communities in their expressing their own cultural conceptualizations (see e.g. Sharifian 2013, 2018). Hence the survey I conducted focuses on English-language media. Its purpose is to identify which of the English-language outlets generally available were actually preferred on the issue of BREXIT.

In that survey, each respondent was asked to name the top English-language online source he or she preferred in acquiring information about Brexit during the first 4 days after the referendum. The objective was to rank the top 10 English-language online sources which served to shape public opinions on those milestone days. However, the respondents were also invited to provide comments or additional information they perceived as relevant. The majority of the respondents did not restrict their input only to answering the main question. Out of the 40 respondents, 29 reported they checked more than two sources every day. 17 respondents reported they deliberately tried to acquaint themselves with opposing perspectives and arguments. 4 participants reported they did not deliberately look for multiple sources but read several random pieces a day. Those were pieces they could access most quickly and easily. Only 3 participants proved settled and unvarying in their media choices (all 3 were representatives of the older generation). None of the respondents reported they used more than 5 outlets on the topic over the period. In sum, in ranking the top 10 English-language EU online

sources, all respondents' preferences and not just their first choices were registered as equally valid. Two of the media sources, however, had to be excluded later on account of the second main consideration in our dataset material selection.

That second consideration was the necessity to establish the general pro- or against-Leave orientation of each source. That task, however, proved far from easily attainable. Two studies on UK newspaper editions confirm the difficulties in establishing a media outlet's Brexit stance. The first study was conducted by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. It analyzes a total of 1,127 news stories published by ten UK daily papers within the four months leading up to the Brexit poll (Internet source 9). Those newspapers were reported to account for more than 82% of the national daily newspaper readership. The second study was conducted by Loughborough University's Centre for Research in Communication and Culture and was part of a broader 'news audit' of all pro-Remain and pro-Leave reporting in the UK (Internet source 8).

Both studies conclude the topic of Brexit does not translate directly into standard left vs. right press orientation. Nor does it translate directly into classifications such as 'popular' (e.g. The Sun and The Daily Mail), 'mid-sector' (e.g. the Daily Mail and The Daily Express) and 'quality' (e.g. The Guardian and The Times). Second, the studies demonstrate media ownership is also unreliable in tracing Brexit orientation as, for instance, Murdoch-owned The Sun backed Brexit and Murdoch-owned The Times supported Remain. Wavering Brexit stances were also a challenging issue: according to the surveys, The Times, to name one of many, had publicly declared support for Remain but in the final week of campaigning published a greater number of pro-Leave articles than pro-Remain ones. Crucially, as confirmed by both surveys, 100 % of the newspapers, regardless of their general stance, reported both pro- and against-Leave arguments and did not advance arguments favoring only one choice. Overall, the

combined influence of all these factors led to the present conclusion that prototypological principles need to be applied to the analysis of media sources' Brexit stances.

Hence, in selecting dataset-relevant media outlets, the present investigation did not embrace the idea of a polar opposition between Leave and Remain. The notion of a scale was employed instead, which led to a more finely graded view on media orientation. Four major scale areas (i.e. pro-Remain, neutral with a pro-Remain leaning, neutral with a pro-Leave leaning, pro-Leave) were profiled, and a pair of sources were selected to represent each. If a third media outlet was added to the list by the respondents in the survey, then the source was dropped to keep Brexit stances as proportionately represented as possible.

Eight media were thus selected out of the original top 10: The Guardian and The Times; the BBC and Deutsche Welle; Euronews and The Independent; The Telegraph and The Daily Mail (rated here from predominantly pro-Remain to predominantly pro-Leave). Those constitute the online media sources for our first sub-dataset.

The online media sources in the second sub-dataset were separated into two groups. The UK sources include: the BBC, The Daily Mail, The Guardian, The Telegraph. The English-language online media sources in the continental group are: the BBC, Reuters, Deutsche Welle, Euronews. The number of media draws on the respondents' declaring (ibid.) they would typically use more than a single but fewer than 5 outlets a day to keep informed on Brexit. The inclusion of the BBC in both groups reflects the increasing global impact of both national and international media. (For the last decade, the BBC has been even reported as the most trusted network in the USA [see e.g. Internet source 14]).

The third sub-dataset is abstracted from five major UK online media. The outcome of the classification procedure led to the selection of the online editions of the following media outlets: The Guardian; the BBC; The Independent; The Daily Telegraph and The Daily Mail (rated here from predominantly pro-Remain to predominantly pro-Leave).

Overall, the data selection principles applied in this investigation cohere with a DW approach which adopts the viewpoint of the text receiver. The present analysis does not aim to establish how objective or how biased certain media were in the first post-referendum days, nor does it aim to establish if there existed metaphor trends in the pro- or anti-Brexit camps. What is investigated is the pool of available metaphors which the readers of the major English-language EU online media were actually exposed to. Exactly how many metaphors each respondent encountered and absorbed, or what portion of the available metaphors each respondent was socially influenced by are issues beyond the verification potential of this investigation. What this paper can confirm is that it registers the English-language metaphors in circulation on the first post-referendum days and that it registers them the way they were used in the top media sources listed above. The present study views those metaphors from the perspective of the text receivers' exposure to them.

VII. 4. Analytical procedures

To extract all relevant samples from the sources, first, general searches for texts and videos containing the word *Brexit* were conducted on each of the sites selected for inclusion in the study. The only query was the word *Brexit* since the study tries to encompass all source domains on which BREXIT might be drawing and does not aim at testing the presence of any specific source domain.

Following the considerations discussed in the VII. 1.and VII. 2., the texts extracted through the general searches were organized into three sub-datasets. The texts retrieved for the first sub-dataset (which is aimed at accounting for all-EU metaphorizations of BREXIT) were of a total size of 55,000 words roughly. The texts retrieved for the second sub-dataset (aimed at accounting for UK vs. non-UK EU metaphorizations of BREXIT) were of a total size of 42,500 words roughly. The texts retrieved for the third sub-dataset (aimed at accounting for UK metaphorizations of BREXIT) were of a total size of 23,000 words roughly.

The dataset texts were then analyzed for content individually with a view of isolating all linguistic structures referring to BREXIT. The analysis was conducted manually, following previous studies (e.g., Deignan 2005; Stefanowitsch 2006), where the search term is taken to stand for the target domain, while a subsequent manual search in the texts locates metaphoric linguistic expressions or ones occurring in proximity to any non-literal uses. Linguistic expressions were isolated for subsequent analysis as long as they (1) referred to BREXIT, and (2) characterized one or more aspects of it (as in Musolff 2006, 2017). The size and type of the linguistic structures were not considered of significance, i.e. words, phrases, clauses, etc. were seen as equally qualified for analysis as long as their referent was BREXIT and their function was to characterize at least one aspect of the concept.

This search was conducted with the full understanding that any manual procedure bears a risk of error. However, any literature review will reveal manual searches are still very much

the method of the day, despite the fact that automatic metaphor identification methods have made strides (e.g., Neuman et al. 2013 report a 71% average precision of metaphor retrieval). To narrow the margin of error in the manual annotation, a re-scan of the dataset was conducted about four months after the original metaphor identification. The objective was to verify the accuracy of the first-scan results.

The next step was to test each extracted text segment for metaphorization. The notion of 'metaphoric segment' was employed here to help account systematically for (a) instances of a single metaphor use, (b) instances of extended metaphors, and (c) instances of the so-called mixed metaphors. The testing procedure applied to any of those types of (potentially) metaphoric segments followed basic analysis principles of the Metaphor Identification Procedure (proposed by the Pragglejaz Group in 2007), or MIP, and, more specifically, its advanced version of MIPVU (Steen et al. 2010 a, b; Nacey et al. 2019).

Generally, that procedure relies on a sequence of steps which lead to the validation or refutation of the metaphoric nature of a linguistic structure. Succinctly put, the contextual meaning of the linguistic structure is first established and then that meaning is contrasted with the unit's basic dictionary definition. The decision of whether a use was literal or not was based on the linguistic unit's contextual sense in contrast/comparison to its dictionary meaning (in MIP, the Macmillan Dictionary is preferred for reference purposes).

Unlike the 'classic' version of MIP, however, the present analysis accepts the possibility for the conceptual process of metaphorization to be evident in linguistic segments longer than a single word. Such a choice allows us not to focus disproportionately on issues concerning, for instance, uncertainties in the classification of linguistic units such as phrasal verbs, on uncertainties in the classification of examples deriving diachronically from conceptual metaphorization, or on uncertainties in the classification of examples associating with what Cameron terms 'nesting of groups within groups' (1999). Admittedly, on the surface, such a

treatment of metaphor may seem less rigorous. Nevertheless, such a treatment is one allowing for the principles of prototypology to be fully operative in conceptual metaphor use the same way they are in research in, practically, all of the humanities (as discussed in Chapters I and II). In brief, it is my conviction that accepting principles of prototypology into CMT analysis reflects more adequately the existence not only of typical, unambiguous uses, but also of borderline cases.

Thus, the analytical steps opted for here bear considerable resemblance to yet another alternative of the MIP procedure, namely PIMS (Procedure for Identifying Metaphorical Scenes). Developed by Johansson Falck (2018), and Johansson Falck and Okonski (2022), the PIMS procedure builds upon what Johansson Falck (2018) calls 'lexico-encyclopedic conceptual [LEC] metaphors' by integrating them with Barsalou's (e.g. 2006, 2008) simulational viewpoint on language use. PIMS analysis "starts out from analysis of the scenes evoked by texts", i.e. it identifies the scenes "evoked by the linguistic constructions under analysis and whether or not the elements of scenes or scenes evoked can only be directly understood or if a metaphorical understanding is possible" (Johansson Falck and Okonski 2022: 303). In terms of procedural steps, PIMS is rather flexible and adaptable to a variety of investigative objects and objectives:

> What comprises a relevant scene or what elements of a scene are relevant depends on the aim and the research questions of the study. The first step of PIMS thus involves establishing what type of scene and what types of elements are relevant to the aim and purpose of the study at hand. Researchers who use PIMS will need to adapt it to fit within their research context and their research questions and to provide transparent descriptions of the scope of the scenes that they focus on in their analysis. (Johansson Falck and Okonski 2022: 304)

Clearly, such an approach is highly compatible with Musolff's treatment of metaphoric scenarios discussed in the previous section.

The next step in the present investigation had each metaphoric expression classified in accordance with the source domain its underlying conceptual transfer employed. On that basis, in the following procedural step, the total number of uses of each source domain was calculated. The main aim was to trace existing tendencies in the ongoing, day-by-day conceptualization of BREXIT on each day of the 4-day period analyzed.

In terms of the type-token distinction (Charteris-Black, 2005), what was counted was each time a source domain was used regardless of whether a linguistic expression revealing that particular conceptual transfer appeared for the first time or not. Thus, within a metaphoric segment, each overt linguistic expression of a metaphorization processes was counted separately. For instance, in the metaphoric segment from our dataset stating that *As the dust settles on the EU referendum war, some 33 million voters await with bated breath to see what the victors will do,* both *war* and *victors* register as separate manifestations of conceptual transfer from the domain of BATTLE.

This principle is also applied in accounting for dataset metaphoric segments such as the one stating that Brexit is *…an amputation, not a death blow*, in which there are also two metaphoric uses registered. Both the uses of *amputation* and *death blow* can be argued to derive from a broader domain such as A (KILLING) BLOW (TO EUROPE), although the transfer may be less evident than the transfer from the BATTLE domain in our previous example. Following Musolff's analyses (discussed in VII.3.above), both uses are seen here as associated with a common general domain, although not with all its (overlapping) sub-domains. In contrast, in the metaphoric segment from our dataset which states that *Brexit will be either a wake-up call or the beginning of a dangerous path for European people*, there are two

metaphors and two metaphor sources registered: A WAKE-UP CALL and PART OF A JOURNEY.

The logic behind this analytical choice rests on the premise that frequency of a text receiver's encountering a metaphor is crucial for the manipulative, subconscious and – what Lakoff and Turner call – 'automatic' operation of the respective metaphor (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 129). As it is one of the objectives of the present analysis to provide a snapshot of the BREXIT metaphors UK media users were exposed to, the analysis registers any metaphoric instance in circulation on the first post-referendum days. How many of the metaphors encountered were actually absorbed and socially acted upon by the public are issues which, regrettably, lie beyond the verification potential of the present thesis. Nonetheless, as argued above, the present dataset is meant to enable an analysis from the viewpoint of the text receiver, and, consequently, frequency of metaphor reinforcement through recurrence is a crucial analytical issue here.

A last point that may need procedural clarification concerns the paper's objective of establishing the evaluative (i.e. positive, neutral or negative) characterization of BREXIT. The present criteria for rating a source domain as negative, neutral or positive associate with the general semantics of each source domain – a principle which, basically, suggests the importance of semantic connotations in our analysis. At present, however, to the best of my knowledge, academically accepted connotation reference sources are hardly available. One option of coping with that absence would suggest the use of concordancers, which display examples of a word in varied linguistic co-textual environments. Through a concordancer, a linguistic structure could be positioned along a scale between a positive and a negative opposite, based on the structure's frequency of occurrence near prototypically positive and prototypically negative lexical units. However, two factors impede the use of such a technique here.

The first one is the fact of BREXIT being a newly-emergent notion, on the variety of whose environments concordancers could not offer sufficient information. This impediment is additionally amplified by the current lack of information about different culture's connotation-related interpretations of the Brexit phenomenon, cultural variation being, to my mind, a major obstacle to the creation of valid connotation dictionaries in general. Furthermore, bearing in mind the two-year sustained social division on the issue of Brexit (discussed in VII.1.above), there exists the very likely possibility for no total sum of individual interpretations of Brexit to surmount 50% (i.e. the amount of personal interpretations prototypically required for an opinion trend to become a norm) of the general UK opinions.

Thus, the present investigation resorts to a technique which only derives from principles of concordancing, without using an actual concordancer. As already stated above, the analysis of the dataset employed for present purposes does not limit itself to single metaphoric unit's occurrences. It broadens its scope to encompass 'metaphoric segment' language stretches. Following the PIMS procedure (Johansson Falck and Okonski 2022), in terms of connotation-relevant language stretches, the analysis broadens its scope even further to encompass language segments which would, generally, abide by the norms of a concordancer (such as the Collins COBUILD English Collocations). In doing that, a particular segment's evaluation of Brexit is seen as dependent on two parallel and correlated factors: (a) the possible positive or negative semantics of the central source domain concept, and (b) the occurrence of prototypically positive or negative concepts in concordance-relevant proximity.

VII. 5. Sub-dataset 1 results and discussion

The main objective of the analysis reported here is to establish whether there are any tendencies which could explain the particular conceptual transition of BREXIT from one RW segment into another. In other words, the hypothesis is that there must be some cognitive mechanism(s) providing sufficient overlap (or good gestalt) between Worlds for BREXIT to transition along. As Lakoff and Johnson argue (1980, 1999), fundamental values in a culture will be coherent with the metaphorical structure of fundamental concepts in the culture.

Such mechanism(s), clearly, need to be simultaneously present in different Worlds or World segments to enact the transition. Importantly, such mechanism(s) need to be also recursively activated numerous times across public communicative occurrences in order for the concept of BREXIT to undergo a socially-verifiable change. Therefore, finding such a cognitive mechanism needs to rely on frequencies of occurrences in actually used public texts and discourses.

With those stipulations in mind, during the first step in the analysis, all metaphoric segments were isolated and classified according to the day on which they appeared. This procedure yielded 293 metaphoric uses obtained from a total of 30 reports, 24 editorials and 40 news items.

However, some unforeseen specifics in the day-by-day distribution of the 293 metaphors were revealed. That required proceeding to the second step of analysis to be briefly postponed. The present discussion will similarly first pay attention to the specifics of the day-by-day metaphor distribution. It will present some additional suggestions concerning the second step of analysis. Only then will it move on to the sub-classification of the examples in terms of their source domains, i.e. to the second step.

Table 1 below displays the distribution of the 293 metaphoric segments obtained and presents their net totals per day:

	DAY 1	DAY 2	DAY 3	DAY 4
NET TOTAL OF METAPHORIC SEGMENTS	24	56	104	109

Table 1. Distribution of net total of BREXIT metaphor uses on each of the four days

As Table 1 demonstrates, the distribution of metaphoric uses over the four days is significantly uneven, varying from 24 to 109. The variation represents a disparity of more than 400 %. Moreover, the 400% increase from Day 1 to Day 4 represents steady, uninterrupted growth in the number of metaphors used.

Both trends could be explained, if the subsequent analysis reveals it is not only the net total of metaphoric uses that has risen from Day 1 to Day 4. If the overall increase also results from a rising number of source domains employed, then it could be argued that the number of metaphoric uses increases in parallel with the general public's acceptance of BREXIT becoming reality. In other words, the potential presence of a rising number of source domains could be a result from the public's need to configure conceptually the 'suddenly real' phenomenon of BREXIT. Alternatively, if the number of source domains does not rise from day to day, that could be interpreted as evidence for the presence of existing entrenchment of the metaphors used on Day 1.

The steep increase in the number of metaphoric uses from Day 1 to Day 4 could also be explained, if seen from the perspective of Critical metaphor theory (discussed in Chapter V). The increase could be interpreted as ensuing from thwarted pre-referendum cultural attitudes and expectations. Such a hypothesis is consistent with the results from the surveys conducted by Loughborough University and the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (discussed in VII. 3. above). Both surveys confirm the pre-referendum presence of more than 75 % of 'Leave' texts throughout UK media. The referendum percentages, however, do not mirror that

figure. Instead, they point to far more divisive results and not to a strong social agreement on 'Leave'. This hypothesis could be verified, if the second step of our analysis reveals predominantly positive or predominantly negative characteristics of the BREXIT source domains used. In other words, the verification of this assumption may depend on what part of the source domains employed carry generally positive or generally negative semantic connotations.

Proceeding to the second step in the analysis, we need to note again that the metaphors used on each of the 4 days have been classified in accordance with their source domains. Table 2 below displays the data concerning Day 1 of the announcement of the Brexit-poll results:

DAY 1 NET TOTAL	**SOURCE DOMAIN**	**EXAMPLES**
16	PART OF A JOURNEY	• *…requires fresh leadership to take it in this direction.* • *I do not think it would be right for me to try to be the captain that steers our country to its next destination.*
5	WAR	• *I fought this campaign … in the only way…*
3	DIVORCE	• *…a messy divorce between two Britains.* • *This is not just a divorce between Britain and the EU, it feels just as much like a divorce between one Britain and another.*

Table 2. Day 1 results

Table 2 reveals that the most significant source domain on Day 1 is the one structuring BREXIT as a new phase in the UK's JOURNEY. This conceptual transfer, clearly, is associated with the

LIFE IS A JOURNEY complex metaphor (discussed in II. 3. 1. and in VI. 4.). The examples in Table 2 also demonstrate that this metaphoric transfer results in expressions which would sooner rate as neutral rather than positive ones. In terms of general semantics, the phrases *next destination, steady the ship, take a different path* all avoid characterizing BREXIT as an event leading to a very negative or to a very positive UK future.

The second most significant source domain here is the one which helps construct BREXIT as A REASON FOR WAR. The relevant language samples reveal that, on Day 1, this 'war' is 'fought' and 'won' between UK pro-Leavers and UK pro-Remainers. In other words, on that day, the construction of BREXIT as A REASON FOR WAR is exclusively presented as a domestic UK affair.

Moreover, on Day 1, unlike the rest of the days, BREXIT is exclusively conceptualized as a DIVORCE between 'two Britains', i.e. a divorce 'internal' to the UK's 'family'. That, combined with the 'internal' WAR metaphorizations concerning UK pro-Leavers and pro-Remainers, suggests it is UK processes, and not processes within the EU, that are most salient on Day 1.

Two of the three source domains employed for BREXIT conceptualization and metaphorization on Day 1 (i.e. BREXIT IS A REASON FOR WAR and BREXIT IS A DIVORCE) could be seen as profiling negative senses and, thus, carrying negative connotations in terms of their general semantics. Additionally, as discussed above, the third source domain PART OF A JOURNEY leads to predominantly neutral characterizations of the phenomenon. Thus, from a general semantic perspective, it can be argued that the actual metaphorizations of BREXIT on Day 1 rate from negative to neutral.

A final point to note with respect to Day 1 is that both the highest-ranking metaphoric mappings cite the same original source, which is an address delivered by the UK's Prime Minister David Cameron. In other words, what is registered in Table 1 is instances of

journalists' citing the then-PM Cameron's address. As argued in VII.2., dissemination through recurrence is a prominent factor in metaphor conventionalization. Hence each token registers here separately.

Overall, Day 1 is characterized by few metaphoric uses. The data on that day exemplify a predominant reliance on non-metaphorized facts. From a Critical metaphor theory perspective, the near-absence of metaphoric segments could be argued to reveal a desire to characterize the emerging realities very cautiously.

Table 3 below displays the data concerning Day 2 after the Brexit poll:

DAY 2 NET TOTAL	**SOURCE DOMAIN**	**EXAMPLES**
27	DIVORCE	• *... as the long, complicated process of political and economic divorce from the EU is negotiated.* • *... while the divorce is being negotiated...*
13	PART OF A JOURNEY	• *Through Brexit, it would be necessary to take things slowly - one step at a time.*
8	WAR	• *As the dust settles on the EU referendum battleground, some 33 million voters await with bated breath to see what the victors will do. And if those defeated will continue to fight.* • *...to see if he does not run and effectively abandons the field, ...*
5	NATURAL DISASTER	• *This Brexit thing is ... a wave of shock, which is reverberating around Europe.* • *It's an explosive shock.*

3	MECHANICAL FAILURE	• *… is a break down in all EU mechanisms.* • *…means the disintegration of the European Union...*

Table 3. Day 2 results

In comparison to Day 1, on Day 2, the number of source domains used to metaphorize BREXIT increases from 3 to 5. In terms of their total number of uses, 2 out of the 5 source domains (i.e. the two domains of DIVORCE and JOURNEY) seem pronouncedly more significant than the other 3 (i.e. A REASON FOR WAR, NATURAL DISASTER and MECHANICAL FAILURE).

On Day 2, the number of metaphoric construals of BREXIT as a DIVORCE is not only considerably higher than it was on Day 1. Indeed, DIVORCE is the most prominent source domain for Day 2, with a significant lead before the second most prominent source domain. However, in contrast to Day 1, the linguistic expressions used reveal the DIVORCE that BREXIT represents now is not between 'two Britains'. The Day 2 DIVORCE takes place between the UK and the EU.

On the basis of these data, it can be concluded that the BREXIT as a DIVORCE metaphor invariably employs DIVORCE as a source domain, but it does so against the background of two different metaphoric scenarios – the one of UK HOME POLITICS and the one of THE UK–EU RELATIONSHIP. It should be highlighted that neither of these backgrounds is seen here as directly providing source domain structure for BREXIT. On the contrary, in both cases, the transfer from DIVORCE functions in parallel with other metaphoric construals. In the first case, it functions in parallel with the metaphoric construction of SOCIAL GROUPS as MEMBERS OF A FAMILY. This metaphor itself associates with the NATION IS A FAMILY metaphor. In the second case, BREXIT IS A DIVORCE co-functions with the

EU COUNTRIES ARE MEMBERS OF A FAMILY metaphor. This transfer associates with the EU IS A FAMILY one.

The principle of a metaphor operating against different backgrounds (i.e. different RW-associated scenarios) is also applicable to the BREXIT IS A REASON FOR WAR conceptual transfer. In similarity to the DIVORCE source domain, BREXIT IS A REASON FOR WAR can be seen as employing structure from the same source (i.e. REASON FOR WAR) but doing so in relation to several other background domains. A possible background domain for such parallel co-activation could be again the one of UK HOME POLITICS (as in BREXIT IS A DIVORCE above). In such cases, the 'enemies' seen as 'fighting' would be pro-Leavers versus pro-Remainers. Another alternative could be the EUROPEAN UNION background, in which the 'enemies' seen as 'fighting' tend to be LONDON and BRUSSELS. Clearly, such a conceptualization interprets the EU as a PLACE, which is generally confirmed by the EXIT metaphoric element in the morphological blend of 'Brexit'.

Going back to the day-by-day distribution of BREXIT metaphors, it should not go without mention that the second most frequently used source domain on Day 2 is the one of JOURNEY. This domain was the one most frequently employed on Day 1 but now it does not preserve its leading position. This trend, combined with the shift as to background domain co-activation in the DIVORCE metaphor (as discussed above), can be interpreted as placing a stronger focus on BREXIT as a lasting EU issue and not simply as a temporary UK domestic problem. Such a premise is further supported by the move of the BREXIT IS A REASON FOR (DOMESTIC) WAR metaphor into 3rd place. In a way, domestic British considerations can be claimed to subside gradually on Day 2; the place of Britain on the international map can be claimed to gain prominence.

Two source domains not present on Day 1 appear on Day 2. The first domain construes BREXIT as a NATURAL DISASTER. The second domain structures BREXIT as

MECHANICAL FAILURE. The latter metaphoric transfer can be interpreted as deriving from a parallel metaphorization in which THE EU is seen as a MACHINE (the principle of domain vs. sub-domain mapping was discussed in VII. 2.). In other words, the more general EU as a MACHINE metaphorization serves as background against which the BREXIT as MECHANICAL FAILURE is currently metonymized and profiled. Importantly, the EU as a MACHINE metaphorization in this case associates with the RW only as it is not linguistically signalled, while BREXIT as MECHANICAL FAILURE, being linguistically signalled, reveals an overlap between the current TW and the RW.

On a more general note, both the newly introduced source domains, i.e. BREXIT as a NATURAL DISASTER and BREXIT as MECHANICAL FAILURE associate with negative general-semantics connotations. Both contribute to the overall negative construal of BREXIT on Day 2.

Table 4 below displays the data concerning Day 3 after the Brexit referendum:

DAY 3 NET TOTAL	**SOURCE DOMAIN**	**EXAMPLES**
29	NATURAL DISASTER	• *Brexit has rocked the continent…* • *…the seismic event …* • *…sends shockwaves…*
21	DIVORCE	• *If you are going to divorce, it is better to get it over and done with, …* • *European leaders are divided over a quickie divorce.* • *The divorce negotiations will last at least two years.* • *The White House wants to see Britain and the EU "divorce responsibly".*

21	(KILLING) BLOW TO EUROPE	• *…an amputation, not a death blow.* • *… not a funeral for Europe.* • *…will kill off the EU.*
11	MECHANICAL FAILURE	• *…is the disintegration of the EU.*
9	PART OF A JOURNEY	• *… an irreversible step…* • *Brexit will be either a wake-up call or the beginning of a dangerous path for European people.*
8	NUCLEAR DISASTER	• *…the Brexit fallout will take hold.* • *How horrific the fallout will be depends on…*
2	ENEMY	• *…Parliamentary fightback against Brexit …*
2	WAKE-UP CALL TO THE (SLEEPING) EU	• *Brexit will be either a wake-up call or the beginning of a dangerous path for European people.*
1	DESTRUCTIVE ACCIDENT (INVOLVING A PLANE, SHIP, BUILDING, ETC.)	• *The imperative now is to salvage as much as possible from the wreckage.*

Table 4. Day 3 results

Day 3 confirms the trend for increase in the number of source domains used in the metaphorization of BREXIT.

The most prominent source domain on Day 3 is the one of NATURAL DISASTER. This domain did not appear on Day 1 and registered a small number of uses on Day 2. Moreover, the significance of the NATURAL DISASTER source domain grows in parallel with the rising significance of the domain of NUCLEAR DISASTER. If combined, their uses would amount

to a total of 36 % of all metaphorizations on Day 3. Both metaphorizations carry generally negative connotations.

On Day 3, two source domains share the second place. The first one is the domain characterizing BREXIT as A (KILLING) BLOW to Europe. The second one is the domain characterizing BREXIT as UK's DIVORCE from Europe. While the DIVORCE source domain remains strong for yet another day, the (KILLING) BLOW appears for the first time on Day 3. This fact makes the (KILLING) BLOW's prominence even more pronounced. Significantly, both domains share the same point of orientation and that is EUROPE.

The 4th place on Day 3 is also occupied by a EUROPE-related metaphor. This specific mapping suggests BREXIT is a MECHANICAL FAILURE likely to lead to EUROPE's 'disintegration' or 'break-down'. Clearly, this metaphor functions in parallel with another metaphoric construction – that of THE EU as a MACHINE. Arguably, the trend for replacing BREXIT as a UK DOMESTIC PROBLEM with BREXIT as an EU ISSUE continues on Day 3.

The top three metaphorizations on Day 3 carry strongly negative connotations. This generalization comes in sharp contrast to the neutral-to-negative semantic range of the conceptualizations on Day 1. In this respect, Day 3 can be argued to continue the trend which originated on Day 2.

Table 5 below displays the data concerning Day 4 after the Brexit referendum:

DAY 4 NET TOTAL	**SOURCE DOMAIN**	**EXAMPLES**
29	NUCLEAR DISASTER	• *…Brexit fallout will be coming…* • *…the fallout for EU citizens living in the UK…*

25	DIVORCE	• *Last Thursday's momentous vote was a vote to begin divorce proceedings. Or, if you like, to move out of the house we share with 27 other countries.* • *…it is hoped will be an amicable separation.* • *…a messy divorce…* • *… let alone the filing of the divorce papers themselves.*
19	NATURAL DISASTER	• *the shock of an epoch-defining referendum reverberates in every corner of the land.*
14	PART OF A JOURNEY	• *…tortuous path towards a bright utopia.* • *…charting a way forward…* • *On a new European path, Brexit Britain cannot afford to lose its passport.*
7	EXAMINATION/ TEST	• *… is a tough test for Europe.* • *Both face the test of…*
6	(KILLING) BLOW TO EUROPE	• *…a blow to Europe and to the European unification process.* • *…wounding to all the nations.*
5	MECHANICAL FAILURE	• *…and means this is a EU break-down.*
2	RUIN OF THE UK'S HOUSE	• *The pillars of the British establishment have been damaged.*
1	(HARD TO DIGEST) FOOD	• *…digesting the UK's choice to leave the EU.*
1	DIVIDING LINE	• *Brexit is a difficult watershed with many consequences.*

Table 5. Day 4 results

Day 4 confirms the trend for increase in the number of source domains used in the metaphoric conceptualization of BREXIT. The source domains employed on this day amount to 10 versus the total of 3 on Day 1. However, it should be noted that the overall increase in the number of metaphors from Day 3 to Day 4 is not as substantial as it was from Day 1 to Day 2. The tendency for increase from Day 2 to Day 4 slows down noticeably.

On Day 4, the most frequently employed source domain on Day 3 (i.e. BREXIT as a NATURAL DISASTER) drops to 4th position. The most prominent metaphorization on Day 4 is the NUCLEAR DISASTER one, which first appeared on Day 3 but accounted for fewer uses then. What is more, the linguistic expressions used on Day 3 can be argued to focus on NATURAL DISASTER as an event in progress. In contrast, Day 4 focuses on the RESULT of a (NUCLEAR) DISASTER. Simultaneously, the uses of the JOURNEY source domain also display an increase on Day 4. On the basis of all these facts, Day 4 could be interpreted as a point in time, at which, for the first time after Day 1, BREXIT metaphorizations make us 'look at the future'.

Additionally, on Day 4, the texts from the dataset display a significant number of references to future POLITICAL GAMES relating to or ensuing from BREXIT. In other words, the dataset displays frequent appearances of metaphoric structures referring to upcoming GAMES and SPORTS activities. Some examples are: *It's important to wait and play a tactical game to keep Britain in*; *It's all like boxing…*; *shadow boxing, I would call it*; *red gloves, blue gloves*; *cards are not on the table yet*; *needs to be played carefully*.

Such metaphoric expressions could not be registered as characterizing BREXIT as they serve to construct the broader domain of POLITICS. As I have argued elsewhere Tincheva (2014), there are two types of metaphors in political discourse: metaphors <u>in</u> politics and metaphors <u>of</u> politics. Examples of metaphors <u>in</u> politics would be THE STATE IS A BODY/PERSON or THE EU IS A MACHINE. A metaphor <u>of</u> politics would be POLITICS IS

COMPETITION. Clearly, the two types can merge to an extent that it can be rather difficult to categorize an expression as signaling only one of the two. For instance, a STATE can be metaphorized as a WARRIOR (which would be a metaphor in politics), while POLITICS can be constructed as WAR (which would be a metaphor of politics).

Nevertheless, the GAME and SPORTS metaphoric expressions in the present dataset were not included as data on BREXIT. They are interpreted here as conceptualizing the general RW political situation 'surrounding' and 'including' BREXIT and not BREXIT itself. On the other hand, the fact that GAMES and SPORTS examples were numerous on Day 4 and the fact that they first appeared on this day made the new trend worthy of mention.

Overall, the data in Tables support the assumption that there exists a pluralistic set of BREXIT metaphors. That set contains 14 mappings. The following list presents the source domains salience in conceptualizations of BREXIT in terms of net totals of uses of each source domain throughout the dataset:

1. DIVORCE (76)
2. NATURAL DISASTER (53)
3. PART OF A JOURNEY (52)
4. NUCLEAR DISASTER (37)
5. (KILLING) BLOW TO EUROPE (27)
6. MECHANICAL FAILURE (19)
7. REASON FOR WAR (13)
8. EXAMINATION/ TEST (7)
9. RUIN OF THE UK'S HOUSE (2)
10. WAKE-UP CALL TO THE (SLEEPING) EU (2)
11. ENEMY (2)
12. DESTRUCTIVE ACCIDENT (INVOLVING A PLANE, SHIP, BUILDING, ETC.) (1)
13. DIVIDING LINE (1)
14. (HARD TO DIGEST) FOOD (1)

Thus, the analysis of English-language EU online media texts appearing on the first 4 post-referendum days can be concluded to reveal that the most prominent source domains in the metaphoric conceptualization of BREXIT are DIVORCE, A NATURAL DISASTER and PART OF A JOURNEY. These three metaphorizations are present either on all of the days analyzed (DIVORCE and PART OF A JOURNEY) or on all of the days but one (A NATURAL DISASTER). Moreover, these three source domains account for the highest total numbers of metaphoric structures throughout the four-day period.

The above conclusion is not intended as a claim that the three most significant source domains blend into a single, complex metaphor. While BREXIT IS A DIVORCE and BREXIT IS THE NEXT PHASE OF A JOURNEY might be seen as sharing a certain amount of conceptual structure (e.g. the possible DIVORCE IS A PHASE IN A PERSON'S LIFE mapping), BREXIT IS THE NEXT PHASE OF A JOURNEY could not be as easily interpreted as cohering with BREXIT IS A NATURAL DISASTER. Critically, no linguistic evidence in the dataset suggests that these three metaphors have generated blended emergent structure of their own.

VII. 6. Sub-dataset 2 results and discussion

The data obtained are systematized to account for each of the 4 days in the period analyzed. Table 6 provides accumulated data on all of the 4 days.

	DAY 1	**DAY 2**	**DAY 3**	**DAY 4**
UK DATASET METAPHORS	14	32	63	65
NON-UK EU DATASET METAPHORS	12	25	47	59

Table 6. Distribution of net totals of BREXIT metaphors over the four days

As reported in the previous section, Table 6 demonstrates an uneven distribution of uses over the four days. It also displays a steep, uninterrupted increase from Day 1 to Day 4. Arguably, the increase reflects the EU public's realization they need to 'make sense' of BREXIT. Another – and not necessarily conflicting – explanation could be that the predominantly factual/ literal uses on Day 1 may represent a reluctance for early interpretations and comments. That can be seen as confirmation of the assumption that metaphorizations are basically evaluative and involve perspectivization on what is being metaphorized.

The increase over the 4-day period follows relatively the same line in the UK and in the continental sub-datasets. There is a more pronounced tendency for metaphor use throughout the period in the UK sub-dataset. A possible explanation could be the UK conceptual evolution BREXIT had undergone before the referendum was held, an evolution continental media users did not have to experience as they had no voting rights on the issue.

The data on Day 1 are systematized in Table 7 below. Representative samples are:

(1) *I do not think it would be right for me to try to be the captain that steers our country to its next destination.* (Source domain: PART OF A JOURNEY)

(2) *…a messy divorce between two Britains; …it feels just as much like a divorce between one Britain and another.* (Source domain: DIVORCE)

SOURCE DOMAIN	**UK DATASET**	**Non-UK EU DATASET**
PART OF A JOURNEY	9	7
WAR/ FIGHTING	3	0
DIVORCE	2	5

Table 7. Day 1 results

Table 7 demonstrates the source domains employed for BREXIT metaphorization on Day 1 are few: 3 in the UK dataset and 2 in the non-UK dataset. Overall, on Day 1, the conceptual core of the BREXIT concept seems narrow and well-centered.

Both sub-datasets reveal PART OF A JOURNEY as the source domain used most frequently. However, if the second sub-dataset excludes the BBC's uses, the results will demonstrate a continental preference for the DIVORCE metaphorization. Still, in a way, both metaphorizations serve to put Brexit into perspective and direct audience's attention to the future.

These data confirm the observations from the previous section about DIVORCE uses. The two sub-datasets diverge as to the background RW scenario activated. Thus, in the UK dataset texts, on Day 1, the TW conceptualizations profile exclusively a DIVORCE between 'two Britains'. In the continental dataset texts, the TW conceptualizations profile exclusively a DIVORCE between the UK and the EU.

Similarly, on Day 1, the WAR/FIGHTING metaphorizations exclusively represent Britain as the battleground on which the Brexit WAR takes place. In other words, the WAR

there is not between the UK and the rest of the EU, it is an 'internal' UK WAR between pro-Leave and pro-Remain stances.

The data on Day 2 are systematized in Table 8 below. Representative samples are:

(3) *… the first steps of the UK withdrawal from the EU.* (Source domain: PART OF A JOURNEY)

(4) *As the dust settles […] some 33 million voters await with bated breath to see what the victors will do.* (Source domain: WAR/ FIGHTING)

(5) *...if it erodes EU unity.* (Source domain: NATURAL DISASTER)

SOURCE DOMAIN	**UK DATASET**	**Non-UK EU DATASET**
DIVORCE	11	13
PART OF A JOURNEY	10	3
WAR/ FIGHTING	8	2
NATURAL DISASTER	3	2
MECHANICAL FAILURE	0	5

Table 8. Day 2 results

Table 8 demonstrates that, compared to Day 1, the number of metaphoric uses in both sub-datasets increases by more than 100%. Moreover, the source domains used are greater in number: 3 on Day 1, and 5 on Day 2. This development could be seen as indicative of broadening of the BREXIT conceptual core.

However, the source domains in the UK-media dataset are 5, and in the non-UK sub-dataset – 4. This is the second consecutive day on which the non-UK sub-dataset represents a narrower conceptual core. The supposition is supported by the fact that the instances of another source domain in the non-UK sub-dataset – WAR/ FIGHTING – appear in the BBC texts only.

On Day 2, both sub-datasets employ most frequently the source domain of DIVORCE. It was the third most frequently used domain on Day 1, at that it was so in both sub-datasets. In other words, this is the source domain which displays most significant increase in Day 2 uses.

On both Day 1 and 2, it is the continental sub-dataset that opts for the DIVORCE source domain more frequently. However, in the UK-preferred dataset, the DIVORCE increase from Day 1 to Day 2 is greater – 500%+. Arguably, for that sub-dataset, the initial move from non-figurative (Day 1) to figurative BREXIT representations is primarily in terms of BREXIT as a DIVORCE.

Crucially, on Day 2, the BREXIT divorce is not between 'two Britains' (as on Day 1): in 8 out of the 11 instances, the DIVORCE now takes place between the UK and the EU.

The two sub-datasets display differences in their second-most preferred source domains. In the UK sub-dataset, it is PART OF A JOURNEY, which rivals the topmost source domain of DIVORCE, and which was the top domain on Day 1. In the non-UK sub-dataset, it is MECHANICAL FAILURE, which exists against the background of the EU as a MACHINE. Arguably, the UK-preferred sub-dataset represents a dynamic view of the UK as an ENTITY JOURNEYING on, while the continental sub-dataset represents a static view of the EU as an impassionate MECHANICAL OBJECT. The less dynamic interpretation of BREXIT as MECHANICAL FAILURE is absent from the UK sub-dataset.

The third most frequently employed domain in the UK sub-dataset is WAR/ FIGHTING, whose uses even exceed the ones of the 2nd most salient domain in the non-UK sub-dataset (i.e. MECHANICAL FAILURE). As on Day 1, the WAR is represented as an internal UK affair. In the non-UK sub-dataset the only 2 WAR instances are both from the BBC texts.

The data on Day 3 are systematized in Table 9 below. Representative samples are:

(6) *…an amputation, not a death blow; …not a funeral for Europe; …will kill off the EU* (Source domain: (KILLING) BLOW)

(7) *…the seismic event…, …an earthquake…, …erosion…* (Source domain: NATURAL DISASTER)

(8) *…are divided over a quickie divorce; If you are going to divorce, it is better to get it over and done with.* (Source domain: DIVORCE)

(9) *…may result in the disintegration of the EU* (Source domain: MECHANICAL FAILURE)

SOURCE DOMAIN	**UK DATASET**	**Non-UK EU DATASET**
NATURAL DISASTER	19	11
(KILLING) BLOW	12	10
DIVORCE	9	9
MECHANICAL FAILURE	6	10
LIFE-THREATENING EVENT	7	3
PART OF A JOURNEY	6	3
ENEMY (IN A WAR)	2	0
WAKE-UP CALL	2	1

Table 9. Day 3 results

Table 9 demonstrates that, on Day 3, the source domains are greater in number. On Day 1 and 2 they were 3 and 5 respectively. On Day 3, their number rises to 8. This development is, arguably, indicative of continued broadening of the BREXIT conceptual core.

The source domains used in the UK sub-dataset are 8, those in the non-UK sub-dataset – 7. For a third consecutive day the non-UK sub-dataset represents a narrower conceptual core.

On Day 3, the non-UK-preferred metaphorizations focus around 4 domains of almost equal salience (NATURAL DISASTER, (KILLING) BLOW, DIVORCE, MECHANICAL FAILURE), followed by 3 peripheral – in terms of their uses – domains. In contrast, in the UK-preferred sub-dataset, there are 2 central source domains (NATURAL DISASTER, (KILLING) BLOW), followed by 4 domains of almost equal salience, and then by 3 peripheral domains. The metaphoric concept continental users were exposed to seems narrower and almost equally distributed within the prototype center. The metaphoric concept UK users were exposed to seems better focused but with a broader spread around the center, and a further extending periphery. In a way, the UK metaphorization is more complex and better developed.

On Day 3, both UK and non-UK media employ most frequently the source domain of NATURAL DISASTER. In both sub-datasets, the second most frequently preferred source domain is (KILLING) BLOW. Both source domains not only display considerable increase, but perpetuate the figurative characterization of Brexit as a negative event. However, there are contextual differences in the way these metaphorizations appear in the two sub-datasets. In the UK one, (KILLING) BLOW is used against the background of both domestic UK politics and EU politics, and is further enhanced by the appearance of (ENEMY IN A) WAR uses concerning internal UK political fights.

The data on Day 4 are systematized in Table 10 below. Representative samples are:

(10) *a blow to Europe and to the European unification process; …is wounding to all the nations* (Source domain: (KILLING) BLOW)

(11) *…the seismic event…* (Source domain: NATURAL DISASTER)

(12) *…whether it will mean an EU break-down* (Source domain: MECHANICAL FAILURE)

(13) *…digesting the UK's choice to leave the EU* (Source domain: FOOD)

(14) *Both face the test of…; … is a tough test for Europe* (Source domain: TEST)

(15) *…the pillars of the British establishment have been damaged* (Source domain: (UK's) HOUSE RUIN)

(16) *…a difficult watershed with many consequences* (Source domain: DIVIDING LINE)

(17) *…torturous path towards a bright utopia* (Source domain: PART OF A JOURNEY)

(18) *…Brexit fallout will be coming…* (Source domain: LIFE-THREATENING EVENT)

(19) *…a messy divorce…; …it is hoped will be an amicable separation; … let alone the filing of the divorce papers themselves* (Source domain: DIVORCE)

SOURCE DOMAIN	**UK DATASET**	**Non-UK EU DATASET**
LIFE-THREATENING EVENT	16	12
NATURAL DISASTER	11	10
(KILLING) BLOW	5	2
DIVORCE	13	16
MECHANICAL FAILURE	1	6
PART OF A JOURNEY	8	4
ENEMY (IN A WAR)	5	0
WAKE-UP CALL	0	1
TEST	2	6
(UK's) HOUSE RUIN	2	0
FOOD	1	2
DIVIDING LINE	1	0

Table 10. Day 4 results

Table 10 demonstrates that the number of source domains employed for BREXIT metaphoric conceptualization continues to rise. On Day 1, the number of source domains was 3; on Day 4, they are 12. The development is indicative of continued broadening of the BREXIT conceptual core.

On Day 4, the source domains used in the UK-preferred sub-dataset are 11; those used in the continental sub-dataset – 9. Throughout the whole period, the non-UK sub-dataset represents a smaller number of daily domain uses, and, arguably, a narrower conceptual core.

The metaphorizations in both sub-datasets focus around 3 domains of topmost salience (LIFE-THREATENING EVENT, NATURAL DISASTER, DIVORCE), followed by 3 domains of average salience, and then by peripheral domains. In the continental sub-dataset, however, all three 'zero uses' associate with peripheral domains, which could be interpreted as re-confirmation of a narrower and better focused conceptual core in the non-UK sub-dataset.

The 3 domains of topmost salience in the sub-datasets are the same. However, on Day 4, as on Day 3, the sub-datasets diverge in their most frequently employed source domain. While in the UK one it is LIFE-THREATENING EVENT, in the non-UK sub-dataset, NATURAL DISASTER is the top source domain. NATURAL DISASTER is the second most frequently employed domain in the UK sub-dataset, while the second most frequently employed source domain in the non-UK sub-dataset is DIVORCE. As LIFE-THREATENING EVENT and NATURAL DISASTER could be argued to share conceptual structure, their uses, if subsumed into a common, more general domain, would amount to roughly 50 % of all Day 4 metaphorizations. In contrast, within the non-UK sub-dataset, the top two source domains – NATURAL DISASTER and DIVORCE are not semantically associated. Thus, arguably, on Day 4, the UK sub-dataset displays an emphatic preference for a prototypical center representing BREXIT as a (natural or human-induced) DISASTER.

However, the UK sub-dataset texts reveal there are opposing perspectives on the DISASTER. In contrast to the continental sub-dataset, a significant number of uses here, reveal positive attitudes towards, for instance, 'the seismic event' reverberations expected to be experienced in Brussels, the 'earthquake' shattering the foundations of the UK establishment, the 'fallout' which is likely to 'erode' liberal European perspectives, etc. Truly, the DISASTER source domain on its own carries negative semantic connotations: it involves danger, fear, etc. Our dataset, however, demonstrates no source domain functions in isolation and its tokens can be profiled against a multitude of other domains.

The accumulated data are systematized in Table 11, which ranks the source domains in each sub-dataset in accordance with their overall net total uses:

RANK	**UK DATASET**	**Non-UK EU DATASET**
1	DIVORCE	DIVORCE
2	NATURAL DISASTER	NATURAL DISASTER
	PART OF A JOURNEY	
3	LIFE-THREATENING EVENT	MECHANICAL FAILURE
4	(KILLING) BLOW	PART OF A JOURNEY
5	WAR/ FIGHTING	LIFE-THREATENING EVENT
6	ENEMY (IN A WAR)	(KILLING) BLOW
	MECHANICAL FAILURE	
7	TEST	TEST
	WAKE-UP CALL	
	(UK's) HOUSE RUIN	
8	FOOD	FOOD
	DIVIDING LINE	WAKE-UP CALL
		WAR/ FIGHTING

Table 11. Source domain ranking for the sub-datasets

Table 11 demonstrates the two sub-datasets share the same top source domain: DIVORCE. Within the limits of the first position, it is the continental sub-dataset which displays a considerably stronger preference for this domain.

In net totals, NATURAL DISASTER counts as the 2nd most prominent domain in both sub-sets. However, it displays about 30% more uses in the UK sub-dataset. Furthermore, as discussed above, in the UK sub-dataset, its uses are not unified around a single social evaluative center.

PART OF A JOURNEY not only shares the 2nd place in the UK sub-dataset, it surpasses its uses in the continental sub-dataset (where it lies in 4th position) by 100%. In a way, the media preferred by UK citizens tend to minimize Brexit to yet another STEP along the UK's JOURNEY.

LIFE-THREATENING EVENT is positioned in the 3rd place in the UK sub-dataset and in the 5th place in the continental one. It displays 140% uses more in the UK sub-dataset. Moreover, it shares the 3rd position across the datasets together with MECHANICAL FAILURE. As argued above, in the UK sub-dataset it coheres with NATURAL DISASTER and serves to accommodate opposing political stances.

MECHANICAL FAILURE is the source domain displaying the greatest discrepancies in the two sub-datasets. In the continental one, the uses are 300% more frequent. As argued above, the continental sub-dataset displays a preference for viewing the EU as a static, stable and inanimate MACHINE.

In contrast to the continental sub-dataset, the UK one uses WAR/ FIGHTING as the 6th most significant domain. This domain can be argued to overlap with the 5th and 7th most important domains for the sub-dataset: (KILLING) BLOW and ENEMY (IN A WAR) as they all draw on the same metaphoric scenario. Their combined uses in the UK sub-dataset would equal the top-most domain of DIVORCE. Similarly to the DIVORCE domain (as discussed

above), within the UK sub-dataset, there exist opposing viewpoints towards WAR: some construe it as a domestic UK phenomenon, others – as a EU phenomenon, some express a positive attitude towards the 'war', others fear it.

A peripheral source domain which deserves a mention is the TEST one, which appears in the continental sub-dataset predominantly. The co-textual environment of its uses reveals this metaphor coheres with the EU IS A MACHINE. It serves to construct the EU as a stable inanimate OBJECT which can survive current trials and keep functioning.

In brief, the non-UK sub-dataset can be argued to reveal a better structured and broader BREXIT conceptual periphery. The UK sub-dataset can be argued to represent a more pronounced conceptual BREXIT prototypical center; its periphery is revealed to be narrower and less frequently employed.

VII. 7. Sub-dataset 3 results and discussion

This section runs the risk of providing data which could be read as relatively redundant – much of the data has been already included as part of the previous two sections. However, the results and discussion in VII. 5. amalgamated UK and non-UK EU data, and did not present UK data separately. Then the results and discussion in VII. 6. approached UK and non-UK EU data contrastively but still did not present UK data separately. Moreover, as VII. 3. stated, UK and non-UK EU sources had to be selected along the same requirements, and due to non-UK EU sources being of limited number in the respondents' answers, some of the top 6 UK sources had to be left out to match the non-UK EU ones.

This section focuses on UK data only, which, to my mind, fully merits separately presented analysis. Additionally, focusing on UK sources separately would allow us to include data from the slightly more peripheral UK media outlets, which were nonetheless frequently mentioned by the respondents in the probe reported in VII. 3.

To minimize redundancy, this section will predominantly lay emphasis on the evaluation and perspectivization achieved through metaphoric BREXIT conceptualizations and will avoid repeating previous conclusions despite their present validity. Another reason for focusing on metaphoric evaluation and perspectivization is to provide information on DW-related political attitudes throughout the dataset texts (the discussions in the previous two sections already provided information on TW-RW overlaps).

Therefore, here, in the words of Musolff (2006: 35), we will 'look beyond the domain-level and focus on specific scenarios and their argumentative uses'; we will also establish 'differences in the frequency of use and in the argumentative exploitation of metaphor scenarios'. As repeatedly demonstrated (e.g. Musolff 2006, Ahrens and Zeng 2022), cognitive scenarios can carry evaluative and attitudinal biases related to political preferences and intentions. What is more, Boeynaems et. al's (2017) systematic literature review shows that

metaphoric framing in political discourse can bring about 'real-world changes' (see, e.g., Charteris-Black 2006; Musolff 2017, 2021). To achieve that, our analysis will need to incorporate elements from CDA and Critical Metaphor Analysis (discussed in Chapter V).

189 BREXIT-related metaphoric samples have been extracted from this third, UK media only, sub-dataset. The net totals of metaphoric uses per each day of the period are distributed as follows: Day 1 – 15 metaphoric samples; Day 2 – 39 metaphoric samples; Day 3 – 64 metaphoric samples; Day 4 – 71 metaphoric samples.

The data obtained concerning Day 1 are systematized in Table 12 below.

NET TOTAL OF USES	**SOURCE DOMAIN**	**DATASET SAMPLE**
11	PART OF A JOURNEY	*I do not think it would be right for me to try to be the captain that steers our country to its next destination.*
2	WAR	*I fought this in the only way…*
2	DIVORCE	*…it feels just as much like a divorce between one Britain and another.*

Table 12. Day 1 results

The data confirms the conclusions in the previous sections that the most frequently used source domain on Day 1 is the one of BREXIT as a part of UK's JOURNEY. In general semantic terms, the JOURNEY domain could not be argued to be characterized either positively or negatively. Its neutral connotations, however, may be overridden in this specific case as all the 11 registered metaphoric instances in the dataset occur in proximity to the text producer's expressing regret, uncertainty and a desire to dissociate from the Brexit situation. In other words, in the present dataset, the generally neutral semantics of the JOURNEY source domain can be argued to carry a degree of negative characterization. What is more, the other two source

domains employed for BREXIT metaphoric conceptualization on Day 1 also carry negative connotations.

Overall, Day 1 is characterized by few metaphoric and few strongly evaluative uses. The number and connotations of the actual uses could be summarized to present a rather cautious metaphoric characterization of the emerging realities as well as a predominant strive for non-metaphorized, connotatively-neutral facts. Such a conclusion seems rather surprising as it appears in stark contrast to the predominant pro-Brexit media bias in the pre-referendum period (Internet sources 12-14; see also Krzyżanowski 2019). The existence of that general pro-Leave pre-referendum media dominance has been unanimously verified by a multitude of sources (see, e.g., Internet source 11 for a summary). With the success of the Leave vote at the polls, the expectation would be for the general media tone on the first post-referendum days to be positive, if not victorious. Our data on Day 1 after the referendum, however, strongly suggest otherwise.

The data obtained concerning Day 2 are systematized in Table 13 below:

NET TOTAL OF USES	**SOURCE DOMAIN**	**DATASET SAMPLE**
18	DIVORCE	*… political and economic <u>divorce</u> from the EU is negotiated.*
11	PART OF A JOURNEY	*…the first <u>steps</u> of the UK withdrawal from the EU.*
6	WAR	*As the dust settles on the EU referendum <u>war</u>, some 33 million voters await with bated breath to see what the <u>victors</u> will do.*
3	NATURAL DISASTER	*...if it <u>erodes</u> EU unity.*

Table 13. Day 2 results

In comparison to Day 1, on Day 2, the total number of source domains employed for BREXIT metaphorization increases. It has to be noted, however, that in terms of their net total of uses, 2 out of the 4 source domains (i.e. DIVORCE and JOURNEY) seem pronouncedly more significant. Moreover, the source domain of JOURNEY is the same source domain which proved most salient on Day 1.

One new source domain not present on Day 1 appears on Day 2. It evokes a conceptualization of BREXIT as a NATURAL DISASTER, and, relates semantically to life-threatening events. Thus, it can be argued to carry a strong negative connotation, and to contribute to the overall negative construal of BREXIT on Day 2.

The data obtained concerning Day 3 are systematized in Table 14 below:

NET TOTAL OF USES	**SOURCE DOMAIN**	**DATASET SAMPLE**
21	NATURAL DISASTER	*…the seismic event of…* *…sends shockwaves…*
14	(KILLING) BLOW	*…an amputation, not a death blow.* *…will kill off the EU.*
11	DIVORCE	*If you are going to divorce, it is better to get it over and done with, …* *European leaders are divided over a quickie divorce.*
6	MECHANICAL FAILURE	*…may result in the disintegration of the EU.*
5	PART OF A JOURNEY	*…as the UK is heading for the door…*
5	LIFE-THREATENING EVENT	*…the Brexit fallout will take hold.* *How horrific the fallout will be …*
1	ENEMY	*…Parliamentary fightback against Brexit …*

1	WAKE-UP CALL	*Brexit will be either a wake-up call or the beginning of a dangerous path for European people.*

Table 14. Day 3 results

Day 3 confirms the trend for increase in the number of source domains used in the metaphoric conceptualization of BREXIT. In contrast to Day 1, on which only 3 source domains were employed, Day 3 uses 8 source domains for the metaphoric conceptualization of BREXIT.

The most prominent source domain on Day 3 is the one of NATURAL DISASTER, which did not appear on Day 1, and which registered a rather humble number of uses on Day 2. The growing importance of this domain can be argued to be even greater as NATURAL DISASTER can be seen as related to (and overlapping with) the domain of A LIFE-THREATENING EVENT. A LIFE-THREATENING EVENT in its turn appears for the first time on Day 3. If added, the uses of these two related source domains would amount to a total of 36 % of all metaphorizations on Day 3. Both metaphorizations, by being related semantically to life-threatening events, can be argued to carry strong negative connotations. Both contribute to the predominantly negative construal of BREXIT on Day 3.

Two source domains share the second place on Day 3: the domain characterizing BREXIT as A (KILLING) BLOW to Europe, and the domain structuring BREXIT as a DIVORCE from Europe. While the DIVORCE source domain remains strong for yet another day, the (KILLING) BLOW appears for the first time on Day 3, which makes its prominence even more pronounced. Moreover, both domains share the same point of orientation (or deictic center) and that is EUROPE.

The 4th place on Day 3 is again occupied by a metaphor relating to Europe or, rather, to its MECHANICAL FAILURE (it can be seen as a result of chain metaphorization in which EUROPE is construed as a MACHINE). Additionally, the most frequently used source domain

on Day 1 (i.e. the one of the UK's JOURNEY) continues to lose its significance. This general trend, arguably, is proof of the shift from conceptualizing BREXIT as merely an internal problem to the UK to a broader EU context. In other words, on Day 3, BREXIT tends to be defined through its influence on Europe and not that much through its impact on the UK alone.

Overall, the top three source domains used on Day 3 have strongly negative general connotations. Day 3 can be argued to continue the negative-connotations trend, which already started to gain prominence on the previous two days.

The data obtained concerning Day 4 are systematized in Table 15 below:

NET TOTAL OF USES	**SOURCE DOMAIN**	**DATASET SAMPLE**
20	LIFE-THREATENING EVENT	*…the fallout for EU citizens living in the UK…*
16	DIVORCE	*Last Thursday's momentous vote was a vote to begin divorce proceedings. Or, if you like, to move out of the house we share with 27 other countries.*
13	NATURAL DISASTER	*the aftershock of an epoch-defining referendum reverberates in every corner of the land.*
9	PART OF A JOURNEY	*…tortuous path towards a bright utopia.*
4	(KILLING) BLOW	*…a blow to Europe and to the European unification process.*
4	EXAMINATION/ TEST	*… is a tough test for Europe.* *Both face the test of…*
2	MECHANICAL FAILURE	*…whether it will mean an EU break-down.*
2	RUIN OF THE UK'S HOUSE	*…that the pillars of the British establishment have been damaged.*
1	FOOD	*…digesting the UK's choice to leave the EU.*

1	DIVIDING LINE	*Brexit is a difficult watershed with many consequences.*

Table 15. Day 4 results

Day 4 confirms the trend for increase in the number of source domains used in the metaphoric conceptualization of BREXIT: the source domains employed now amount to 10 versus the 3 source domains evident on Day 1. Overall, the top three source domains on Day 4 (i.e. A LIFE-THREATENING EVENT, DIVORCE, and A NATURAL DISASTER) carry negative connotations. The three metaphoric conceptualizations account for approximately 69% of all uses on that day.

Out of the 10 source domains on Day 4, only 2 are semantically neutral (i.e. PART OF A JOURNEY and DIVIDING LINE) and 2 could be argued to rate as neutral to negative (i.e. EXAMINATION/ TEST and (HARD TO DIGEST) FOOD). None of those source domains, however, classifies among the top three for the day. Furthermore, the total number of uses of the 4 semantically neutral source domains amounts only to 21 %. The remaining 79 % of the source domains used for metaphoric conceptualizations on Day 4 carry negative connotations.

In conclusion, the data in Tables reveal that, on the first days after the referendum, in the online versions of the top 5 UK media preferred by UK users, there appear a total of 13 BREXIT-related metaphor source domains. The source domains employed for the 13 metaphoric conceptualizations rank as follows in accordance with the net totals of their uses over the period analyzed:

1. DIVORCE (47)
2. NATURAL DISASTER (37)
3. PART OF A JOURNEY (36)
4. LIFE-THREATENING EVENT (25)
5. (KILLING) BLOW (18)

6. MECHANICAL FAILURE (8) and WAR (8)
7. EXAMINATION/ TEST (4)
8. RUIN OF THE UK'S HOUSE (2)
9. ENEMY (1), WAKE-UP CALL (1), FOOD (1) and DIVIDING LINE (1)

The data obtained demonstrate that the most prominent BREXIT-related source domains UK online readers were exposed to on the first post-referendum days are those of DIVORCE, A NATURAL DISASTER and PART OF A JOURNEY. These source domains display the greatest numbers of total uses over the period analyzed.

The DIVORCE and PART OF A JOURNEY conceptual metaphorizations of BREXIT are present on all of the 4 days analyzed. The NATURAL DISASTER metaphorization appears on 3 out of the 4 days in the period. Thus, it could be argued that the two most significant BREXIT source domains on the first post-referendum days are those of DIVORCE and PART OF A JOURNEY.

Out of the remaining 10 source domains, 4 appear on 2 of the days in the period analyzed: A LIFE-THREATENING EVENT, A (KILLING) BLOW, MECHANICAL FAILURE and WAR. The remaining 6 source domains appear on a single day and with a frequency of less than half a percent, which could not be considered significant.

It should be noted that the LIFE-THREATENING EVENT source domain stands out in the list, as on the two days it appeared, it accumulated a number of uses comparable to the number of the uses of the top metaphorizations over the whole four-day period. Moreover, LIFE-THREATENING EVENT displays the highest average frequency of uses per day, although it does not appear on all four days but only on the last two days of the period.

As far as the possible presence of evaluation-relating general connotative regularities in the source domains used is concerned, the analysis of the dataset reveals a preference for negative source domain general semantics. It is not only that the source domain uses over the

whole period rate from strongly negative to neutral, with the 'neutral' part of the scale displaying considerably fewer uses than the 'strongly negative' one. Each of the days in the period separately also rates from strongly negative to neutral, with the 'neutral' part of the scale displaying considerably fewer uses than the 'strongly negative' one. Furthermore, none of the days displays metaphorization from prototypically positively characterized source domains. The most positively tinged neutral source-domain general semantics for the whole period would be the WAKE-UP CALL ones. However, that source domain appears only once over the whole period and, consequently, could not be considered prominent.

This predominantly negative evaluative potential of the connotative aspects of the BREXIT source domains used on the first post-referendum days proves in stark contrast to the near-par between Leave and Remain at the referendum. Crucially, the negative slant runs against the overwhelming pro-Leave media bias registered in the pre-referendum period. That bias would have suggested a generally victorious (or at least emphatically positive) post-referendum source domain choices.

Admittedly, employing a negative source domain does not necessarily lead to an overall negative interpretation of the metaphorized phenomenon. On the contrary, positioned within the context of the whole text, the use can support a rather positive attitude on the part of the text producer. For instance, in our dataset, BREXIT as a DISASTER tends to be represented positively, as happening to the hateful (to the author) EU (e.g. *…erodes EU unity)*. Similarly, BREXIT can be a KILLING BLOW to the author's ENEMIES (e.g. *a death blow to Europe*), or a most-welcome AMPUTATION to the EU BODY. Analysis of such metaphoric 'scenarios' and their evaluative power have been long established in CMT and CDA literature (see Musolff, 2006, 2017). The present endeavor, however, argues in support of the existence of yet another 'level' of source domain employment, which – on the basis of the general semantics of the domains – can also function evaluatively.

Thus, the negative Brexit source-domain characterization, however subconsciously enacted, could be seen as a factor enabling the thriving desire to reverse the Brexit decision. It could also be related to the fact that, for the last three years, Remain have not been behind Leave in the social opinion polls.

VII. 8. Implications of the investigation

The investigation reported here contributes to both general DA research on Brexit (e.g. Miglbauer et al. 2021; Mompean and Manzanares 2019; Zappettini and Krzyżanowski 2021) as well as research on the political impact of conceptual metaphor (e.g. Perrez and Reuchamps 2015; Perrez et al. 2019). More specifically, it supports beliefs such as Walter and Helmig's that "only the combined analysis of discourses and metaphors can lead to a comprehensive understanding of the social construction of reality" (2008: 119; emphasis mine). Adler-Nissen et al. (2019: 574), too, write of Brexit discourses as not simply describing reality but also as constructing it.

The investigation examines how figurativity, through metaphtonymy and World overlaps, serves to construct said 'reality'. It examines how a socio-political concept such as BREXIT can be operative in the construction of a RW. The underlying assumption (see VII.1.) is that there exists a cognitive mechanism or structure which is present in both TWs and RWs, and that the co-presence allows for TW-RW overlaps. Those overlaps, in their turn, are what can enable the transition of BREXIT from a TW into the RW.

The analysis of our dataset verifies unambiguously the presence of such a cognitive structure: the (LIFE AS A) JOURNEY complex metaphor, which has been confirmed throughout the literature to structure general perceptions of LIFE (see II.3.) proves to be a key metaphorization of BREXIT, too. Crucially, JOURNEY provides the dominant metaphoric scenario on the first 2 days of the Brexit referendum.

The last point is of special prominence as there are, as the data reveal, very few figurative uses on Day 1 of the period studied. Arguably, although BREXIT had existed in TWs before the 2016 referendum, the very day of the referendum and the one after marked BREXIT's transition into the RW, which caused figurative uses of the concept to pause. As

BREXIT gradually became part of the RW, the number of metaphoric instances as well as the number of metaphoric source domains grew.

Several conclusions could be drawn from these facts. First, at times of uncertainty (i.e. times of ambiguous or difficult processing of ongoing events), people minimize their figurativity and, if they use non-literal thinking at all, they resort to the most basic metaphorizations such as the JOURNEY OF LIFE. Perhaps contrary to logic, figurativity actually makes a concept 'real', i.e. it verifies the concept's status as part of the RW. Figurativity, therefore, could be employed as a measure of the degree of transition from conceptualization to categorization.

Second, the present investigation confirms Musolff's (2017: 15) claim that the "affective, argumentative and also entertaining appeal of figurative faming makes facts and figures meaningful". However, as our data reveal, that claim should not be interpreted as advocating the effectiveness of positively charged figurativity only. Our analysis demonstrates that evaluative metaphoric conceptualization is not necessarily positively charged even when employed by supporters of an idea. Despite the prevailing negative connotations of the metaphoric transfers in our dataset, perhaps driven by a subconscious fear of change (i.e. the change of World status of the BREXIT concept), the very use of figurativity is what proves socially effective. Clearly, both this, second, conclusion, and the first one above, would require further testing and confirmation beyond the notion of BREXIT.

In summary, Chapter VII:

(a) combines CDA/CMA analysis with quantitative principles of data;

(b) supports studies on the role of recursion (in this case the role of recurring cognitive processing of BREXIT) in creating stereotypical scenarios and ensuing political attitudes in society;

(c) confirms the theoretical validity and the analytical practicality of using the notion of 'RW':

(d) demonstrates how, chronologically, new ideas and inventions come into being: first, they emerge in TWs and, then, via a figurative mechanism, they transition into an overlapping RW.

A last point to note here is Adler-Nissen et al.'s (2019: 574) attempt to expound what they call 'a performative theory of Brexit' and to propel an "understanding of Brexit in performative terms". The logic behind their attempt is that, in accord with speech act theory, performative utterances not only describe 'reality' but also change it.

Both (d) above and Adler-Nissen et al.'s (2019: 574) proposal suggest the feasibility of discussing not only TW-into-RW transitions but also the possibility for DW-into-RW transitioning to occur. This will be the topic of the next chapter in this thesis.

Generally, without the notion of 'RW', it would be impossible for us to explain how a concept without a real-world referent such as BREXIT gradually 'enters reality'.

CHAPTER VIII

REAL WORLDS AND SOCIO-POLITICAL ACTION: FACEBOOK POSTS

VIII. 1. A case in point: Facebook posts and political discourse

It probably goes without saying that, since its launch in 2004, Facebook has ushered in a new era of human communication – the era of social media. It is an era which has brought about Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC) and the phenomenon of remote participants/ audiences in a communicative activity. What is in focus here, above all, is the fact that Facebook use has considerably blurred the boundaries between personal, private, and public spheres (Mey 2018). In case the claim of Facebook's social efficiency is considered too farfetched, one needn't look any further than the fact that there are 3 billion Facebook users as of the beginning of 2023. Thus, the most general aim of this chapter is to contribute to understanding the socially significant overlap between personal and public communication as perceived by Facebook users.

Addressing the issue of how Facebook functions at the juncture point between the personal and the public sphere, this chapter needs to amalgamate and balance several notions associating with the following basic questions: What is 'real' communication nowadays?, Does 'real' communication entail (all) participants' physical presence and their sharing a common space?, Is social media use only a communicative activity, or does using social media represent actual participation in social life?, Can social media use be seen as 'doing something socially'?,

etc. Clearly, such questions pertain to our discussion of 'RW' vs. 'reality', thus this chapter applies the multi-process model to them.

The chapter tackles these issues against the background of the 2020 social distancing environment. An event of global proportions, the 2020 pandemic is assumed to have heightened, if not permanently, then at least temporarily, the role of social media. Confirming or refuting that assumption is another objective of the present investigation.

In parallel with the 2020 pandemic social distance restrictions, the summer of 2020 witnessed a number of socio-political events of national and international significance. Such an event is the Black Lives Matter movement, which swept across the United States and many European countries. The event came after a period of quarantine restrictions. Another similarly massive event, one that also follows a quarantine period, took place in Germany in the form of successive pandemic-related anti-restrictions protests.

Eastern-EU Bulgaria was also swept by a wave of post-quarantine mass protests, although they were unrelated to either the Black Lives Matter movement, nor to the anti-social-distancing movement in Germany. Following a period of quarantine restrictions between mid-March and mid-May, the period of social distancing measures in Bulgaria continued, but it ran in parallel with expansive anti-corruption protests involving the actual physical co-presence of tens of thousands, and sometimes hundreds of thousands, of citizens together in the streets. Importantly, the protests gathered those people physically and not only virtually, or online. The main objective of the present investigation is to verify whether there is any change in the use of Facebook (as a major representative of social media) between Bulgaria's quarantine period and its in-pandemic, post-quarantine, and mass-protests period. Clearly, our focus will then have to fall on Facebook use in relation to its socio-political issues specifically.

The reasons for choosing Bulgaria only as the source of data here include, first, the fact that the country follows the pattern of sequencing the stage of quarantine measures with a stage

of more relaxed social distancing measures in parallel with sequencing a quarantine period with a mass protest eruption. The second reason is that, in contrast to other countries such as the USA, the UK and Germany, in terms of duration, the post-quarantine protests in Bulgaria took long enough to be comparable in duration to the quarantine period imposed in the country. The third reason is the presence of data from an earlier investigation I conducted on the use of Facebook as a performative tool in socio-political Bulgarian life (Tincheva 2019) – an investigation the data from which could be used as a frame of reference for the data obtained on the 2020 and post-2020 pandemic period.

In sum, the main object of investigation in this chapter, Facebook posts, are seen here as a phenomenon lying at the intersection where the notions of 'communication', 'reality', 'social' and 'political' meet. However, within the last decade, such society-directed and communication-based notions have evolved so dynamically that they mandate one's either re-confirming their definitions or re-defining them entirely.

This chapter presents two sociolinguistic studies conducted with a view of answering the above questions; then it discusses the data thus obtained from a sociolinguistic perspective. Second, the chapter interprets the findings from the viewpoint of the multi-process cognitive framework proposed here. Third, on the basis of the conclusions thus drawn, the chapter re-visits concepts discussed in Part I and Part II such as 'reality', 'RW', 'DW', 'text type', and 'intertextuality'.

VIII. 2. The notion of 'political discourse'

Asking what political discourse is may be a "seemingly naive question" (van Dijk 1997) but the term is easily confirmed as one of "ambiguous nature" (ibid.). Generally, van Dijk maintains, when asking what political discourse is,

> [t]he easiest, and not altogether misguided, answer is that political discourse is identified by its *actors* or *authors, viz., politicians.* […] This way of defining political discourse is hardly different from the identification of medical, legal or educational discourse with the respective participants in the domains of medicine, law or education. (van Dijk 1997: 12)

In van Dijk's perspective, however, defining political discourse only in accordance with the parameter of text producer is bound to lead to both theoretical and analytical problems. So, van Dijk proposes an interactional approach be adopted, thus including in the analysis not only text producers but also text receivers. In parallel, the parameter of text producers, van Dijk argues (ibid.), should be broadened to include other 'primary' participants in the communicative process such as social movements and interest groups. Both these suggestions will be met in the Study 1 and Study 2 presented here; they will be also reflected in the questionnaires' design.

The question remains open, however, about how inclusive the parameter of 'political discourse participants' should be. A relevant opinion is, for instance, Wilson's (2005) who raises the question of how we classify instances such as family discussions of political topics and events. Elaborating on Wilson's line of reasoning, one could ask the question of how we define instances such as family discussions of political figures. Should all discussions of political figures classify as political, or should questions such as the physical or sexual attractiveness of a particular politician be excluded from political discourse? What characteristics of a political personality should be seen as 'political', when, in fact, voting results can prove dependent on factors other than 'purely' political? Generally, do all family

discussions of politics and politicians belong to political discourse, or are some of them only 'family discourse'? "In one sense", Wilson further argues, "they are both", and "the issue […] may simply be a matter of emphasis" (2005: 399). Yet, how Wilson understands 'emphasis' is not an issue tackled in his paper.

From the perspective of our multi-process model, the interrelation between Wilson's two types of discourse (i.e. family discourse and political discourse) is explainable through, first, their overlapping, and, second, through the operation of profiling shifts. Transferred to analysis of the domain of political discourse, prototypology would allow for discourse domains to overlap through sharing cognitive elements and cognitive elements' interconnections. That principle could also be employed in answering how everyday family communication and political discourse can coincide: they can do so by sharing cognitive elements/ structures such as participants, participants' actions and their interrelations. Profiling, in its turn, if applied to two overlapping domains such as family conversations and political discourse, can allow us to monitor which domain is currently being 'in focus' and which is 'pushed to the background'. Furthermore, profiling would allow us to monitor which DW element within a discourse is currently in focus and which is currently suppressed as background.

The importance of another facet from our multi-process model – World scope variation – has also been implied in discussions of political discourse. Van Dijk (1997: 15), for instance, warns against incorporating too much in 'political discourse':

> in order to avoid the extension of politics and political discourse to a domain that is so large that it would coincide with the study of public discourse in general we shall not treat such forms of discourse-with-possible-political-effects as political discourse. […] This excludes the talk of politicians outside of political contexts, and includes the discourse of all other groups, institutions or citizens as soon as they participate in political events.

Two points need to be mentioned in respect to this quotation. The first one associates with the central object of investigation in this chapter, namely what van Dijk calls the political effects of a discursive occurrence, which will be discussed later in this chapter, but whose implicit presence in many scholarly interpretations of political discourse needs to be noted.

Second, van Dijk's quote, interpreted from the perspective of the multi-process model proposed here, can be rephrased as either (a) asking how broad the scope of a POLITICAL DISCOURSE's DW can be or (b) asking what DWs POLITICAL DISCOURSE can be actualized through. The two questions would correspond to the two interpretations of DISCOURSE proposed in Chapter V: (a) DISCOURSE as a particular dialogic communicative occurrence and (b) DISCOURSE as a specific and systematically occurring TW-DW-RW combination. The present investigation relies on principles of prototypology and, thus, regardless of the extent of its scope, accepts any communicative exchange which might have communication-driven political implications as exemplifying political discourse.

Thus, prototypology also applies to definitions of political discourse as dependent on the topic(s) of the text delivered (as in, e.g., Wilson 2005: 398). In parallel, prototypology also applies to definitions of political discourse as dependents on the interpersonal functions performed by a text (as in, e.g., van Dijk 1997). The latter proposition, especially, can be quite problematic: first, classifying textual functions is hardly a straightforward activity (as exemplified in Chapter II), and, second, differentiating between communicative functions and political functions can also be ambiguous.

As already mentioned in II. 1., there is considerable agreement in the literature (Miller 1984; Cillia and Wodak 2005; Charteris-Black 2011) that politics concerns reconciling differences in society and, as a consequence, politics is highly dependent on communicative practices such as discussing, persuading and bargaining. Wodak also maintains that "[p]olitics necessarily includes persuasion, rhetoric, deceptive devices, and so forth" (2009: 578).

Communication in general is considered central to politics (e.g. Hague et al. 1998; Chilton 2004). Charteris-Black (2011: 4) even goes so far to argue that language "is the lifeblood of politics: it is debatable whether language would have developed in the first place without politics and certain that politics would never have developed without language". For that reason, however, political practices and communicative practices can prove extremely hard to delimit from each other (Miller 1984).

In brief, if prototypology, World overlaps and profiling shifts are employed in analyses of political discourse, that would allow us a non-normative and non-prescriptive dynamic view on the data analyzed. Such an approach would also help abide by van Dijk's proposal that a political discourse analyst needn't search for "what political discourse analysis *should* be" but, instead, for "what 'doing' political discourse analysis *could* be" (1997: 11; emphasis as in original).

As far as methods of political discourse analysis are concerned, Reyes-Rodríguez (2008) quite rightly generalizes that, ever since Aristotelian times, political discourse has been attracting analytical attention of the qualitative research type. Moreover, in seeking to account for the communicative effect of a political text (e.g. Gamson 1992; Lee 2001; Chilton 2003; De Cillia et al. 2005; Charteris-Black 2014, 2017, 2018), researchers tend to correlate political audience reception with the presence of certain 'in-text' structures and/or rhetorical figures (e.g. Freedman and Medway 1994; Fetzer and Bull 2012). Even cognition-centered studies can be generalized to aim at correlating political audience reception with the presence of cognitive 'in-text' structures (Lakoff 2013, 2014; Musolff 2006, 2016, 2020; Kövecses 2010, 2017; Charteris-Black 2019). Overall, the permanent political-discourse-related linguistic trend can be summed up to aim at locating items and structures within a text, and then generalizing about their in-text uses in similar texts.

VIII. 3. The Facebook post as a genre

Facebook statuses and comments (subsumed under the cover term of 'Facebook posts') are seen here as a relatively new and socially transformative genre. In choosing to treat Facebook posts as a separate genre, this chapter upholds the theoretical view expounded in, for instance, Page (2010), Lomborg (2013), Whitworth (2014), Fuchs (2016), Virtanen (2017); Yus (2014, 2022), Page et al. (2022): "In the 21st century, Bakhtin may have well added the Facebook status update, the blog post, the comment on an online newspaper story, TV quiz shows, and more, as forms of speech genre", writes Whitworth (2014: 125). True to fact, the prevailing modern view on the topic can be summarized as what Abercrombie anticipated to be a "steady dismantling of genre" (1996: 45).

Xie and Yus maintain that it is the Internet which "shatters traditional dividing lines among offline genres, mixes qualities of several genres" and even creates new genres (2018: 4). Edwards and McKee (2005) also draw special attention to the influence of the Internet in many genres' redefinitions. Palmquist agrees that, in present days,

> the rules of writing have changed. Publication is no longer assumed to be linked to a printing press. Nor is it necessarily linked to well-defined print genres. As the Web has grown to encompass literally billions of sites [...] writers are living, in the fullest sense of the ancient Chinese proverb, in interesting times. Not since the fifteenth century, when Gutenberg perfected a workable system of movable type, has there been such a change in how information and ideas are exchanged. (Palmquist 2005: 219).

As far as Facebook posts in particular are concerned, they present us with a special case – they are the only social media genre which can experience trans-genre changes, or the so-called genre recontextualizations (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). Facebook posts can re-appear, after they have first appeared in the Facebook platform, as articles or as newspaper columns in traditional mass media. Overall, as Horsbol (2018: 241) generalizes, Facebook has

become “an increasingly integrated part of the public sphere” and “an important arena in political communication”.

Regardless of recent Internet-related developments, one needs to note the fact that the notion of genre has been around for quite some time, and that, like so many humanities’ terms, it has not yet found its conclusive definition (see Hogan 2003; Herman 2009; Hyland 2010; Hyvärinen 2012). The linguistic literature on genre in particular affords us two broad types of definitions. The first could be called conventional due to their representing the kind of reasoning about genres which prevailed for centuries (for a discussion see Allen 1989; Kennedy 1998). The second, more up-to-date definitions tend to interconnect genres with the social, pragmatic, or, generally, interpersonal function(s) they have the potential to perform (e.g., Biber 1989; Swales 1990; Devitt 2009, 2015; Bawarshi 2000; Bawarshi and Reiff 2010).

Martin, for example, argues that a genre is “a staged, goal-oriented, purposeful activity in which speakers engage as members of our culture” (1984: 25). Swales, similarly, suggests a genre is “a class of communicative events, the members of which share some set of communicative purposes which are recognized by the expert members of the parent discourse community” (1990: 58). From a viewpoint not far removed, Devitt maintains that genres are “typical rhetorical ways of acting in different situations” (2009: 58). Miller (1984: 151) also argues that “a theoretically sound definition of genre must be centred not on the substance or the form of discourse but on the action it is used to accomplish”. Freedman and Medway (1994: 2) concur that:

> While recognising that genres can be characterized by regularities in textual form and substance, current thinking looks at these regularities as surface traces of a different kind of underlying regularity. Genres have come to be seen as typical ways of engaging rhetorically with recurring situations. The similarities in textual form and substance are seen as deriving from the similarity in the social action undertaken.

Thus placing genre within a broader environment does not go without consequences. One of those consequences is the precisely the realization that, as society evolves, so must genres. That evolution is considered to take place through the "constant process of negotiation and change" enacted by discourse participants (Buckingham 1993: 137). As a result, genre boundaries become blurred, genre cross-overs and genre hybridization tend to happen more quickly and in more unguided ways than ever before (Abercrombie 1996; Cap and Okulska 2013).

In sum, as demonstrated by the scholarly interpretations included above, modern views of genre agree on its representing 'social action'. How it is possible for a GENRE to be conceptualized as ACTION – at that as RW ACTION – is the main issue addressed by the present investigation. The investigation, however, will not remain focused on scholarly interpretations only.

Thus, the research techniques which will be employed for the purpose derive from sociolinguistic studies and studies on prototypes. Admittedly, applying prototypological principles to genre analysis is not exactly a new idea. The connection has been either explicitly formulated (e.g., Montgomery et al. 2000; Kettemann and Marko 2002; Herman, 2009; Hogan, 2011; Hyvärinen, 2012) or implied (e.g. Virtanen, 1992; Toledo, 2005) throughout a range of research. Swales, for instance, speaks of genres as 'fuzzy' categories (1990: 52), and Fowler argues that genres display prototype effects (1989: 215). Medway, too, discusses 'fuzzy genres' as, he hypothesizes, "there are degrees of genreness" (2002: 141).

Prototype effects can be also observed in definitions of genre such as Devitt's, who proposs genres be analysed as sets of interactive types. A genre set, to her mind, will include all types of texts produced by a person in a particular work occupation (1991: 339). Bazerman similarly suggests members of a community employ a "complex web of interrelated genres where each participant makes a recognizable act or move in some recognizable genre, which

then may be followed by a certain range of appropriate generic responses by others" (1994: 96). That web is termed by him 'a genre system', i.e. a system of "interrelated genres that interact with each other in specific settings" (ibid.: 97). Spinuzzi, similarly, speaks of 'genre repertoires', which change over time due to the fact that newly-emergent genres rely on improvisation (2004: 4). What is left unanswered in such studies is how those sets, systems and repertoires operate cognitively.

Principally, for the last two decades, the interconnection between genre and cognition has been infrequently explored (an exception would be, e.g., Herman 2009) and it has taken a predominantly literary turn, as most evident in Cognitive Poetics (e.g. Gavins 2007; Semino 2010; Giovanalli 2013; Stockwell 2020). "There has hardly been any empirical research on the ways in which real audiences might understand genre" (Buckingham 1993: 137), while, in thinking and talking about genres, "our theorizations can diverge quite significantly from our tacit conceptual formations" (Hogan 2011: 191). Thus, an objective of the studies presented here is to provide quantitative data obtained from actual genre users.

VIII. 4. The studies

The two studies reported here focus on obtaining socio-linguistic information on political discourse. Both studies are questionnaire-based; they employ a quantitative method and techniques of research.

The questions in neither study are open-ended. The questionnaire in the first study offers several possible genre options as answers to each question. The options are selected on the basis of the genres appearing with the highest frequency throughout research on political discourse (e.g. Gamson 1992; Chilton 2003; Eggins and Martin 1997; Fetzer and Bull 2012; Lomborg 2013; Paltridge 2021). The set of alternative options targets prototypical political discourse genres but also tests two (relatively newly-emergent) Internet-related political ones: Facebook statuses and Twitter messages. In the questionnaires, all genres were listed alphabetically to avoid priming effects.

Study 1 involves 16 questions grouped into 2 sets. The first set (containing 6 questions) places each respondent in the position of a text receiver; the second set (containing 8 questions) places each respondent in the position of a text producer. There are 2 additional questions included at the end to obtain information specifically on the Internet genres involved. The expectation was that, due to the relevantly recent emergence of the two genres, some participants' responses might need to be specially elicited. The organization and progression of the questions covers DW variations along the parameters of text users' status, text producers' status, text user's intentions, text functions.

The 2 additional questions in Study 1 yielded results of special significance and were, for that reason, set apart in what was later called Probe 1 (which is part of Study 1). The reason was that the quarantine period and the heightened use of social media suggested the relevance of re-probing for updated information. Two subsequent re-probes were thus conducted; the two are set apart here into a common study, Study 2 (which contains Probe 2 and Probe 3).

The 3 probes (across the 2 studies) had 120 respondents fill the same questionnaire three times: first – in Bulgaria's pre-pandemic period, second – in the spring quarantine period, and third – in Bulgaria's social-distancing and mass-protests period. The three probes were conducted during the following periods:

- Probe 1 took place from April 1st 2018 to July 30th 2018;
- Probe 2 took place from March 23rd 2020 to May 3rd 2020 (spring quarantine period);
- Probe 2 took place from July 1st 2020 to August 15th 2020 (social-distancing and mass-protests period).

Each probe involves a two-item questionnaire. The second and the third probe repeat exactly the two questions' formulations from the original probe. The questions are targeted at establishing why and how people use Facebook for socio-political reasons. The questions are so formulated as to follow a communicative-function-based type of progression. The progression rests on the premise that communicative functions operate prototypically, i.e. they may overlap.

The functions listed as answering options to each question in the three probes are extracted from the questionnaire employed in a previous investigation on Facebook use – that of Brandtzæg and Heim (2009). The functions represent a two-parameter scale ranging (a) from most passive to most active communication, and (b) from a Facebook user's involvement only in virtual reality to a Facebook user's involvement in real life activity.

In both Study 1 and Study 2, while filling the questionnaire, the respondents are asked to:

- Provide only their immediate responses,

- Provide information drawing only on their own personal experience (i.e. they were expected not to generalize about others' socio-political views and/or behavior).

After answering, the respondents were also strongly encouraged to provide additional comments or information they perceived as relevant.

Study 1

The first set of questions in Study 1 had them grouped in 2 sub-sets depending on the combination of political discourse parameters being investigated. In the first sub-set, the 3 questions involve the prototypical political-discourse primary participants of 'political figure/ organization' and 'the media' (as classified in van Dijk's definition in VIII. 2.above). The 3 questions in the second set involve non-prototypical political discourse participants.

In all 6 questions in the first set, the respondents had to identify themselves with the text receiver. In the second set of questions, the respondents' viewpoint was reversed: they had to identify themselves with the text producer.

Study 1 (set 1)

Question 1. *Which genre would you prefer, if you had to be **informed** on a political issue by a political figure/ organization, or by the media?*

GENRE	**NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS**
Article	21
Debate	3
Facebook status	17
Interview	11
News item	62
Speech	4
Twitter message	2
None of the above	0

Table 1

The data obtained through Question 1 demonstrate that:

- *News item* performs significantly better than all the rest of the genres.

- The more ‘traditional’ genres of *news item* and *article* prove highest in preferences, when it comes to Bulgarians’ acquiring information on politics.
- Third in frequency of preference comes the (relatively) newly-emergent genre of *Facebook status* and it lies at a (relatively) small distance from the genre which came second in preferences, i.e. the *article*.
- When it comes to acquiring political information from official public sources, monologic genres are steadily preferred over dialogic ones by Bulgarian political audiences.

The additional respondents’ comments to Question 1 reveal the following specifics about the genre choices made:

- More than 70 % of the preferences pointing to *article* concern online sources.
- *Debate* was chosen on one occasion because the respondent believed that, ‘Truth pops up only there’.
- Nearly 65 % of those who preferred *Facebook status* pointed out that they also tend to cross-check the information with other media outlets and genres.
- Another point concerning *Facebook status* is that, when in search of information, participants prefer to follow statuses by journalists and academics.
- *News item* provoked two major kinds of comments. Respondents from the older generation noted that they prefer TV news items – a tendency which is not present in the younger group of respondents. A second tendency is for *news item* to associate in as many as nearly 28 % with radio news. Here no age differences are traceable, but this kind of comments came from regular drivers, and from city dwellers rather people from towns and villages.
- Both the respondents who chose *Twitter message* felt the need to provide additional comments. Both commented that they use the genre to follow only U.S. President Trump’s activity on Twitter. They noted they did not believe the source, just used it to keep informed.

(Those two comments, clearly, cast a doubt as to the two respondents' general choice of answer.)

- Almost 30 % remarked they used more than one genre and would, normally, purposefully seek the presence of the information in at least a second source.

Question 2. *Which genre would you prefer, if you had to be* ***persuaded on a political issue*** *by a political figure/ organization, or by the media?*

GENRE	**NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS**
Article	24
Debate	27
Facebook status	12
Interview	8
News item	12
Speech	23
Twitter message	1
None of the above	0

Table 2

The data obtained through Question 2 demonstrate that:

- In contrast to the answers to Question 1, this time no single genre stands out.
- When political persuasion is concerned, *article*, *debate* and *speech* attract almost the same number of preferences. In contrast, when information on politics is concerned (in Question 1), *article* ranks 7 times better than *debate* and *speech*.

- *News item* demonstrates a sharp decline from 62 choices in Table 1 to 12 in Table 2. Simply put, the data shows the information value of this specific genre may be high but its persuasive value is more than 5 times lower.
- *Speech* enters the top three choices and proves to be still seen as more persuasive of a genre than an informative one.
- When persuasion is the issue in question, monologic genres tend to be better preferred than dialogic ones.
- There is a presence of 13 instances of no-response (i.e. refusal/ inability to answer) here, while in Question 1 every participant chose to answer. One possible conclusion would be that decisions about persuasiveness are more difficult for the respondents as compared to cases in which politicians and media just inform them. Alternatively, it is easier for politicians and media to just inform Bulgarian political audiences than persuade them on an issue.

The additional respondents' comments to Question 2 reveal the following specifics about the genre choices made:

- 8 respondents explain that they choose *debate* as the correct genre label for cases when more than one interviewee is invited to contribute to a topic and the differences of opinions between/ among interviewees lead to a heated discussion which barely includes the interview host.
- 1 respondent commented he used Twitter messages to persuade himself the tweeting politician 'is no good'. In other words, he was not persuaded into believing a political argument; he just has his convictions about the qualities of a politician confirmed.

Question 3. *Which genre would you prefer, if you had to be* ***persuaded into political action*** *(e.g. voting, joining a strike, participating in a flash mob, etc.) by a political figure/ organization, or by the media?*

GENRE	**NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS**
Article	8
Debate	6
Facebook status	21
Interview	14
News item	5
Speech	6
Twitter message	0
None of the above	0

Table 3

The data obtained through Question 3 demonstrate that:

- Two genres - *Facebook status* and *interview* - display more pronounced preference.
- Due to its substantial decrease from 24 to 8, *article* can be argued to be perceived as more suitable for persuading political audiences (Question 2) but not as suitable for convincing political audiences into action.
- The above tendency is even more pronounced for *debate*, as preferences for it drop sharply from 27 (Question 2) to 6.
- The *Facebook status* almost doubles the number of its preferences. This genre proves most suitable when political action is required.
- *Interview* and *news item* jointly display a downward tendency.

- The most radical decrease is displayed by *speech*. On that basis, it could be argued that political speeches are successful when dealing with ideas, but they are far from that useful when it comes to motivating audiences into political action.
- When political action is in question, monologic genres and dialogic genres prove comparable in efficiency.
- There is a presence of 60 no responses to this question. In comparison, to Question 1 there were 0 no-responses, and to Question 2 there were 13 instances. Arguably, when political action is in question, respondents experience lack of certainty as to whether any genre could influence them strongly enough.

The only additional respondents' comments to Question 3 reveal the following specifics:

- *Debate* was chosen by 2 respondents for negative reasons. Both shared they would feel motivated to vote, if the participants in a debate make them angry enough on a topic.

Table 4 below displays the systematized results from Tables 1-3 on the progression of each of the selected genres from its informative efficiency, through its persuasive efficiency, to its action-motivating efficiency:

GENRE	**QUESTION 1**	**QUESTION 2**	**QUESTION 3**
Article	21	24	8
Debate	3	27	6
Facebook status	17	12	21
Interview	11	8	14
News item	62	12	5
Speech	4	23	6
Twitter message	2	1	0

Table 4

Arguably, the steep decrease of all preferences in the last column concerning Question 3 (with the exception of the most recently emergent genre of *Facebook status*) demonstrates a prevailing tendency for disbelief and distrust in all Bulgarian political discourse genres.

Overall, the results point to the following conclusions about each genre:

- *Article* tends to be perceived by Bulgarian political audiences as more or less persuasive but not informative or efficient in motivating them into political action.
- *Debate* tends to be perceived by Bulgarian political audiences as more or less persuasive but definitely not informative or efficient in motivating them into political action.
- *Facebook status* is the genre which tends to be perform most evenly across all three communicative genre functions. It is perceived by Bulgarian political audiences as least efficient in persuasion, but informative and most efficient in motivating them into political action.
- *Interview* also performs rather evenly across all three communicative genre functions, although with considerably lower efficiency than *Facebook status*. *Interview* tends to be perceived by Bulgarian political audiences as most efficient in motivating them into political action and least successful in political persuasion.
- *News item* tends to be perceived by Bulgarian political audiences as informative but definitely not efficient in motivating them into political action.
- *Speech* tends to be perceived by Bulgarian political audiences as persuasive but not informative or very efficient in motivating them into political action.
- *Twitter messages*, in contrast to Facebook statuses, are generally not used by Bulgarian political audiences.

Question 4. *Which genre would you prefer, if you had to be **informed** on a political issue by **a non-political figure/ organization** or media?*

GENRE	**NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS**
Article	7
Debate	10
Facebook status	39
Interview	48
News item	0
Speech	3
Twitter message	0
None of the above	0

Table 5

The data obtained through Question 4 demonstrate that:

- *Interview* is the genre which ranks highest, when respondents' acquiring political information from sources which are not primary political participants is concerned. *Interview* outranks by a significant margin even the second most-frequently chosen genre in the list, i.e. the *Facebook status*.
- Second in frequency of preference comes the (relatively) newly-emergent, and monologic, genre of *Facebook status*.
- As *interview* ranks first and *debate* lies in third place, it can be concluded that, in acquiring information on politics from sources which are not primary political participants, Bulgarian respondents tend to prefer dialogic genres over monologic ones.

The respondents' additional comments from Question 4 reveal the following specifics about the genre choices made:

- To the respondents, the choice of *debate* was exclusively associated with arguments among family and friends. Moreover, those were debates in which the respondent themselves participated actively and were not merely observers.
- On one occasion, *debate* was chosen because the respondent believes that, "Truth surfaces only there" (translation NT).
- Whenever *interview* was chosen as an answer, '*interview*' concerned mediated events involving non-political entities. Non-politicians, when being interviewed, are reported by the respondents here as more trustworthy than politicians being interviewed.
- *Speech* was the genre chosen by respondents to characterize "heated family monologues" (translation NT) typically delivered by a spouse in a domestic environment. In other words, the responses on *speech* in Question 4 see the genre of *speech* as non-mediated.
- The respondents' comments cited in the previous can be viewed as providing confirmation of the existence of overlaps between public/political and family/ private domains.

Question 5. *Which genre would you prefer, if you had to be* ***persuaded*** *on a political issue by* ***a non-political figure/ organization*** *or media?*

GENRE	**NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS**
Article	11
Debate	13
Facebook status	37
Interview	8
News item	12
Speech	23
Twitter message	0

None of the above	0

Table 6

The data on Question 5 demonstrate that:

- When 'being persuaded' politically is in focus, the distribution of genre choices across the responses is much more even than it was in regard to Question 4, which concerned respondents' 'acquiring information' about politics from non-prototypical political discourse participants.
- When political persuasion is concerned, two genres stand out as top respondents' choices here: *Facebook status* and *speech.* Perhaps interestingly, if viewed from a historical perspective, these two genres can be argued to represent the newest and the oldest political discourse genres to emerge.
- In comparison to Question 4, *Facebook status* preserves not only its leading place but also preserves relatively the same number of preferences. In other words, the genre is found to be equally informative and persuasive by our respondents.
- When 'being persuaded' politically by non-prototypical political discourse participants is in focus, monologic genres are better preferred than dialogic ones by Bulgarian political audiences.
- In contrast to Question 4, the questionnaire registers 16 no-responses to Question 5. Arguably, for Bulgarian respondents, moving from only acquiring political information to growing a political belief is not an unambiguous transition.

The respondents' additional comments from Question 5 reveal the following specifics about the genre choices made:

- About 30% of the responses here suggest that, when a non-politician writes a political *article,* to the respondents, the *article* needs to be found in a blog or in another online source.

- Importantly, 4 respondents remarked that non-politicians' *Facebook statuses* can be frequently reprinted in the media as *articles*.
- Both the above types of comments provide further confirmation of the existence of overlapping between public/political and family/private domains.
- To the respondents, the choice of *debate* was exclusively associated again with their arguments with family and friends. As in Question 4, those were debates in which the respondent themselves participated and did not simply observe.
- *News items* are seen by the respondents here as representing cases in which political news is retold to the respondents by their family members or friends.

Question 6. *Which genre would you prefer, if you had to be* ***persuaded into political action*** *(e.g. voting, joining a strike, participating in a flash mob, etc.) by* ***a non-political figure/ organization*** *or media?*

GENRE	**NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS**
Article	4
Debate	4
Facebook status	39
Interview	23
News item	1
Speech	2
Twitter message	0
None of the above	0

Table 7

The data obtained through Question 6 demonstrate that:

- Two genres – *Facebook status* and *interview* – display significantly higher numbers of preferences than all other genres.
- Between the two leading genres, *Facebook status* registers considerably more choices. Compared to its salience in Table 5 and 6, this genre even displays an increase in the number of respondents' preferences, thus suggesting *Facebook status* is even more efficient when political action is concerned.
- In comparison to Question 5, which concerns political persuasion, in Question 6, there is an increase in respondents' preferences for *interview*.
- Two genres display a steep decrease in number of preferences. *Speech*, which registered 23 choices in Question 5, now drops to only 6. Arguably, to Bulgarian political audiences, political *speeches* deal with ideas only and are not efficient in leading to political action.
- *Debate*, too, sharp declines from 13 to 4 preferences. Again, the genre could be argued to deal with ideas only and not to lead to actual political action, according to our respondents.
- When political action is concerned, to our respondents, there is a balance between monologic genres and dialogic ones.
- Question 6 registers 35 no-responses. Arguably, for Bulgarian respondents, moving from acquiring political information, or being persuaded politically to actual political action(s) is an uneven transition.

There was only one respondent's additional comment as to Question 6:

- A respondent indicated that, if an article is written by a friend or a relative, its effect in leading to political action would be greater. This suggestion re-confirms the existence of overlapping between public/political and family/private domains.

Table 8 below systematizes the data from Tables 5-7 concerning the progression of each genre from its informative efficiency, through its persuasive efficiency, to its political action-motivating efficiency:

GENRE	QUESTION 4	QUESTION 5	QUESTION 6
Article	7	11	4
Debate	10	13	4
Facebook status	39	37	39
Interview	48	8	23
News item	0	12	1
Speech	3	23	2
Twitter message	0	0	0

Table 8

The results in Table 8 point to the following conclusions about the potential of each genre to perform in political communicative situations in which a text is not produced by a prototypical primary political participant:

- *Article* tends to be perceived by Bulgarian political audiences as more or less persuasive but not informative or efficient in motivating them into political action.
- *Debate* tends to be perceived by Bulgarian political audiences as more or less persuasive and informative but definitely not efficient in motivating them into political action.
- *Facebook status* is the genre which tends to perform most evenly across all communicative functions singled out as parameters in our investigation. *Facebook status* is perceived by Bulgarian political audiences as least efficient in persuasion, but informative and most efficient in motivating them into political action.
- *Interview* performs rather unevenly across the three communicative genre functions singled out as parameters in our investigation. Nevertheless, it is the only genre to compete in

efficiency with the *Facebook status*. *Interview* tends to be perceived by Bulgarian political audiences as highly informative, rather efficient in motivating them into political action but not as persuasive in terms of conveying ideas successfully.

- *News item* is relevant here only when a text exemplifying the genre is retold to a political actor by his/her family and friends. *News item* is considered persuasive but definitely not efficient in motivating Bulgarian political audiences into political action.
- *Speech* tends to be perceived by Bulgarian political audiences as persuasive but not informative, nor efficient in motivating them into political action.
- *Twitter messages*, in contrast to *Facebook statuses*, are generally not used by Bulgarian political audiences.

Overall, the additional comments in the first set of questions can be argued to provide a snapshot of the current political 'post-truth' reality. In that reality, Bulgarian users of political information, whether consciously wary of fake news or simply distrustful of both politicians and non-politicians, do suggest they seek information from various and multiple sources. They report to double check intentionally that information not only across sources but also across genres.

Study 1 (set 2)

Question 7. ***Which genre would you prefer if you wanted to express yourself politically to people you know?***

GENRE	**NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS**
Article	2
Debate	56
Facebook post	47

Interview	0
News item	0
Speech	15
Twitter message	0
None of the above	0

Table 9

The data obtained through Question 7 demonstrate that when the 'express oneself' aspect of political performance is in focus and the text addressees are people with whom the text producer is familiar:

- *Debate* is the most frequently preferred genre. This positioning, combined with the *speech* genre, which came in 3rd place, strongly suggests Bulgarians prefer face-to-face communication when expressing themselves politically in familiar environments.
- Second in frequency of preference comes the *Facebook post*.
- The 2 answers selecting the *article* genre as their communicative vehicle of choice were both given by professional journalists.

Question 8. ***Which genre would you prefer if you wanted to express yourself politically to strangers?***

GENRE	**NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS**
Article	4
Debate	12
Facebook post	87
Interview	0
News item	0

Speech	7
Twitter message	0
None of the above	10

Table 10

The data on Question 8 demonstrate that when the 'express oneself' aspect of political performance is in focus and the text addressees are people with whom the text producer is not familiar:

- *Facebook post* is the most frequently preferred genre and comes first with more than 7 times the number of preferences as the genre in 2nd place (*debate*).
- In contrast to the data obtained on Question 1, *Facebook post* demonstrates an increase of 40 preferences. This number represents a swing of as much as 1/3 of the total votes. Bearing in mind that the only parameter in Question 8 that differs from the parameters involved in Question 7 is the one that relates to text addressees being strangers, it can be argued that when expressing themselves politically to strangers Bulgarians prefer non-face-to-face communication. More specifically, in such situations they opt for the *Facebook post* genre and not for other mediated genres such as *Twitter messages* or TV/ radio *interviews*.
- In comparison to Question 7, the *speech* genre still occupies 3rd position; however, it also registers a sharp decline from 15 (Question 7) to 7 (Question 8) in the number of actual preferences.
- All 4 answers that indicate the *article* genre as their vehicle of choice in expounding political views to strangers are given by professional journalists.
- In contrast to Question 7, here there are 10 'None of the above' responses. Arguably, this choice indicates a reluctance to expound one's political views before strangers.

Question 9. ***Which genre would you prefer if you wanted to attract politically like-minded people?***

GENRE	**NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS**
Article	1
Debate	16
Facebook post	97
Interview	0
News item	0
Speech	1
Twitter message	0
None of the above	5

Table 11

The data obtained through Question 9 demonstrate that when the 'perform within political reality' aspect of performing politically is in focus and the text producer initiates the community-building process:

- *Facebook post* is the most frequently preferred genre and comes first with a lead of more than 6 times the number of preferences for the genre in 2nd place (*debate*).
- The 1 answer that points to the *article* genre as the vehicle of choice is given by a professional journalist.
- There are 5 'None of the above' responses. Arguably, those choices point to a reluctance to initiate a political movement or a community-creating process.

Question 10. ***Which genre would you prefer if you wanted to join politically like-minded people?***

GENRE	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS
Article	0
Debate	3
Facebook post	111
Interview	0
News item	0
Speech	4
Twitter message	0
None of the above	2

Table 12

The data obtained through Question 10 demonstrate that when the 'perform within political reality' aspect of performing politically is in focus and the text producer does not initiate the community-creating process:

- *Facebook post* is the most frequently preferred genre and comes first with a lead of more than 28 times the number of preferences for the genres in 2nd (*speech*) and 3rd place (*debate*) combined.
- All genres other than *Facebook post* register very low numbers of choices and, thus, could not be interpreted as registering actual tendencies.
- The respondents who preferred *speech* and *debate* later commented that they prefer to "argue their way" into being accepted in a political community.

Question 11. ***Which genre would you prefer if you wanted to convince people about what the political reality is?***

GENRE	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS
Article	3
Debate	26
Facebook post	79
Interview	2
News item	0
Speech	10
Twitter message	0
None of the above	0

Table 13

The data obtained through Question 11 demonstrate that when the 'perform verbally within political reality' aspect of performing politically is in focus and the text producer wants to create a truthful rendition of that political reality:

- *Facebook post* is the most frequently preferred genre and comes first with a lead of more than 3 times the number of preferences for the genre in 2nd place (*debate*).
- *Debate* is the 2nd most frequently preferred genre. This positioning, combined with the 3rd place of the *speech* genre, suggests a significant number of Bulgarians (roughly 30%) prefer face-to-face communication when they want to convince others on political issues.
- The numbers of choices registered by all other genres are very low and could not be interpreted as registering actual tendencies.
- There are no 'None of the above' responses. Arguably, to Bulgarian non-politicians (as mentioned above, the group of respondents includes no politicians) the communicative function of 'lying' does not overlap with the communicative function of 'convincing'.

Question 12. ***Which genre would you prefer if you wanted to deceive people about what the political reality is?***

GENRE	**NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS**
Article	2
Debate	7
Facebook post	102
Interview	0
News item	0
Speech	2
Twitter message	2
None of the above	5

Table 14

The data on Question 12 demonstrate that when the 'perform verbally within political reality' aspect of performing politically is in focus and the text producer does not want to create a truthful rendition of that political reality:

- *Facebook post* is the most frequently preferred genre here and comes first with a lead of almost 15 times the number of preferences for the genre in 2nd place (*debate*).
- In contrast to the answers to Question 11 above (where a truthful rendition of reality was the task), in Question 12 (where a non-truthful rendition of reality is the task), there is a very significant rise in preferences for the *Facebook post* genre. Simply put, Bulgarian respondents appear to find it considerably easier to lie about a political issue via Facebook than tell the truth via Facebook. In other words, performing untruthfully via Facebook proves considerably easier than performing truthfully via Facebook. This conclusion, however, should not be interpreted as a counter-argument against Facebook posts as they are still by far the most frequently preferred genre when rendering a political reality in general is the task.

- *Debate* is the 2nd most frequently preferred genre here; however, the number of choices registered for it is very low and comparable to all other choices except the top-most one.
- All other genres but *Facebook post* demonstrate very low numbers of preferences. The numbers are so low that they could not be claimed to register tendencies.

Question 13. ***Which genre would you prefer if you wanted to bring about changes in Bulgarian politics?***

GENRE	**NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS**
Article	1
Debate	7
Facebook post	89
Interview	4
News item	0
Speech	2
Twitter message	0
None of the above	17

Table 15

The data obtained through Question 13 demonstrate that when the 'actually doing' aspect of performing politically is in focus:

- *Facebook post* is the most frequently preferred genre and comes first with a lead of almost 13 times the number of preferences for the genre in 2nd place (*debate*).
- All other genres but *Facebook post* demonstrate very low numbers of preferences. The numbers are so low that they could not be claimed to register tendencies.

- There are 17 ‘None of the above’ responses. None of the other 6 questions so far has displayed a comparable number of ‘None of the above’ choices. A possible interpretation would be that Bulgarian respondents would not like to see their political system change; however, their comments after this question strongly suggest that the reason for these 17 non-responses is disbelief that the Bulgarian political system can be changed.

Question 14. ***The use of which genre would you consider actual political action?***

GENRE	**NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS**
Article	0
Debate	11
Facebook post	89
Interview	2
News item	0
Speech	5
Twitter message	0
None of the above	13

Table 16

The data obtained through Question 14 demonstrate that when the ‘performative’ aspect of performing politically is in focus:

- *Facebook post* is the most frequently preferred genre and comes first with a lead of more than 8 times the number of preferences for the genre in 2nd place (*debate*).
- *Debate* is the 2nd most frequently preferred genre. In comparison to Question 13 and in contrast to the *Facebook post*, which appears with exactly the same number of preferences, the

number of preferences for *debate* increases. Arguably, for roughly 8% of respondents, face-to-face arguments count as political action.

- There are 13 ‘None of the above’ responses. None of the other questions so far except Question 7 has displayed a comparable number of ‘None of the above’ choices. Arguably, for more than 10% of Bulgarian respondents, verbal communication does not classify as actual political action. This is in contrast to the roughly 74% of Bulgarian respondents who view the *Facebook post* as a truly performative political action genre.

Study 2

Both Probe 2 and Probe 3 in Study two repeat the two questions from Probe 1 in Study 1. Four options are offered as possible answers to either question; they involve the following interpersonal functions:

- *exchange socio-political information*
- *debate a socio-political issue*
- *motivate others into socio-political (in)action*
- *act socio-politically*

The respondents were asked to arrange those four options in terms of how truthfully each option applies to the specific participant's Facebook experience and habits. The top option would be the one that best represents the participant's experience; the bottom option would be the one that is least representative of their experience. If necessary, the participants were allowed to place two options in the same ranking position. The ranking of each answer was multiplied by the number of respondents who chose it, and thus an overall point score was calculated for each answer option.

The participants' responses are summarized as follows:

Probe 1.

Question 1. ***Do you use Facebook with regard to socio-political issues and, if you do, why*****?**

1. *to debate a socio-political issue* – 64 points

(20 respondents rank it in 1st place; 13 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 6 respondents rank it in 3rd)

2. *to exchange socio-political information* – 66 points

(13 respondents rank it in 1st place; 25 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 1 respondent ranks it in 4th place)

3. *to motivate others into socio-political (in)action* – 105 points

(6 respondents rank it in 1st place; 33 respondents rank it in 3rd place)

4. *to act socio-politically* – 154 points

(1 respondent ranks it in 2nd place; 38 respondents rank in 4th place)

The remaining 58 respondents answer they do not use Facebook on socio-political topics.

Probe 1.

Question 2. ***If you post on Facebook with regard to a socio-political issue, you would be…***

1. *debating a socio-political issue* – 129 points

(65 respondents rank it in 1st place; 32 respondents rank it in 2nd place)

2. *exchanging socio-political information* – 171 points

(28 respondents rank it in 1st place; 64 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 5 respondents rank it in 3rd place)

3. *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* – 289 points

(4 respondents rank it in 1st place; 87 respondents rank it in 3rd place; 6 respondents rank it in 4th place)

4. *acting socio-politically* – 381 points

(1 respondent ranks it in 2nd place; 5 participants rank it in 3rd place; 91 respondents rank in 4th place)

Probe 2.

Question 1. ***Do you use Facebook with regard to socio-political issues and, if you do, why*****?**

1. *to exchange socio-political information* – 93 points

(42 respondents rank it in 1st place; 9 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 11 respondents rank it in 3rd place)

2. *to motivate others into socio-political (in)action* – 129 points

(7 respondents rank it in 1st place; 43 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 12 respondents rank it in 3rd place)

3. *to debate a socio-political issue* – 157 points

(13 respondents rank it in 1st place; 7 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 38 respondents rank it in 3rd; 4 respondents rank it in 4th place)

4. *to act socio-politically* – 241 points

(3 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 1 respondent ranks it in 3rd place; 58 rank in 4th place)

The remaining 35 respondents answer they do not use Facebook on socio-political topics.

The respondents provided the following additional comments to this question:

- Roughly 40 % maintain that they choose 'exchanging information' as their answer but, in doing that, they, strictly speaking, mean 'sharing information'; roughly 28% suggest the information they exchange/share concerns their emotional experience of being quarantined but as they share it with others likely to be experiencing the same, that can be seen as 'exchanging social information'.
- Roughly 5% explain they choose 'acting socially' as their answer as, due to their being quarantined into a confined space, Facebook posting is the only socially-directed action they are physically allowed.

Probe 2.

Question 2. ***If you post on Facebook with regard to a socio-political issue, you would be…***

1. *debating a socio-political issue* – 181 points

(46 respondents rank it in 1st place; 22 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 25 respondents rank it in 3rd place; 4 respondents rank it in 4th place)

2. *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* – 215 points

(33 respondents rank it in 1st place; 29 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 16 respondents rank it in 3rd place; 19 respondents rank it in 4th place)

3. *exchanging socio-political information* – 277 points

(8 respondents rank it in 1st place; 30 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 27 respondent ranks it in 3rd place; 32 respondents rank it in 4th place)

4. *acting socio-politically* – 297 points

(10 respondents rank it in 1st place; 16 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 29 respondent ranks it in 3rd place; 42 respondents rank it in 4th place)

Probe 3.

Question 1. ***Do you use Facebook with regard to socio-political issues and, if you do, why?***

1. *to motivate others into socio-political (in)action* – 147 points

(15 respondents rank it in 1st place; 25 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 26 respondents rank it in 3rd; 1 respondents rank it in 4th place)

2. *to debate a socio-political issue* – 163 points

(23 respondents rank it in 1st place; 11 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 14 respondents rank it in 3rd; 19 respondents rank it in 4th place)

3. *to act socio-politically* – 175 points

(18 respondents rank it in 1st place; 10 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 19 respondents rank it in 3rd; 20 respondents rank it in 4th place)

4. *to exchange socio-political information* – 185 points

(11 respondents rank it in 1st place; 21 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 8 respondents rank it in 3rd; 27 respondents rank it in 4th place)

The remaining 30 respondents answer they do not use Facebook on socio-political topics.

Probe 3.

Question 2. ***If you post on Facebook with regard to a socio-political issue, you would be…***

1. *debating a socio-political issue* – 213 points

(29 respondents rank it in 1st place; 30 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 28 respondents rank it in 3rd; 10 respondents rank it in 4th place)

2. *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* – 233 points

(20 respondents rank it in 1st place; 36 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 23 respondents rank it in 3rd; 18 respondents rank it in 4th place)

3. *acting socio-politically* – 260 points

(27 respondents rank it in 1st place; 9 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 29 respondents rank it in 3rd; 32 respondents rank it in 4th place)

4. *exchanging socio-political information* – 264 points

(21 respondents rank it in 1st place; 22 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 17 respondents rank it in 3rd; 37 respondents rank it in 4th place)

The data in Probe 1, conducted in a normal, pre-pandemic environment, reveal:

- The order of preferences for the four functions specified in the answers is the same for the two questions. As the first question triggers a considerable number of respondents' non-participation (i.e. the participants answer they do not use Facebook on socio-political issues), but the data for the two questions in this Probe are roughly the same, it seems justified to argue

that, in a normal, non-pandemic environment, the opinions of people who choose not to use Facebook on socio-political topics do not change the overall population's attitudes towards Facebook use on such topics.

- In each of the two questions, the overall top function preferred by the respondents (i.e. *debating a socio-political issue*) is the one that also gathers the highest number of direct No.1 rankings. In other words, that function does not rank as No.1 simply due its overall distribution of preferences (i.e. its total points collected). Thus, this top function is highly likely to represent a prototypical center of the category of Facebook socio-political use. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that:
- Similarly to the top function of *debating a socio-political issue*, all four functions are ordered in accordance with the number of their direct and first ranking choices, and not simply in accordance with their total points collected. Thus, all four functions are ordered in a descending manner as far as both overall ranking (i.e. total points collected) and number of direct ranking choices are concerned. This is highly likely to represent the prototypical arrangement of functions in terms of a center of the category (i.e. the top function of *debating a socio-political issue*) of Facebook socio-political use and a periphery of the category (i.e. the other three functions).
- In both questions in Probe 1, in terms of overall points, the responses can be divided into two groups. Each group contains two functions. The overall points of the top two functions (i.e. *debating a socio-political issue* and *exchanging socio-political information*) are comparable in number, as are those of the other two functions (i.e. *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* and *acting socio-politically*). However, there is a significant gap between the numbers of preferences for the two separate groups of functions. This could also be seen as support for the conclusion that the responses in Probe 1 point to a prototypical core (i.e. the top two functions of *debating a socio-political issue* and *exchanging socio-political*

information) and a periphery (i.e. *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* and *acting socio-politically*).

- The top two functions both lie near the 'passive' end of the 'passive – active' socio-political participation' scale.

The data in Probe 2, conducted in a quarantine environment, reveal:

- Unlike Probe 1, in probe 2, the order of preferences for the four functions specified in the answers is not the same for the two questions.
- As in Probe 1, in each of the two questions in Probe 2, the overall top function preferred by the respondents is the one that also gathers the highest number of direct No.1 rankings (for Question 1 that is *exchanging socio-political information*, and for Question 2 that is *debating a socio-political issue*). In other words, the top function does not rank as No.1 simply due its overall distribution of preferences (i.e. its total points collected). Thus, each top function is highly likely to represent a prototypical center of the category of Facebook use. However, unlike the results in Probe 1, in Probe 2, this possibility is not as conclusively supported as:
- The four functions are not all ordered in accordance with the number of their direct top ranking choices: they are ordered in accordance with their total points collected. Three out of the four functions in either question do follow that descending order but both groups contain one exception: in question 1, *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* is in 2nd position, although it was ranked directly into 1st place only 7 times versus the 13 times *debating a socio-political issue* was ranked directly into 1st place. *Motivating others into socio-political (in)action* gathered a higher number of overall points. For the same reason, in question 2, *exchanging socio-political information* ranks in 3rd place with only 8 direct rankings in 1st place versus 10 such rankings for *acting socio-politically*.

- Unlike Probe 1, in terms of overall points, the responses in Probe 2 cannot be divided into two groups, within which the points are comparable in number. Overall, in probe 2, there seems to still be a clear prototype center (i.e. a clear top function), but, moving away from it, the other three functions all display comparable numbers of choices. Those three functions could be interpreted as lying towards the periphery of the category and representing that periphery to a similar degree.

The data in Probe 3, conducted in a social distancing (and mass protests) environment, reveal:

- Unlike Probe 1, the order of preferences for the four functions specified in the answers is not the same for the two questions. Unlike Probe 2, there is a single switch in the positions and that concerns only the top two functions in the two questions: in question 1, *motivating others into social (in)action* ranks first, while *debating a socio-political issue* ranks 2nd; in question 2, *debating a socio-political issue* ranks first, while *motivating others into social (in)action* ranks 2nd.
- Unlike Probe 1 and Probe 2, in probe 3, in each of the two questions, the overall top function preferred by the respondents is not the one that also gathers the highest number of direct No.1 rankings. In other words, that function ranks as No.1 only due its overall distribution of preferences (i.e. total points collected). Thus, in Probe 3, this top function is not as likely to represent a prototypical center of the category of Facebook socio-political use.
- In probe 3, all the four functions are not ordered in accordance with the number of their direct top ranking choices. All four are ordered in accordance with their total points collected.
- Unlike Probe 1, in terms of overall points, the responses cannot be divided into two groups. The preferences for all four functions are, arguably, comparable in number.

- Overall, in Probe 3, there does not seem to be a clear and unambiguous prototype center (i.e. a clear top function) as to the participants' choice of function. All four functions display comparable numbers of choices. They could be seen as lying nearer a prototype center and representing the periphery around the center to a similar degree.

The generalized overall data across the three probes reveal the following tendencies:

- In the responses to question 1, moving from Probe 1, through Probe 2 and to Probe 3, *exchanging socio-political information* ranks in 2nd place, then in 1st place, then in 4th place. Thus, in terms of its overall ranking as to question 1 in all three probes, *exchanging socio-political information* lies in 2nd place. However, its overall points as to question 1 in all three Probes amount to a total of 344, and, in terms of those points, *exchanging socio-political information* is the top function chosen by the participants. For those combined reasons, *exchanging socio-political information* is arguably the prototypical function as far as actual Facebook socio-political uses in general are concerned.
- In the responses to question 1, moving from Probe 1, through Probe 2 and to Probe 3, *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* ranks in 3rd place, then in 2nd place, then in 1st place. Thus, in terms of its ranking as to question 1 in all three probes, *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* shares the 1st place with *debating a socio-political issue*. However, the overall points of *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* as to question 1 in all three Probes amount to a total of 381, and, in terms of those points, *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* ranks 2nd (although it registers only 3 points better than *debating a socio-political issue*). Importantly, the line of progression of *motivating others in socio-political (in)action* across the probes displays a steady upward tendency, while *debating a socio-political issue* rates inconsistently. For those combined reasons, prototypically, *motivating others into*

socio-political (in)action can be seen as the function lying along the periphery, but still lying closest to the central function as far as actual Facebook socio-political uses in general are concerned.

- In the responses to question 1, moving from Probe 1, through Probe 2 and to Probe 3, *debating a socio-political issue* ranks in 1st place, then in 3rd place, then in 2nd place. Thus, in terms of its ranking as to question 1 in all three probes, *debating a socio-political issue* shares the 1st place with *motivating others into socio-political (in)action*. However, the overall points of *debating a socio-political issue* as to question 1 in all three Probes amount to a total of 384, and, in terms of those points, *debating a socio-political issue* ranks 3rd (although it registers only 3 points worse than *motivating others in socio-political (in)action*). Moreover, as argued above, the line of progression of *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* across the probes displays a steady upward tendency, while *debating a socio-political issue* rates rather inconsistently. For those combined reasons, prototypically, *debating a socio-political issue* is a function lying along the periphery, which, although lying very close to second best rated function of *motivating others into socio-political (in)action*, still exemplifies the periphery of actual Facebook socio-political uses.
- In the responses to question 1, moving from Probe 1, through Probe 2 and to Probe 3, *acting socio-politically* ranks in 4th place, then in 4th place, then in 3rd place. Thus, in terms of its ranking as to question 1 in all three probes, *acting socio-politically* ranks last, i.e. in 4th position. The overall points of *acting socio-politically* as to question 1 in all three Probes amount to a total of 570, and, in terms of those points, it also ranks 4th. For those reasons combined, prototypically, *acting socio-politically* is a function lying farthest from the prototype center and along the fuzzy boundary of the category. Still, it does exemplifies the category of actual Facebook socio-political uses. Moreover, it needs to be highlighted that the line of

progression of *acting socio-politically* across the three probes displays the steadiest and most significant upward tendency in comparison with all other functions.

- In the responses to question 2, moving from Probe 1, through Probe 2 and to Probe 3, *debating a socio-political issue* ranks in 1st place, then 1st place, and then again in 1st place. Thus, in terms of its overall ranking as to question 2 in all three probes, *debating a socio-political issue* lies in 1st position. Importantly, this is the only instance of such consistent ranking throughout the three probes. Moreover, the overall points of *debating a socio-political issue* as to question 2 in all three probes amount to a total of 523, and, in terms of those points, *debating a socio-political issue* is also the top function chosen by the participants. For those combined reasons, *debating a socio-political issue* is unambiguously the prototypical function as far as question 2 is concerned.

- In the responses to question 2, moving from Probe 1, through Probe 2 and to Probe 3, *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* ranks in 3rd place, then in 2nd place, then again in 2nd place. Thus, in terms of its ranking as to question 2 in all three probes, *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* lies in 2nd place. The overall points of *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* in question 2 in all three Probes amount to a total of 737, and, in terms of those points, *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* also ranks 3rd. However, in that respect, *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* registers only several points worse than *exchanging socio-political information*, which lies in 2nd place. For those combined reasons, prototypically, *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* can be seen as ranking 2nd as to question 2, and, although lying close to the central function of *debating a socio-political issue*, as still lying along the periphery.

- In the responses to question 1, moving from Probe 1, through Probe 2 and to Probe 3, *exchanging socio-political information* ranks in 2nd place, then in 3rd place, then in 4th place. Thus, in terms of its ranking as to question 2 in all three probes, *exchanging socio-political*

information lies in 3rd position. The overall points of *exchanging socio-political information* as to question 2 in all three Probes amount to a total of 712, and, in terms of those points, *exchanging socio-political information* ranks 2nd. However, the line of progression of *exchanging socio-political information* across the probes displays a steady downward tendency. For those combined reasons, prototypically, *exchanging socio-political information* is seen here as a function lying along the periphery, which, although lying close to the second best rated function of *motivating others into socio-political (in)action*, it still exemplifies the farther periphery of Facebook socio-political uses.

- In the responses to question 2, moving from Probe 1, through Probe 2 and to Probe 3, *acting socio-politically* ranks in 4th place, then 4th place, then 3rd place. Thus, in terms of its ranking as to question 2 in all three probes, *acting socio-politically* ranks last, i.e. in 4th position. The overall points of *acting socio-politically* as to question 2 in all three Probes amount to a total of 938, and, in terms of those points, it also ranks 4th. For those reasons combined, prototypically, *acting socio-politically* is seen here as a function lying farthest from the prototype center and along the fuzzy boundary of the category. Still, the respondents shows *acting socio-politically* does exemplify the category of Facebook socio-political uses. Moreover, the line of progression of *acting socio-politically* across the three probes displays the steadiest and most significant upward tendency in comparison to all other functions.
- No single function is revealed by the respondents as a top function in both question 1 and question 2 and across the three different probes. Three of the functions rate similarly. There is not clear overall prototypological center. Arguably, people's attitudes toward the use of Facebook for socio-political communication and activity are in a process of considerable fluctuation and change during the pandemic period.

The generalized in-pandemic data (i.e. data on the quarantine period as well as the post-quarantine social-distancing period) in Probe 2 and Probe 3 reveal the following tendencies:

- With respect to question 1, the combined in-pandemic data suggest *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* ranks 1st in the period, followed by a shared 2nd position for *debating a socio-political issue* and *exchanging socio-political information*, and a 4th position for *acting socio-politically*. In contrast, in the pre-pandemic period, *debating a socio-political issue* ranks 1st, followed by *exchanging socio-political information*, a 3rd position for *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* and 4th position for *acting socio-politically*. In other words, what has changed is that *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* has moved up from 3rd into 1st place, thus replacing there *debating a socio-political issue.*

That change in positions can also be analyzed with respect to the scales of 'passive communication – active communication' and 'a Facebook user's involvement only in virtual reality – a Facebook user's involvement in real life activity'. Then, what we have in the pre-pandemic period is top positions for *debating a socio-political issue* and *exchanging socio-political information*, which are the functions characterized by the highest degree of passivity in communication and the highest degree of involvement in virtual reality solely. In contrast, in the in-pandemic period, the top position is taken by the more pro-active and considerably more real-life-directed *motivating others into socio-political (in)action*. Arguably, this shift in respondents' attitudes represents an in-pandemic tendency for Facebook use to be perceived as more 'active' and more of a 'real world' activity.

- The combined in-pandemic data suggest *debating a socio-political issue* ranks 1st, followed by *motivating others into socio-political (in)action*. *Exchanging socio-political information* ranks 3rd, and *acting socio-politically* again lies in 4th position. In the pre-pandemic period, *debating a socio-political issue* ranks 1st, followed by *exchanging socio-political information*. The 3rd position is for *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* and the 4th

position – for *acting socio-politically*. In other words, what has changed is that *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* has moved up and replaced *exchanging socio-political information.* That change in positions can again be analyzed with respect to the scales of 'passive communication – active communication' and 'a Facebook user's involvement only in virtual reality – a Facebook user's involvement in real life activity'.

Then, what we have in the pre-pandemic period is top positions for *debating a socio-political issue* and *exchanging socio-political information*, which are the functions characterized by the highest degree of passivity in communication and the highest degree of involvement in virtual reality solely. In contrast, in the in-pandemic period, the more pro-active and considerably more real-life-directed *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* has been more frequently preferred Combined with the significantly increased number of preferences for *acting socio-politically*, this shift in respondents' attitudes can be seen as representing an in-pandemic tendency for Facebook use to be perceived as more 'active' and more of a 'real world' activity.

- Overall, the generalized in-pandemic data (i.e. Probes 2 and 3) differ significantly from the generalized data in the pre-pandemic Probe 1. This fact additionally supports the above assumption that people's attitudes toward the use of Facebook for socio-political communication and activity are in a process of considerable fluctuation and change during the pandemic period.

The generalized data on the quarantine period (i.e. Probe 2) and the generalized data on the post-quarantine social-distancing period (i.e. Probe 3) reveal the following tendencies:

- The quarantine period data suggest *exchanging socio-political information* ranks 1st in the period, followed by *motivating others into socio-political (in)action*. *Debating a socio-*

political issue lies in 3rd position, and *acting socio-politically* – in 4th. In contrast, in the social-distancing period, *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* ranks 1st, followed by *debating a socio-political issue*. The 3rd position is for *acting socio-politically*, and the 4th position – for *exchanging socio-political information*. In other words, what has changed is that *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* and *acting socio-politically* have moved up.

Those two are the functions characterized by the least degree of passivity in communication and with the highest degree of involvement in real-life activities. In other words, while the quarantine period seems to be characterized by a greater exchange of information, the social distancing period tends to see Facebook use as more pro-active and considerably more real-life-directed.

- With respect to question 2, the quarantine period data suggest *debating a socio-political issue* ranks 1st in the period, followed by *motivating others into socio-political (in)action*. *Exchanging socio-political information* lies in 3rd position, and *acting socio-politically* – in 4th. In contrast, in the social-distancing period, *debating a socio-political issue* ranks 1st, followed by *motivating others into socio-political (in)action*. The 3rd position is for *acting socio-politically*, and the 4th position – for *exchanging socio-political information*. In other words, what has changed is that *acting socio-politically* has moved up. Overall, the conclusion drawn above that, in comparison with the quarantine period, the social distancing period tends to see Facebook use as more pro-active and considerably more real-life-directed, is further supported.
- These inferences further support the above assumption that people's attitudes toward the use of Facebook for socio-political communication and activity are in a process of considerable fluctuation and change even within the duration of the pandemic period.

In summary, the participants' contributions in the studies reported in this section can be generalized, first, to confirm the prototypical operation of (a) genre-specific texts (i.e. Facebook posts) associated with 'TW', which (b) function within a DW, while some of the 'DW' functions (e.g. 'talking politically') are metaphorized as RW functions (e.g. 'acting politically') and, consequently, (c) are also seen as elements within the RW.

Second, our studies provide confirmation of the otherwise unsupported by actual language users premise that participating in political communication means "tak[ing] part in the construction of the polity itself" (Diez 1999: 599; see also Hajer 2009; Horsbol 2018).

Another crucial generalization is that the contributions of the participants in the three probes demonstrate the above conclusion was not equally valid at all three time periods tested. In the first probe, it is only (a) and (b) that are confirmed as operational. In the second probe, (c) also emerges. In the third probe, (b) and (c) are predominantly in focus. This is a progression from a narrower, text-centered view of Facebook posts related only to textual and communicative functions to a broader view of Facebook posts related to social RW functions.

VIII. 5. Contextualizing the investigation: 'performing', 'acting', 'Internet role-playing'

The quantitative data obtained from actual language users in the two studies reported in the previous section contribute by supporting several scholarly theoretical assumptions discussed at the beginning of Chapter VII. This section traces those, and, in parallel, it seeks existing theoretical explanation(s) of the data obtained in the studies.

A theoretical precept which finds its confirmation through the two studies is Mey's assertion (2018) that mass Internet usage has brought about a new interpretation of 'sociality' – a 'sociality' that relies simultaneously on participants' traditional, obligatorily bodily presence in a communicative exchange as well as on modern-day participants' bodily remoteness. In tackling the difference between the two types of communication, Mey relies on what he calls 'linguistic avatarism' (2018: 16) and 'Internet role-playing' (2018: 17). Importantly, to Mey, 'linguistic avatarism' and 'Internet role-playing' lead to the existence of two types of identities employed by the same person in the two types of communication. As others do (e.g. Ellison et al. 2006; Tagg and Seargeant 2016; Matley 2018), Mey distinguishes between a real-life identity and an online/virtual identity. In a similar vein, drawing on Goffman's pioneering work (1959) on selective self-presentation, Dayter (2018) discusses what he calls real-life vs. social-media 'self-presentation'. Clearly, 'real-life identities' within those theoretical frameworks are viewed in non-cognitive terms and cannot be equated with the RW IDENTITIES as cognitive simulations proposed in the present thesis.

In Mey's and Dayter's frameworks, at first glance, 'Facebook communication' seems to associate with virtual-world identities, while 'politics' and 'political communication' associates with real-life identities. But what happens if we address a case in which the Facebook user in Facebook communication is a RW politician? Does their usage of Facebook count as a RW identity usage or as a virtual-identity usage? Does that usage classify as 'political communication' or as 'virtual communication'? And does a politician's 'virtual political

communication' count only as 'virtual communication' or also as 'virtual political action'? Can it count as 'virtual political action with effects in political reality'? The respondents' answers in the two studies on which this chapter centers attest to Facebook communication representing simultaneously virtual and RW identity use; they also provide an affirmative answer to the last question. Therefore, the respondents' answers can be seen as confirmation that virtual worlds and RWs share a common status (otherwise overlaps and metonymic transfer would not be possible), and that neither is the same as 'reality'.

Generally, the term 'virtual world' tends to be used interchangeably with the term 'virtual space' and sometimes even with 'virtual reality'. Jung and Vitzthum (2022), however, provide a more apt definition of virtual worlds as 'the contents' of virtual realities, contents whose elements could be 3D animated objects, sound, lighting, backgrounds, etc. Computer-simulated in essence and, practically, functioning as an interface, a Virtual Reality in its turn can vary into an Augmented Reality, a Diminished Reality, a Mixed Reality, a Mediated Reality (i.e. a combination of an Augmented Reality and a Diminished Reality) or into an Extended Reality (see, e.g., Azuma 1997; Broll 2022). Each is considered to represent a combination and a direct link between computer-generated spaces and 'physical reality', which, however, emphasizes the hardware and technology (i.e. the 'physical') aspect over its cognitive counterpart.

Virtual worlds in their turn are generally defined as spaces which are three-dimensional, although generated on a two-dimensional computer screen. Their interpretative nature is evident in this rather typical description, which traces the way physical world spaces are re-created in a virtual world:

> There are buildings and rooms that are designed to facilitate specific forms of interaction as for instance in the case of lecture theatres, seminar rooms or assembly halls. The architecture of such rooms, including not only their shape but also the arrangement of

> furniture and technical equipment, provides affordances that facilitate and structure lectures, class-room discussions and debates. [...] In online virtual worlds, the spatial context of interaction has to be graphically recreated. The various aspects of this context, however, are selectively re-created. Some of them serve similar functions as in physical life ... (Berger et al. 2016: 83; emphasis mine)

Clearly, the very use of the concepts of ROOMS and SPACES in virtual communication reveal the presence of metaphorical conceptualizations underlying the general understanding of online communication. Virtual worlds and spaces, furthermore, can be 'accessed' through virtual identities frequently called 'avatars'. Virtual identities, consequently, are also simulational in nature, and, in similarity to ROOMS and SPACES, can also be argued to stand in conceptual metaphoric or metaphtonymic relationships with RW identities, which takes us back to Mey's (2018) 'linguistic avatarism' and 'Internet role-playing'.

Complying with the necessity to pay special attention to the concept of virtual/online identity, one cannot but single out Yus's Cyberpramatics approach, the stepping stone of which are several ethnomethodological premises:

> Goffman's differentiation between the roles that we play in society and the real identity that is hidden behind the "social facade" is undoubtedly applicable to Internet-mediated communication, where users' identities often remain backstage in intimacy, while other electronic identities play their parts in the visible area of the social stage. (Yus 2011: 21)

In discussing individual/personal identity and collective/social identity, Yus draws heavily on Gumperz's (1971: 114) belief that one of the main sources of identity is the speech community, and, therefore, argues that a person's intra-group identity can be complemented by a person's inter-group identity. All these identity components can be enacted through Facebook posting: Yus (2011, 2018a, 2018b) maintains people shape both the physical and psychological aspects

of their identities through (a) uploading content on Facebook, and (b) through managing this content's impact on others. In that,

> identity is mainly constructed through interpersonal interactions, and the social and physical environment. While a user may try to portray an ideal construction of the self while online, with full awareness of the underlying identity-related intentionality, in most instances this performance is not viewed as a conscious act and it partly remains subconscious, depending on the situation (environment and audience). (Yus 2018b: 118)

Positioned within the theoretical framework adopted in this thesis, 'acting' can be interpreted as one's supporting two overlapping IDENTITIES: one IDENTITY in a RW and another – in the overlapping TW-DW evident, in our case, in a Facebook post. Either IDENTITY, prototypically, functions as a cluster of (sub-)identities which can be dynamically actualized in accordance with the DW.

Such a view could be taken to find support in Yus's claim (2011, 2018a, 2018b) that an identity is not fixed or stable: it is interactive, co-constructed and adapted to different contexts. In other words, in online communication, an identity, just as in 'reality', displays great discursive variability. Thus, a Facebook profile is

> a form of digital body where individuals must write themselves into being in order to express and represent salient aspects of their identity for others to see and interpret. ... By means of different types of uploaded (verbal-visual-multimodal) discourse, users position themselves as unique individuals (Davies/Harre 2001) and upload content on their profiles with expected audiences and interpretations, a kind of *identity performance* (Chatora 2010, 20–21). Yus (2018: 127)

Moreover, general research on genre also supports such a view: Bawarshi & Reiff (2010) refer to particular "performances" of a genre, and Hyland (2010) harmonizes genres with one's

"performing" one's identity through 'community repertories'. Consequently, through the concept of identity, 'performing' seems to have the potential to bridge the gap between 'communicating in a virtual world' and 'acting in a real world'.

The notion of an individual's enacting of their identity through performing and the notion of performing to socially enact one's identity are, arguably, fundamental for perceptions of COMMUNICATION. A metaphoric but rather revealing version of an IDENTITY-related perception of COMMUNICATION could be seen in Act II, Scene VII of Shakespeare's "As you like it", in which the WHOLE WORLD is metaphorized as a STAGE and all HUMANS as merely PLAYERS upon it. Modern times in film and acting have witnessed a modified but related understanding of 'performing' in Meisner's cornerstone claim that "[t]he foundation of acting is the reality of doing" (Meisner and Longwell 1987: 16). This interpretation also inspired Salz's "The Reality of Doing: Real Speech Acts in the Theatre" (2000), which aims to bridge the gap between several aspects, or several viewpoints, on what to 'perform' means. Generally, such theatrical, film, literary, or, in other words, fiction-related perceptions of COMMUNICATION as PERFORMING tend to amalgamate the notions of 'doing', 'reality', 'fictional reality' and 'expressing oneself publicly'. They can also apply to 'Virtual Reality' due to its being (a) fictional, and (b) a type of narrative (for a discussion see Sheldon 2022), which would also allow us to claim that a 'Virtual Reality' is a type of TW.

The concept of 'perform', it should be highlighted, is not restricted to fictional, i.e. to virtual, theatrical, filming and literary environments. One version of it can be observed in linguistics, where performatives are studied as simultaneous descriptions and expressions of an ongoing communicative act (e.g. Greenbaum, 1992; Dirven & Verspoor, 2004). Clearly, linguistic analyses of this kind aim to represent these descriptions and expressions as part of a 'real' reality in which 'real' (i.e. not 'fictional') communication takes place.

In parallel, Discourse Analysis can be found to metaphorize DISCOURSE in terms of

> a "dance" that exists in the abstract as a coordinated pattern of words, deeds, values, beliefs, symbols, tools, objects, times, and places in the here and now as a performance that is recognizable as just such a coordination. Like a dance, the performance here and now is never exactly the same. (Gee 2005: 19; emphasis mine)

Not far removed from the language- and discourse-focused line of thought is the philosophy-based Speech Act Theory (see V. 2. 1.), according to which performative utterances are part of the 'simple' belief that "language is action" (Wittgenstein 1979; Austin 1962; Searle 1969; Sbisà 2014). Research in Pragmatics and Relevance Theory (Wilson and Sperber 1985; Sperber and Wilson 1986; Wharton 2009; Wharton et al. 2022; Yus 1998, 2011, 2014) has also drawn extensively on the notions of performatives. The so-called Dialogic Speech Act Theory carries the notion even further and maintains every speech act is either an action or a reaction (Weigand 2006), while Butler and her followers interpret performatives as at once linguistic and bodily (Butler 1997; Diez 2011; Rai 2014; Adler-Nissen et al. 2017).

A difference between the arts-directed and the language/discourse-directed interpretations could be detected in the fact that the latter puts slightly greater emphasis on the 'language use' aspect of performing. I say 'slightly' because Pragmatics has been known to study non-verbal, bodily aspects of communication such as gestures, facial expressions, quality of voice, length of pauses, etc.

From the perspective adopted in this thesis, all the different approaches mentioned above choose whether to profile elements from a TW (i.e. linguistic structures), to profile elements from a DW (i.e. communicative functions), or to profile elements from a RW (i.e. participants' actions). Due to existing TW-DW-RW overlaps, however, each theoretical approach may not only profile a single World or elements from a single World (e.g. PARTICIPANTS' IDENTITIES, ACTIONS), but may choose to profile two overlapping

Worlds together (against the background of the third World), or to profile some element(s) which are simultaneously present in two Worlds.

Due to the conflated, simultaneous and metaphtonymized presence of elements in more than one World, it is possible for both scholars and laypeople to interpret VERBAL COMMUNICATION in a DW as ACTION in a RW. Hence also scholars' long-standing, cross-discipline conceptualizations of PERFORMING as COMMUNICATING VERBALLY (in what this thesis sees as a DW) and ACTING (in what this thesis sees as a RW) simultaneously. Hence the more general possibility for the Pragmaticists notion of perlocution to exist: it conflates VERBAL COMMUNICATION in a DW with ACTION in a RW. Hence also our respondents' beliefs (discussed in VIII. 4.) that Facebook posting (which, generally, exists as TW-DW overlap) can constitute RW action.

VIII. 6. Contextualizing the investigation: 'text types'

The conclusions and suggestions in the previous section could associate not only with the notions of 'action' and 'performativity'. Through highlighting the significance of functions in TWs and DWs, they also associate with the text linguistic notion of 'text type' discussed in Chapter V.

Investigations on 'text type' represent analysts' need to classify texts and discourses in accordance with functions texts and discourses have the potential to perform (see Snell-Hornby 2006). True to fact, Werlich (1976) sees a text type as expressing a text's dominant function; Reiss (1976) introduces text types into translation studies and argues they depend on text purpose (the so-called 'skopos' theory, from the Greek 'purpose'); Biber (1989) defines text types as related to communicative functions; Hatim and Mason maintain text type is "a conceptual framework which enables us to classify texts in terms of communicative intentions serving an overall rhetorical purpose" (1990: 140).

A rare exception to this general view can be found in Virtanen (1992, 2022), who approaches text types as combinations of a text producer's intent and a linguistic form. Virtanen even postulates two different terms to match the function-form duality: 'text type', to her, is a formal linguistic category in opposition to 'discourse type' as a functional category (1992: 302). Another exception is Aumüller's defining text type as "an abstract category designed to characterize the main structure of a particular text or one of its parts according to its dominant properties" (2014: 1).

Even if we focus only on the majority of research on text type, which deals with text functions exclusively, the issue stands as to how to classify those functions. In that respect, text type classes still pose "a severe challenge" to linguistic typology (de Beaugrande and Dressler 1981: 182). Typically, the Aristotelian narration, description, exposition and argumentation

would be resorted to in scholars' classifying text types (Paltridge 2001, 2013, 2021), with some variations.

Kinneavy (1980), for instance, supports the existence of only four text types although they are not the Aristotelian ones: he lists narration, classification, description and evaluation. Kinneavy prefers to classify those types in accordance to two general 'modes' and differentiates between static and dynamic 'modes'. He further sub-classifies the two 'static' text types into one focusing on individual existences (i.e. describing) and one focusing on several things grouped together (i.e. classifying). The two dynamic text types, Kinneavy argues, are narration or of evaluation.

To Werlich (1976) and to Hatim and Mason (1990), however, the text type functions are five: those authors add 'instruction' to Aristotle's list. De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981), too, propose more than the four 'classical' text types be delineated: they list narrative, argumentative, descriptive, scientific, didactic, poetic and literary texts types.

In contrast, Reiss (1976) argues the list should be shortened to three main functions only: informative (in which arguments, intentions, opinions, feelings, etc. are communicated and the text type focuses on the text's topic), expressive (in which the artistic expression is of special significance thus focusing the text type on the text producer), and operative (in which the subsequent actions and reactions of the text receiver(s) are on focus).

The idea of 'focusing' is also present in Trosborg's works, which combine it with profiling principles to explain text types. Trosborg argues that there are four major components of every communicative exchange and that any of them can by highlighted: text producer, text receiver, the object being referred to and the linguistic structures used (1997: 13). If the main focus is on the text producer, she argues, the function will be 'expressive'; if the focus is on the text receiver, the text will be 'persuasive'; if the focus falls on the linguistic structures

employed, the text type will be ‘literary’; and if the text highlights objects from reality, the function will be ‘referential’.

This approach is easily translatable into a cognitive framework, where focusing on an element brings about perspectivization within a cognitive frame or a cognitive scenario. However, if Trosborg’s proposal is approached through the framework proposed in this thesis, focusing on the text producer or on the text receiver would amount to profiling a DW function; focusing on linguistic structures and images they evoke would amount to profiling (elements in) a TW; focusing on “objects from reality” would amount to profiling (elements in) a RW.

Another strong point in Trosborg’s theory is that, according to it, no text is expected to display features of one text type only. All texts, she argues, are multifunctional (1997: 16; see also Chapter II in this thesis) – a claim echoed by Werlich (1976) and Virtanen (1992), too. Trosborg also expounds the view that one of the set of text types being employed will, normally, be identifiable as dominant. In a similar vein, Hatim and Mason (1990:146) maintain text types are highly susceptible to hybridization and what should classify a text as belonging to one of the types is its dominant function. De Beaugrande and Dressler also argue that the “demands or expectations associated with a text type can be modified or even overridden by the requirements of the context of occurrence” (1981: 182).

Furthermore, as Hatim and Mason forcibly argue (1990: 145), there is substantial difference between rhetorical purpose and communicative intent, which can be combined in various ways. A text producer’s intent, they maintain, may be to persuade but, in order to achieve persuasion, the text producer may choose to narrate, or describe, or inform. What is more, the overtly formulated text producer’s intent may be considerably different from his/ her actual intent. Last but not last, a text may become incorporated into a larger one, which may lead to modification(s) or even to a shift in its overall and/ or dominant purpose.

In brief, if the taxonomies listed above are themselves used as a database, what generalization can be drawn reveals that:

(a) Functional labels such as ‘narrative’, ‘argumentative’ and ‘descriptive’ express what one does ‘in’ the text: that is, one narrates, provides arguments, describes, etc. Consequently, such labels associate with TWs;

(b) Functional labels such as ‘persuasive’ and ‘informative’ reveal why the text producer narrates, provides arguments, describes, etc.: that is, the text producer does so because they intend to persuade or to inform someone. Consequently, such labels associate with DWs.

An alternative interpretation could suggest that, if we adopt Hatim and Mason’s (1990) terms mentioned above, communicative-intent related labels (e.g. ‘persuasive’, ‘informative’) specify the goal of communication (in the DW), while rhetoric-purpose related labels (e.g. ‘narrative’, ‘descriptive’) specify the means to achieving that goal (in the TW).

Overall, due to the overlap and the ensuing conflation of the two types of Worlds, all classifications display a mixture of TW functions and DW functions. Perhaps that is also the reason why de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981), whose theoretical approach does not employ the notion of DW, offer two separate – still mixed – text type taxonomies and postpone the resolution of the issue of how to classify text types for future times.

In confirmation of these theoretical conclusions, I could cite the results from a study I conducted on text types (Tincheva 2017) involving actual users of the term. Although van Dijk (1972) maintains knowledge of text types is part of ‘obligatory textual competence’ every participant in a communicative exchange should possess, it seems safe to state that few people unrelated to academic practices use the term. As the notion tends to be employed only by teachers, academics and writers (Dudley-Evans 1998; Paltridge 2001; 2013), the term could not

be considered to be part of general knowledge and vocabulary, as, for instance, ‘genre’ could be. Therefore, in conducting the said study, I had to confine myself to university contexts only.

The study reveals that most users employ the term ‘text type’ to refer to functions rather than text form or content. It also reveals that, out of all possible interpretations of ‘function’, rhetoric functions rather than text producer’s intent are most salient. ‘Text type’, the respondents confirm, is a prototypical category with a center and periphery, which so operate as to refute theoretical claims of the special importance of a single dominant function.

As far as the interconnection between ‘text type’ and ‘genre’ is concerned, there can be found studies (e.g. Bowie et al. 2014), which use the terms synonymously. Prototypically, as Biber writes, text types and genres are “clearly to be distinguished, as linguistically distinct texts within a genre may represent different text types, while linguistically similar texts from different genres may represent a single text type” (1989: 6). Genres, viewed from a text type analyst’s perspective, can be also generalized to be something text types “cut across” (Trosborg 1997; Virtanen 2020).

In contrast, our discussions in this chapter can be summarized to view TEXT TYPE as a concept typically profiling a conceptual region of TW-DW overlap, and GENRE – as a concept typically profiling a conceptual region of TW-RW overlap. While TEXT TYPE prototypically conflates rhetoric functions and communicative intent, GENRE prototypically conflates textual organization and real-life action. Undoubtedly, these conclusions are supportable as far as only the present-day stage of the notions’ evolution is concerned.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

IX. 1. Contributions of the thesis

The thesis addresses issues pertaining to the complexity of text and discourse analysis. It seeks to harmonize perspectives on TEXT, DISCOURSE, and the way(s) they could be studied.

In most general terms, the thesis associates with two main domains and it does so to varying degrees. The first domain is the one of TEXT, DISCOURSE and related notions; the second domain is the one of existing theoretical approaches to the concepts in question. Those theoretical approaches are believed here not only to reflect (figuratively) scholarly interpretations of TEXT and DISCOURSE, but also to result from the operation of the same cognitive mechanisms that enable the operation of TEXT and DISCOURSE themselves.

As a consequence, the first contribution of the thesis is the theoretical framework it employs: the framework co-ordinates premises from several cognitive fields of research. The thesis argues in favour of harmonizing principles from studies on conceptual figurativity, gestalt psychology, text-world theory, and cognitive text and discourse studies. In this way, the thesis tries and provides a step towards achieving greater cross-fertilization in text- and discourse-oriented cognitive research.

The investigative progression employed in the thesis leads to the formulation of a multi-process cognitive model intended as a multi-purpose instrument, which has the potential to be applicable in research on various aspects of text and discourse use. The model is intended as applicable to both single aspects of text and discourse use as well as to any possible

combinations of such aspects. In other words, the model reflects the theoretical and analytical need to integrate different aspects of the object of investigation, which makes the model applicable to various research goals and sets of research goals.

'Model' is the word used in the thesis for a multi-process set of simultaneously functioning cognitive mechanisms; it is preferred due to its evoking a (scholarly) interpretation of actual cognitive processes and mechanisms. The model, basically, represents a theoretical hypothesis that those cognitive mechanisms co-function. It also represents the hypothesis that their co-functioning can be studied through various – qualitative and quantitative – research techniques, and for various text- and discourse-related research purposes.

Importantly, the multi-process model does not represent a new approach. The model stands for a contention that anything – from analysis of a single notion to the meta-analysis of whole theoretical approaches – can be studied as resulting from the same basic cognitive operations.

The thesis has isolated the following cognitive mechanisms as components of the multi-process model proposed here: conceptual metaphor, conceptual metonymy, World overlapping and World profiling. Each mechanism itself is believed to function through the amalgamation of component cognitive operations. The mechanisms are argued to function simultaneously and through overlaps to the point of creating significant impediments before the analytical isolation of separate mechanisms.

Last but not least, the list of mechanisms is far from exhaustive. Each component mechanism, prototypologically, could potentially accrue further cognitive operations and/or cognitive mechanisms into the model. Viewpoint and stance, for instance, have been mentioned in the thesis as potential candidates for such accrual. Thus, future research on operations and mechanisms could, potentially, introduce significant changes into the multi-process model. What the basic premises here hold is that (a) conceptual metaphor, conceptual metonymy,

World overlapping and World profiling are key to any understanding of TEXT and DISCOURSE, and that (b) those mechanisms should be studied together as a gestalt.

Indeed, the operation of each of the component cognitive mechanisms in the set has been known to have been investigated: at that, some of the mechanisms have been investigated very extensively. However, those investigations have almost exclusively aimed at isolating and distinguishing one mechanism from the others. The present thesis suggests the opposite: it tables a proposal according to which it is the four mechanisms' co-functioning which needs to find its proper place in the literature.

Thus, a contribution of the thesis is the first-time harmonization of research on Worlds with research on gestalt perception. Another contribution is the introduction of the notion of 'Real World' as a cognitive phenomenon. Yet another – the proposed coherence in the co-operation of conceptual metonymy with World creation, and the ensuing claim that whole Worlds (and not only general domains) can be profiled metonymically through either World expansion or World reduction.

The thesis also demonstrates that the same multi-process set of cognitive mechanisms functions in both 'online' and 'offline' processing of text- and discourse-related information. In that, the mechanisms are revealed to function prototypically, one or more mechanisms looming larger in dependence on the object studied. Within the limitations of the thesis, concepts of 'narrower' scope such as text elements (e.g. TEXT STRUCTURE) have been shown to be more metaphor- and metaphtonymy-dependent. 'Broader' scope notions (e.g. a whole genre such as POLITICAL SPEECH, FACEBOOK POST) appear more dependent on World-related mechanisms and metonymy.

In this way, the thesis also demonstrates how the multi-process model can be actually used in hands-on analysis. Moreover, the analysis has been conducted on both

academics'/scholars' interpretations of text- and discourse-related notions as well as on general populations' conceptualizations of them.

The thesis only seeks to verify the simultaneous presence and co-operation of the set of cognitive mechanisms, and it could not investigate here all its applications. Moreover, the very purpose of systematizing the cognitive mechanisms into a coherent model is to give grounds and an original impetus for, hopefully, numerous and varied future investigations.

IX. 2. Contributions of the chapters

Chapter II has offered a principled theoretical suggestion on the basis of which political speeches could be (re-)defined and the multiple simultaneous functions performed by a political speech could be analyzed.

Another contribution of the chapter is the confirmation that, in the case of POLITICAL SPEECHES, the metaphoric transfer from the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schema is triple and evident in all three types of Worlds. In TW, it controls the unfolding of 'the story'. In the RW, it metaphorizes LIFE as A JOURNEY. Together with conceptual metonymy, it serves to profile a DW as a STEP along the PATH of LIFE.

Third, in addition to introducing the notion of World overlaps, the chapter supports a view of TW-DW profiling shifts as holding a potential to trigger a lasting ambiguity as to which World is currently profiled. Examples (included in the chapter) such as *What I want the American people to know, what I want the Congress to know is that I am profoundly sorry* are revealed to signal (a) the RW (as would, e.g., *I was sorry for quite some time*), (b) a DW (as would, e.g., *I feel sorry as I am speaking right now*), or (c) a TW (i.e. the PROTAGONIST in the story feels sorry). Such examples, the chapter argues, confirm that choosing which type of World (i.e. a TW or a DW) is currently being profiled is not a one-correct-answer activity but rather a matter of individual perceptual specificities. Such a view, to the best of my knowledge, has not been supported yet in the literature.

Chapter III focuses on the terminological and conceptual diversity surrounding the notion of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE. The chapter re-examines WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE and demonstrates how it functions as a category through prototypicality effects. The investigation, first, isolates six major terms used throughout the literature to refer to a structure which 'runs

across' a whole text, or which 'holds' a whole text 'together': 'rhetorical structure', 'narrative structure', 'text structure', 'overall structure', 'superstructure' and 'macrostructure'.

The analysis illustrates how TEXT STRUCTURE, RHETORICAL STRUCTURE, NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, MACROSTRUCTURE, OVERALL STRUCTURE, SUPERSTRUCTURE, etc. function as realizations of the same multi-faceted conceptual complex due to the amalgamated operation of the cognitive mechanisms in the multi-process set. In other words, each of the concepts of RHETORIC STRUCTURE, NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, TEXT STRUCTURE, OVERALL STRUCTURE, SUPERSTRUCTURE and MACROSTRUCTURE is demonstrated to function metonymically by evoking different facets of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE.

The chapter also provides an explanation of how the 'sense' of MOVEMENT through WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE, created on the basis of a metaphoric transfer from the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL structure, is enacted. The analysis also provides support for the possibility for MOVEMENT through WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE to be created through the mechanism of profiling shifts. Those profiling shifts, analysis of the dataset verifies, are enacted on the simultaneously operating TWs and DWs.

Another contribution is the generalization that a whole text's structure can employ either principles of World sequencing, principles of World conflation, or any mixture of the two. More simply put, Chapter III verifies that either of the two cognitive mechanisms (i.e. World sequencing and World overlapping) can co-function with conceptual metaphor to create the impression of step-by-step MOVEMENT through a TEXT.

Chapters IV and V answer the question of which theories can function as background to the application of the multi-process model proposed in the thesis. In other words, the chapters answer the question of which approaches to TEXT and DISCOURSE could cohere with,

sustain and be advanced by employing the multi-process model. In doing that, the chapters provide meta-analysis of academic works/discourses.

On the basis of the cognitive mechanisms in the multi-process model, Chapter IV provides a re-definition of the field of Text Linguistics. It argues that, in addition to metaphtonymizations of TEXT as a PHYSICAL PRODUCT, as a COGNITIVE PRODUCT, or as a system of text-related COGNITIVE PROCESSES, Text Linguistics is characterized by conflation and profiling switches enacted on text-centered textual aspects (cohesion, coherence) and user-centered textual aspects (intentionality, acceptability, informativity and situationality).

Chapter V, in its turn, provides a prototypology of approaches dedicated to analyses of discourse(s). Above all, it supports the generalization that, in Discourse Analysis, the predominant underlying metaphtonymyzation of TEXT, DISCOURSE and SOCIETY/ CULTURE as representing a progression in terms of concentric geometric spaces of increasing scope. The metaphtonymyzation is demonstrated to operate simultaneously through World profiling shifts.

Chapter VI employs the multi-process model and distinguishes theoretically between 'context', 'DW', 'user-centered parameters', 'communicative environment', etc.

The chapter also contributes by advancing our understanding of the multi-process model by providing evidence for the operation of TW-DW-RW overlapping and coincidence. Moreover, it provides evidence for the overlapping and coincidence of more than one World of a type, for example, overlapping of two TWs with a RW. The possibility is explained to exist due to profiling and scope variation specifics.

Importantly, the chapter defends the position that a DW and a RW co-operate through conceptual metonymy.

Chapter VII advances the understandings that (a) a 'RW' and 'reality' are different notions, and (b) that a DW and a RW co-operate through conceptual metonymy.

In verifying the latter premise, the chapter offers analysis of BREXIT, and generalizes that, at times of socio-political changes, people tend to minimize their use of figurativity. Moreover, it non-literal thinking is used in such times, people tend to employ fundamental metaphorizations such as LIFE as a JOURNEY. The chapter also argues that the use of figurativity in mediated discourse can be used a measure of the degree to which a concept is interpreted as 'real', i.e. as part of a RW.

As far as BREXIT in particular in concerned, Chapter VI contributes by verifying that, within the limits of the time period analyzed:

- ✓ BREXIT is most often metaphorized as a DIVORCE, A NATURAL DISASTER and PART OF A JOURNEY.
- ✓ In UK media, the JOURNEY, DISASTER and WAR metaphoric conceptualizations prevail. In non-UK EU media, MECHANICAL FAILURE is more prominent.
- ✓ Overall, a preference for inanimate source domains characterizes both UK and non-UK EU media uses.

Through the notion of 'RW', Chapter VII provides an explanation as to how a concept without a real-world referent (such as BREXIT) gradually 'enters reality'.

Chapter VIII advances the theoretical contribution of Chapter VII by offering an explanation of how another (relatively) newly-emergent concept – Facebook posts – gradually 'enters' RWs. In this manner, the chapter contributes to studies of cognitive phenomena in context, and

especially to studies of discourse as (social) action, thus positioning the present investigation close to research on human cognitive ecologies.

Another contribution of the chapter is its applying the notion of intra-domain activation as intra-World profiling and metonymy. The results and conclusions from the discussion included support the possibility for conceptual metonymic overlap and the ensuing conceptual coincidence between a DW and a RW to be so extensive that the DW and the RW become integrated into a conceptual gestalt.

As far as Facebook posting in particular is concerned, the data obtained and discussed in Chapter VIII support the assumption that the 2020 pandemic has heightened the socio-political role of Facebook. The chapter further contributes by establishing that the Facebook post is seen in present-day Bulgarian society as a separate genre and as a social instrument through which Bulgarians do not simply communicate but believe they actually act politically.

Moreover, Chapter VIII provides and discusses sociolinguistic data on the functions and efficiency of other major genres in political discourse. The data obtained reveal the Facebook post and the debate are the only two genres which are seen as so communicatively efficient as to represent actual political action(s).

At that, the Facebook posting tends to be increasingly seen as a pro-active and real-life-directed activity: in the pre-pandemic period, people primarily used Facebook socio-politically to *debate a socio-political issue* and *exchange socio-political information*. In the quarantine period, people used Facebook primarily to *debate a socio-political issue* and *motivate others into socio-political (in)action*. In the social-distancing period, people used Facebook primarily to *motivate others into socio-political (in)action* and *debate a socio-political issue*. Overall, the data obtained reveal that the tendency across the three periods is for people increasingly to perceive Facebook use as a non-virtual-world activity.

Another contribution of Chapter VIII is its employing the multi-process model to provide re-definitions of ‘text type’ and ‘genre’. TEXT TYPE is argued to typically profile a conceptual region of TW-DW overlap, while GENRE typically profiles a conceptual region of TW-RW overlap. As a consequence, while TEXT TYPE prototypically conflates rhetoric functions and communicative intent, GENRE prototypically conflates textual organization and real-life action.

The discussion in Chapter VIII is also related to the notion of ‘multifunctionality’ initially addressed in Chapter II. In this way, Chapter VIII completes the spiral progression and the line of argumentation spanning the thesis.

IX. 3. Implications for future research

As the multi-process model's cognitive mechanisms, which themselves are used to study conceptual structure(s) and cognitive mechanisms, are perceived here as different from research techniques for studying conceptual structure(s) and cognitive mechanisms, the successful isolation of the cognitive mechanisms constituting the multi-process model proposed in this thesis can be seen as a prerequisite for further research establishing correspondences between the cognitive mechanisms systematized here and specific research techniques via which the mechanisms could be studied. In other words, this theoretical model could be also viewed as a step towards determining research techniques and procedures to be used in tracing the cognitive mechanisms and their co-functioning in text(s) and discourse(s). Thus, the multi-process model can be also viewed as applicable to Applied Linguistics research.

A second area of research which comes to mind when future applications of the model are in question is research on visual narratives and multimodality. Tracing the amalgamated operation of the cognitive mechanisms from the model in visual and multimodal texts/discourses could further be harmonized with virtual communication studies.

To conclude, this thesis only verifies a hypothesis of the simultaneous functioning of a set of cognitive mechanisms, which has the potential to (a) enable future theoretical investigations of text(s) and discourse(s), and (b) sustain hands-on analyses of text(s) and discourse(s). Many of the assumptions formulated here, clearly, are open to both confirmation and refutation from future studies.

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